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Abstract 
This thesis explores the concept of subsumption in the work of Immanuel Kant, 
G.W.F. Hegel and Karl Marx in order to construct a distinct theoretical problem 
resting on the articulation of conceptual and social relations. Each of these authors 
develops a ‘logic’ within which subsumptive relations are operative: 
Transcendental logic, dialectical logic and finally Marx’s ‘logic of the body 
politic’; these are investigated in turn. The thesis opens with a close reading of 
subsumption in Kant’s philosophy, arguing that it is here that the concept first 
attains its modern or critical sense. This critical sense distinguishes it from the 
classical notion of subsumption (as a formal or purely logical relation) and gives 
rise to a novel philosophical account of how synthetic subsumption acts unite 
heterogeneous elements within a compositional totality. In Hegel’s philosophy 
this account takes on a series of new determinations, as social, historical and 
developmental aspects to subsumption are introduced. Nonetheless, Hegel’s 
concept of subsumption remains within the ambit of a ‘closed’ idealist discourse, 
just as Kant’s does. The second section of the thesis explores how this closure is 
thrown into crisis by Marx’s materialist attack on philosophy as a self-sufficient 
branch of knowledge, altering the stakes of conceptual relations as such, and 
therefore subsumption. Drawing on the work of Mexican-Ecuadoran philosopher 
Bolívar Echeverría, Marx’s materialism is reconstructed as a theory of social 
reproduction, encompassing the practical process of social life in its entirety. This 
then provides the basis for an analysis of subsumption in its specifically capitalist 
form, which, the thesis argues, must be thought as operative at three levels of 
social activity: exchange, production and reproduction, each with their own 
distinct but interconnected logics of power and resistance. Grasping these three 
dimensions in their unity, the thesis finally outlines an original framework for 
comprehending capitalist domination in its concrete specificity. In order to do so 
it goes beyond Marx’s own theory of (formal and real) subsumption as well as 
interpretations of it that reinstate theoretical closure to historical contingency (for 
example in the work of Negri and Adorno). Instead, a dynamic theory of capitalist 
subsumption is proposed in order to register the diverse mechanisms of control 
through which capitalist power shapes the course of social reproduction and 
historical development. 
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Introduction: Logics of Composition 
 
This thesis focuses on the concept of ‘subsumption’ as the site of a central 
problematic in the encounter between modern philosophy and critical social 
theory. It traces the development of the concept and shifting context of its 
application in the work of Kant, Hegel and above all Marx, in order to explore the 
theoretical and political issues that emerge at the nexus of logic and social being. 
However, this thesis does not propose a new interpretation of the concept per se 
nor offer a detailed historical reconstruction of its transmission and modification 
(although interpretive and critical-historical aspects are central to the arguments I 
make). Rather, it attempts to construct a strong framework within which to 
explore the social implications of conceptual relations and conceptual 
implications of social relations by establishing the continuities and 
discontinuities, consistencies and contradictions in the use of subsumption, both 
across and within the theories in question. It is, perhaps, the proposed 
consistencies that are most fundamental and original in this thesis, insofar as they 
enable the construction of a unique ‘problem’ of subsumption inaugurated by 
Kant and that reaches a climax (although not ‘completion’) in Marx’s critique of 
political economy. I take seriously the idea that between the transcendental, 
dialectical and socio-economic contexts in which subsumption is employed there 
exists a necessary inner connection, a problematic conceptual core which informs 
(whether explicitly or implicitly) the sense of every relation that can be described 
as subsumptive. More, then, than a simply genealogical succession of scenarios in 
which the concept has been used, or a solely analogical function taken on by the 
concept when used outside of an immediate logical context, there is a shared 
conceptual basis from which we can approach idea such as Kant’s claim that ‘we 
can only understand and communicate to others what we ourselves can produce’ 
or Marx’s assertion that ‘capital does indeed exist from the outset as One or Unity 
as opposed to the workers as many’.1 The key to the comprehension of such 
diverse statements lies in a ‘critical’ conception of subsumption that refers to the 
productive and oppressive dimensions of conceptually organised ‘systems-in-
                                                          
1 Immanuel Kant, letter to Jacob Sigismund Beck, July 1, 1794, in Correspondence, translated by 
Arnulf Zweig, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999, p. 482; Karl Marx, Grundrisse: 
Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy (Rough Draft) [1857-8], translated by Martin 
Nicolaus, London and New York: Penguin, 1993, p. 590. 
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process’ and a dynamic articulation of concepts such abstraction, composition, 
form and totality. 
Developing an account of this ‘critical’ concept of subsumption requires a 
far more expansive and deeper engagement with its conditions, structure and 
effects than is normally afforded to it. Adequately grasping these is hindered by 
the fact that the scope of subsumption appears at first sight to be both too vast 
conceptually and too narrow textually. Conceptually, subsumption immediately 
connects to a huge range of problems and ideas within philosophy (almost all 
logic, epistemology and ontology invokes an idea of subsumption taken in its 
broadest sense, as a mode of classification, inclusion or identification, even where 
the term itself is not invoked directly) but also to other disciplinary regions (law, 
art history, informatics, etc.). Whilst textually, none of the authors in question, 
nor by and large the traditions they have inspired, recognise subsumption as a 
concept central to their theories or as a distinct philosophical ‘problem’ worthy of 
sustained engagement (as they do, for example, proximate concepts such as 
abstraction, contradiction or alienation). This difficulty perhaps explains why no 
in-depth study dedicated to subsumption has as yet been published and why, 
where it is discussed, there is a sharp disjunction between the term’s employment 
as a strictly philosophical concept and its employment as a technical Marxist 
concept. The connection between these two aspects, a small number of exceptions 
notwithstanding, has by and large been treated as a superficial one, of primarily 
philological interest and incidental to the systemic significance and functioning of 
Kant, Hegel and Marx’s thought. 
At the same time, much contemporary philosophy and critical theory has 
actively problematized the political dimension of logical/ontological relations (as 
political relations) in tandem with a concern over the status of ‘the’ particular (or 
more logically coherent - the singular) generating a panoply of normative 
categories: affinity, constellation, rhizome, difference and exclusion/exception. A 
general notion of subsumption often figures here connected or synonymous with 
‘abstraction’, as a ‘bad’ relation or operation: unilateral, reductive and repressive 
in its integrative function against which critique is directed.2 However, without 
penetrating the complexity and productivity of subsumptive relations and their 
                                                          
2 Cf. Peter Osborne, ‘The Reproach of Abstraction’, Radical Philosophy 127, September/October 
2004, p. 21. 
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constitutive processes, such moralisms of the abstract/concrete struggle to 
disentangle the field upon which their political demands and calls might be 
theoretically articulated with the material conditions and possibilities implicated 
in their realisation. Alternatively, departing from a more specific but liberally 
interpreted reading of subsumption in Marx’s work, the concept has been 
employed by authors as diverse as Antonio Negri and Theodor Adorno as a 
periodising marker to register the degree to which qualitative particularity has 
been effaced by the identitarian organisational forces of capital in its progressive 
colonisation of the life-world. Again though, whilst grasping the core aspect of 
capitalist subsumption, its inner dynamic and effects tend to be simplified and 
exaggerated in these readings, undermining its force as a critical category through 
which to comprehend real conditions and conflicts. 
 By emphasizing the consistency and coherence of the problem of 
subsumption in its ‘critical’ form this thesis aims to overcome at least some of the 
aporias currently faced by these philosophical approaches to an oppressive social 
reality, by drawing out the deeper theoretical issues and structures at stake in the 
concept. However, the objective of such an approach is not simply to block 
together the distinct approaches offered by Kant, Hegel and Marx under a 
monolithic and all-encompassing notion of subsumption. Instead, drawing out 
these structural continuities also allows for a stronger conception of where the key 
theoretical breaks lie between them. In this sense, this thesis reckons with the new 
dimensions of subsumption that emerge from two fundamental modifications in 
the scope and context of its theoretical meaning and the political implications that 
flow from them. 
The first of these breaks occurs between the ‘classical’ (i.e., pre-Kantian) 
and ‘critical’ conceptions of subsumption. In its traditional philosophical form, 
subsumption names the hierarchical relation between a 'universal' and 'particular', 
where the particular is said to be an instance of the universal category or concept, 
and all particulars gathered under the universal share the same relation of logical 
identity to it. At the same time, subsumption also refers to the act (of judgment) 
that produces this relation, that of subsuming the particular under the universal. 
Here it has the legal connotations, which Kant invokes, of determining the 
universal rule under which an individual case falls, and in this sense it can be 
conceived as a problem of correct judgment. This idea of logical relation is first 
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presented by Aristotle in the Prior Analytics, but is only formalised in the 13th 
century as the famous ‘Dici De Omni’ where the phrase ‘sumere sub’ first appears 
in a text by William of Sherwood, amongst similar formulations by Aquinas, 
pseudo-Aquinas, Albertus Magnus, Ockham and Buridan. This is then conjoined 
into ‘subsumptio’ in the 16th century and reaches Kant most likely via Wolff. 
In distinction to this ‘classical’ sense, the ‘modern’ or ‘critical’ concept of 
subsumption pertains to relations that are effective or actual beyond a purely 
conceptual sphere of representation, marking a transition from (formal) logic to 
diverse logics. Thus for all three of the authors under consideration here, 
subsumption is not an abstract operation that effects a ‘mere play of 
representations’ but one with a systemic and ‘objective’ significance, insofar as it 
productively relates heterogeneous orders and their elements (eminently, concepts 
and intuitions) in order to determine the form of the true or actual through active 
processes of adaptation, mediation and unification. What is presupposed in this 
processual idea of subsumption is a given distribution of elements whose initial 
configuration and function is ‘resolved’ or suspended by their subsumptive 
articulation within a new order of being – that specified by the determining forms 
or ‘functions’ under which the particulars are subsumed. It is this formative 
action, of the dominant relational series upon the subsumed series, which 
establishes systemic coherency and objectivity, as, for example, in Kant’s 
Critique of Pure Reason, where  
experience rests on the synthetic unity of appearances, i.e., on a synthesis 
according to concepts of the object of appearances in general, without 
which it would not even be cognition but rather a rhapsody of perceptions, 
which would not fit together in any context in accordance with rules of a 
thoroughly connected (possible) consciousness, thus not into the 
transcendental and necessary unity of apperception.3  
A critical theory of subsumption does not simply grasp the logical relation 
implied by this conceptual synthesis, thus revealing the mediated character of an 
apparently unmediated presence, but actively seeks to establish what the process 
of synthesis in reality consists in, what its conditions structure and effects are. In 
this sense, a theory of subsumption becomes an essential component of critique in 
                                                          
3 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason [1781, 1787], trans. Paul Guyer and Allan W. Wood, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998, A156/B195. 
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that it establishes the connection between presence or form and the subject and 
context of its production, moving from the judgements that ‘subsume a particular 
under an already constituted category’ to ‘the occlusive constitution of the field of 
categories themselves’.4 What is key to this critical procedure is that the two 
orders of being (which appear from a systemic standpoint as ‘universal’ and 
‘particular’) have the contradictory dual status of ‘specific heterogeneity’ and 
‘generic homogeneity’, a contradiction that is comprehended with reference to a 
mediating ‘ground of unity’ irreducible to either order but containing both (the 
compositional totality in which they subsist). Kant initiates this critical 
orientation, but the ‘field of categories’ he establishes and their ‘ground of unity’ 
are both destabilised by subsequent thinkers, most importantly Hegel. This 
generates the specific problem of how to think the articulation of (i) a ‘dominant’ 
system of principles of form, (ii) the multitude of ‘minor’ elements transformed 
and unified according to them and (iii) the compositional totality that is their 
shared ‘medium of existence’. 
The second break occurs between the ‘critical-philosophical’ and ‘critical-
social’ conceptions of subsumption. Consistent in both is the aforementioned 
impulse to penetrate through the surface level of appearances and establish the 
real processes and structure though which they are constituted systematically. But 
Marx’s challenge to philosophy radically alters the stakes of subsumption by 
contesting the ideal basis and purely subjective compositional totality within 
which it was thought to occur by Kant and Hegel. Through his ‘new materialism’ 
of historical practice Marx undermines the finality and truth of those underlying 
syntheses and mediations traced by critical idealism back to purely ideal relations 
and instead establishes an alternative account of form-constitution based on the 
practical dimension of ‘sensuous’ activity. For Marx, the ‘metabolic’ syntheses 
effected by this practice are the real basis underlying any formal or conceptual 
syntheses of elements, as well as the ground of unity in which their significance 
could be registered. Marx does not entirely jettison the idea of a subjective 
constitution of objectivity, but unlike for Kant and Hegel this cannot be decoupled 
from the living, natural dimension of subjective being implied in his idea of 
‘social humanity’, in light of which ‘self-sufficient philosophy [die selbständige 
                                                          
4 Judith Butler, ‘What is Critique? An Essay on Foucault’s Virtue’, eipcp, 2001: 
http://eipcp.net/transversal/0806/butler/en [accessed Feb 2016]. 
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Philosophie] loses its medium of existence'.5 This means that the ‘field of 
categories’ under which individuals and objects are subsumed are not reducible to 
categories of thought (although they may still retain a conceptual dimension) but 
are more broadly conceived as categories of historical being or social forms of 
existence that determine and are constituted through the collective practice of 
social individuals. The immense theoretical revolution contained in Marx’s early 
attack on philosophical conceptions of actuality and form are profound, and 
widely recognised as such, if not normally in terms of a discourse of subsumption. 
By pursuing the problematic of synthesis, mediation and systemic totality through 
this radical reorientation, new dimensions and insights into both Marx’s theory 
and the concept of subsumption itself become available to us. In particular the 
unique dialectical unity of conceptual relations and social being implied in Marx’s 
idea of a ‘logic of the body politic’ and the historically determined co-ordinates of 
that logic encapsulated in the idea of ‘social form’. 
As I will show, Marx's key break with Kant and Hegel turns precisely on 
his construction of subsumption as a fundamentally historical problem. Whereas 
for idealism the compositional totality mediating subsumptive relations is marked 
by a structure of reflexive or speculative closure which delimits the possibilities 
of the field of form-determining categories according to a self-referential horizon 
(the philosophical ‘medium’), for Marx the compositional totality – ‘society’ – is 
constituted in the tension between its own immediate horizons (that act as a form 
of structural limitation) and the open series of possibilities that are both 
immanently present and active within those horizons and yet at the same time 
transcend them. The structural closure of the totality of composition that would 
for Kant and Hegel constitute an absolute limit is thus for Marx never more than 
‘provisional’ because it is constituted in an open process of historical 
development that exceeds any reduction to a basic framework of substantial social 
action, or, in the form in which that idea of action is fully developed, 
reproduction. It is therefore precisely through a dialectical thinking of history (as 
socio-natural history) that Marx is able to articulate his own original conception 
of freedom that places the finality of any form or structure of subsumptive 
determination in question. At the same time, Marx is also able to refine his 
                                                          
5 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The German Ideology [1845-6], translated by S.W. 
Ryazanskaya, New York: Prometheus Books, 1998, p. 43 (translation modified). 
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analysis of those forms and structures in relation to the (historically) ‘specific 
logic of the specific object’: bourgeois society, giving rise to his theory of the 
‘subsumption of labour under capital’. Here, subsumptive relations appear in a 
historically specific form under certain conditions of social reproduction and with 
their own unique ‘field of categories’ which Marx elaborated through his critique 
of political economy. The problem of subsumption in a capitalist context turns on 
how these categories (‘social forms’) are articulated with and affect the wider 
sphere of subjective and objective elements that they subsume as well as the 
compositional structure that grounds their social power and actuality (‘the body 
politic’). This is a problem which Marx, given his own apparent hesitation with 
regards to the theory of subsumption, only partially engaged with in explicit 
terms, although in a broader sense it characterizes a fundamental aspects of his 
critical project taken as a whole. Nonetheless, if developed in more detail and 
with greater conceptual rigour, in a manner adaptable to both the concrete 
specificities and open possibilities of the social process, a critique of capitalist 
subsumption can offer a compelling theorisation of the precise mechanisms of 
capitalist power, their supporting frameworks and developmental dynamics, 
enabling us to specify with greater clarity what exactly is at stake in contemporary 
forms of domination and the struggles to supersede them. That is, to know what 
we really mean when we say that something is ‘subsumed’. 
 
Chapter outline 
 
The first chapter of this thesis presents an exposition and critical reconstruction 
of the concept of subsumption in the writings of Kant and Hegel. In analysing 
the various forms of subsumptive judgement presented by Kant in his first and 
third critiques it offers an account of the basic problem and modifications of the 
concept in its critical-philosophical form, i.e., as a concept that still denotes 
logical inclusion or categorisation (as in its ‘classic’ form) but (1) as a relation of 
determination between elements that are not formally homogenous, (2) as the 
mediating condition of an apparently self-sufficient totality and (3) as a process 
dependent on a pre-existing ground of unity (a totality of composition within 
which both the subsumed and subsuming entity exist). Following this the chapter 
moves on to a reading of subsumption in Hegel’s work, focusing on how his 
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critique of Kant, specifically of transcendental logic and the transcendental 
subject, leads to a new form of (speculative) totality and thus a new context for 
subsumption. Subsumption here no longer functions to mediate absolute 
extremes (heterogeneous faculties) in a static structural context (transcendental 
apperception), but rather appears as a form of mediation specific to different 
stages in a process of dialectical development, thus breaking with both the fixed 
transcendental categories and principles that are the ‘functions’ of subsumption 
for Kant and the individual consciousness that acts as the subjective totality 
within which subsumption occurs for Kant. Hegel thus establishes a dynamic and 
social-relational theory of subsumption, although he will ultimate criticise its 
logical insufficiency as an unresolved opposition that contradicts its apparent 
unification of universal and particular. 
The Second chapter of the thesis presents a reconstruction of Marx's ‘new 
materialism’ and its ‘logic’ of natural-historical being by tracing Marx’s 
transformation of philosophical critique on the basis of his famous assertion that 
‘all mysteries which lead theory to mystification find their rational solution in 
human practice and in the comprehension of this practice’.6 It asks how such 
practice can be understood as distinct from philosophical, that is purely 
intellectual, activity, and how it transforms the determinations and implications 
of subsumption in its critical sense by situating it within this new ‘medium of 
existence’ (human practice). The chapter thinks together the continuities in 
Marx’s critical adoption of Hegel’s dialectical framework (as a critique of 
appearances and the exposition of constitutive subject-object mediations) and the 
divergences contained in his development of a materialist account of activity and 
actuality. This latter aspect passes through stages of increasing conceptual 
sophistication and critical effectivity in Marx’s texts, grounding itself in the 
concepts of ‘activity’, ‘praxis’, ‘labour’, ‘social production’, and finally, in a 
general theory of ‘social reproduction’, which I argue, following Bolívar 
Echeverría, is the most advanced expression of Marx’s materialism. Through this 
concept of socially reproductive activity the underlying syntheses exposed in the 
                                                          
6 Marx, On Feuerbach, thesis VIII. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Marx Engels Werke. Band 3. 
Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1978. Unless otherwise noted I use Wal Suchting’s translation from ‘Marx’s 
Theses on Feuerbach: Notes Towards a Commentary (with a New Translation)’, in Issues in 
Marxist Philosophy vol. 2: Materialism, edited by John Mepham and David Hillel-Ruben, 
Brighton: Harvester Press, 1979, pp. 21-22. 
9 
 
critique of subsumptive relations is reconceived as a process of metabolism 
between productive subjects and natural objectivity, giving rise to ‘socio-natural’ 
or ‘trans-naturalised’ forms whose objectivity is determined with reference to a 
practical totality. This practical totality, the socio-natural forms that exist within 
it and the metabolic syntheses that produce them, are all co-determined by 
structures of social and practical relationality whose specific forms are 
historically variable and in a process of constant contestation. This necessitates 
the analytic movement from the general (i.e., transhistorical) theory of 
reproduction to its specific historical configurations if a concrete, and therefore 
critical, comprehension of the social actuality of conceptual relations is to be 
developed. The chapter finally explores the double aspect of the social process as 
at once a process of social reproduction and at the same time a process of 
historical development. 
Chapter three moves on to systematically reconstruct Marx’s theory of 
capitalist subsumption from his various discussions of subsumption within his 
critique of political economy, beginning in the late 1850s. In doing so it brings 
together the idea of a productive, constitutive process of conceptual subsumption 
developed in chapter one with the theory of social form-determination – the 
materialism of the social reproduction process – developed in chapter two. It 
aims to show how, in its capitalist mode, society’s reproduction and the forms 
through which it is realised are uniquely determined on the basis of a mediating 
relation of subsumption under economic abstractions, operative at two distinct 
but interconnected levels: (1) subsumption to the abstract universality of value 
and ‘impersonal’ market forces in the process of commodification and exchange 
and (2) subsumption to direct capitalist command in the production process. 
These two moments reciprocally form the distinctive synthesis of capitalist 
subsumption, by which the formal-economic dimension of its circulatory 
movement is grounded in and progressively comes to modify the metabolic 
synthesis through which social wealth is reproduced, thus giving rise to a 
historically distinct set of conditions and dynamics. I analyse the multiple forms 
of subsumption to capital outlined by Marx (‘formal’, ‘hybrid’ and ‘real’) by 
which abstract economic categories are articulated with concrete productive 
practices in diverse ways, and develop their full implications both in terms of the 
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command relations governing production and the objective structure and output 
of the labour process.  
Chapter four takes a more problematizing tack, departing from the 
insufficiencies of Marx’s account of capitalist subsumption and the theoretical 
ambiguities arising from them. I argue that further determinations of the concept 
have to be developed in order to overcome the abstract opposition of the linear 
series of subsumption forms and their historical realisation and so propose a 
dynamic conception of subsumption that mediates the between the two in order 
to establish the systematic necessity but historical contingency of capitalist 
subsumption. I begin by criticizing the two interpretive extremes that have 
dominated the Marxist discourse of subsumption. On the one hand the crude 
historical schematisation of the transition from formal to real subsumption found 
in the work of Negri and Adorno, rejecting the idea that the dynamic of 
subsumption constitutes either an extensive template of world-historical 
development or ‘a theory of the internal periodisation of the capitalist mode of 
production’ (as Jason Read has it).7 On the other hand, I criticise the hyper-
logical and capital-centric account employed in the ‘systematic dialectics’ of 
theorists such as Christopher Arthur and Moishe Postone. Whereas the first 
approach fails to think historical openness and developmental complexity in its 
conception of the subsumptive dynamic, the second excises the antagonistic 
character of the subsumptive process, reducing class struggle and the power 
relations driving social development to a functional residue of a self-moving 
logical subject, reminiscent of Hegel’s concept. Both extremes threaten to 
impose a form of theoretical closure upon the theory of subsumption, either 
diachronically (as closure to historical development, in the first case) or 
synchronically (as closure to systemic externality, in the second case), reducing 
the theory to either a linear developmental telos of modern society or a generic 
cellular tendency of capital. A dynamic conception of subsumption, by contrast, 
mediates these systematic and historical aspects of capitalist subsumption in 
order to establish the reciprocal relationship between ‘local’ mechanisms of 
direct command (forms of subsumption through which labour is controlled in the 
production process) and a ‘global’ system of domination, in the widest sense, as 
                                                          
7 Jason Read, The Micro-Politics of Capital: Marx and the Prehistory of the Present, Albany: 
SUNY Press, 2003, p. 107. 
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operative on ‘a social scale’. I therefore go on to explore what effects, 
conditions, conflicts and possibilities are generated by the increasing dominance 
of capitalist reproduction as the primary form of global social reproduction – 
how it interacts with non-capitalist forms (both objective and subjective) 
absorbing them, altering them, abolishing them or being resisted and altered by 
them in turn and how this, finally, can open the path for further critical 
engagements at various levels of concretion with the ongoing processes of 
subsumption and resistance to them. 
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Chapter 1 – The Invention of a ‘Critical’ Concept of Subsumption 
 
 
Part I – Kant: Subsumption and Synthesis 
Judgment, in its various forms and occasions, lies at the heart of Kant’s critical 
philosophy. Indeed, read in strictly methodological terms, the Kantian project 
might be best understood as an attempt to systematically transpose the basic 
logical forms of judgment structuring discursive reason onto the various spheres 
of rational activity characterizing human life (knowledge, practice, judgment, 
etc.) in order that their objective validity can be secured. At the centre of this 
judicial enterprise lies the act of subsumption; the process through which the 
particular content of the various domains is brought to bear under the universal 
judgments which Kant prescribes to them. Consequently, understanding the 
modes of subsumption operative in the various species of judgment, the particular 
configurations of the faculties at work in each and the circumstances that occasion 
them, is crucial to grasping the way in which Kant’s thought functions as a 
systematically oriented whole as well as highlighting the multiple points of 
tension at which the system threatens to break down or transgress its own limits. 
 In its most general sense, subsumption for Kant is the process which 
determines the application of a concept to a representation, or the representing 
concretely of a particular under a concept. This act is modelled on the minor 
premise of a syllogistic judgment, in which a given universal rule (such as ‘all 
men are mortal’) is applied to a particular case (‘Caius is a man’) and from which 
an inferential judgment can flow, establishing all the implications of the rule 
within the particular (‘Caius is mortal’). Indeed, this kind of syllogistic judgment 
is the model for Kant’s entire theory of rational cognition, within which 
subsumption functions as the mediating act connecting particular representations 
with the predicates, or ‘marks’ (‘Merkmale’), of universal concepts: 
Reason, considered as the faculty of a certain logical form of cognition, is the 
faculty of inferring, i.e., of judging mediately (through the subsumption of a 
condition of a possible judgment under the condition of something given). 
The given judgment is the universal rule (major premise, major). The 
13 
 
subsumption of the condition of another possible judgment under the 
condition of the rule is the minor premise (minor). The actual judgment that 
expresses the assertion of the rule in the subsumed case is the conclusion 
(conclusio). The rule says something universal under a certain condition. 
Now in a case that comes before us the condition of the rule obtains. Thus 
what is valid universally under that condition is also to be regarded as valid 
in the case before us (which carries this condition with it). We easily see that 
reason attains to a cognition through actions of the understanding that 
constitute a series of conditions. 1 
In his pre-critical essay from 1762 on ‘The False Subtlety of the Four 
Syllogistic Figures’, Kant works through the compositional structure of this 
‘series of conditions’, as an assemblage of ‘marks’ constituting a concept. The 
composite unity of marks in a concept is what gives the rule for determining a 
(logical) subject as one specific thing rather than another.2 In its genesis, Kant 
explains, such a concept is always abstracted ‘as a characteristic mark’ from other 
‘subordinate concepts’ – i.e., those that are subsumed under it - and thus carries 
up and totalizes the characteristic marks belonging to these subordinate concepts; 
that is why the conditions are carried up.3 These ‘subordinate’ conditions, 
however, are only mediately related to the concept in question, as they do not 
correspond to its minimal definition; the operation which renders the relation 
immediate (for consciousness) is the syllogistic inference. So for Kant, it is 
mistaken to think that logic begins with concepts, because prior to them, as their 
generative requirements, are judgments and syllogisms: 
A distinct concept is only possible by means of a judgment, while a 
complete concept is only possible by means of a syllogism. A distinct 
concept demands, namely, that I should clearly recognise something as a 
characteristic mark of a thing; but this is a judgment. In order to have a 
distinct concept of a body, I clearly represent to myself impenetrability as 
a characteristic mark of it. This representation, however, is nothing other 
than the thought: a body is impenetrable. The only thing which needs to 
                                                          
1 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A330 (my emphasis). 
2 Cf. Robert B. Pippin, ‘The Schematism and Empirical Concepts’, Kant-Studien, Vol. 67 (1-4), 
1976, p. 158. 
3 Kant, ‘The False Subtlety of the Four Syllogistic Figures’ [1762], in Theoretical Philosophy, 
1755-1770, translated by David Walford and Ralf Meerbote, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1992, §2. 
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be remarked upon in this connection is the fact that this judgment is not 
the distinct concept itself, but rather the action, by means of which the 
distinct concept is actualised. For the representation of the thing which 
comes into being after the operation is distinct.4 
Concepts are therefore developed and connected with each other, as well as their 
objects, through elementary acts of judgment, and their unity is not simply 
grasped passively but must be produced. In prioritising the active, dynamic aspect 
of thought in this way Kant establishes the centrality of subsumption as the core 
operation underlying the logical relationship between universals and particulars 
which brings the latter under the former immediately in imagination.  
The problem of correspondence between concept and object, or rule and case, 
which since Plato has troubled philosophy, is for Kant not therefore primarily 
about recognition or classification but rather production (recognition, as we will 
see, is only the final moment which consummates the subsumptive process).5 As 
Kant declares in a letter from 1794, ‘we can only understand and communicate to 
others what we ourselves can produce'.6 Thinkability, and more importantly 
objectivity, must be produced through acts and series of judgments, at the heart of 
which lie subsumptive operations.  
Subsumption’s role within ‘pure’ cognition 
 
This notion of the productivity of subsumptive judgment is fundamental for 
Kant’s account of how objective experience is constituted through ‘pure’ 
cognition. That is, cognition of objects grounded in an accord between the 
faculties of sensibility and the understanding established logically prior to any 
particular content which it might give rise to. Here, subsumption is the common 
thread and key link in Kant’s transposition of general or formal logic into a 
‘transcendental logic’ of experience, as, in Carsten Held’s words, it is ‘both the 
paradigmatic activity of the mind in forming judgments and the paradigmatic 
explication of what Kant means when he characterizes the activities of the 
                                                          
4 Kant, ‘The Jasche Logic’ [1800], in Lectures on Logic, translated by J. Michael Young, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992, §6. 
5 Cf. Theodor W. Adorno, Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason [1957], edited by Rolf Tiedemann, 
translated by Rodney Livingstone, Cambridge: Polity, 2001, p. 131.  
6 Kant, letter to Jacob Sigismund Beck, July 1, 1794, in Correspondence, translated by Arnulf 
Zweig, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999, p. 482. 
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understanding as acts of “determination”’.7 However, the problem of 
transcendental subsumption is not straightforwardly one of rendering subordinate 
marks immediate to a higher concept as it is in its purely logical form, but rather 
depends firstly on the adaptation, or ‘schematisation’, of ‘entirely 
unhomogeneous’ sources of representations to one another, such that they can be 
articulated as a single ‘series of conditions’ structured according to the universal-
particular relationship. 
For Kant, the objectivity of experience can only be secured by establishing its 
thoroughgoing interconnectedness and consistent unity – as a ‘whole of compared 
and connected representations’. This interconnection cannot, however, be derived 
from experience, as it would lack the a priori necessity required for the truly 
lawful definition of objectivity to which Kant aspires: ‘experience never gives its 
judgments true or strict but only assumed and comparative universality (through 
induction)’8. Instead, in the Critique of Pure Reason’s infamous ‘transcendental 
deduction’, Kant attempts to establish the validity of a universal, law-governed 
structure of experience which would a priori condition – although not generate - 
every possible object of actual experience. To this end, in the deduction sensible 
intuitions are posited as necessarily, rather than contingently, subject to a set of 
conceptual laws of relation (‘concepts of the object of appearances in general’) 
which order and organise them discursively in order to constitute the coherent 
continuum of conscious experience (the ‘series of conditions’). This 
‘transcendental use’ of the understanding is the means by which experience 
attains its objective character and can be categorically distinguished from a mere 
‘rhapsody of perceptions’ or the habitual aggregation of empirical sensations.9 
In the terms of subsumptive judgment outlined above, in objective cognition 
the understanding gives a general rule (concept) in the case of a possible 
condition (intuition), such that the sensibly given manifold is determined as a 
particular instance of the universal (an ‘object in general’). The basic syllogistic 
moments are thus transposed and absolutised by Kant as transcendental 
conditions of experience such that, articulated in this way, representations given 
                                                          
7 Carsten Held, ‘Analyticity and the Semantics of Predicates’, in Kant's Legacy: Essays in Honor 
of Lewis White Beck, edited by Predrag Cicovacki, Rochester: University of Rochester Press, 
2000, p. 104. 
8 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, B4. 
9 Ibid, A156. 
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by the faculties of sensibility and understanding can be shown to logically occupy 
the opposing poles of the subsumptive relation – as subject and predicate, 
particular and universal. However, given the absolute heterogeneity of intuitions 
and concepts, the relationship cannot directly be one of species to genera (i.e. 
subordinate marks to a higher aggregate concept) but rather must be one of pure 
form to pure matter such that ‘sensibility gives the mere material for thought, but 
the understanding rules over this material and brings it under rules or concepts’.10 
Kant retains a broadly Aristotelian dualism here, opposing ‘a matter for cognition 
from the senses’ to ‘a certain form for ordering it from the inner source of pure 
intuition and thinking’11. Indeed, this hylomorphic conception of the relations 
between sensible and conceptual representations (rather than of substances, as it is 
in the classical Aristotelian theory) is fundamental to Kant’s account of cognition; 
for him matter and form ‘are two concepts which lie at the basis of all other 
reflection, so very inseparably are they bound up with the use of the 
understanding’.12 The matter/form opposition is fused by Kant with the epistemic 
conception of syllogistic inference so that the production of the unity of 
experience is modelled on the cognitive structure of judgment acts, whilst the 
relation and distinction between its unified elements is hylomorphic. 
The problem which Kant faces as a result of this original conjunction is one 
of commensuration; how can the manifold of intuition given by sensibility and the 
conceptual rules of objectivity given by the understanding be articulated within 
the syllogistic form – that is, as a series of interconnected ‘marks’ that can be 
arrayed in hierarchical relation. For this to occur, the matter (sensibility) and form 
(understanding) of cognition must be ‘for’ each other; there must be homogeneity 
between the two faculties:  
In all subsumption of an object under a concept the representations of the 
former must be homogeneous with the latter, i.e., the concept must contain 
that which is represented in the object that is to be subsumed under it, for that 
is just what is meant by the expression "an object is contained under a 
concept.13 
                                                          
10 Kant, ‘The Jasche Logic’, §1. 
11 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A86/B118 (my emphasis). 
12 Ibid, A 266/B 322. 
13 Ibid, A137/B176. 
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Both sensibility (the source of intuitions) and the understanding (the source of 
concepts), however, are taken by Kant to be elementary and heterogeneous 
faculties, neither of which ‘is to be preferred to the other’ and that furthermore 
‘cannot exchange their functions’, therefore Kant asks: 
How is the subsumption of the [intuition] under the [concept], thus the 
application of the category to appearances possible, since no one would 
say that the category, e.g., causality, could also be intuited through the 
senses and is contained in the appearance?14 
The subsumption of intuitions under concepts cannot merely be a matter of 
recognition or resemblance, because that would presuppose, tautologically, the 
pre-existence of conceptual marks in the manifold, which the understanding 
would only have to ‘recognize’ or reflect (restricting the problem only to asking 
quid facti?) For this subsumption to proceed a conformity between the matter of 
intuition and the form of its thinkability has to first be established. Consciousness 
cannot simply incorporate the manifold as a series of subordinate marks (what 
Kant calls an ‘image’) into its higher order concepts, but must first determine 
intuitions as marks of the same kind, of the same order of representation. Kant 
therefore seeks a solution which does not presuppose its result as its cause: ‘we 
must be able to show how pure concepts can be applicable to experiences’.15  
Kant’s well-known solution is to introduce a ‘third thing’, common to both 
concepts and intuitions, which acts as a ‘mediating representation’ between the 
understanding and sensibility. This third thing, that Kant calls a ‘transcendental 
schema’, is a ‘function of the power of judgment’ that specifies ‘the formal 
condition under which something can be given in intuition’ and therefore has both 
a sensible and intellectual dimension.16 The schema can do this by relating both 
faculties of representation through their common seat in the domain of inner 
sense. As Kant establishes in the transcendental aesthetic, the pure form of inner 
sense is time; ‘that in which [representations] must all be ordered, connected and 
brought into relations’17. The common element found in both sources of 
representation is thus a time-determination, so that ‘an application of the category 
to appearances becomes possible by means of the transcendental time-
                                                          
14 Ibid, A138/B177. 
15 Ibid, (translation modified). 
16 Ibid, A247/B304. 
17 Ibid, A99 (my emphasis). 
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determination which, as the schema of the concept of the understanding, mediates 
the subsumption of the latter under the former.’18 Through their schematisation, 
the pure concepts of an object in general are transposed into a series of universal 
temporal relations or ‘compositions’ which can be applied as conditions of formal 
organisation to the matter of sensibility. Whereas the pure concepts specified 
abstract functions or rules of unity, their schemata turn these into rules for the 
temporal synthesis of intuitive representations. That is, rules for the determination 
of inner sense ‘in one concept in accord with the unity of apperception’.19  
It is worth recalling that the ‘pure concepts’ of the understanding are 
presented by Kant as the forms taken by the judgments of the understanding - 
which he considers to be the fundamental logical ‘functions’ constituting 
discursive reason as such - when transcendentally adapted to the object of 
experience. What Kant here demonstrates is that a further mediation is in fact 
required if he is to account for the objective interrelation of concepts and objects, 
this is the work that schematism must do: ‘if this condition of the power of 
judgment (schema) is missing, then all subsumption disappears; for nothing 
would be given that could be subsumed under the concept’.20 
It is therefore through the schema that Kant claims to have overcome the 
problematic heterogeneity of sensibility and understanding, setting into motion 
the productive encounter of the two elements of experience: the ‘empty’ functions 
of the concepts that iterate a pure universality and the blind contingency of 
intuitions characterised by radical singularity. It is by virtue of this interface that 
the faculties can relate to each other systematically, subjecting appearances to 
general rules of synthesis that make them fit for a thoroughgoing connection in 
one experience. Schematism is thus a requisite condition for subsumption in 
reason’s transcendental use; it is what allows the application of pure concepts to 
sensible representations, by adapting them to the temporal form of intuition – a 
process that Kant calls ‘Hypotyposis’ (rendering in terms of sense). Each of the 
concepts is schematised as a universal time determination, or ‘pure image’ of the 
time series, which can then be represented empirically, exhibited in intuition as a 
                                                          
18 Ibid, A139/B178 (my emphasis). 
19 Ibid, A142/B181. ‘By synthesis in the most general sense, however, I understand the action of 
putting different representations together with each other and comprehending their manifoldness 
in one cognition.’ A77/B103. 
20 Ibid, A247/B304. 
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concrete ‘composition’; so, for example, ‘the schema of actuality is existence at a 
determinate time. The schema of necessity is the existence of an object at all 
times’ etc... 21 In this way, the subsumption of the manifold under the schematised 
categories circumscribes the general limits of experience a priori, binding 
empirical content together in a law-like manner that enables it to be thought and, 
crucially for Kant, ‘communicated’.22 In distinction from the contingent contents 
of experience derived a posteriori, it is not a case of finding out if there is, for 
example, a causal connection between appearances, but only what the causal 
connection is, as without it experience would simply lack basic self-consistency.  
That schematised concepts specify only the rules for combining 
representations given in intuition consolidates the reciprocal dependence of 
sensibility and the understanding in cognition, for this relating can only be 
exhibited between such sensible representations. More precisely: sensible 
representations are given conceptual determinacy (i.e. objectivity) by their 
articulation within the time series, but the time series is itself only populated - and 
thus actualised - by these representations in conceptual relation. In terms of the 
four sub-groups in the table of categories: 
Quantity - generates substantial time - (the time series) 
Quality   - fills it (the content of time) 
Relation - joins the perceptions amongst themselves to all time, creating 
continuity (the order of time) 
Modality - determines whether and how the object belongs to time (the 
scope or sum total of time) 
Through the mediation of the schemata, the subsumptive operation thus consists 
in a double-articulation which posits the time series itself in the very same act that 
determines the objectivity of phenomena within it. This is nothing more than that 
                                                          
21 Ibid, A145/B184. 
22 ‘The composition itself is not given; on the contrary, we must produce it ourselves: we must 
compose if we are to represent anything as composed (even space and time). We are able to 
communicate with one another because of this composition. The grasping (apprehensio) of the 
given manifold and its reception in the unity of consciousness (apperceptio) is the same sort of 
thing as the representation of a composite (that is, it is only possible through composition), if the 
synthesis of my representation in the grasping of it, and its analysis insofar as it is a concept, yield 
one and the same representation (reciprocally bring forth one another). This agreement is related 
to something that is valid for everyone, something distinct from the subject, that is, related to an 
object since it lies exclusively neither in the representation nor in consciousness but nevertheless 
is valid (communicable) for everyone.’ Kant, Letter to Jacob Sigismund Beck. July 1, 1794, in 
Correspondence, p. 482. 
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which is expressed in Kant’s famous dictum that ‘the conditions of the possibility 
of experience in general are at the same time conditions of the possibility of the 
objects of experience’ grasped in terms of those conditions in the process of their 
temporalised unfolding.23 What it manifests clearly is the way in which the 
schemata establish a zone of limitation through which experience and its object 
are reciprocally realized by being restricted to their common temporal interface. 
‘The schemata of sensibility first realize the categories, yet they likewise also 
restrict them, i.e., limit them to conditions that lie outside the understanding 
(namely, in sensibility)’ in order that they can be more than the mere ‘play of 
representations’, whilst similarly, perceptions only become objectively cognized 
through their restriction to a mode of combination derived from outside of 
sensibility itself (i.e. the categories).24 Although the understanding legislates the 
formal unity of this process, it nonetheless only gives the rule of a possible 
judgment, which is still dependent on its condition being met in imagination; as 
the source of these conditions, sensible intuitions are required to carry the rule 
over in an actual judgment, where the latter is subsumed under the former 
‘according to its synthetic unity (of composition)’.25 
The process of synthetic composition enabled by the transcendental schema 
is therefore that through which and in which subsumption occurs. ‘Subsumption’ 
and ‘synthesis’ here refer to two parallel descriptions of the same process grasped 
from differing theoretical levels or standpoints. Whereas synthesis denotes the 
real productivity of the process of combination that unifies multiple 
representations according to a schematised category, subsumption simply denotes 
the concrete representing of those representations under that category, 
presupposing the very homogeneity or ‘logical identity’ between them that 
synthesis establishes (the particular and the universal must be ‘for’ each other). So 
whilst it is clear that synthesis is a condition for transcendental subsumption, it is 
not clear that this subsumption is anything other than the synthesis viewed from 
the perspective of the judgment it enables. Subsumption would, in this case, be 
simply the systemic (i.e., apperceptive) consciousness of the process of synthesis; 
only making sense retroactively, from the perspective of its completion. In terms 
                                                          
23 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A 158/B197. 
24 Ibid, A146/B186. 
25 Kant, Letter to Johann Heinrich Tieftrunk. December 11, 1797, in Correspondence, p. 538. 
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of their presentation, the logical order of these moments is as follows: (1) 
schematisation translates the pure categories into rules for (2) acts of temporal 
synthesis which, once effected, result in (3) the subsumption of intuitions under 
the pure concepts, thereby allowing the manifold to be thought objectively. The 
sequential construction of this operation reflects a crucial difference between the 
transcendental form of judgment and its purely logical prototype, because in the 
latter case the subsumptive operation is analytically reversible, as the forms of 
judgment permit consciousness to survey its conceptual horizons across multiple 
poles: inductively and deductively, traversing the vertical plane of conceptual 
‘marks’ related to each other as grounds and consequences. Synthesis according 
to pure concepts, however, is from the standpoint of consciousness a totally 
irreversible process of composition that simultaneously determines the inner 
constitution and outer limit of experience. In the transition made by Kant from 
general logic to its transcendental equivalent this irreversibility is the result of 
adding a condition that lies outside of reason and over which reason has no 
power; namely, sensible intuitions.26  
There is a further dimension to the tension between subsumption and 
synthesis at the level of transcendental subjectivity, because whereas synthesis 
describes the process of composition effected between representations, 
subsumption designates the punctual act of judgment which binds these 
synthesised representations to apperceptive consciousness – the ‘I’ through which 
subjectivity subsists. The dynamic of synthesis and subsumption established 
above is therefore itself grounded in a second constitutive procedure; that which 
relates determining acts of subsumption to the transcendental consciousness 
which is their unifying topos. Subsumption is always subsumption by 
transcendental subjectivity, which is the ground of unity for the multiple moments 
of synthesis (we could contrast this with the fact that for Kant it is the imagination 
that synthesizes under the guidance of schematised concepts). As we saw in the 
analysis of the time-series, however, this ground of apperception is only itself 
brought into being in the act of subsumption through which the time series and its 
objects are simultaneously determined. These two double-movements, between 
intuitions and concepts and between the subsumptive act and its subject, are 
                                                          
26 Cf. also, Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A331/B388. 
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together what constitute apperceptive consciousness as the transcendental space 
of experience. 
The account of subsumption given by Kant in the Critique of Pure Reason 
thus establishes a general theory of cognitive production in which subsumptive 
acts confer an objective form (i.e., universal intelligibility) onto a matter (the 
manifold of intuition) which has a merely subjective and arbitrary mode of 
appearance. The necessity of schematisation demonstrates that subsumption under 
the categories cannot simply consist in the application of ‘internal’ cognitive 
concepts to ‘external’ objects, but rather must entail the subject’s purely internal 
mediation of its two modes of representing: on the one hand, its sensible mode of 
affection, and on the other, its discursive form of intellect. This is necessary 
because intuitions ‘do not represent the object as it is in itself but only express the 
manner in which the subject is affected by the object, in accordance with his 
particular constitution, and so the object is presented only as it appears to us, that 
is, indirectly’27. Synthetic judgments thus enable the transition from a subjective 
and arbitrary order of representations to an objective and universal one. Within 
this context subsumption is the corrective that raises the singularity of intuition up 
into universally thinkable – and communicable – form, as Cicovacki points out: 
‘Kant’s idea is to show that by means of judging we overcome the privacy and 
idiosyncrasy of the given and turn them into communicable and intersubjective 
experience.’28 In light of this, Kant’s claim that philosophical cognition ‘considers 
the particular only in the universal’ need not necessarily be read as an admission 
of the reductive character of transcendental cognition, as it does for Hegel.29 
Rather than the subsumptive process abstracting away from a set of original 
concrete determinations which fix an object here and now before us and reducing 
it to an empty abstraction, what is central to Kant’s thesis is the idea that to know 
an object depends on it being internally composed according to the universal 
                                                          
27 Kant, Letter to Johann Heinrich Tieftrunk, December 11, 1797, in Correspondence, p.538. 
28 Predrag Cicovacki, ‘Paths Traced through Reality: Kant on Commonsense Truths’, in Kant's 
Legacy: Essays in Honor of Lewis White Beck, edited by Predrag Cicovacki, Rochester: 
University of Rochester Press, p. 56. 
29 ‘Subsumption under the species alters what is immediate. We strip away what is sensory, and 
lift out the universal [...] The alteration underway here is called abstracting. It seems absurd if 
what we want is knowledge of external objects, to alter these external objects by our very 
[abstractive] activity upon them [...] The  alteration consists in the fact that we separate off 
what is singular or external, and hold the truth of the thing to lie in what is universal rather than 
in what is singular or external.’ Hegel, Lectures on Logic [1831], translated by Clark Butler, 
Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008, pp.12-13. 
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categories of experience, indeed knowing it is nothing other than the theoretical 
affirmation of this conformity. Hence the discourse which reads subsumption as 
concerned primarily with abstraction occludes the productive act of synthesis 
subtending in the logical identity between universal and particular; it is not simply 
a case of abstracting from the singularity of sensation, but rather of 
transcendentally inscribing sensation within the order of cognitive intelligibility. 
Subsumption and empirical concepts 
 
Parallel to the theory of transcendental subsumption which dominates in the first 
Critique, Kant also develops a ‘minor’ (although far more philosophically 
orthodox) account of subsumption in relation to the use of ‘empirical’ concepts, 
i.e. concepts that specify distinct aggregates of marks that can be differentiated in 
experience – as opposed to the mere concept of an object in general ‘which 
cannot be further intuited by us’.30 At stake in this type of subsumption is the 
thinkability of identity and difference within the continuum of experience, which 
entails the presence to consciousness of the distinctness of an a, as opposed to a b 
or a c. In other words, the subsumption of ‘many’ empirical objects under a 
generic (but not pure) ‘one’, a ‘conceptus communis’. Such concepts are ‘rational 
abstractions’ (to borrow a term from Marx) which consciousness uses to represent 
empirical regularities, such as, for example, a dog: 
The concept of a dog signifies a rule in accordance with which my 
imagination can specify the shape of a four-footed animal in general, 
without being restricted to any single particular shape that experience 
offers me or any possible image that I can exhibit in concreto.31 
Whereas both the content of pure concepts (the rule, or function, that they 
specify) and the rule for their application are given immediately by the 
understanding, so that under the legislating power of the understanding and 
mediated by the schematism, subsumptive judgment under these concepts is 
effected ‘mechanically’.32 With empirical concepts, however, neither the 
concept’s content nor the rule for its application are given to the imagination 
                                                          
30 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A109. 
31 Ibid, A141/B180. 
32 Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment [1790], translated by Paul Guyer and Eric Matthews, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, V. 
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transcendentally. There is thus no transcendental guarantee of the correct 
subsumption of objects under empirical concepts, the process of ‘determining 
whether something stands under a given [empirical] rule’ belongs to the domain 
of what Kant calls ‘the healthy understanding’, an art that ‘cannot be taught but 
only practised’.33 For Kant, this raises the possibility of erroneous judgments 
about whether something is an a or not, made when one ‘understands the 
universal in abstracto but cannot distinguish whether a case in concreto belongs 
under it’34. The principal gesture of transcendental philosophy – the separation of 
the a priori and a posteriori domains of judgment - is intended precisely to 
immunize experience itself from this uncertainty at its most fundamental level, 
that of objective form as such, but it nonetheless remains pertinent in the context 
of empirical judgments, manifested as the problem of correspondence between 
specific concepts and objects. This is why it makes sense, within transcendental 
limits, to ask ‘is it a dog?’ but not to ask ‘does it have a cause?’, because whilst 
the former refers to a merely possible correspondence of concept and object in the 
empirical domain, the latter refers to a transcendentally necessitated element of 
all experience. 
Although the scope of concepts is always universal (for Kant it is a ‘mere 
tautology’ to state as much) Kant contrasts two distinct modes of universality at 
work in his account of subsumptive judgments of objects of experience - that 
proper to pure concepts, on the one hand, and that proper to empirical concepts on 
the other. The universality of the latter, whilst sufficient for differentially thinking 
some object as an a, is neither certain nor exhaustive in the sense of true 
lawfulness, and so attains ‘merely the form of universality’ in the generality of a 
common definition under which various particulars can be thought.35 This is 
because subsumption under empirical concepts never determines an object of 
experience qua object (as is the case with subsumption under the categories), but 
rather produces an intellectual judgment about it, or in Kant’s terms, ‘only the 
mode of reflection concerning it, in order to attain its cognition’36 (hence he will 
refer to these cognitions, from the Critique of Judgment onwards, as ‘reflective’ 
judgments). This generic universality, being without transcendental necessity, 
                                                          
33 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A132-3/B171-2. 
34 Ibid, A134/B173. 
35 Kant, ‘The Jasche Logic’, §1, 3. 
36 Ibid, §82. 
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must therefore itself be produced through an ascent from the particulars to the 
general via ‘comparison of objects of experience’. This involves three acts of the 
understanding: comparison, reflection and abstraction: 
I see, e.g., a spruce, a willow, and a linden. By first comparing these objects 
with one another I note that they are different from one another in regard to 
the trunk, the branches, the leaves, etc.; but next I reflect on that which they 
have in common among themselves, trunk, branches, and leaves themselves, 
and I abstract from the quantity, the figure, etc., of these; thus I acquire a 
concept of a tree.37 
But because in this process the content of the concept must be derived from 
the content of experience itself, subsumption under these concepts yields 
judgments that have only a posteriori validity. Subsumption under empirical 
concepts, therefore, is a far weaker process than its transcendental counterpart, as 
it deals only in the distribution of objective identity rather than its constitution and 
furthermore ‘has only subjective validity, for the universal to which it proceeds 
from the particular is only empirical universality – a mere analogue of the 
logical’38. Therefore in empirical judgments the rule under which the object is 
subsumed is only provisional, can never determine, but only reflect upon, the 
object. Nonetheless, for Kant these empirical concepts are ‘useful and 
indispensable’ for Erfahrungserkenntnis (experiential cognition); they aggregate 
the essential elements of an entity or relation and formalise them as the necessary 
conditions for identifying it in experience. An empirical concept is, like any other 
concept, the ‘consciousness of a unity of synthesis’, so it makes, for example, the 
towerness of a tower thinkable.39 When subsumed under such an empirical 
concept, the represented objective unity of the manifold is accompanied by a 
representation of its specificity as a particular unity that consciousness 
recognizes. In this way empirical subsumption adds a further, intellectual 
determination to the synthetic representation of an object, a determination which 
allows us to think its specificity and therefore to assign it a taxonomic position 
within the entire domain of objects.  
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38 Ibid, §81. 
39 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A103. 
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At the level of its genetic process, subsumption under empirical concepts, as 
in transcendental subsumption, is effected through a process of schematisation 
which generates a rule for connecting a concept to an image. The schema 
mediates between the two elements, which in themselves ‘are never fully 
congruent’: ‘No image of a triangle would ever be adequate to the concept of it. 
For it would not attain the generality of the concept, which makes this valid for all 
triangles, right or acute, etc., but would always be limited to one part of this 
sphere.’40 Whilst equally, the concept of a triangle does not explicate all of the 
properties of a triangle given to us in intuition (length of the sides for example). 
So once again a ‘third thing’ in the form of a schema is needed to bring the 
concept to an image (to be ‘exhibited’) and allow the image to be thought in the 
concept; with this tool the understanding gives a rule to the imagination for 
uniting concept and object in a judgment by rendering each element as one pole 
of the universal-particular (i.e. subsumptive) relation. Empirical subsumption is 
distinct from its transcendental variant in that it is not a unilateral process of 
conditioning but a mobile, bi-lateral method for approximating a unique set of 
marks given in an object to an abstract definition delineated in the concept. 
Instead of fixed transcendental axioms, here schemata are the results of an 
immanent process which follows the same stages as that used to generate 
empirical concepts in the first place: 
Comparison of representations among one another in relation to the unity of 
 consciousness; 
Reflection as to how various representations can be conceived in one 
 consciousness; and finally 
Abstraction of everything else in which the given representations differ.41 
In this case, (1) the comparison is not between multiple given objects (e.g. the 
three different trees) but between a singular object given in experience and a 
stockpile of empirical concepts explicable in the imagination (cat, dog, fox, 
rabbit, etc...). (2) Reflection discovers the isomorphism between marks thought in 
the object and marks thought in the concept, asserting their adequation. And 
finally, (3) abstraction subtracts all the superfluous determinations found in the 
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object but not the concept, thus ‘perfect[ing] it and enclose[ing] it in its 
determinate limits’42. 
Schematisation is crucial for determining whether the rule for synthesis given 
in the concept fits the object or not. If successful, the synthesis is effected and 
produces a new representation in which the object is thought as a particular 
instance of the (empirical) universal. This is the moment of ‘recognition in the 
concept’ which subsumes a determinate but singular object under the concept of 
an ontically distinct entity. Once again, subsumption marks a point of transition 
between two orders of representation; this time from the cognition of objects in 
experience to classification as empirical types. Kant makes clear that the latter 
operation is dependent on, and logically preceded by, the former, because 
subsumption under empirical concepts is the product of an ‘intellectual’ synthesis 
which is itself only the analytic dissolution of an originary ‘figurative’ synthesis 
effected in cognition. It is this figurative synthesis which first renders the object 
as an object; that is, as an aggregate of conceptual marks that can be intellectually 
surveyed, compared and deconstructed: 
A representation that is to be thought of as common to several must be 
regarded as belonging to those that in addition to it also have something 
different in themselves; consequently they must antecedently be conceived in 
synthetic unity with other (even if only possible representations) before I can 
think of the analytical unity of consciousness in it that makes it into a 
conceptus communis.43 
The process of schematisation essential to empirical concept formation and 
subsumption is always for Kant a kind of second-order productivity in which 
‘empirical affinity’ is the ‘mere consequence’ of ‘transcendental affinity’.44 The 
priority of transcendental conditions remains present even in the case of empirical 
judgments, because ‘although we learn many laws through experience, these are 
only particular determinations of yet higher laws’.45 Within the architectonic of 
reason empirical subsumption thus marks a transition from a discourse of 
production to one of distribution and organisation. The act of bringing an object 
under the concept of its type effects an organisation within the experiential series, 
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which is not strictly productive, but rather an analytic management of its 
members.  
‘Reflective’ judgment and the faculty of judging 
 
In the Critique of Judgment Kant significantly extends and deepens the notion of 
reflective judgment intimated toward in the Critique of Pure Reason in the 
context of subsumption under empirical concepts. Here it is no longer defined 
within the language of determinative categorical judgment but is assigned its own 
terminology and demarcated space within the system of transcendental 
philosophy. Kant primarily does this through the association of reflective 
judgments with the action of a cognitive faculty in its legislative mode – so that 
‘the reflecting power of judgment is that which is also called the faculty of 
judging’.46 This power, although essential to the operation of reason in its 
theoretical and practical use, had not before the Critique of the Power of 
Judgment been awarded the status of a ‘higher’ faculty, i.e., capable of 
determining the relations between faculties in order to produce a specific type of 
judgment according to its own a priori principle.47 Thus despite Kant’s claim that 
“philosophy as a system can only have two parts”48, it is shown in the third 
Critique to be grounded in a tripartite division of cognitive faculties 
corresponding to the three moments of the syllogism: 
first, the faculty for the cognition of the general (of rules), the 
understanding; second, the faculty for the subsumption of the particular 
under the general, the power of judgment; and third, the faculty for the 
determination of the particular through the general (for the derivation from 
principles), i.e., reason.49 
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Accordingly, what were in the first Critique merely ‘useful and indispensable’ 
inferences for grasping the variety of objective forms in experience, now become 
a fundamental element of Kant’s system – one that bears the crucial reconciliatory 
task of ‘mediat[ing] the connection’ between the domain of natural law prescribed 
by the understanding, and the sphere of freedom legislated by reason. Unlike the 
other faculties however, the power of judgment in its legislative action in no way 
acts to determine objects of cognition; instead it “is related solely to the subject 
and does not produce any concepts of objects for itself alone”.50 Reflective 
judgment thus emerges as another species of judgment whose import is equal to 
the determinative, so that at the most fundamental level of cognitive activity they 
denote two different modalities of thinking the particular under the universal, 
each of which figures the role of judgment power differently: 
The power of judgment can be regarded either as a mere faculty for 
reflecting on a given representation, in accordance with a certain  
principle, for the sake of a concept that is thereby made possible, or as a 
faculty for determining an underlying concept through a given empirical 
representation. In the first case it is the reflecting, in the second case the 
determining power of judgment. 51 
This formalisation of the power of judgment opens up the problem of 
subsumption within Kant’s thought in a number of highly important ways. The act 
of subsuming is no longer simply an aspect of theoretical or practical inferences, 
but rather, through its identification with the faculty of judging, becomes one of 
the three basic cognitive operations of which the subject is capable. Furthermore, 
by directly explicating the reflective mode of subsumption, Kant expands his 
account of how the universal-particular relationship can be posited in a situation 
where the content of the universal pole (the major premise, or ‘function of unity’) 
cannot be derived from an already given concept – and instead must be found. 
Throughout the third critique, Kant’s elaboration on the possibility of such a non-
conceptual form of subsumption comes through a detailed account of the 
interaction between the power of judgment and the understanding in reflective 
judgments of taste and teleology.   
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The theoretical and practical occasions for subsumption outlined by Kant in 
his first two critiques saw the power of judgment, under the legislation of the 
understanding and reason correspondingly, play a primarily determining role, as 
“a faculty merely for subsuming concepts given from elsewhere”52. But in the 
case of reflective judgments, where no principle of determination (i.e., concept) is 
available, the power of judgment is commissioned to reflectively formulate the 
universal that is lacking. Thus it is shown to be “not merely a faculty for 
subsuming the particular under the general (whose concept is given), but is also, 
conversely, one for finding the general for the particular”.53 What is noteworthy 
in this mature conception of reflective judgment is the peculiar manner in which 
the understanding guides the power of judgment’s activity; for in so far as the 
content of the understanding (pure concepts) is concerned it contributes nothing, 
but thought of as a power whose a priori principle is the prescription of 
lawfulness (‘the general’) – it is crucial. The role occupied by the concept-
function in determinate judgment, is, in reflective judgment, filled by a purely 
formal and indeterminate notion of generality dependant for its iteration on the 
understanding’s generic power of positing lawfulness per se.  
A significant problem emerges as a consequence of this conceptless account 
of subsumption, concerning the initial requirements for a reflective judgment to 
be carried out. In objective cognition, determinative judgment is grounded in a 
given concept which acts as the principle for judgment, i.e., that on the basis of 
which the judgment can proceed – the major premise; here, category and principle 
are synonymous. But by contrast, reflective judgment must ‘produce’ its concept 
through a series of comparative and analogical procedures, so the process of 
reflection seems to logically precede the discovery of the conceptual principle by 
which, on the model of determinate judgment, it could take place. This generates 
an aporia at the level of the temporal structure of reflective judgment, which for 
Kant to solve requires a non-categorial principle that can set the concept-
producing judgment into motion. This a priori principle, native to the power of 
judgment, is the assumption of an agreement between the products of nature and 
our discursive mode of reflection:  
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If there is to be a concept or a rule which arises originally from the power of 
judgment, it would have to be a concept of things in nature insofar as nature 
conforms to our power of judgment, and thus a concept of a property of 
nature such that one cannot form any concept of it except that its arrangement 
conforms to our faculty for subsuming the particular given laws under more 
general ones even though these are not given.54 
Through this principle, which Kant calls ‘purposiveness’, cognition attributes 
a discursive systematicity to nature for pragmatic purposes; assuming a ‘general 
correspondence’ between natural forms which makes reflection through 
comparison possible. Such a principle is necessitated because of the 
transcendental distinction between the a priori lawfulness of experience and the a 
posteriori contingency of nature; which means that ‘it might be possible for us to 
connect perceptions to some extent in accordance with particular laws discovered 
on various occasions into one experience, but never to bring these empirical laws 
themselves to the unity of kinship under a common principle’55. So whilst 
experience is composed as a system, natural laws are merely aggregated and 
never attain a necessary unity. The principle of assumed purposiveness thus 
serves to bring nature into agreement with the form of experience, ‘in order to be 
able to reflect in accordance with its own subjective law, in accordance with its 
need’.56 Through this presupposition, purposiveness is invested in objects not at 
the level of their individuality, but ‘only in general’, at the level of the formal 
interconnectedness of natural representations in experience. So individual objects 
may not display objective purposiveness, but as part of nature we think it in them; 
nature gives us ‘not the least trace of a system’ and yet we must constitute it as 
one. The notion of system that Kant has in mind here is manifestly subsumptive: 
The logical form of a system consists merely in the division of given general 
concepts (of the sort which that of a nature in general is here), by means of 
which one thinks the particular (here the empirical) with its variety as 
contained under the general, in accordance with a certain principle.57 
So in reflective judgment, empirical particularity is formally (i.e., a priori) 
subsumed under the universal principle of nature as purposive. This posits the 
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identity of nature and experience in order that the content of experience is made 
fit for reflection, and ultimately, subsumption in concreto. The particular laws 
that are thereby discovered and that play the role of the concept are found from 
amongst the products of nature, but for the judgment to take place always requires 
the a priori representation of generality (given by the understanding) in 
conjunction with the a priori principle of purposiveness (given by the power of 
judgment). So reflective judgment, although undertaken without the aid of 
determinate a priori concepts, is nonetheless grounded in the transcendental 
accord between the power of the understanding and the power of judgment. The 
capacity to creatively generate concepts afforded by this accord is what leads 
Kant to distinguish the theoretical explanation of phenomena, represented in 
determinate judgments as ‘mechanical’, from the subjective reflection on nature, 
which he calls ‘technical’: 
The reflecting power of judgment thus proceeds with given appearances, 
in order to bring them under empirical concepts of determinate natural 
things, not schematically, but technically, not as it were merely 
mechanically, like an instrument, but artistically, in accordance with the 
general but at the same time indeterminate principle of a purposive 
arrangement of nature in a system58  
Subsumption and aesthetic judgments 
 
The discussion of reflection and purposiveness in the introduction to the Critique 
of the Power of Judgment paves the way for the sustained enquiry into aesthetic 
judgments that occupies the first part of the book. Aesthetic judgments differ from 
both determinate judgments of theoretical and practical objects and reflective 
judgments about natural forms, as their conclusions concern ‘only the receptivity 
of a determination of the subject’.59 The question which Kant seeks to address in 
his third critique is how can objective judgments, which are ‘always made by the 
understanding’, be formed on the basis of reflection on purely subjective 
affections?60 Of course, theoretical and practical cognitions are also 
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determinations of the subject in the broadest sense (all cognitions are), but in their 
case the judgment determines the relation between the representation and the 
object whereas aesthetic judgments determine the relation between the 
representation and the subject: 
By the designation ‘an aesthetic judgment about an object’ it is therefore 
immediately indicated that a given representation is certainly related to an 
object but that what is understood in the judgment is not the determination 
of the object but of the subject and its feeling. 61  
Kant’s introduction of the concept of ‘feeling’ here contradicts the account of 
judgment given quite consistently throughout the first two critiques as a solely 
discursive enterprise; that is, one based on cognition through concepts. For whilst 
objects are always determined conceptually, the subject can only be determined 
affectively, which is to say, in terms of feeling. The very notion of aesthetic 
judgment cannot therefore be based on the comparison of conceptual marks, but 
has an entirely alternative measure for differentiating and connecting 
representations in consciousness. Some fifteen years before the publication of the 
third critique, in a lecture course on metaphysics, Kant intimated toward this 
criterion, speaking of a ‘special’ and ‘wholly other faculty’ of the soul, for 
‘distinguishing things according to the feeling of pleasure and displeasure, or of 
satisfaction and dissatisfaction’.62 This feeling of pleasure or displeasure is what 
is determined in an aesthetic judgment, and, as the ‘one so-called sensation that 
can never become a concept of an object’, is always attributed to the subject. 63 
But if it is only the subject’s affective state that is thereby determined, and as 
a corollary this determination is itself non-conceptual, then can Kant legitimately 
speak of aesthetic judgment as subsumptive? Or even as judgment all? It is not 
only the case that no concept is given for aesthetic judgments, but equally that no 
concept could ever be found through reflection; pleasure and displeasure are ‘felt, 
not understood’. This is the reason why aesthetic judgments cannot be expounded 
within the terms of the table of judgments, and as Howard Caygill notes, are 
defined negatively in relation to the four categorial groupings: they ‘are in respect 
of quality without interest; they are universally valid without a concept; their 
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relation is final but without an end; and their modality, necessary but without a 
concept’.64 Each of the categories is effective only insofar as it gives 
determination to a representation on the basis of a fixed quantity, quality, relation 
or modality, but this is not possible when the ‘object’ of determination in question 
is the subject itself. How then, can the feeling of pleasure and displeasure act as a 
universal principle under which the particular aesthetic representation could be 
subsumed, in order to render the judgment objective? 
In characteristic Kantian fashion the problem rests upon the dynamics of the 
subject’s internal mediation. It is the subject rather than some putative ‘external 
domain’ that for Kant is the seat of objectivity and universality: we can recall how 
in the Critique of Pure Reason, the subjective particularity of intuition was 
rendered objective by subsumptive judgment, which articulated the sensory 
manifold according to the discursively thinkable, universal relations specified by 
the understanding. The transcendental legerdemain of Kant’s objectively defined 
subject is precisely what enables the individual to supersede the particularity of its 
own subject-ness, by subsuming its deficient perception under its rational, 
systematic intellect.65 (This is why subsumption is so central to Kant’s entire 
project; it is the mediating act that brings all particularity into lawful, and most 
importantly communicable, form.) Similarly, in reflective judgments of natural 
forms, the attribution of purposiveness to nature makes the content of empirical 
experience fit for systematic cognition. But aesthetic judgment breaks away 
before the categorial determination of the manifold and follows a parallel path of 
discrimination not rooted in conceptual synthesis or analysis. So although, for 
Kant, we do cognise the manifold as an object of experience, nothing we might 
say about it in this respect has any traction upon our aesthetic judgment of it, 
because this would involve defining the aesthetic (i.e., affective) character of the 
representation in terms of objective attributes – and thus de-subjectivising it; size, 
texture, colour, etc. cannot be predicated of the subject. 
It might therefore seem that in bypassing conceptual determination Kant 
relinquishes the possibility of universally valid aesthetic judgments. The feeling 
of pleasure or displeasure occasioned in the subject by the representation is 
entirely particular, or what Kant calls a ‘private interest’; in addition, the 
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representation of the object to which this feeling is connected is equally particular 
– as it is a pre-categorial ‘image’ (bild) of which no generality can be thought. 
Therefore, if the relationship between terms in an aesthetic judgment is only ever 
one of particular to particular (of ‘feeling’ to ‘image’) then it can never attain 
objective determination at the level of its content, in the way a judgment of the 
understanding can. However, as we shall see, this is not a hindrance to aesthetic 
judgment, but rather its unique quality, as such a judgment has a purely formal 
and yet at the same time subjectively oriented validity – its universality is derived 
only from the form of the judgment and remains indifferent to the content. (We 
might then add a further form of universality to the three enumerated above – 
logical, transcendental, empirical – that of subjective universality). 
Just as with reflective judgments of natural forms, when no concept is given 
to the power of judgment it must proceed on the basis of its own inner principle, 
which is that of purposiveness – or the assumed conformity of a representation ‘to 
our faculty for subsuming the particular given laws under more general ones’66. 
However, as aesthetic judgments are not related logically to the cognition of the 
object, but only to the effect of an intuition on the subject, this purposiveness 
cannot be cashed out in terms of the correspondence between empirical forms and 
cognition; instead the aesthetic purposiveness of a representation denotes ‘nothing 
but its suitability to the cognitive faculties that are in play in the reflecting power 
of judgment’67 - in other words a subjective, rather than objective purposiveness. 
On the basis of this principle, the pure, indeterminate form of the object is 
constituted as the particular that is subsumed ‘under a relation that is merely a 
matter of sensation, that of the imagination and the understanding reciprocally 
attuned to each other’68. So, bizarrely, what is represented in the object is only the 
formal principle by which we reflect on it, ‘the subjective, merely sensitive 
condition of the objective use of the power of judgment in general (namely the 
agreement of those two faculties [imagination and the understanding] with each 
other)’.69 
The perception in the object of a formal accord between the faculties of 
understanding and imagination is thus the result of the judgment; it generates a 
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representation of the general (i.e., indeterminate) agreement of the powers of 
apprehension and presentation as such: 
If, then, the form of a given object in empirical intuition is so constituted that 
the apprehension of its manifold in the imagination agrees with the 
presentation of a concept of the understanding (though which concept be 
undetermined), then in the mere reflection understanding and imagination 
mutually agree for the advancement of their business, and the object will be 
perceived as purposive merely for the power of judgment, hence the 
purposiveness itself will be considered as merely subjective; for which, 
further, no determinate concept of the object at all is required nor is one 
thereby generated, and the judgment itself is not a cognitive judgment. – 
Such a judgment is called an aesthetic judgment of reflection.70 
Reflection, which is based on the relation of the apprehending power of the 
imagination and the law-prescribing power of the understanding, is here set into 
free play. Whereas in the first critique schematism determined the activity of the 
imagination, and in the second critique it was reason (through the moral idea), in 
the Critique of the Power of Judgment there is no heteronymous source of 
determination for the imagination. So whereas normally a judgment is the end 
result of a process which fixes the relation between two terms according to a rule 
or principle (for example synthesis or reflection), a judgment of beauty depends 
on the freedom of the very powers of determination; it is a determinate-
indeterminacy. Which is to say that it is determinate at the level of the relation 
between powers, but indeterminate insofar as there is no rule by which the 
relation is given specific concretion – it has no determinate content. The free play 
of the faculties, which Kant also calls harmony, is a merely formal (i.e., 
indeterminate) purposiveness; and thus beauty is taking enjoyment in the form of 
purposiveness as such: form becomes the content.  
With this, the topos of judgment is interrupted by an explosive instance of 
transcendental slippage. Despite the centrality of transcendental powers and 
conditions to Kant’s critical project, their valence concerns only the grounds of 
possibility for most instances of judgment (cognitive, moral, natural), and in the 
case of an actual judgment they remain concealed; only the conditioned appears 
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to the conscious subject. But this is not so with an aesthetic judgment of taste: 
what is judged about in a predication of beauty (as opposed to ‘agreeableness’, 
which is never objective) is the pleasure resulting from the subject’s capacity to 
feel its own life, to represent its own subjective state to itself; ‘the faculty of 
making one’s own representations the object’s of one’s thought’.71 In other words, 
aesthetic judgment ‘holds the given representation in the subject up to the entire 
faculty of representation, of which the mind becomes conscious in the feeling of 
its state’.72 The condition of possibility for judgments thus becomes itself the 
‘object’ of the judgment; the aesthetic judgment of taste ‘has taken into 
consideration solely [...] the formal condition of the power of judgment, and is 
pure, i.e., mixed with neither concepts of the object nor with sensations as 
determining grounds’.73 Therefore through feeling, aesthetic judgments apprehend 
a pure determinability, or formal purposiveness, that expresses nothing but the 
transcendental structure of judgment-power itself, in its operation, which ‘does 
not (as in theoretical judgments) merely have to subsume under objective 
concepts of the understanding and stands under a law, but where it is itself, 
subjectively, both object as well as law’74. This is the sense in which a judgment 
of beauty mediates the subject’s self-affection and results in a feeling of the 
principle of life (Lebensgefühle)75 which accompanies the judgment.  
The pure formality of aesthetic reflection, and the subjective involution that it 
precipitates, is the key to understanding how judgments of the beautiful are 
universally valid for Kant, because their basis is not the peculiarity of the object 
which occasion them, or the individuality of the subject which judges, rather they 
are grounded in the universality of the structure of subjectivity, in the faculties 
whose harmony is apprehended: 
[Their] determining ground must lie not merely in the feeling of pleasure and 
displeasure in itself alone, but at the same time in a rule of the higher faculty 
of cognition, in this case, namely, in the rule of the power of judgment, 
which is thus legislative with regard to the conditions of reflection a priori, 
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and demonstrates autonomy; this autonomy is not, however (like that of the 
understanding, with regard to the theoretical laws of nature, or of reason, in 
the practical laws of freedom), valid objectively, i.e., through concepts of 
things or possible actions, but is merely subjectively valid, for the judgment 
from feeling, which, if it can make a claim to universal validity, demonstrates 
its origin grounded in a priori principles.76 
Such a judgment is thus made from the standpoint of universality, and makes an a 
priori claim on the community of subjects which demands agreement, even if no 
such agreement can reached in actuality, because the principles on which the 
subsumption of the particular is grounded are themselves valid for all judging 
subjects. The ‘objectivity’ of a subjective judgment of beauty is therefore derived 
from its ‘universal communicability’, a notion which arises from Kant’s 
refiguring of the Aristotelian concept of a ‘sensus communis’: 
That in which the sense of human beings agree is the universal sense. But 
how can a human being pass a judgment according to the universal sense, 
since he still considers the object according to his private sense? The 
community amongst human beings constitutes a communal sense. Out of 
the intercourse among human beings a communal sense arises which is 
valid for everyone. Thus whoever does not come into a community has no 
communal sense77  
In terms of the subsumptive structure of judgments of taste, particularity is 
brought to bear under a fully anthropological and vital principle of universality. 
This is not figured merely as an abstract, distributed essence of universality, but 
rather as an expression of the concrete community of rational beings. In this way, 
‘objectivity’ is restored in the space of the aesthetic by virtue of the formal 
subjective universality of judgments of beauty. Through the critique of such 
judgments, Kant posits two registers of affection and discrimination that operate 
in parallel within the subject (or more accurately, the ‘Gemüt’): that of thinking 
and that of feeling.78 Thinking unfolds in the judicial relation of representation 
and object, be it comparative or determining, in which the subject (qua affect) is a 
silent partner; but feeling, by contrast, emerges solely from the relation between 
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the representation and the subject - so here the object is held in stasis as the mere 
‘occasion’ of the relation. In the former case, categorical subsumption determines 
a ‘natural’ economy of objective representations; in the latter case reflective 
comparison with the entire life of the subject determines an affective economy of 
purely subjective representations, to which the subject is either attracted or 
repelled. This attraction or repulsion is part of the vital movement of the 
promotion or hindrance of life. If a representation ‘harmonizes’ with the principle 
of life it produces pleasure, if it resists the principle it produces displeasure. But 
given that the pleasure in a judgment of beauty results from the formal character 
of the judgment at the level of subjective powers, life here must be considered in 
its extra-individual mode, it is not ‘my’ life that is felt and promoted in a 
judgment of beauty, but rational life as such (hence Kant’s designation of sensus 
communis as the universale in concreto).79 
Conclusion 
 
The typology of judgment given throughout Kant’s three critiques elucidates a 
series of possible relations that a subject can have to a representation. Underlying 
these relations is, in each case, a different technique of subsumption with different 
requirements and consequences.  
In pure cognition subsumption is a question of production, and the point of 
distinction where a process of production (in this case synthesis), generates an 
individuated product (the object in general, =x). In the oscillation between 
synthesis and subsumption we can see how the process is itself transformed, or re-
modelled from the standpoint of the product, constituting a tension between (at 
least) two perspectives on the process. In subsumption under empirical concepts, 
as it is conceived in the first Critique, Kant deals with the question of distribution, 
and the economy of ‘types’ within the domain of nature. Here, the account of 
subsumption bears more resemblance to notion of a conceptuality which ‘covers’ 
the individuality of the particular that is thought under it, abstracts from of its 
concreteness, and represses its unique identity. But Kant demonstrates that this 
reflective mode of subsumption has only a superficial and pragmatic (what will 
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later become purposive) relation to the object, which always depends on the prior 
operations of the understanding in categorically determining the manifold 
according to basic conceptual ‘marks’. Once determined, the object can be 
reflected on and subsumed under the concept of its species. Neither of these 
processes of subsumption, however, simply take the particular as a mere instance 
of the universal, rather they elaborate techniques of synthesis which always have 
to be effected. 
Whereas cognitive and practical judgments operate through subsumption 
under concepts, in which the understanding and reason in turn legislate the power 
of judgment, by contrast, aesthetic judgments are peculiar in that they are 
grounded not in a concept but in the legislative action of judgment-power itself – 
i.e., the very capacity to subsume. Such judgments precipitate an involution of 
judgment power that generates Lebensgefuhle: an affective representation of the 
subject’s very power of representing. Here, the subject qua individual is brought 
under itself qua rational being, as it subsumes its particular representation act 
under its universal capacity to represent. Through this, the consistency of Kant’s 
conception of the subject and its self-relation is disrupted, because the a priori 
structure of consciousness which conditions, but is never itself conditioned, 
suddenly enters the stage as an a posteriori element of experience (albeit one that 
is ‘felt’ rather than ‘thought’). The consequences of this are explosive, and the 
third critique bears witness to a performative unravelling of the edifice which 
Kant has built up throughout the works on theoretical and practical reason. 
Perhaps most troubling for the Kantian enterprise is that such judgments convey a 
sense of the whole more than determinate, objective knowledge ever can; the 
subject, which can only be thought of as an ‘aggregate’ of powers, is from the 
vital standpoint of life a disjunctive unity capable of surveying its own state 
affectively.80 
                                                          
80 Here the pleasure taken in a judgment of beauty (and its transgression of the structure of 
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entirety of individual capacities and the generic universality of these capacities are expressed and 
explored – although crucially, not exhausted. It is not hard to see how elements of this model can 
be transposed into the context of sensuous activity, rather than contemplative enjoyment.  
41 
 
Most importantly, however, is the quite consistent idea throughout Kant’s 
critiques, that subsumption always implies – and indeed is operative at – points of 
transition between different orders of representation: between manifold and 
object, object and form, rule and law, representation and power, etc... What is so 
significant about aesthetic judgment in this respect, is that it implies a point of 
transition not just between two orders of representation, but between the order of 
representation taken in toto and a perhaps more fundamental order of vital powers 
(something also attested to in the ‘analytic of the sublime’). But that this 
transition always occurs through the mediation of a judgement of beauty, 
establishes the problem of the finite manifestation of the infinite that would go on 
to become a central concern for both romanticism and speculative idealism. 
 
Part II – Hegel’s Critique of Subsumption 
 
The significance of Kant’s critique of theoretical reason for Hegelian philosophy 
is not just that it sought to demonstrate which kind of judgments about objects are 
legitimate (taken here to mean universally valid, in the sense expounded above), 
but also, and as a result, that it revealed these judgments to have always-already 
taken place when we experience an object. Kant discovered conceptual mediation 
– in the form of judgments of subsumption under ‘pure’ concepts – implicit in all 
apparently immediate knowledge. This transition from immediacy to its 
mediating condition is a movement derived from Kant’s pre-critical logic, where 
discrete concepts were shown to be the product of subsumptive judgment acts.81 
But whilst in formal logic thought need only find agreement with itself in order to 
produce valid judgments, in the sphere of experience dealt with in the first 
Critique (transcendental logic) thought must find agreement with its other, that in 
the subject which is not a determination of thought – sensible intuition – in order 
for an object to be known. 'Transcendental logic’ represents Kant’s attempt to 
guarantee the correspondence of thought and object by enclosing them within a 
unitary structure of subjectivity. On this account, to know an object is to have 
specified (subsumptively) the consistency of its empirical content according to the 
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basic categorial determinations of the understanding. This is the epistemological 
context in which subsumption emerges in the Critique of Pure Reason as a 
condition of possibility for experience – which is equated with knowledge – of 
objects. 
For Hegel, Kant was correct to argue that thought is always implicit in the 
constitution of objectivity and that this involvement is a process entirely 
immanent and internal to consciousness. Hegel recognised that in subsuming 
intuitions under concepts in this way, consciousness permeates them with itself, 
with its own unity and self-relation, sublating their particular immediacy into the 
universality and determinateness that, as for Kant, together constitute objectivity: 
The comprehension of an object consists in nothing else than that the ego 
makes it its own, pervades it and brings it into its own form, that is, into 
the universality that is immediately a determinateness, or a 
determinateness that is immediately universality. As intuited or even in 
ordinary conception, the object is still something external and alien. When 
it is comprehended, the being-in-and-for-self which it possesses in 
intuition and pictorial thought is transformed into a positedness; the I in 
thinking it pervades it. 82 
In accordance with critical philosophy’s new understanding of the object as pre-
constituted by the spontaneity of the “I”, Hegel holds that the determinations of 
the object emerge from the subjective process of its comprehension. Crucial to 
this conception is Kant’s attempt (in the transcendental deduction) to reciprocally 
derive both the categories under which the manifold is subsumed from the unity of 
the “I”, and simultaneously, the unity of the “I” from the act of thinking the object 
under these categories. It is the equation of conceptual universality with the unity 
of the pure “I” arising from this deduction that dissolves the opposition between 
truth and subjectivity and gives rise to a conception of the object as mediated. 
This forms the general structure of transcendental logic with which Hegel’s 
philosophy engages; but despite his affinities with it, Hegel took issue with Kant’s 
model of subsumptive cognition in three primary respects: (1) that the 
apperceptive “I” – and therefore the transcendental subject – was modelled on the 
empirical, psychological individual; (2) that the categories of the understanding 
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were taken up uncritically from Aristotelian logic; (3) the limitation of truth to 
objects of experience alone that meant that critical philosophy was still mired in 
the sphere of empirical appearance. 
 Metacritically outlining these limits to Kant’s model of cognition allowed 
Hegel to incorporate the basic movement of transcendental critique (from 
conditioned to condition) within a reconstructed outline of both the elements 
(conceptual determinations) and the total structure of unity (subjectivity) of 
Kantian thought. Neither of these two aspects, Hegel contested, were the product 
of a fully immanent philosophical derivation, and much extraneous and 
unjustified content was smuggled into Kant’s philosophy. But Hegel did not reject 
the basic structure of opposition between the unity and determinateness of self-
consciousness, instead he subjected them to the dialectical critique that would 
produce (1) a phenomenology of spirit (in the case of transcendental subjectivity); 
(2) a speculative logic (in the case of the categories) and, (3) a new conception of 
truth as speculative totality. These transformations bear on the status of 
subsumption within Hegel´s system in so far as both the structured context of the 
subsumptive act and the specific determinations executed by it are subject to a 
new derivation that fundamentally alters their nature. 
 Hegel’s modification of the concept of subsumption begins first and 
foremost with his critique of the constitutive divisions of transcendental logic; 
specifically, those which precipitate the emergence of subsumption in the Critique 
of Pure Reason. That is, the basic opposition of concepts of the understanding and 
the manifold of intuition carried over from Kant’s division between the ‘empty’ 
form of thought given in general logic and the content to which it is applied. The 
crucial consequence of this division is that Kantian philosophy takes the 
subsumed to be ‘entirely unhomogeneous’ to that which subsumes it, such that for 
Hegel the subsumption amounts to an external imposition on the matter given in 
intuition: ‘the empirical material, the manifold of intuition and representation, 
first exists on its own account, and […] then the understanding approaches it, 
brings unity into it and by abstraction raises it to the form of universality.’83 
Thought thus pervades intuition to know it as its own, but it does so coercively, 
imposing its own relations and mediation upon it rather than drawing out the truth 
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of those that are already present within it; the manifold neither has, nor develops, 
an inner, concrete universality, and only obtains universality when the functions 
of unity given by the understanding have been determined in it subsumptively. 
This model is consonant with the worldview of Newtonian science, for which ‘the 
universal (the genus, etc.) contained in [the particular] is not determined on its 
own account, nor is it intrinsically connected with what is particular; but universal 
and particular are mutually external and contingent, just as much as the 
particularities that are combined are, on their own account, external to each other 
and contingent.’84 On the basis of this standpoint it appears that ‘I possess 
[concepts] and the [Concept], just as I also possess a coat, complexion, and other 
external properties’85. 
 Despite their a priori interconnection, concepts and intuitions remain 
utterly distinct (and implicitly self-sufficient) ‘sources’ of cognition; indeed, it is 
precisely this difference that for Kant necessitates their mediation in a ‘third 
thing’ (the transcendental schema). Hegel opposed this fixed externality of 
faculties arguing that the difference between sensible intuition and concepts is one 
only of the ‘forms’ of ‘a content that remains one and the same’.86 In Faith and 
Knowledge, Hegel’s early review of the ‘reflective’ philosophies of his time, the 
primary distinction between intuitive and conceptual syntheses appears simply in 
that the concept grasps the positedness of determinations in distinction from its 
own self: ‘Synthetic unity is only concept because it binds the difference in such a 
way that it also steps outside of it, and faces it in relative antithesis’.87 Whilst the 
centrality of synthetic unity would be demoted in hegel’s later works, the 
emphasis on a ‘truly necessary, absolute, original identity of opposites’ would be 
retained, in opposition to the Kantian idea of an original division of the faculties 
that ‘constitute only an aggregate and not a system’88.   
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 Hegel thus disparages the weakness of the subsumptive-synthetic relation 
between concepts and intuitions that are supposed to ground the truth of 
experience for Kant, as relations that unite the two elements of cognition in an 
‘external, superficial way, just as a piece of wood and a leg might be bound 
together by a cord’.89 Such unity is not, for Hegel, a properly philosophical unity 
in which relations between elements and higher determinations are developed 
immanently out of those elements as their implicit conditions: ‘the very 
expression synthesis easily recalls the conception of an external unity and a mere 
combination of entities that are intrinsically separate’.90 
 Kantianism, by asserting a model of ‘mechanical’ connection between 
independent elements, gives the opposition of thought and external reality held by 
‘normal consciousness’ a philosophical articulation, reproducing it in the 
transcendental distinction between the object as it is for-us and as it is in-itself. 
Because our mode of receiving the ‘external’ object is deficient, lacks conceptual 
coherence and unity, it must be subsumed under an alien schema of universality, 
and this ‘subsumption under the species alters what is immediate’.91 Only the 
object for-us – that which results from subsumptive judgment – is true for Kant, 
and yet this truth is paradoxically qualified as having no bearing on the thing as it 
might actually be, which is lost in the process of its comprehension. For Hegel, 
this expulsion of the in-itself from the realm of knowledge leads Kantianism to 
yield only a ‘truth of the false’: 
 It seems absurd, if what we want is knowledge of external objects, to 
 alter these external objects by our very [abstractive] activity upon them. 
 Quite absurd to want to come to know things as they are [in themselves] 
 and yet alter them, thus receiving things into our knowledge only as 
 altered. The alteration consists in the fact that we separate off what is 
 singular or external and hold the truth of the thing to lie in what is 
 universal rather than in what is singular or external. Quite oddly, for 
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 Kant it is by altering things that we are persuaded we secure their inner 
 truth.92  
 The one sidedness of this structure of determination is, on Hegel’s 
account, exactly what undermines the Kantian conception of truth, reducing it to a 
tautological affirmation of subjectivity that assimilates consciousness’s other (the 
in-itself) to itself, whilst simultaneously reducing itself (qua ‘I’) to the empirical. 
It thereby fails to recognise – in anything other than a nominal sense (that 
expounded in the ‘refutation of idealism’) – the subject´s own mediation in and 
through this other, and the process of subsumption is effected unilaterally and 
mechanically (even by Kant’s own admission) upon the sensibly given material.93 
‘The understanding is in this way an intrinsically empty form which, on the one 
hand, obtains a reality through the said given content and, on the other 
hand, abstracts from that content, that is to say, lets it drop as something 
useless’.94 And yet in spite of this, transcendental subjectivity cannot entirely 
dispose of the in-itself that stands beyond it; it remains beholden to precisely that 
which it repudiates. The conceptual identity produced by the understanding ‘finds 
itself immediately confronted by or next to an infinite non-identity, with which it 
must coalesce in some incomprehensible way’.95 The epistemological horizon of 
Kantian philosophy, its limit of comprehension, therefore ‘remains entirely within 
the antithesis’ between nature and reason, subject and object, thought and being, 
willing and acting, finite and infinite, etc., precisely because of its original 
incapacity of knowing the object as it really is.96 ‘A formal idealism which in this 
way sets an absolute Ego-point and its intellect on one side, and an absolute 
manifold, or sensation, on the other side, is a dualism.’97  
 Kant does of course recognise the higher unity that would resolve these 
oppositions, in the form of reason’s orientation toward the unconditioned. But this 
orientation, far from genuinely grounding the unifying movement of thought, is 
demoted to the production of regulative principles at best and ‘transcendental 
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illusions’ at worst, in contrast to the objective universality of the  understanding’s 
‘fixed determinations’. The constitutive oppositions of Kantianism are therefore 
superseded only subjectively in the ideas, which have no objective, i.e., real, truth 
content. Again, Hegel criticises the division separating the discrete concepts of the 
understanding and the unifying tendency of reason (what Hegel calls the Concept) 
as a characteristic limit of ‘the reflective philosophy of subjectivity’:  
 Kantian philosophy declares finite cognition to be all that is possible […] 
 it falls back into absolute finitude and subjectivity, and the whole task and 
 content of this philosophy is, not the cognition of the absolute, but the 
 cognition of this subjectivity.98 
Because Kant aims at a critique of the finite intellect, rather than knowledge of the 
absolute, his philosophy is resigned to ‘progression in finite determinations’, and 
‘an endless aiming at the concrete is required for thought, a filling up in 
accordance with the rule which completion prescribes’ – albeit a completion never 
to be realized, only regulatively strived towards in the mode [set out] by its 
abstract universality:99 
 ‘[Kantian philosophy] leads knowledge into consciousness and self-
 consciousness, but from this standpoint maintains it to be a subjective and 
 finite knowledge. Thus although it deals with the infinite Idea, expressing 
 its formal categories and arriving at its concrete claims, it yet again denies 
 this to  be the truth, making it a simple subjective, because it has once for 
 all accepted finite knowledge as the fixed and ultimate standpoint.’100 
It is precisely in the rejection of this finitude that Kant’s critical differentiation 
between the truth of legitimate and illegitimate judgments of subsumption is 
called into question. What we must ask then, is how the character and effects of 
subsumptive judgment are altered by Hegel’s refutation of the static division 
between the aesthetic, analytical and dialectical moments of transcendental 
subjectivity, and what role subsumption plays in Hegel’s reconfigured concept of 
the subject as process. 
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A new derivation 
 
Hegel’s overcoming of the empirico-epistemological boundary of Kant’s 
philosophical claims – specifically the adherence to a structurally constitutive 
distinction of subject and object – is the task he set out to achieve through his 
dialectical treatment of consciousness in the Phenomenology of Spirit. The 
Phenomenology deals with the development of the relation between consciousness 
and its object, progressing through the series of forms, or shapes, of experience, 
each of which specifies a different relationship of knowledge to its object. This 
passes from the immediacy of sense-certainty, through to the emergence of self-
consciousness from relations of recognition between individuals, the social forms 
of spirit and the final standpoint of absolute knowing from which the opposition 
between subject and object (substance) is sublated into the unity of spirit with 
itself and the knowledge of experience is resolved into a pure ontology in the 
logic (i.e., not simply the determinations of the object as it appears to 
consciousness, but the pure determinations of the object as it ‘actually’ is). The 
initial departure from Kant here – one that characterizes Hegel’s system as a 
whole – is the fact that rather than attempting to ascertain the necessary content 
and structure of experience in order to then critically determine what counts as 
knowledge, Hegel’s preface to the phenomenology (which also serves as preface 
to the entire system) states quite clearly that the process of reflecting on 
knowledge cannot be divorced from knowledge itself (as illustrated by his well-
known metaphor of desiring to learn how to swim before getting in the water).101 
With it, philosophy has already begun. It is thus not simply the final stage of 
consciousness taken in isolation that can be thought of as the ‘true standpoint’ of 
knowledge, but rather all the stages in the totality of their development that 
constitute the truth of knowledge – as a process. ‘In this movement the passive 
Subject itself perishes; it enters into the differences and the content, and 
constitutes the determinateness, i.e. the differentiated content and its movement, 
instead of remaining inertly over against it’.102 Subjectivity cannot thus be 
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reduced to a static aggregation of principles and powers, but instead is grasped as 
the dynamic movement of the whole in its dialectical self-development. 
 This informs the status of subsumption in Hegel in so far as the Kantian ‘I’ 
is premised on precisely this fixed division of faculties that Hegel rejects, 
specifically the dualism of intuition and intellect, whose heterogeneous contents 
have to be brought synthetically into relation. Overcoming such a division by 
virtue of subsumption under concepts forms the basis for the reciprocal 
establishment of the unity of consciousness and the consistency of experience in 
Kant’s first Critique. But with Hegel’s dialectical critique of consciousness in the 
Phenomenology, this oppositional structure is transformed into a processual 
concept of subject, as the organic self-development of an (in the last instance) 
objective process. The unity of consciousness is thus no longer a static structure of 
self-relation, but the dynamic unfolding of knowing through its various shapes or 
moments.  Integral to this movement is the supercession of the finite standpoint of 
individual consciousness and the development of the social concept of 
subjectivity that emerges with the transition from subject-object relations through 
subject-subject, and then subject-substance relations in the various forms of 
ethical life. Hegel’s exposition attempts to demonstrate, in the first place, that 
interpersonal relations are an implicit condition for the existence of individual 
self-consciousness. At this stage the problem ceases to have a solely 
epistemological significance (i.e., of the correspondence between thought and 
object) and instead becomes a problem of social recognition, because the object 
that appears to consciousness is revealed to itself be another free self-
consciousness – i.e., a subject. What is at stake here is the way in which objective 
structures of recognition produce contradictory relations – of mis-recogntion – 
between individual self-consciousnesses. Not only is the subsumption of intuitions 
under concepts that is so fundamental for Kant thereby demoted to a partial and 
limited stage in this conceptual development, but the very constitutive limit of 
knowledge set out by Kant – individual, empirical experience – is superseded as 
consciousness ‘leaves behind it the colourful show of the sensuous here-and-
now’.103 
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Subsequently, at the point in Hegel’s exposition where social relations emerge as 
objective structures rather than contingent relations between isolated individuals, 
with the emergence of spirit, contradiction arises primarily at the level of the 
relation between individual self-conciousnesses – the ‘I’ (subject) – and the forms 
of social relations, or ethical life  – the ‘we’ (substance) – that unite them. 
Although Hegel does not explicitly discuss these contradictions in terms of 
subsumption, their conceptual structure is homologous with what he identifies as, 
on the one hand, the weak synthetic unity of heterogeneous elements, and on the 
other, the coercive determination of individual elements under an abstract 
universality. Insofar as subsumptive relations thus obtain at the level of structures 
of spirit, they are relations between individuals and the universality of the social 
form they exist within and are constituted by (as opposed to simply the 
domination of one self-consciousness by another, as described in the section on 
‘lordship and bondage’). This can occur in terms of the dominant universality of 
the social substance which subsumes individuals with antithetical desires (as in 
the case of ‘ethical life’) or of the alienated abstract universality of individual 
personhood under which the community proper is subsumed (for example, with 
private property in ancient Rome). Here we can find the same structure of double-
determination that was operative in Kant’s theory of subsumption – between (i) 
the individual representations that are bound together by concepts and (ii) the 
relation of these unified representations to the compositional totality in which they 
are unified – in effect at the level of (i) relations (of recognition) between 
individuals and (ii) relations (of recognition) between individuals and the 
community. Andrew Chitty highlights this in his claim that: 
 fully realised (or ‘absolute’) spirit is constituted only when this mutual 
 recognition between individuals that brings into existence a universal self 
 is supplemented by a second mutual recognition between this universal 
 self and the individuals that compose it, or between individuals acting as 
 members of this universal self and the same individuals acting as particular 
 individuals.104 
 It is not necessary to give an in depth analysis of all subsumptive relations 
(and their sublation) in the Phenomenology; what is pertinent to the problematic 
                                                          
104 Andrew Chitty, ‘Species-Being and Capital’, in Karl Marx and Contemporary philosophy, 
edited by Andrew Chitty and Martin McIvor, London: Palgrave Macmillon, 2009, pp. 124-5 
51 
 
as a whole is the fundamental transformation of the concept of the subject that 
Hegel carries out. With Kant, the fixed, transcendental structure of subjectivity 
provides both the context and resources that give rise to subsumptive judgment 
acts. Hegel lauds the Critique of Pure Reason because in it ‘the unity which 
constitutes the nature of the Concept is recognised as the original synthetic unity 
of apperception, as unity of the I think, or of self-consciousness’; but if this 
conception of the I is expanded – as it is in the Phenomenology – then the context 
and resources for subsumption are thereby also altered. 105 Most important for the 
present inquiry is the aforementioned transition, in the course of the process of the 
(subjective) development of spirit, to the exposition of properly social (as opposed 
to merely inter-personal) forms of self-consciousness. This lays the foundation for 
an analysis of subsumption where individuals are subsumed under objectively 
universal structures of sociality which constitute their collective and individual 
identities and practices. We are no longer dealing with synthetic judgment acts 
internal to an individual consciousness, but rather the development of relational 
social forms that determine individual identities and collective practices, in terms 
of both their subjective and objective implications (developed in the 
Phenomenology and Philosophy of Right correspondingly). This is the first 
essential modification to the problem of subsumption that we can find in Hegel.  
 A second, related, aspect to Hegel’s critique of subsumption in Kant 
follows directly (both with respect to the – at least initial – order of the system, 
and in terms of the present problem) from this new concept of the subject as 
process: the issue of the content of that process, i.e., its determinate stages, or 
shapes, and their objective status once the phenomenological derivation of 
ontology (as logic) has been achieved. This consists, first and foremost, in a 
critique of the specific forms of conceptual universality under which subsumption 
can occur, as well as their status as actual abstractions, rather than determinations 
of the object whose validity is limited to its appearance for us. The exposition 
given by Hegel in the Science of Logic seeks to submit the categories of thought 
to a rigorous enquiry that does not depend on their belonging to an empirical 
consciousness (Hegel believed that he had already with the Phenomenology 
achieved the immanent development of self-conscious spirit into logic) but 
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attempts to dialectically develop the determinations of thought out of their own 
immanent content and contradictions.106 Hegel therefore introduces not only a 
new conception of subjectivity, but also of logic, in the course of which the 
conceptual form of subsumption will be posited with a ‘higher’ determinacy. 
 
 From pure concepts to dialectical categories 
 
As we have seen, Kant believed formal logic to be devoid of specific content, 
merely describing the empty functions of thought as such (the judgment forms) 
whose movement was limited to the ‘play of representations’. Yet when 
transcendentally adapted to the form of intuition as ‘pure concepts of the 
understanding’ such forms came to constitute the a priori structure of all 
objective experience. In this adapted form, the concepts enumerated traditional 
metaphysical categories such as quality, quantity, relation etc. Transcendental 
logic was the product of this logicisation of metaphysical concepts, which 
displaced these necessary determinations of the object to the subject-structure 
itself, and then reintroduced them into the cognised object via the subsumptive 
operation. Hegel was broadly in accord with the necessity of such internalisation 
and the explication of a subjectively mediated structure of objectivity. But as with 
Kant’s transcendental deduction of the subject-structure of consciousness, Hegel 
claimed that the specific thought determinations – the categories of the 
understanding – which specify the modes of relating the determinations of the 
object to the unity of the I, were on the one hand, not the product of an immanent 
derivation (he accused Kant of taking up the formal logic on which they were 
based naively from 'ordinary' logic, a largely unmodified Aristotelian theory of 
judgments) and on the other, attenuated by their epistemologically restricted 
validity:107 
 First of all, the Critical Philosophy subjects to investigation the validity of 
 the concepts of the understanding that are used in metaphysics, but also in 
 the other sciences and in ordinary representation. This critique does not 
 involve itself with the content, however, or with the determinate mutual 
 relationship of these thought-determinations to each other; instead, it 
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 considers them according to the antithesis of subjectivity and objectivity in 
 general. […] The more detailed forms of the a priori, i.e., of thinking 
 which, in spite of its objectivity, is interpreted as a merely subjective 
 activity, are presented […] in a systematic order which, it may be 
 remarked, rests only upon psychological-historical foundations.108 
 Now because the interest of the Kantian philosophy was directed to the so-
 called transcendental aspect of the categories, the treatment of the 
 categories themselves yielded a blank result; what they are in themselves 
 without the abstract relation to the ego common to all, what is their 
 specific nature relatively to each other and their relationship to each other, 
 this has not been made an object of consideration.109 
Hegel therefore proposes in the Science of Logic (continuing the efforts of his 
Jena system) to undertake a complete reconstruction of the categories of pure 
thought. One of the central premises of this project is the rejection of Kant’s 
initially logical distinction between the form and content of thinking; an 
assumption that is problematically reproduced at the level of the relation of 
concepts and intuition, giving rise to the need for transcendental subsumption in 
order to establish their correspondence. Instead Hegel proposes to take the 
categories of thought as at the same time both the content and form of a scientific 
enquiry into thinking: 
 It is quite inept to say that logic abstracts from all content, that it teaches 
 only the rules of thinking without any reference to what is thought or 
 without being able to consider its nature. For as thinking and the rules of 
 thinking are supposed to be the subject matter of logic, these directly 
 constitute its peculiar content.  
 Far from [objective thinking] being formal, far from it standing in need of 
 a matter to constitute an actual and true cognition, it is its content alone 
 which has absolute truth, or, if one still wanted to employ the word matter, 
 it is the veritable matter — but a matter which is not external to the form, 
 since this matter is rather pure thought and hence the absolute form 
 itself.110 
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109 Hegel, Science of Logic, p. 63. 
110 Ibid, pp. 44; 49-50. 
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By asserting the identity of the form and the content of thought within a single 
self-developing process (whose ‘method’ is also not be distinguished from its 
‘matter’) not only is Hegel able to claim that his exposition constitutes a 
systematic derivation, i.e. one in which each determination emerges immanently 
from the dialectical critique and determinate negation of the previous (something 
Kant never achieved, instead articulating his categories in parallel), but also that 
its results have an objective validity (because the determinations of logic are 
actual moments of a reality far more ‘concrete’ than the sensory show of empirical 
experience) rather than merely being subjective forms of thought pertaining to the 
individual consciousness in its opposition to the object: ‘the science of logic in 
dealing with the thought determinations which in general run through our mind 
instinctively and unconsciously […] will also be a reconstruction of those which 
are singled out by reflection and are fixed by it as subjective forms external to the 
matter and import of the determinations of thought’.111 All such ‘lifeless’ 
determinations of the understanding, which had been reduced by the logic of the 
time to analytical, mechanical (begriffloses – concept-less, irrational) procedures, 
are, in Hegel’s logic, enfolded within the sequence of logical forms in their 
immanent development. It is by virtue of this speculative identity of concepts and 
the Concept that critical philosophy’s antithesis between the limited, abstract 
universality of the conceptual content of thought and the distributed universality 
of its ‘external’ ground in individual consciousness is dissolved: 
 The antithesis between form and content, which is given special validity 
 when the Concept is supposed to be what is only formal, now lies behind 
 us, together with all the other antitheses that reflection keeps fixed. They 
 have been overcome dialectically, i.e., through themselves; and it is 
 precisely the Concept that contains all the earlier determinations of 
 thinking sublated within itself. Certainly the Concept must be considered 
 as a form, but it is a form that is infinite and creative, one that both 
 encloses the plenitude of all content within itself, and at the same time 
 releases it from itself.112 
The second essential modification of subsumption that we find with Hegel is 
therefore the idea that those determinations of the object through which 
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subsumption might occur can only be understood in the fullness of their truth by 
grasping their place, and actuality, within the systematic totality of determinations 
in which externality and synthesis are sublated in the course of the organic 
development of mediating conditions. 
 These two aspects to Hegel’s critique of Kant therefore articulate the unity 
of the processual subjective totality, and with it the function and implications of 
subsumption, on an entirely new conceptual plane. On one hand, it is the 
development of the process as a whole that gives unity and meaning to the various 
moments of its existence. On the other hand, the categories themselves, in their 
dialectical interrelation and development out of one another, are precisely what 
constitutes the determinate moments of the process. So the basic Kantian structure 
of apperception has been retained, but the scope of the “I” and its moments have 
been both expanded and given a higher degree of conceptual coherence. An 
important question arises at this point. Namely, how subsumption fits within the 
general movement of the Concept as both a constitutive feature of the movement 
as such, but also as a part of one of its determinate stages, or moments (which as a 
partial and thus inadequate moment will be abolished in the course of its 
development). Is this a repeat of the tension between synthesis and subsumption 
we found in Kant? i.e., the tension of process and act? And is this resolved with 
Hegel’s speculative repositioning of subsumption at a specific moment in the 
exposition of the concept as whole?  
 
Subsumption’s place in the exposition 
 
A consequence of Hegel’s speculative re-founding of logic is that subsumption, 
like any other logical determination, cannot simply be grasped as an abstractly 
self-sufficient conceptual relation that is then applied to a content independent of 
it. Instead, its truth and meaning must be established by virtue of its place within 
the concrete totality. Subsumption’s conceptual determinacy therefore emerges at 
the stage in the concept’s self-development at which it is ‘posited’, although it 
should be noted that it is not for Hegel a logical category proper in the way that 
‘quality’, ‘ground’ or ‘the judgment’ are. Hegel’s discussion of subsumption 
arises in the ‘subjective’ logic, i.e. that part of the logic that deals not with the 
‘ontological’ determinations of objects, but with the forms of subjective thinking 
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taken at the same time as the concept’s own object. Such forms broadly 
correspond to the traditional entities of logic: the concept, judgment and syllogism 
– those that originally gave rise to the problem of subsumption from Aristotle 
onwards, and notably with Kant. The treatment of these forms emerges in logic 
once the essential determinations of the object have been developed to their 
highest form as ‘substance’, but the subjective side of thinking that grasps such 
determinations remains only implicit, such that the antithesis between concepts 
and the Concept (what for Kant would correspond to understanding and reason) 
has not been overcome (even if it has been methodologically alluded to). This is 
what the ‘doctrine of the concept’ undertakes to do, by developing the various 
functions of unity which relate the determinations of being with the reflected 
determinations of essence, leading to the freedom of the concept in its 
externalisation and return to self (resolving concepts into the concept). 
 Structurally, Hegel’s exposition mirrors the Kantian treatment of 
subsumption in his lectures on formal logic, beginning with the immediacy of the 
concept, then demonstrating its mediation through acts of judgment, and finally 
placing these discrete acts within the syllogistic form that can then be extended to 
produce chains of inferential, or mediated, reasoning. But in critiquing the 
subjective forms of the concept from the perspective of his transformed 
conception of the subject-structure, and the systematic derivation of its 
determinate content, Hegel gives a new perspective on the conceptual structure, 
content and most importantly the limits, of the subsumptive relation. 
 For Hegel, the first shape of the subjective concept is its discreteness as a 
concept (rather than the concept), which in its first mode of appearance is 
associated with the abstract universality of concepts of the understanding: ‘The 
[Concept] in the guise of immediacy constitutes the point of view for which the 
[Concept] is a subjective thinking, a reflection external to the subject matter’.113 
Here the concept is statically self-identical and bears only an external relation to 
any content which might be contained subsumptively under it; it therefore lacks 
concreteness. But precisely this specific determinacy of its content contradicts the 
universality of its form (as concept), revealing it to be only a limited form of 
universality – a ‘particularised’ universal: 
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 [the concept’s] abstract determinations are eternal essentialities only in 
 respect of their form; but their content is at variance with this form; 
 therefore they are not truth, or imperishable. Their content is at variance 
 with the form, because it is not determinateness itself as universal; that is, 
 it is not totality of the Notion's difference, or not itself the whole form; but 
 the form of the limited understanding is itself the imperfect form, namely, 
 abstract universality.114 
 The simple concept therefore splits into its two moments: universal and 
particular. These are ‘diverse’ and ‘opposed’ moments of the concept, which as 
John Burbidge points out in his commentary to the logic, ‘function as particulars 
vis-a-vis each other, even though one of the particulars is called the universal’115. 
Finally these two antithetical aspects are united in the singular (Einzelne) concept, 
which constitutes the third moment, and the unity of the concept as such in all its 
moments: ‘as the second negation, that is, as negation of the negation, it 
is absolute determinateness or singularity and concreteness’116. A higher form of 
universality that incorporates these differentiations is thereby posited, over and 
above the initial abstractness of the ‘simple’ concept. 
 Universality, particularity and singularity are thus for Hegel the ‘genuine 
distinctions’ or ‘types’ of the concept, but to think them apart as discrete 
existences is still to grasp them via ‘external reflection’, and this is the limit of the 
singular concept’s universality, because ‘the Concept as such does not abide 
within itself, without development (as the understanding would have it); on the 
contrary, being the infinite form, the Concept is totally active.’117 Hegel therefore 
goes on to develop the implicit condition for the existence of these moments of 
the concept in their concreteness, which is the activity of their ‘immanent 
distinguishing and determining […] in the judgment’, this is the movement of 
thought that generates their distinctness and then holds it together, so Hegel 
asserts, much like Kant, that ‘to judge is to determine the Concept.’118 It is here, in 
the active articulation of the relations between conceptual determinations, that 
Hegel’s main discussion of subsumption arises. 
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 For Hegel judgment always and necessarily ‘particularises’ the concept by 
explicitly positing the relations between its ‘independent extremes’, universal 
(predicate) and singular (logico-grammatical subject), each of which is itself 
already a concept. It thus develops the Concept’s own reality out of itself, or its 
own essential determinations: ‘The judgment can therefore be called the 
proximate realisation of the [Concept], inasmuch as reality denotes its general 
entry into existence as a determinate being.’119 Judgment is the concept’s 
actualising activity, and its significance points beyond the subjective emptiness of 
its formal logical character. But it takes at first, the ‘subjective’ form of an 
‘external unity’ posited between the two concepts that occupy the subject and 
predicate positions: 
 The judgment has in general for its sides totalities which to begin with are 
 essentially self-subsistent. The unity of the [Concept] is, therefore, at first 
 only a relation of self-subsistents […] From this subjective standpoint, 
 then, subject and predicate are considered to be complete, each on its own 
 account, apart from the other: the subject as an object that would exist 
 even if it did not possess this predicate; the predicate as a universal 
 determination that would exist even if it did not belong to this subject.120 
So whilst the relating of subject and predicate has been posited explicitly, the 
relation remains abstract. The judgment is characterised by the antithesis of 
subsumption and inherence, which mirrors the tension we have already developed 
between the two universalities of the subject-structure and its determinations. The 
abstractly universal property inheres in the subject, whilst the subject is subsumed 
under the predicate. 
 Since the predicate is thus distinct from the subject, it is only 
 an isolated determinateness of the latter, only one of its properties; while 
 the subject itself is the concrete, the totality of manifold 
 determinatenesses, just as the predicate contains one; it is the universal. 
 But on the other hand the predicate, too, is a self-subsistent universality 
 and the subject, conversely, only a determination of it. Looked at this way, 
 the predicate subsumes the subject; [singularity] and particularity are not 
 for themselves, but have their essence and substance in the universal. The 
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 predicate expresses the subject in its [Concept]; the individual and the 
 particular are contingent determinations in the subject; it is their absolute 
 possibility. When in the case of subsumption one thinks of an external 
 connection of subject and predicate and the subject is conceived of as a 
 self-subsistent something, the subsumption refers to the subjective act of 
 judgment above-mentioned in which one starts from the self-subsistence 
 of both subject and predicate. From this standpoint subsumption is only 
 the application of the universal to a particular or an individual, which is 
 placed under the universal in accordance with a vague idea that it is of 
 inferior quality.121 
Because of their initially presupposed externality, subject and predicate attain only 
to an abstract, ‘differenceless identity’ – that posited in the “is” of the copula, yet 
at the same time this ‘is’ asserts the supersession of this external relation, insofar 
as it posits an identity of being between the two extremes: ‘the copula indicates 
that the predicate belongs to the being of the subject and is not merely externally 
combined with it’.122 The contradictory structure of judgment is that it renders 
explicit both the self-subsistence of the independent extremes and their abstract 
identity in the copula; whilst their sublating into a higher unity is only implicitly 
contained in the form as a whole, and remains undeveloped. The relation is truly 
antithetical then, on the one hand the discrete identity of each is constituted by its 
relation to the other, on the other their posited identity is undermined by their 
mutual externality. Each absorbs the other from the standpoint of its own abstract 
universality (subsumption of the subject under the predicate, inherence of the 
predicate in the subject), but at this stage no standpoint of higher unity that would 
sublate these oppositions is posited concretely.  
 Subsumption first arises as one side of the judgment in general, but it is in 
Hegel’s exposition of the ‘judgment of reflection’ that it emerges as the dominant 
or characteristic logical shape of the judgment as a whole, and is treated in detail. 
Here, rather than the determination of predicate as just one of the subject’s 
multiple properties, as was the case in the judgment of existence, ‘it is the subject 
rather that is alterable and awaits determination’ by the predicate, which ‘no 
longer inheres in the subject; it is rather the implicit being under which this 
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individual is subsumed as an accidental’123. In these reflective judgments the 
predicate unilaterally ‘constitutes the basis by which, and in accordance with 
which, the subject is to be measured and determined’, so that it receives a concrete 
identity only as a manifestation of the conceptual richness of the predicate.124 
 Hegel goes on to develop the various modes of subsumption of the subject 
under the predicate, in which the subject develops itself into a progressively 
universalised form: from the singular judgment (x is y), to the particular judgment 
(these or some x’s are y), to the universal judgment (all x’s are y) in which subject 
and predicate reach apparent equality. But even at this developed point, the 
universality of the relation is only: 
 the external universality of reflection, allness; 'all' means all individuals, 
 and in it the individual remains unchanged. This universality is, therefore, 
 only a taking together of independently existing individuals; it is the 
 community of a property which only belongs to them in comparison. It 
 is this community that is usually the first thing that occurs to subjective, 
 unphilosophical thinking when universality is mentioned. It is given as the 
 obvious reason why a determination is to be  regarded as universal that it 
 belongs to a number of things.125 
In the distinction between this ‘allness’ and the true universality of the Concept, it 
is clear that subsumptive judgment has not overcome the antithesis holding 
subjectivity and determinateness apart; it is only a one sided relation in which the 
subject is the ‘essential appearance’ of the predicate’s implicit universality. This 
is because both predicate and subject remain abstract extremes: 
 if the abstract universal which is the predicate falls short of constituting a 
 [Concept], for a [Concept] certainly implies something more, and if, too, a 
 subject of this kind is not yet much more than a grammatical one, how 
 should the judgment possibly contain truth seeing that either its [Concept] 
 and object do not agree, or it lacks both [Concept] and object? On the 
 contrary, then, what is impossible and absurd is to attempt to grasp the 
 truth in such forms as the positive judgment and the judgment generally.126 
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This, then, is the constitutive limit of the subsumptive relation for Hegel, its 
universality is stunted at the point of ‘allness’, it can only determine its own being 
in the subject unilaterally and externally, it has no deeper reach to an explicit unity 
with that which it subsumes. As Hegel goes on to show, this ‘allness’ will develop 
its implicit universality into the ‘genus’, ‘the universality which is in its own self a 
concrete’. 127 The genus holds both the richness of determinations and the ground 
of unity together, such that it 'does not inhere in the subject […] but it is no 
longer subsumed in its predicate’ either.128 By rendering explicit the immediate 
identity of subject and predicate the very character of the judgment has become 
objective, and crucially the antithesis between the poles has been sublated into a 
diverse unity: ‘when the predicate is determined to objective universality, it ceases 
to be subsumed under such a determination of relation, or comprehensive 
reflection’.129 Now it is the copula, rather than either of the extremes that 
constitutes the true universal, at the point at which the identity of subject and 
predicate is rendered explicit and their difference is dissolved: 
 ‘Subject and predicate are therefore identical, that is they have coalesced 
 into the copula. This identity is the genus or absolute nature of a thing. In 
 so far, therefore, as this identity again sunders itself into a judgment it is 
 the inner nature through which subject and predicate are related to one 
 another — a relation of necessity in which these terms of the judgment are 
 only unessential differences.’130  
With this the antithetical relation between conceptual determinations has been 
sublated and ‘the form of the judgment has perished […] because subject and 
predicate are in themselves the same content’, a content which is now unified in 
the syllogism.131 
 The subsumptive relation taken as self-subsistent has therefore in the 
course of the exposition been shown by Hegel to only ever determine a limited 
form of universality, which does not properly belong to the subject. Here is 
Hegel’s critique of subsumption as such (as a logical form), because once the 
relation of difference between conceptual determinations has resolved itself into a 
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truly universal identity, the relation between universal, particular and singular is 
no longer subsumptive – each moment is equally universal and the relation 
becomes that between universal, universal and universal. Subsumption therefore 
falls away in the movement from fixed and simple immediacies to the living 
dynamic totality, which incorporates all of these putatively self-sufficient 
moments into the whole. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The ‘critical’ concept of subsumption is first developed by Kant in response the 
problem of how distinct cognitive orders and elements can be related and unified 
in the absence a self-evident or naturally given taxonomy of species and genera. 
In his attempt to establish the truth of experience, Kant’s critique of apparently 
self-sufficient forms of objectivity reveals them to be conditioned by a complex 
series of form-determining processes that synthetically unify the sensibly given 
manifold according to a dominant order of rational consistency. In this ‘critical’ 
sense, subsumption expresses a relation of determination, or belonging, between 
two essentially heterogeneous elements or orders; a relation that is made possible 
by their common ground in a unified medium of composition, which at the same 
time is given consistency only by virtue of the subsumptive judgments that it 
enables. So we have a kind of reflexive circuit, or self-grounding structure, that 
emerges from this new conception; a reciprocity between the act of subsumption 
and its subjective ground or compositional totality. There is one direct result of 
this that bears on the basic logical scheme of universal, particular and singular that 
is of special interest here, because it will be crucial for thinking about 
subsumption in Marx’s writings. This is that on this account, there can be no 
unmediated subsumption of singularity by a universal that stands outside it. 
Instead, subsumption can only occur through a mediation that has its basis in the 
unifying structure in which both the singular and the universal are ‘composed’. To 
put it another way – particularity is always a mediated result. (And logically, this 
suggests that subsumption is better thought as a syllogistic process, rather than a 
form of judgment). 
 Hegel devotes little explicit discussion to subsumptive relations, and it 
certainly does not play a central role in his system in the way that it does for Kant. 
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Nonetheless, his engagement with the broader aspects of the problematic 
enumerated above have important consequences the development of the concept 
of subsumption, opening the way in many respects for Marx’s theorisation of it. 
For Kant the transcendental subject is a fixed structure of unity within which both 
concepts and intuitions are composed (and can therefore be related 
subsumptively). Hegel not only recognised the importance of such a unity, in 
which heterogeneous elements could be correlated, but he criticised Kant for not 
developing it far enough, for not producing a properly ‘philosophical’ unity at the 
level of this structure. In the first place, Hegel disparages the weakness of the 
subsumptive-synthetic relation between concepts and intuitions because he thinks 
that they unite the two elements of cognition in an ‘external, superficial way’. 
Then following this, Hegel takes issue with the relation posited by Kant between 
concepts of the understanding and the ‘I’ in which they are grounded. In contrast 
to this, Hegel says that sensible intuition and concepts are forms of ‘a content that 
remains one and the same’. Instead of conceiving of subjectivity of consciousness 
as a static aggregation of principles and powers that are unified in a structure of 
reflexive closure, Hegel attempted to grasp it in the Phenomenology as the 
dynamic movement of knowing passing through the various stages of its 
immanent self-development. From this perspective the basic structure of Kantian 
subjectivity only represents a partial moment in a larger process, because for 
Hegel, no single structure or ‘shape of consciousness’ taken in isolation can be 
thought of as the ‘true standpoint’ of knowledge, but rather all the stages in the 
totality of their development constitute this truth as a unified movement.  
 The reflexive closure that defines the relation between form and totality in 
Kantian philosophy is thereby transformed into a processual concept of subject 
(and totality), which is no longer indifferent to the determinations of universality 
that it employs, but rather only exists in, and as the unity of, these determinations. 
This also indicates a transition from a synchronic set of universals or faculties – a 
fixed ‘field of categories’ – to a diachronic sequence of subjective structures – 
each with their own ‘set’ or ‘field’ – that are immanently connected in their 
dialectical development, rather than related through the mediation of their 
common abstract and fixed grounding. What Hegel thus achieves is a new 
conception of how acts of relational determination (such as subsumption) interact 
with the structure of unity in which their relata are situated. From the standpoint 
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of this unity the subsumption of particulars under the universal (or universals) is 
not an infinitely self-same act, but rather takes on a fundamentally different 
character and produces vastly different effects depending on the stage of 
development at which it occurs, and at the same time drives that development 
onwards. So Hegel opens the structure of fixed determinations that defined 
Kantian subjectivity and makes it part of a process of dynamic dialectical 
development. The act of subsuming some particular under a universal, can, in any 
given stage of this process, only constitute a partial and limited shape of the whole 
– meaning that it doesn’t have the same degree of immediate reciprocity as it did 
for Kant, where the whole was grounded in a single structure of determination. 
The subject now represents a developmental rather than simply reflexive or 
structural unity. Not just a closed set of relations, but an immanent movement in 
which any such closure is negated. What this means is that the significance and 
effect of any act of subsumption can only be grasped with reference to its place 
within the systematic totality of determinations – which is the only standpoint 
from which it could be determined as actual.  
 In the Phenomenology this processual concept of subjective development 
results in the supersession of the finite standpoint of an isolated consciousness and 
the development of the social concept of subjectivity that emerges with the 
transition from subject-object relations through subject-subject, and then subject-
substance relations in the various forms of ethical life. Hegel’s exposition 
attempts to demonstrate, in the first place, that interpersonal relations are an 
implicit condition for the existence of the individual self-consciousness that 
characterizes the standpoint of Kant’s philosophy. Not only is the subsumption of 
intuitions under concepts that is so fundamental for Kant thereby demoted to a 
partial and limited stage in this conceptual development, but the very constitutive 
limit of knowledge set out by Kant – individual, empirical experience – is 
exploded (to use Adorno’s phrase) as consciousness ‘leaves behind it the colourful 
show of the sensuous here-and-now’.132 The resulting emergence of social 
relations as objective structures of spirit, generates contradictions at the level of 
the relation between individual self-conciousnesses – the ‘I’ (subject) – and the 
ensemble of social relation within which they are united – the ‘we’ (substance). 
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Subsumptive relations thus appear within structures of spirit as that which binds 
particular individuals to the universality of the social form they exist within and 
are constituted by. This is hugely important for Marx’s thinking on subsumption, 
as it lays the foundation for an analysis of processes through which individuals are 
subsumed under objective structures of sociality which constitute their identities 
and practices at a collective and individual level. We are no longer dealing with 
synthetic judgment acts of an individual consciousness, but rather the 
development of relational forms that determine the practical action of 
‘individuals’ in a collective context. 
 But despite the complexity introduced by Hegel into a critical concept of 
subsumption, and his demolition of the reflexive closure of apperception 
supporting the coherence of Kant’s account of determining subsumption, he 
himself introduces a form of theoretical closure which overdetermines the scope 
of subsumptive relations. Hegel imprisons the relation between conceptuality and 
objectivity, universality and particularity, and between the ‘field of categories’ 
and the elements to which they give form, within a speculatively totalised 
developmental series. The full truth of any discrete element as well as any 
synchronic ‘shape’ or configuration of categories within this series can only be 
registered with reference to the (speculative) unity of the process as a whole. This 
ultimately leads Hegel to criticise – entirely correctly – the logical relation of 
subsumption on the basis of its immanently contradictory character, and to derive 
its truth from the dynamic mediation of the syllogism at the apex of the Logic. But 
the logical ‘completeness’ of this derivation and the total series of the system 
within which it is inscribed, endows it, as a compositional medium, with a 
similarly self-grounding and self-sufficient quality to Kant’s transcendental 
subject. Both accounts of subsumption are therefore marked by a theoretical 
closure of the totality, as reflexive closure of the structure or speculative closure of 
dialectical development, respectively. This establishes the limit point of the 
critical-philosophical concept of subsumption, given that it is a theoretically 
bound totality that circumscribes the limits of relation, form and composition. 
What remains to be considered are the possibilities and qualities of subsumptive 
relations whose truth and meaning cannot be determined within a purely 
theoretical context. 
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Chapter 2: Materialism, Social Form & Reproduction 
 
 
Vulgar criticism […] discovers contradictions everywhere. […] a 
truly philosophical criticism of the present constitution does not 
content itself with showing that it contains contradictions: it 
explains them, comprehends their genesis, their necessity. It grasps 
their particular significance. This act of comprehension does not 
however consist, as Hegel thinks, in discovering the 
determinations of the concepts of logic at every point; it consists in 
the discovery of the particular logic of the particular object.1 
 
 
This chapter traces the development from a critical-philosophical to a critical-
social concept of subsumption (and conceptual relations more broadly) through a 
general reconstruction, and extension, of what can in the most general terms 
simply be called Marx’s ‘materialism’. This materialism emerges from Marx’s 
critique of philosophy (in both its idealist and ‘traditional’ materialist variants), 
finds its first iteration in his famous eleven theses On Feuerbach and acts as a 
consistent (although progressively more sophisticated) theoretical framework 
right through to Capital, where the key elements are introduced to conceptualise it 
in its most developed form: as a materialism of the social reproduction process. 
This reconstructive endeavour draws heavily on the work of Mexican-Ecuadoran 
philosopher Bolívar Echeverría, who from the 1970s onwards emphasized and 
sought to elaborate upon the originality and richness of Marx’s discourse on 
materialism and its centrality – however textually implicit – to Marx’s later work. 
In addition to its more general scope and effects, this account of materialism acts 
as the key theoretical mediation between the strictly philosophical accounts of 
subsumption presented by Kant and Hegel and what is normally considered to be 
a strictly socio-economic theory of ‘subsumption under capital’ outlined by Marx 
in his ‘mature’ works. Whilst the turn to human practice and history ostensibly 
represents a break with the limits of philosophical discourse it is crucial to note 
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that this occurs, at least in part, as a critique of and through the categories of that 
discourse, which are not thereby jettisoned altogether but rather ‘refunctioned’, as 
Hans-Georg Backhaus argues: 
Upon examination of the Marxian conception, already at first sight it 
becomes visible that it is based on a large number of refunctioned 
conceptual pairs and problems of philosophical provenance. Yet two 
complexes of problems dominate: on the one hand, the problem of 
universals, i.e. the problem of the synthesis between the general and the 
particular or the individual respectively; on the other hand, the subject-
object problem. Moreover, there are the relations between being and 
semblance, essence and appearance, being and significance, being and 
becoming, substance and relation, premise and result, act and entity, 
concept and existence.2 
It is by virtue of this that we can identify a persistent relevance of the central 
problems and motifs of subsumption developed at a philosophical level (form-
determination, compositional totality, reciprocity and subjectivity) to their new 
theoretical context: the ‘real life’ of ‘social humanity’ in its ‘natural form’ of 
reproduction and the subsumption of individuals ‘under social production’. In 
contrast to an alleged break between an early ‘humanist’ Marx and a late 
‘scientific’ or ‘economic’ Marx, focusing on the status of the key conceptual co-
ordinates of the problem of subsumption allows us to pursue a coherent line of 
thinking that not only relates Marx’s early critique of philosophy to his critique of 
political economy, but also connects the latter back to former. This allows us to 
theorise what is at stake in capitalist subsumption in a richer manner than Marx 
himself, by exploring its underlying conceptual structure and premises. 
Two principal questions emerge as we survey this line of development 
from philosophy to Marx’s materialism. Firstly, what kind of ‘logic’ is employed 
by Marx’s materialist critique and what is the logical structure of that critique?3 
The second question is that of how the very idea of logic is itself is transformed as 
‘we pass from the problem of knowledge, where Kant and Hegel principally 
                                                          
2 Hans-Georg Backhaus, Dialektik der Wertform: Untersuchungen zur Marxschen Ökonomiekritik, 
Frieburg, Ca ira-Verlag 1997, p.26 (I am grateful to Melanie Waha for help with translation of this 
passage). 
3 Cf. on this question Jindrich Zeleny’s pathbreaking work The Logic of Marx [1968], translated 
by Terrell Carver, New York: Rowman &. Littlefield, 1980. 
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situated and treated it, to the problems linked with the constitutive and constituent 
phenomena of social reality resulting from dynamic and complex capitalist social 
relations’.4 The relation between these two questions, and what ultimately 
establishes the condition of intelligibly for them both, turns on Marx’s 
understanding of history and the dialectical interpenetration of thought and being 
it stipulates. It is the introduction of historical openness that explodes the 
theoretical closure of totality which in Kant and Hegel’s philosophies 
overdetermine the relations between subjective activity, actuality and form. By 
grasping this relation as ‘natural-history’, and in its processual realisation, as 
‘reproduction-development’, Marx’s materialism develops an entirely new 
perspective on the problem of subsumption that is able to grasp it as operative 
beyond a strictly ideal context: as subsumption to social forms. 
 
Critical beginnings 
 
In a condensed but illuminating set of ‘Introductory Notes on the Subsumption of 
Labour under Capital’, Carlos Castillo Mendoza identifies the first of three 
periods in which the concept of subsumption is used by Marx with his Critique of 
Hegel’s Philosophy of Right in 1843. ‘Here, subsumption appears as a logical 
operation with which Hegel conceals a political operation’.5 If apparent forms of 
logical identity were criticised by Kant and Hegel to reveal active processes of 
synthesis, mediation and form-determination, then this much is also true of 
Marx’s earliest use of subsumption. But where Kant and Hegel discovered further 
subjective processes and ideal relations subtending the subsumption of particulars 
under universals, thereby deepening and enriching the philosophical logics they 
employed, the radicality of Marx’s orientation consists in the fact that what he 
critically exposed beneath an apparently harmonic subsumption was not further 
philosophical mediations, but pertained to a political dimension and ‘real’, that is 
non-ideal, processes. At its most profound level, this indicates an entirely new 
articulation of logical relations with social being, that points to the development 
of materialism as an original theoretical standpoint. In its initial sense, established 
                                                          
4 Carlos Alberto Castillo Mendoza, ‘Notas introductorias sobre subsunción del trabajo en el 
capital’, Iralka 17, 2002, p. 5. 
5 Ibid. 
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in Marx’s writings from 1843/4 onwards, this theoretical orientation is already 
grounded on a new plane of engagement that marks a shift beyond the critique of 
philosophy to the critique of social reality, a new object for theory (a new sphere 
of ‘actuality’) that at the same time assigns to theory a new role, and 
concomitantly entails an entirely new mode of conceptualising what a 
subsumptive process entails (of what, by what, under what). Insofar as the 
conceptual focus guiding Marx’s thought retains from Kant and Hegel’s work the 
centrality of the question of form-determination, it differs from those previous 
philosophies as to the ultimate grounds from which this act originates and, as a 
consequence, its adequate theoretical expression: revolutionary, practical, 
historical materialism. 
Crucial in engendering this theoretical reorientation was the inescapable 
historical need, in the wake of Hegel’s thought, for post-Hegelian philosophies 
to take up positions – affirmative, revisionist or critical – in relation to the ‘total 
system’ (marked, as we have seen, by a structure of speculative closure). The 
debates that arose in this context centred primarily on the problem of the 
relation of the system to the existing world – Europe of the 1830s & 40s – and 
above all else, turned on the question of how to interpret Hegel’s famous 
double-dictum from the Philosophy of Right that ‘what is rational is actual and 
what is actual is rational’.6 Whilst Hegel’s philosophy might have been 
acknowledged to be characterised by self-sufficiency and completeness 
(‘rationality’) at a theoretical level, qua philosophy, the ‘left’ and ‘young’ 
Hegelian critics that followed in his wake nonetheless perceived an inadequacy 
in its ‘actuality’ (Wirklichkeit), and in contending that the rational was not yet 
actual in world-historical terms thus claimed that there was still yet a need for 
its actualisation or realisation (alternate renderings of ‘Verwirklichung’). The 
divergent positions within post-Hegelian thought therefore split on basis of 
how they conceived of the unity or disunity of the ‘rational’ and the ‘actual’, 
and the philosophical and political implications that followed from that, which 
is to say they differed over how, if it was indeed deemed necessary, this 
realisation was to be undertaken. Such differences were not merely the product 
of divergent political ‘applications’ of an uncontested Hegelian philosophy, but 
                                                          
6 Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right [1821], translated by H. B. Nisbett, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1991, preface. 
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rather had their basis in fundamentally conflicting interpretations of the system 
as a whole, as Emmanuel Renault points out: 
The Right conceived of realization as “Realisierung”, through the model 
of the transition of the Science of the Logic into the Philosophy of Nature. 
On the contrary, the Left conceived of realization as “Verwirklichung”, 
through the model of the realization of freedom in the world historical 
process. According to Left-Hegelian interpretation of the double dictum, 
contemporary culture and society was not yet rational but still in a process 
of rationalization. 7 
What would it mean, in these terms, for the rational to be actual? For the system 
to be realised? (as the ‘right’ Hegelians claimed to have been the case and the 
‘left’ denied). For Hegel, Wirklichkeit, actuality, indicates not simply that 
something is (actuality is not mere existence), but that it is in the highest sense, as 
free, self-subsistent existence, the ‘unity of particularity and universality’ or 
‘essence and existence’: ‘in it, formless essence an unstable appearance, or mere 
subsistence devoid of all determination and unstable manifoldness have their 
truth’.8 Something therefore attains actuality for Hegel, much as for Aristotle, 
through the manifestation of its inner essence in an outer existence, in 
‘particularising itself’ in a determinate material content, actualising its 
potentiality:  
That which exists for itself only, is a possibility, a potentiality; but has not 
yet emerged into Existence. A second element must be introduced in order 
to produce actuality — viz. actuation, realisation; and whose motive 
power is the Will — the activity of man in the widest sense.’9 
Hegel expresses this idea of actualisation through externalisation most forcefully 
in the Science of Logic, in the lapidary formulation ‘What is actual can act’ (was 
wirklich ist kann wirken), going on to qualify the act in terms of its power to 
produce (systemic) effects: ‘Something manifests its actuality through that which 
it produces’.10 This production, finally, ‘proves’ the actuality of a being insofar as 
it manifests itself outwardly in an other that nonetheless remains identical with it 
                                                          
7 Emmanuel Renault, ‘The Early Marx and Hegel: the Young-Hegelian Mediation’, 2012: 
http://marxandphilosophy.org.uk/assets/files/society/word-docs/renault2012.doc [accessed Feb 
2014], p. 5. 
8 Hegel, Science of Logic, p. 546. 
9 Hegel, The Philosophy of History [1837], translated by J. Sibree, New York: Dover, 2004, p. 22. 
10 Hegel, Science of Logic, p. 546. 
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(what Hegel describes in the Phenomenology of Spirit as ‘pure self-recognition in 
absolute otherness’) rendering this other a moment of its self-expression, its 
freedom, ‘what is actual can preserve itself in otherness, i.e., objectify itself.’11 
This unity of inner and outer constitutes a self-subsistent totality, a singular 
composition that encompasses all of its various determinations within itself. 
Actuality is therefore always the product of a dialectical process that totalizes its 
constituent conditions, the multiplicity of determinations through which it passes 
or is made up of, as Beatrice Longuenesse states: ‘actuality is not something that 
is ontologically given, but the ultimate moment of reflection’, it is a result rather 
than a starting point (this is crucial, because it is one of the foundational 
speculative principles that Marx would come to overturn).12 And yet actuality is 
not only this result taken in isolation, it is also the process, the activity of the 
system itself in and as each of these determinations, ‘actuality is self-movement’, 
Hegel says.13 The actual is thus the truth of the dialectical whole in its various 
moments of posited particularity; this is why Hegel associates it with both the 
‘idea’ and ‘living spirit’, that which is:  
not an essence that is already finished and complete before its 
manifestation, keeping itself aloof behind its host of appearances, but an 
essence which is truly actual only through the specific forms of its 
necessary self-manifestation.14 
For the system of speculative philosophy to be actual, then, its inner rationality 
(its freedom) would have to be proven outwardly in and as a forming and ordering 
of the substance of world-spirit; it would have to have actualised itself, to have 
made the world rational, and itself worldly, by subsuming or sublating the 
irrational elements of external existence to its comprehensive order of being. 
                                                          
11 Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right, §82. 
12 Béatrice Longuenesse, Hegel's Critique of Metaphysics, translated by Nicole J. Simek, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007, p. 113. 
13 Hegel, The Phenomenology of Spirit, §23. 
14 Hegel, The Philosophy of Mind (Part Three of The Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical 
Sciences) [1817], translated by W. Wallace and A.V. Miller, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1971, §378 (Zusatz). It is interesting to note the resemblance between this passage and Marx and 
Engel’s famous statement in the German Ideology that ‘Communism is not for us a state of affairs, 
which is to be established, an ideal, according to which actuality has to be set aright. We call 
communism the actual movement, which transforms [aufhebt] the current state of affairs.’ Marx 
and Engels, ‘Feuerbach’, in ‘Marx and Engels's "German ideology" Manuscripts Presentation and 
Analysis of the "Feuerbach chapter", edited and translated by Terrell Carver and Daniel Blank, 
New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014, p. 93. 
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Repudiating the accomplishment of this theoretically described unification of 
the ideal and existent and thus holding that the project of actualisation was still 
underway, left Hegelianism asserted that philosophy had an active rather than 
contemplative role to play in this process; it bore the ongoing task of criticizing 
the irrational aspects of the contemporary world whilst highlighting its rational 
dimensions, thereby guiding the course of its historical progression. But despite 
contesting speculative rationality’s actuality, such postures remained, according 
to the most radical of the critical responses to Hegelian thought – represented by 
the diverse stances of Ruge, Feuerbach, Bauer and Marx – largely committed to 
the methodology and objectives of the Hegelian system as a whole, departing only 
from the Hegelian right in asserting the need for and demanding its ‘immediate 
application’.15 The ‘young’ Hegelians interpreted such demands as an 
‘accommodation’ to the system’s structural irrationality, which they sought to 
break free from the altogether; they declared, in Ruge’s words, ‘a war of 
liberation against the limitations of the system’.16 These limitations were first and 
foremost those of speculation, and the project of overcoming them marked the 
beginning of a genuinely post-Hegelian theoretical discourse that attempted to 
undermine the systematic self-sufficiency of philosophy.17 In theoretical terms 
this implied challenging not only the degree of actuality which the system could 
be said to possess, but also the idealist methodology that determined the measure 
of that actuality itself; of what, precisely, the inward essence that was to be 
actualised and the ‘outwardness’ that could register such actualisation consisted 
in, as the both the active subject and the passive substance that was acted upon or 
subsumed.18 
                                                          
15 Cf. Renault, ‘The Early Marx and Hegel’. 
16 Ruge, cited in Renault, ‘The Early Marx and Hegel’. 
17 ‘Kant suspected he had initiated a revolution in the conception and resolution of 
metaphilosophical problems. In that way Kant established – before Feuerbach and Marx – that 
traditional metaphysics was at an end. However in response to Kant's views on the destruction of 
pre-critical ontology there arose philosophical systems in which Feuerbach and Marx recognized 
the culminating defence of metaphysics. For post-Hegelian thinkers the end of metaphysics means 
the end of speculative philosophy’, Jindrich Zeleny, The Logic of Marx [1968], translated by 
Terrell Carver, New York: Rowman &. Littlefield, 1980, p. 193 
18 As Patrick Murray notes: ‘In his dissertation notes, Marx states that, to make real progress 
beyond what the Young Hegelians saw as Hegel’s accommodation to an unreasonable social and 
political actuality, it will be necessary to reveal the accommodation latent in his basic principles 
through an immanent critique.’ Marx’s Theory of Scientific Knowledge, New York: Humanity 
Books, 1988, p. 25 
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The kernel of this criticism, in which the first aspects of a practical-
materialist outlook can be discerned, takes issue with the fact that actuality, as 
conceived by speculative idealism, determines the quality of outer objectivity on 
the basis of its correspondence to an inner rationality (‘the concept’) in a manner 
that leaves little room for comprehending the being of living (i.e., ‘existent’) 
individuals beyond their status as bearers – or predicates, for Feuerbach – of 
philosophical world-spirit. (In this sense Althusser was right when he wrote that 
‘for Hegel, history is certainly a process of alienation, but this process does not 
have man as its subject’.)19 If for the idealist discourse that culminates in Hegel’s 
work the critical comprehension of actuality is not simply a theoretical problem, 
then it at least, as Marx and the ‘young’ Hegelians perceived it, fails to transcend 
the limits of an ideally registered process, to which ‘objective' being (which 
includes, crucially, human life in its ‘natural form’) stands in more or less 
adequate correspondence, an inevitable fate given that ‘its essence is something 
other than itself'.20 The need for a subjective will to ‘prove’ its actuality through 
the manifestation of its action upon the objective, so central to Hegel’s thought, 
has meaning only in an ideal sense here, because such objectification can only be 
recognised as the ‘positing’ of conceptual determinations that characterizes the 
basic mode of actualisation on the speculative plane. In this sense, true knowledge 
(Kant) or rational actuality (Hegel) is delimited by the formative activity of a 
subject upon the mute matter that it thereby legitimates as properly objective or 
rational, in distinction from the representationally phantasmatic or ‘merely 
existent’ (lacking actuality). This implies a unilateral arbitration of the worldly by 
the intellectual (of reality by philosophy, as Marx would claim), a selection from 
amongst the empirically present, between that sector of the object or of activity 
admitted to the rational order, that to be re-formed and that to be neutralized or 
abolished. (Indeed, this process of selection, negation and formation within a 
subjective totality is exactly what subsumption, taken in its critical sense, 
involves; subsumption as act indicates not simply inclusion under a definition – 
logical predication – but subsumption under a function of the subject by means of 
                                                          
19 Louis Althusser, ‘The humanist controversy’ [1967], in The Humanist Controversy and Other 
Writings (1966-67), translated by G.M. Goshgarian, edited by Francois Matheron, London and 
New York: Verso, 2003, p. 238. 
20 Karl Marx, ‘Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts’ [1844], in Early Writings, p. 400. 
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which both the subject and subsumed entity are reciprocally, although unevenly, 
constituted.) 
The distinctly post-Hegelian problematic raised by these criticisms 
supersedes the question of how it is that philosophical consciousness can or 
should comprehend the relation between its own rationality and the actual world 
(whether positively or negatively), and instead contests the adequacy of both this 
rationality (speculative logic) and this relation (philosophical comprehension) to 
the task of making the real truly rational, in a manner that goes beyond the 
authoritative legislation of philosophy over the actual, as Paul Marshall Schafer 
argues: 
The basis of Marx's evaluation is that Hegel does not demonstrate the 
rationality of the real, as he claims in the Preface, but is methodologically 
restricted to developing the rationality of the ideal in the form of the real. 
The method of speculative idealism, in other words, leads only to the 
illusion of substantiality, for it is incapable of grasping reality in terms 
other than those offered by its own logic. Consequently every form of 
reality – whether natural, moral, political, or historical – is subsumed to 
the determinations of speculative logic.21 
Breaking with Hegelianism, then, means decoupling actuality from a 
philosophical ideal to which the existing world can only ever correspond as a 
manifestation, as derivative, because ‘since abstract thought is the essence, that 
which is external to it is in essence something merely external […] a defective 
being’.22 In prioritising the logical aspect of development as the actuality of all 
processes Hegel slips back into the transcendence and one sidedness he claimed 
to have overcome. Shattering the speculative closure of the idealist system was 
thus for Marx the condition for developing, simultaneously, an autonomous 
‘logic’ of actuality and an immanent critique of its irrationality that would not be 
determined by a correspondence to philosophical reason and which would treat 
outer objectivity as equally essential to the constitution of the actual as its inner, 
subjective structure. But the criticism levelled here does not only apply to 
Hegelian philosophy, it places the valence of philosophical discourse as such into 
                                                          
21 Paul Marshall Schafer, The Praxis of Philosophy: Nature, Reason and Freedom (PhD 
dissertation), Chicago: DePaul University, 1999, p. 198. 
22 Marx, ‘Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts’, in Early Writings, pp. 399-400. 
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question and marks the entry point and initiation of a period of intense critical 
engagement through which Marx (along with Engels) attempts to ‘settle accounts’ 
with philosophy, asserting that ‘with the exposition of actuality, self-sufficient 
philosophy [die selbständige Philosophie] loses its medium of existence'.23 
But what is the content of this alternative conception of reality? What is it, if 
not the idea, that is in the process of actualisation and that determines the rational 
content against which reality must be measured? Initially for Marx, following 
Feuerbach, it is a human reality constituted in a human community. In negating 
what he and Engels would later dismiss as ‘philosophical illusions of the 
sovereignty of general conceptions’, Marx took up and developed the idea of an 
inversion of subject and predicate formulated by Feuerbach in his critique of 
religion: ‘the exchange of that which determines or that which is determined’ 
whose consequence is that ‘real man and real nature become mere predicates, 
symbols of this hidden, unreal man and this unreal nature.’24 It is not the life of 
the idea but the life of ‘real humanity’ (in its relationship to ‘real nature’) that, on 
this view, was actualising itself in the world-historical process, such that the 
former had to be grasped as an effect of the latter and not vice versa as Hegel 
asserted. By contrast, measuring the being of man against the purity of reason or 
the idea was, for Marx, definitive of the mystified philosophical-theological 
worldview that blocked the way to a genuine comprehension of real (human) 
conditions and, by proxy (in light of this ‘actual irrationality’), their revolutionary 
transformation. However, deconstructing the ‘fantastic realization’ offered by 
religious consciousness, with which Feuerbach was primarily concerned, was 
only the first stage of Marx’s program, and most importantly functioned as a 
precondition for developing a far more radical ‘criticism of the earth’, of the 
really existing political (and, ultimately, socio-economic) forms of human 
existence.  
Initially, Marx’s confrontation with Hegelianism on the issue of the actuality 
and content of rational relations was expressed most concretely in the guise of 
political questions surrounding the state’s relation to civil society. Norman Levine 
                                                          
23 Marx and Engels, The German Ideology, p. 43 (translation modified). 
24 Marx and Engels, ‘Feuerbach’, in Carver and Blank, Marx and Engels's "German ideology" 
Manuscripts, p. 34; Marx, ‘A Passage from The Kreuznach Notebooks of 1843’, in Marx and 
Engels Collected Works vol. 3: Marx And Engels: 1843-44 (hereafter MECW, various vols.), 
London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1975, p. 130; ‘Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts’, in Early 
Writings, p. 396. 
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notes that ‘in 1841-1843 Marx stood in total agreement with Hegel regarding the 
universality of the state and like Hegel he applied an organic image to the state as 
a whole, a universal, which subsumed parts, particularities, into the totality.’25 But 
by the time of writing his commentary on Hegel’s Philosophy of Right in 1843, 
Marx’s attitude toward the theory and reality of the state had changed radically. 
Whilst it did not entirely contradict this earlier vision, and indeed continued to 
make use the Hegelian ‘universal-particular logical apparatus’, Marx had come to 
profoundly different conclusions about the social effects and political meaning of 
this subsumption of particulars on the part of the state.26 Crucially, Marx rejected 
Hegel’s positive view of the Prussian state as necessary, as actual, as universality 
and freedom manifest; instead of producing unity and cohesion through its 
subsumption of the conflicting interests of civil society, this activity was instead 
taken by Marx to be a source of contradiction and antagonism through its 
suppression of the truly universal community, the ‘species-essence’ 
(gattungswesen). For Marx, Hegel was unable to grasp the depth of this 
opposition because he presupposed the universality and positivity of the state in a 
manner that obviated the need of justifying, or even assessing, the particularities 
of its concrete action and relation to really existing society; he proceeded rather, 
by deriving its ideal form from speculative logic and then projecting this onto the 
existing institutional apparatus of his time, which could thereby be declared to 
possess ‘actual rationality/rational actuality’. Holding that 'what matters is to 
recognize in the semblance of the temporal and transient the substance which is 
immanent and the eternal which is present', Hegel failed to grasp the necessity of 
actively shaping the temporal and the transient by any means other than a form of 
comprehension that is speculatively predisposed toward reconciliation.27 Marx 
                                                          
25 Norman Levine, Marx’s Discourse with Hegel, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012, p.153. 
Cf. Marx’s ‘Leading Article in No. 179 of the Kölnische Zeitung’ [1842]: ‘The state itself 
educates its members in that it makes them into state members, in that it converts the aims of the 
individual into universal aims, raw drive into ethical inclination, natural independence into 
spiritual freedom, in that the individual enjoys himself in the life of the whole and the whole 
[enjoys itself] in the disposition of the individual.’ in MECW vol. 1, p. 193 
26 Levine, Marx’s Discourse with Hegel, p.153. 
27 Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right, preface. Whether Marx’s reading of the Philosophy 
of Right as a whole and his charges against the Hegelian theory of the state are accurate or fair is 
not to be decided here, rather the point is to understand the limits of a particular critical-theoretical 
method for comprehending social actuality (that employed by idealism) and how Marx superseded 
these limits with the development of his materialist treatment of the social process, which would 
in turn come to shape his understanding of capitalist domination. On the topic of Marx’s 
misprisions in his critique of Hegel, cf. Ben Fine, ‘Hegel's Philosophy of Right and Marx's 
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criticized this methodologically idealist account of political institutions for 
starting out from the necessity of logical relations and functions then proceeding 
to find an existing content in which to embody them, a charge that finds one its 
clearest and most concentrated expressions in a well-known passage repudiating 
Hegel’s assertion that the executive embodies the logical act of subsuming the 
particular under the universal: 
Hegel does not inquire whether this mode of subsumption is adequate or 
rational. He simply holds fast to the one category and contents himself 
with searching for something corresponding to it in existence. Hegel thus 
provides his logic with a political body; he does not provide us with the 
logic of the body politic.28 
Marx here sets out in nuce the content of his new conception of actuality. It is the 
immanent logic of the ‘body politic’ that Marx seeks to uncover and critique as 
‘the truth of this world’, rather than demonstrating, as Hegel sought to do, the 
identity of a preordained rational order with the extrinsic world-surface in which 
it was objectified. In displacing the problem of truth from the logical essence in 
its appearance to the logical essence of the apparent, a new understanding of 
actuality becomes possible: one that inverts the determining relation between 
rationality and social being. Marx both establishes the theoretical task to be 
achieved and at the same time breaks (if only at this point naively, on political-
representational terms) with Hegelian idealism by setting actuality firmly on the 
side of ‘the world of man, state, society’; it is that to which conceptual activity 
must mould itself (and indeed already does, if initially only in a mystified, 
ideological form) rather than that moulded by conceptual activity in its 
spontaneous self-activity. 
Human finitude and particularity is not, therefore, a deficiency to be resolved 
by the ‘estranged mind’ of philosophical reason or, in its Hegelian political 
corollary (as ‘objective spirit’) the activity of the state in shaping the substance of 
civil society; by contrast it is the source of the dynamic historical force of human 
social being, that which confers upon men and women the capacity and urgency 
of positing their own content in action, as self-activity (Selbsttätigkeit). History, 
                                                                                                                                                              
Critique: A Reassessment’, in Open Marxism vol. III: Emancipating Marx, edited by edited by W. 
Bonefeld, R. Gunn, J. Holloway and K. Psychopedis, London: Pluto, 1995, pp. 84-109. 
28 Marx, ‘Critique of Hegel’s doctrine of the state’, in Early Writings, p. 109 (my emphasis, 
translation modified). 
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thus, would no longer be the medium of a monolithic reason, but reason in its 
concreteness would be the expression of humankind’s historical being and 
struggles, as shaped, limited and motivated by them. Whilst in Marx’s early work 
this conviction fixated on the contradictions of Prussian political and legal 
institutions and their ideal expressions – both for and against – its revolutionary 
implications nonetheless opened the way for a more comprehensive and wide 
ranging re-centring of critical-theoretical activity in which human 'praxis' 
functions as the prime mover and compositional medium that displaces the 
foundational primacy of the self-actualising idea, albeit, as we shall see, at 
different levels of conceptual and historical determinacy. 
 
The actuality of praxis 
 
Holding that ‘man is the highest being for man’, Marx assumed the theoretical 
task of developing a concrete notion – a science (wissen) – of what exactly this 
‘highest being’ consisted in, and, if ‘the Concept’ was no longer to be the measure 
or source of its movement, how it could both register and produce the 
revolutionary actualisation demanded of it, of abolishing the irrational and 
instituting the (humanly) rational. This meant not simply affirming the human in 
the abstract against the ideal (as it did for Feuerbach), but of developing a 
comprehensive and determinate account of what exactly constituted the actuality 
of the human as the concrete subject of the world-historical process; of how real 
humanity, ‘the body politic’, rather than an ideal intellect, ‘acted’, and of what 
content would thereby ‘actualise itself’.  
At the heart of this problematic was an awareness of the inadequacy of an 
idealist conception of action, as the unilateral effectivity of an absolute subject 
that constituted actuality (or, at least, an ideal subject in the process of self-
absolutisation). For the idealist tradition against which Marx and his 
contemporaries were reacting, rational free-willed subjectivity was the source of 
reality, the driving motor of the historical process; 'the will was a special way of 
thinking, it was thought translating itself into reality', as Hegel believed.29 The 
challenge for critical post-Hegelianism in all its diversity was to move beyond the 
                                                          
29 Widukind De Ridder, ‘Max Stirner, Hegel and the Young Hegelians: A reassessment', History 
of European Ideas 34, 2008, p.294. 
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act of thinking to the primacy of the act or action itself, conceived in its most 
general, ‘human’, sense. This marked a break with the monopoly conferred upon 
thought over the individual’s active relation to reality, which would no longer be 
reducible to an intellectual operation or conceptual representation but instead 
would subsume thinking under itself as a partial and limited moment of a ‘real’ or 
‘material’ idea of action – what Marx conceptualised as praxis. In the conflict 
between rational and irrational elements of actuality, the task demanded of a 
practical standpoint was not only to identify and criticize its irrational elements 
but also, crucially, to supersede them through real (i.e., non-theoretical) action. 
This inversion relegates the function of positing in thought (or as thought) to the 
status of a secondary or derivative moment in relation to actualizing in the 
medium of praxis, which is thereby established as a new index of form-
determination, registering action in relation to the life of men and women and its 
revolutionary transformation, rather than the concept.  
The concept of praxis at work here, central to Marx's conception of a 
properly human form of action, has its antecedents in a number of different 
positions within ‘left’ and ‘young’ Hegelian thought, aspects of which were 
drawn upon synthetically and intensified by Marx in his polemic with idealism 
and socialism. The term ‘praxis’ itself was taken from August von Cieszkowski, 
who in 1838 asserted that: 
The future fate of philosophy in general is to be practical philosophy or, to 
put it better, the philosophy of praxis, whose most concrete effect on life 
and social relations is the development of truth in concrete activity.30 
This was echoed by Moses Hess, a contemporary of Marx and influence on his 
early thinking, whose 1843 Philosophy of the act emphatically rejected 
speculative philosophy’s attenuated and parochial grasp of activity: 
Not being but action is first and last [...] Now is the time for the 
philosophy of spirit to become a philosophy of activity. Not only thinking 
                                                          
30 August von Cieszkowski, ‘Prolegomena to Historiosophy’ [1838], in Selected Writings of 
August Cieszkowski, edited and translated by Andre Liebich, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2010, p.77 
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but the whole of human activity must be lifted to a plane on which all 
oppositions disappear.31 
Such assertions were essential in formulating the specific problem of human 
action in its relation to actuality which would shape Marx’s theoretical orientation 
towards non-theoretical activity. But despite the boldness of their claims, both 
Cieszkowski and Hess still subscribed to a broadly Hegelian vision of the process 
of actualisation, as driven by the autonomous act of a subject upon its other, the 
object, or nature. Hess, for example, claimed that: 
Life is activity. But activity is the recovery of an identity through the 
establishment and transcendence of its opposite, the producing of its 
likeness, its likeness to itself, through the breaking of the barrier within 
which the “I” is “not-I.” Activity is, in a word, self-creation, the law of 
which is perceived by the spirit through its own act of self-creation.32 
They were therefore unable to break with idealism in any profound theoretical 
sense, because although cognition has been replaced by ‘practice’ or ‘activity’ in 
name, it is not clear how this 'self-creation' differs in its putatively human form 
from the labour of the concept; it remains an act of pure intellectual willing, 
mediated by a 'worldly' process. What is at stake in these philosophies of action, 
then, is still very much the realization of philosophy as a singular, absolute reason 
that stands over and against the irrationality of the objective world. 
It was in response to this residual theological-idealist vision of realisation 
that Marx drew critically on Feuerbach’s materialism of the human that rejected a 
singular vision of the rational and instead sought to ground the struggle for 
actualisation beyond the sphere of intelligibility delimited by philosophical 
comprehension, instead locating it in the particular 'real being' of the species, in 
human ‘flesh and blood’. For Feuerbach, this sensible, human standpoint opened 
the possibility for the realisation of philosophy (or at least the ideals posited by it) 
whilst being 'also its negation': It was, in Renault’s words, ‘an attempt to redefine 
the philosophical principles at the very level of the concrete existence of humans, 
that of the human existence in its sensitive and particular reality'.33 It was this 
                                                          
31 Moses Hess, The Philosophy of the act [1843]: 
https://www.marxists.org/archive/hess/1843/philosophy-deed/ [accessed Feb 2014] (translation 
modified). 
32 Ibid (translation modified). 
33 Renault, ‘The Early Marx and Hegel’. 
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reality, of sensible human existence, that would determine the conditions to which 
actuality and its comprehension would have to adhere, rather than, vice versa, the 
reduction of human reality to the predicative expression of an all-encompassing 
world-spirit that would overdetermine the significance of any such existence 
according to its place within a schematic philosophy of historical development – 
one in which: 
'totality or the absoluteness of a particular historical phenomenon or 
existence is vindicated as predicate, thus reducing the stages of 
development as independent entities only to a historical meaning; although 
living, they continue to exist as nothing more than shadows or moments, 
nothing more than homoeopathic drops on the level of the absolute.'34 
In 1844 Marx recognised that Feuerbach’s critical re-orientation of humanity and 
history could break with the idealist reduction of activity to which other post-
Hegelian philosophies remained committed: 'Feuerbach's great achievement is’, 
Marx claimed, ‘to have founded true materialism and real science by making the 
social relation of "man to man" the basic principle of his theory'.35 This 
anthropological materialism offered Marx a new critical standpoint from which to 
grasp the meaning of domination and the necessity of revolution as immanent to 
the experience and struggles of real, living humanity, as Gopal Balakrishnan 
highlights, ‘the appeal of Feuerbach’s naturalism to Marx at the time, even as he 
noted its apolitical and indeed ahistorical limitations, was its identification of the 
human essence with suffering.’36 But because Feuerbach’s analysis remained at 
the level of an abstract notion of man in general that was in turn dependent on a 
mechanistic or intuitive conception of matter (the human essence conceived in 
terms of its ‘natural organic qualities’), it could only function, in Marx’s view, as 
the reductive materialist opposite of the idealist exaggeration of subjective 
freedom, one that Marx would use as a foil in order to produce his own original 
conception of the relation between human activity and actuality, a ‘new’ 
materialism of practice.  
Marx’s critical theses On Feuerbach aphoristically condense the essential co-
ordinates of this new materialism in which, beyond the polemical displacement of 
                                                          
34 Ludwig Feuerbach, ‘Towards a Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy’, translated by Zawar Hanfi: 
https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/feuerbach/works/critique/ [accessed Feb 2014] 
35 Marx, ‘Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts’, in Early Writings, p. 381. 
36 Gopal Balakrishnan, ‘The Abolitionist’ (part 1), New Left Review 90, Nov/Dec 2014, p. 125. 
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an idealist vocabulary of the absolute with the worldly language of the human 
community (‘all mysteries that turn theory towards mysticism find their rational 
solution in human practice and in the comprehension of this practice’), a radical 
new conception of the relationship between subject and object, between 
materiality and ideality, and between actuality (Wirklichkeit) and activity 
(Tätigkeit) is sketched out, shattering the structure and limits of ‘traditional’ 
theoretical discourse and opening the way for a new form of revolutionary or 
‘critical’ discourse adequate to the ‘communist problematic’ of revolutionary 
transformation.37 In spite of their brevity, the theses propose an entirely new 
mode of theoretically grasping actuality at its most fundamental level, which is to 
say, they elaborate – in a rudimentary outline – an entirely new account of process 
by which the constitution of objectivity and, its reciprocal condition, the 
actualisation of subjectivity, occurs. Within the context of transcendental or 
dialectical critique, this double-process is, as we have seen, the foundation of 
actuality as a plane of objective presence and universal reference upon which a 
formal lawfulness or coherence (a ‘logic’) determines the formation and structure 
of an order of being in which something can be qualified as intelligible, actual. It 
is at this level of depth that the theses are operative, as Bolívar Echeverría 
recognises in his reconstructive interpretation: 
The most elementary and fundamental, the determining "in" the ambit of a 
theory is the manner in which it gives an account of the irreducible 
experience of the presence of sense in the real, of the presence of the real 
as endowed with sense and not as an ineffable chaos or as an absolutely 
undefined in-itself; or, what is the same, the manner in which it gives 
account of the proper capacity to affirm something – that would be simple 
existence – of the object, of the proper capacity to produce 
significations.38 
With this in mind, the radicality of Marx’s proposition can be appreciated: 
idealism and traditional materialism do not simply constitute two distinct systems, 
discourses or ‘philosophemes’ within which human action and existence might be 
                                                          
37 Marx, On Feuerbach, thesis VIII, translated in Wal Suchting, ‘Marx’s Theses on Feuerbach: 
Notes Towards a Commentary (with a New Translation)’, in Issues in Marxist Philosophy vol. 2: 
Materialism, in edited by John Mepham and David Hillel-Ruben, Brighton: Harvester Press, 1979, 
pp.21-22. 
38 Echeverría, ‘El materialismo de Marx’ [1974], in El Discurso Crítico de Marx, Era, Mexico 
City, 1986, p. 25. Unless otherwise noted all translations from Spanish are my own. 
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registered (and between which one must choose), but there is also, at an even 
more fundamental level, an implicit reciprocity between them insofar as their 
antithesis constitutes the horizons and possible limits of comprehension 
characteristic of what Echeverría terms the dominant ‘modern theoretical 
discourse’, the broad discursive field that includes them both and demarcates the 
‘problematic region’ within which Marx’s critique is operative. In opposition to 
this antithesis, and precisely through a critique of its two poles that demonstrates 
the points at which each slips into an affirmation or presupposition of its other, 
Marx is able to theoretically postulate a new ground of actuality that overcomes 
the mystifying opposition between ‘abstract thinking’ and ‘sensuous intuition’, 
proposing instead a unifying concept of practical materialism. 
For Marx, as we have seen, whilst idealism sought to grasp the true nature, 
actuality, or objectivity of its object through the comprehension of its full 
determinateness, as a dialectically (or transcendentally) articulated series of ideal 
determinations or marks – representations, in the most general sense – this 
bringing forth of the object’s truth attains reality or objectivity, only as a process 
of conceptual development enacted unilaterally by the subject (and through which 
the subject is reciprocally actualised), negating the object’s materiality or 
immediate external presence in favour of a logically determined representational 
form. By reducing the constitution of objectivity, the order of the real, to ‘a 
process emanating from the act in which the subject “posits” the object’, as 
Echeverría puts it, idealism remains within the age-old philosophical dualism of 
thought and being, even as it seeks to suppress (or supersede) it by reducing latter 
to a mere effect of the former.39 Marx’s intervention (in thesis II) exposes the 
insufficiency of this merely ideal and one-sided idea of development through 
which objectivity, actuality, could purportedly be captured theoretically and 
constituted actively, by contending that the object’s mediations and potential 
development, its truth, must be both comprehended and transformed through a 
different kind of activity, one that is not reducible to the effect of an ideal subject 
alone.  
                                                          
39 Ibid, pp. 25-6. 
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Conversely, however, neither can this objectivity be reduced to the passive 
materiality of sensible intuition, the object (as ‘objekt’), with which Feuerbach 
had identified the human essence: 
The chief defect of all hitherto existing materialism – that of Feuerbach 
included – is that the thing [Gegenstand], actuality, sensuousness, is 
conceived only in the form of the object [Objekt] or of intuition 
[Anschauung], but not as human sensuous activity [sinnlich menschliche 
Tätigkeit], practice, not subjectively. Hence it happened that the active 
side, in contradistinction to materialism, was developed by idealism – but 
only abstractly, since, of course, idealism does not know real, sensuous 
activity as such. Feuerbach wants sensuous objects [Objekte], really 
distinct from the objects of thought [Gedankenobjekten], but he does not 
conceive human activity itself as objective [gegenständliche] activity.40 
The double-critique at work in this passage, identifying the insufficiencies of both 
poles of the idealism-materialism antithesis, is strikingly clear in Marx’s novel 
conjunction that equates ‘thing’ (Gegenstand), ‘actuality’ (Wirklichkeit), and 
‘sensuousness’ (Sinnlichkeit). Marx not only refutes the idealist account of the 
‘abstract’  process of objective constitution/subjective actualisation, but also 
rejects the possibility of reverting to an account of actuality founded on the 
primacy of an inactive, intuitive notion of objectivity circumscribed by the same 
‘traditional’ discursive horizon: that adhered to positively within the opposing 
materialist-empiricist perspective, the dumb opposite of living, active subjectivity, 
the ‘abstract materialism of natural science’ as Marx refers to it in Capital.41 So 
whilst contra idealism, the object retains a degree of self-sufficiency and is not 
constituted by the intellect ex nihilo, neither does it have an intrinsic ‘sense’ or 
‘reality’ independent of its relation to a subject (to practice), such that objectivity 
would be an intrinsic feature of the object as ‘matter’, a ‘pure presence’ or 
‘metaphysical substrate’ preceding subjective mediation, as Echeverría puts it. 
The effects of human activity cannot therefore simply be registered as a 
modification of the empirical world-surface that confronts the subject; there is a 
basic negativity to praxis, as process its significance exceeds its intuitive 
                                                          
40 Marx, On Feuerbach, thesis I. (translation modified) 
41 Marx, Capital: a Critique of Political Economy, vol. 1: the Process of Production of Capital 
[1867], translated by Ben Fowkes, London and New York: Penguin, 1976, p. 494 (fn). 
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apprehension. This implies a dissociation of materiality and matter (a 
‘materialism without matter’, in Etienne Balibar’s somewhat polemical 
formulation), without which ‘old’ materialism lapses back into a special kind of 
idealism, a danger that Sartre drew attention to:42 
In order to grasp materiality as such, it is not sufficient to discuss the word 
'matter'. […] There is a materialist idealism which, in the last analysis, is 
merely a discourse on the idea of matter; the real opposite of this is realist 
materialism – the thought of an individual who is situated in the world, 
penetrated by every cosmic force, and treating the material universe as 
something which gradually reveals itself through a 'situated' praxis.'43 
But in turn again, just as the objective cannot thereby be reduced to a mere 
externality, devoid of sense, neither can the subjective be taken as an immaterial 
source of rational operability of the actual, because the ‘situatedness’ of praxis 
dissociates subjectivity as process from the abstract activity of the independent 
intellect. This is alluded to in thesis III, when Marx attests to ‘the coincidence of 
the changing of circumstances and human activity’.44 
Marx’s discourse therefore breaks with the underlying structural antithesis 
between an active ideal-subjectivity (exemplified by Hegelian absolute spirit) and 
a passive material-objectivity (the immediacy of external, intuited otherness) that 
supports the seemingly counterpoised theoretical perspectives of idealism and 
‘traditional’ materialism. Instead, praxis will form the content (at least in this 
initial iteration) of a discourse on actuality that recognizes both its active and 
material aspects as constitutive dimensions of one and the same process; of a 
concrete subjectivity and an active objectivity, an ongoing process of ‘sensible 
human practice’ that is at once mediated (as object) and mediating (as subject) – 
hence its designation as gegenständliche. Echeverría elaborates this dual-aspect of 
objective-activity as the basic foundational moment of Marx’s materialism: 
In order to adequately problematize that which distinguishes objectivity as 
such it is necessary to consider it “subjectively”, that is, as a process in 
motion, and as a process that affects essentially and equally both the 
                                                          
42 , Etienne Balibar, The Philosophy of Marx, Translated by Chris Turner, London and New York: 
Verso, 1995. p. 23. 
43 Jean-Paul Sartre, Critique of Dialectical Reason Vol. 1: Theory of Practical Ensembles [1960], 
translated by Alan Sheridan-Smith, London and New York: Verso, 2004, p. 29. 
44 See Suchting, ‘Marx’s Theses on Feuerbach’, p. 12-3: ‘practice changes not only the ‘object’ 
but also the ‘subject’ of practice, and indeed the two changes are simultaneous.’ 
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subject and the object that appear in it; to consider it “as activity”, as 
praxis that founds every cognitive [cognoscitiva] subject-object relation 
and that therefore constitutes the sense of the real.45 
In this conception of praxis object and subject attain a new articulation in which 
neither is given a privileged role as the ‘organising principle’ of the actual, and 
such that neither corresponds simply to one pole of the opposition between 
idealism and (‘traditional’) materialism; the antithesis has been scrambled. 
Instead, both subjectivity and objectivity are grounded in the unity of a ‘practico-
critical’ process of active world-constitution. By ‘materializing’ subjective 
activity, as in itself already ‘objective’, and thereby making the objective active, 
its truth – its actuality – would now consist in the production of immediately 
‘material’ (i.e. practico-objective) effects rather than the sublimation of these into 
their spiritual or representational results – a conversion that speculative 
philosophy must always undertake. For any kind of determination to take place in 
this sphere of practical composition it must therefore result from, and be grasped 
as, ‘sensible human activity’ (menschliche sinnliche Tätigkeit); willing, conscious 
action that ‘proves its truth’ by shaping the reality that confronts it, materially, 
rather than just theoretically (thesis XI).  
Marx thereby dissolves the distinction between the mute objectivity of a 
passive matter and its formative mediation or synthesis in a pure, active intellect, 
as exemplified in both Kant and Hegel’s compositional totalities.46 In his ‘new’ 
materialism Marx posits an original unitary medium for subject and object, in 
which they figure as dialectically unified aspects of process to which neither can 
claim ultimate monopoly. The action of a (practical) subject no longer stands 
outside, opposed or retrospectively related to a passive material dimension 
(however essential it might have been to the constitution of that dimension in 
transcendental or dialectical terms), but is now rather inscribed within the same 
medium of objectivity, as a co-terminal aspect of it, as its ‘active side’. As Karel 
Kosik put it: 
                                                          
45 Echeverría, ‘El Materialismo de Marx’, pp. 25-6. 
46 In keeping with the line of enquiry set out at the beginning of the thesis in relation to Kantian 
philosophy, I will call them ‘compositional’ totalities at this point to remain agnostic about the 
causal relation between structure and expression – although this will be resolved by Marx with 
his conception of social reproduction outlined further below. 
87 
 
Reality stands out to man not primarily as an object of intuition, investigation 
and theorizing, whose opposite and complementary pole would be an abstract 
cognitive subject existing outside and beyond the world, but rather as the 
realm of his sensuous-practical activity, which forms the basis for immediate 
practical intuition of reality.47 
The practically conceived conjunction of materiality and subjectivity thus re-
assumes from idealist philosophy the centrality of the subject’s capacity to give 
concrete form to objective reality, to shape reality according to its own conscious 
will and plan, ‘men themselves change circumstances’, in Marx’s famous 
assertion, but this transformative activity occurs as an immanent moment of a 
practical totality that delimits the possibilities for realizing such a capacity. 
 
Theory of praxis and the praxis of theory 
 
The radicality of Marx’s elaboration of practical materialism in the years 1845-6 
had effects not only in terms of the substantial content of its theoretical 
proposition; it also essentially modified the status of theoretical discourse as such, 
establishing incipiently the possibility of its properly critical character, because as 
Echeverría claims, ‘the necessity of thinking the revolutionary process turns out 
to be, simultaneously, the necessity of revolutionising the process of thinking'.48 
Through his ‘new’ materialism, it becomes possible for Marx to designate, in a 
manner not available to the idealist account of actuality – in which subjectivity 
and representation were fundamentally bound together, as Etienne Balibar has 
noted – a new relationship between the practice of theory and the theory of 
practice.49 Theory becomes a merely partial moment or region of the concrete 
practical totality, the conditions of social being that come to legislate over its 
possibilities and exigencies. After materialism knowledge is ‘not a purely 
theoretical, internal process’ but ‘stands in the service of life’ such that the ‘logics 
of science […] are embroiled in the logics of practical material life’.50 This 
                                                          
47 Karel Kosík, Dialectics of the Concrete: a Study on Problems of Man and World [1963], 
translated by Karel Kovanda and James Schmidt, Boston: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1976, p. 
1 (my emphasis). 
48 Echeverría, ‘El Materialismo de Marx’, p. 23. 
49 Balibar, The Philosophy of Marx, p. 24. 
50 Alfred Schmidt, The Concept of Nature in Marx [1962], translated by Ben Fowkes, London: 
NLB, 1971, p. 95; Murray, Marx’s Theory of Scientific Knowledge, p. 72. It is important to note 
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reduction of theoretical activity to a mere species of praxis has a double effect, 
both negative and positive. On the one hand it undermines the immediate 
revolutionary capacity of criticism – this had been central to the young Hegelian 
vision of actualisation, in which the critique of illusory ideas was the key to the 
emancipation from irrational conditions – ‘not criticism but revolution is the 
driving force of history’.51 On the other however, it allowed for the development 
of a new role for critique that would be consistent with its own materialist 
premises, as self-conscious of its function within a broader practical-revolutionary 
process. Jindrich Zeleny alludes to this when he claims that ‘an integrating aspect- 
not to be neglected – of that revolutionary process is scientific activity, above all 
the 'conception of praxis' as positive science – the science of practical activity, the 
practical process of development of men’.52 
This reconfiguration of the theory-actuality relationship is crucial for 
grasping what occurs with the concept of subsumption in the course of Marx’s 
development of a theory of praxis, in so far as it is understood in terms of its 
foundation of a new relationship between the abstract and the concrete. By 
reconstructing actuality in theory, Marx’s discourse seeks to dissolve mystified or 
ideological connections and replace them with concrete concepts that not only 
represent actual conditions but are also effective, in practical terms, in 
circumscribing a particular relationship between theoretical activity and 
actuality.53 This does not simply mean negating conceptual abstractions as such, 
but also, crucially, in identifying the presence and effects of actually existing 
abstractions or logical forms – such as subsumption – within the practical 
structure of reality.54 In this sense, the critique of philosophy (as well as 
‘traditional’ theory more generally) is realised as and forms a particular moment 
of the critique of ideology – the ‘destruction of the pseudoconcrete’ – insofar it 
                                                                                                                                                              
that the concept of ‘life’ at work here is not the Hegelian one, in which ‘organism’ ‘refers to a 
logical order of things and not to ‘biology’, even if the model to which [Hegel] refers is the living 
organism’. Stavros Tombazos, Time in Marx: The Categories of Time in Marx’s Capital, Chicago: 
Haymarket Books, 2014, p. 147. 
51 Marx and Engels, The German Ideology, p. 61. 
52 Zeleny, The Logic of Marx, p. 194. 
53 ‘The Marxian terms 'mirroring' and 'image' – though seldom together – are used to characterize 
epistemology as subordinate to a new conception of theory as an aspect of praxis. This has an anti-
ideological function which emphasizes the non-identity of thought and reality within a unity of 
active, hence perceiving thinking individuals and their relations.’ Ibid, p. 154. 
54 ‘Practice must be seen not only as contributing to the constitution of objectivity but as the basis 
of our assessment of the truth or otherwise of our thinking about it.’ Suchting, ‘Marx’s Theses on 
Feuerbach’, p. 7. 
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seeks to break the mystified connection between the object of scientific or critical 
enquiry and the conditions under which it is carried out (and indeed motivated); 
that is, to clarify and potentialize the former by way of grasping the essence, or 
truth, of the latter. The duplicitous world must therefore be ‘both understood in its 
contradiction and revolutionized in practice’.55 As Marx had already established 
in 1843, the task of revolutionary science is first and foremost to comprehend the 
logic of real conditions and their transformation. But if this is so, Zeleny asks: 
How is a positive science which 'grasps praxis' possible? With Marx there 
is no question of founding such a science – in the sense of a Kantian 
critique of reason – since Marx would consider the very question of a 
standpoint for practical materialism to be uncritical, a return to speculative 
philosophizing.56 
The problem of an absolute or rational beginning that would found science, which 
was a primary concern for both Kant and Hegel, is therefore dissolved as a merely 
ideological one; one that obscured the fact that the determinants of thinking were 
given by the real conditions of humanity under which thought is realized and to 
which it must, ineluctably respond. (‘The dispute over the reality or non-reality of 
thinking – that is isolated from practice – is a purely scholastic question.’)57 
Whereas in Hegel’s philosophy the development of the thing in thinking is the 
development of the thing in actuality (of the thing as actuality) as a consequence 
of the speculative identity between thought and being, Marx’s materialist 
intervention dissolves this guarantee, such that conceptual development would be 
restricted to the theoretical reconstruction (rather than retrospective construction) 
of an objectivity that is developed in reality, through praxis. This is a point 
expressed most emphatically in Marx’s 1857 ‘introduction’: 
                                                          
55 Marx, On Feuerbach, Thesis IV. Even so, this picture still remains somewhat simplistic in its 
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The concrete is concrete because it is the concentration of many 
determinations, hence unity of the diverse. It appears in the process of 
thinking, therefore, as a process of concentration, as a result, not as a point 
of departure, even though it is the point of departure in reality and hence 
also the point of departure for observation [Anschauung] and 
conception.58 
The concrete is the actual [wirkliche] point of departure, although in thinking it is 
the result, so thinking strives to reach the actual, to develop a materialist self-
consciousness within and in relation to the actual as totality and horizon of all 
activity. In positing this critical relation between the concrete in thought and the 
concrete (practical) actuality from which it derives, Marx supersedes the 
opposition between ideal (and therefore ‘unreal’) conceptions and ‘real’ humanity 
that defined Feuerbach’s post-Hegelian humanism. Instead, ideal conceptions are 
registered within the terms of practice, making it possible to grasp their concrete 
origins and ‘real’ effects, as Balibar notes: 
The point is no longer to denounce the abstraction of ‘universals’, of 
‘generalities’, of ‘idealities’, by showing that that abstraction substitutes 
itself for real individuals; it now becomes possible to study the genesis of 
those abstractions, their production by individuals, as a function of the 
collective or social conditions in which they think and relate to one 
another.59 
A science of praxis does not therefore depend on a beginning principle (e.g. the 
‘I’, which in its universal validity could only be derived idealistically) but on 
those ‘material’ conditions and practices that support and motivate the production 
of ideal forms. As Marx and Engels assert in the German Ideology, the premises 
are always already in existence. Comprehending these practical premises 
therefore becomes the basic task of theory, but because it is practice itself that 
constitutes actuality in its fundamental form and that produces the relation 
between subject and object, this theoretical task produces a unique mode of self-
relatedness, a self-conscious reflexion on human actuality in its active unfolding 
(as idealism already recognises, albeit in a distorted, one-sided form). This holds 
not only for forms of ideal abstractions, as the critique of ideology identifies, but 
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also for the actual forms of abstraction that constitute the material conditions of 
practice, the inner ‘logic’ of the practical social body – in which relations such as 
subsumption are key. Marx’s critical discourse therefore takes practical activity as 
its theoretical object whilst at the same time constituting a central aspect of this 
activity, precisely insofar as it deliberately supersedes its status as a merely 
theoretical discourse and is instead grasped as a form of praxis.  
But how close does this conception of praxis come, as a reconstruction in 
thought, to the actuality it refers to and reflects? If it is to be the ‘real reality’ of a 
radically original critical discourse, simply negating the primacy of the ideal in 
favour of praxis as such is insufficient and remains, if not still in some respect 
constrained within an idealist framework, then at least no more than a truncated 
critique of philosophy that fails to transcend its particular concerns and posit a 
new ‘problematic region’ proper to the revolutionary project. The concept of 
activity outlined in the theses On Feuerbach does not sufficiently specify the 
processual objectivity of the relationship between thought and activity. They 
remain discursively located in the opposition between the two as abstract 
essences, valorizing one over the other, as marked by a higher degree of actuality, 
or a richer quality of being. The theses therefore set out the task to be achieved 
and the critical framework for doing so, but do not themselves achieve this; they 
mark a point of departure, a critical axis upon which the possibility of articulating 
the critical discourse with a higher degree of determinacy is possible. But this 
further specification remains to be given. The idea of praxis remains abstract or at 
least underdetermined (in relation to these conditions) and therefore nothing more 
than the mere notion of a potential to act whose actualisation can only occur 
under given conditions or, what is the same thing, in specific forms, without 
whose elaboration the actual is reduced to, and remains constrained by, the 
abstractly possible. Therefore, beyond the idea of praxis as such (as ‘human 
sensuous activity’), a more developed conception of the conditions structuring 
this activity and its resultant forms is required to satisfy the demands of the 
revolutionary problematic posed by Marx. The broader question here, one that 
results from the abolition of the self-sufficiency of the idea, is what are the 
subjective and objective dimensions of praxis? What is the structure of praxis as 
an active process? 
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From praxis to natural-history 
 
i) Material-subject: ‘trans-individuality’ and social constitution 
 
Whilst it will be necessary to go beyond the theses in order to respond to the 
second aspect of praxis’ inner structure – that of the objective moment of the 
active process – to which they provide no substantial answer, we can nonetheless 
find in the theses (VI, VII, IX & X) the basic theoretical conditions for thinking 
the former, that of the subjective articulation of the process as a socially 
constituted totality, or ‘ensemble’, of inter-individual relations. These relations 
make up the sum total of practical interdependencies between the agents of 
‘sensuous practice’, determining their possible action, uniting them within a 
social totality and singularizing their collective efficacy as a subject. The idea of 
‘a certain social body, a social Subject’ is not novel to Marx, and is 
paradigmatically explicated by Hegel in the transition from self-consciousness to 
spirit that takes place in the Phenomenology.60 It is this concept of collective 
constitution, placed into dialectical tension with elements of Feuerbach’s 
anthropological materialism that allows Marx to explicate the subjective 
dimension of praxis as at once social and material (with each aspect reciprocally 
giving content to the other). Marx himself had been thinking against an abstract 
conception of the human individual as early as his doctoral dissertation (‘Abstract 
individuality is freedom from being, not freedom in being'), but the theses 
represent a progression beyond the conception of subjectivity previously held by 
Marx, e.g. in 1843, when he claimed that 'subjectivity can exist only as a 
corporeal individual' and on that basis argued that collective politics ought to 
struggle for a radically democratic version of representational actuality, i.e., the 
political form that corresponded most adequately to the real individual. 
In the theses Marx begins to elaborate the properly dialectical mode of 
comprehending how it is that social relations between individuals determine the 
realization of praxis and thus constitute the ‘real essence’ of humanity that is to be 
subjected to critique. The idea of social relationality is synthesized with the first 
moment of the theses – the negation of the primacy of the ideal in favour of the 
                                                          
60 Marx, Grundrisse, p. 86; Cf. chapter 1 of this thesis. 
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practical – in order to asseverate that 'all social life is essentially practical' – 
implying, reciprocally, that all practice is essentially social – this is the most 
developed result of the theses (VIII), that combines their two principle arguments. 
Humanity is therefore redefined as a collective subject realizing itself by means of 
a ‘trans-individual’ practice (to use Balibar’s term), determined by the totality of 
co-operative relations through which the active capacity of each individual can be 
realized in process. Crucially for Marx, this totality of relations through which the 
practical essence of humanity is realised is not fixed but variable in its concrete 
actuality, rendering the identity of the individuals dependent on historically 
specific structures of sociality: ‘the abstract individual […] belongs to a definite 
form of society’.61 Individuality cannot thus be the starting point of a critical 
account of praxis, as it has its genesis in the variable conditions of that praxis 
(social relations). The theoretically undetermined content of practical 
individuality posits only a negative essence characteristic of the human species, 
and in doing so breaks with a second antithesis presented by the traditional 
theoretical discourse, in many ways derivative of that between idealism and 
materialism – that between ‘individualist’ and ‘holist’ conceptions of human 
constitution. 
Marx refutes, on the one hand, the idea that humanity and the objective 
activity proper to it emerges principally in and through a transhistorical form of 
individuality – either as the empirical aggregation of isolated persons (society as 
the ‘result’ of isolated egos, pace Stirner) or the naturalist reduction of individuals 
to mere exemplars of the genus (the generic conception of humanity adhered to by 
Fichte and Feuerbach and criticized by Hegel and Hess), both of which are 
capable only of grasping human activity as what Lukács disparages as the Kantian 
‘pseudo-practice’ of the individual that is unable to alter the ‘object-forms’ of 
reality – of its own fixed identity – and must simply be reconciled to operating 
within them.62 Marx associated this outlook with ‘old materialism’, in so far as it 
treated individuals as passively dislocated and thus failed to grasped their 
practical interconnection as constitutive of their identities, needs and capacities, 
arguing that this corresponded to a politics of abstract, juridical relationality: 
                                                          
61 Marx, On Feuerbach, thesis VII (My emphasis). 
62 Georg Lukács, ‘Moses Hess and the Problem of Idealist Dialectics’ [1926]: 
https://www.marxists.org/archive/lukacs/works/1926/moses-hess.htm [accessed March 2015]. 
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The highest point attained by intuiting materialism, that is, materialism 
which does not understand sensuousness as practical activity, is the 
outlook of single individuals in "civil society."63 
On the other hand, Marx’s insistent critique of the notion of ‘society’ as a 
unilateral force that stands over and against real individuals, ubiquitous, as we 
have seen, in his commentaries on Hegelian philosophy, as well as in the German 
Ideology manuscripts, equally demonstrate a refusal of the reduction inherent in 
the deterministic holism or structuralism which would stamp individuals as mere 
effects of the social form to which they belong, as constituted by it without in any 
significant sense also constituting it. 
In contrast to these polar reductions, Marx states that the standpoint of his 
new materialism, or, what is the same, the subject ‘of’ practice (or ‘as’ practice) is 
‘socialized humanity’, the ‘social’ aspect of which must be taken as dialectically 
opposed to and intended to displace what would be the merely natural 
determination of the human, as a fixed essence (located either in the individual or 
the totality), abstracted from the ‘historical process’. By contrast, human actuality 
consists in praxis, and the conditions and form of praxis are determined socially, 
according to historically variable forms.  
As a result, it is the logic of this process of formation/forming that becomes 
the central object of critique for Marx, rather than a putative separation or 
alienation between an underlying essence and a phenomenal reality. 
(Methodologically, we can discern here a similar move to first thesis’ rejection of 
the opposition between traditional materialism and idealism; Marx does not 
adhere to the antithesis between them, but rather inscribes both within a 
dialectical relation of determination grasped as a unified process). Balibar 
emphasizes the importance of the suspension of this antithesis in opening the path 
to a new mode of theoretical enquiry in Marx’s thought: 
For the discussion of the relations between the individual and the genus, it 
substitutes a programme of enquiry into this multiplicity of relations, 
which are so many transitions, transferences or passages in which the 
                                                          
63 Marx, On Feuerbach, thesis IX (translation modified). 
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bond of individuals to the community is formed and dissolved, and which, 
in its turn, constitutes them.64 
The refutation of the idea that there is a fixed form of praxis, Marx’s negative 
essentialism, therefore turns out to be the condition for thinking the historical 
development and transformation of human existence – and therefore the 
revolutionary problematic to which Marx’s discourse responds – in materialist 
terms. That is, under the idea that it is the particular conditions and structure of 
social activity (rather than an invariable essence) that determine the practical 
possibilities and limitations of the realization of humanity’s social being. 
A continuity, and indeed a radically original response, can be discerned here 
with the problem posed by Kant in his second critique (although the theological 
provenance of this problem stretches far back before him): that humanity is the 
site of a conflict or tension between natural (‘pathological’) and rational 
determination that must be resolved practically. Marx takes up this problematic, 
but in an entirely novel manner. Firstly, because the form in which this conflict 
plays itself out, as the subjectivity of the human, is not generically present in each 
individual (who ought to choose rational over pathological action) but depends on 
the collective mode of life within which individuals exist and realize themselves, 
as parts of the social subject. Secondly, because if this totality of social 
individuals is not united ‘naturally’, according to a preconceived image, then the 
primary theoretical problematic of a revolutionary science must focus upon the 
processes through which they come to relate to each other in specific historical 
forms, and in turn how these forms might be subject to transformation. The 
concrete existence of humanity thereby attains a higher determinacy than that of 
mere action in the abstract: individual practice is realized socially, and the social 
is realized in the collective, co-ordinated activity of an organic totality of 
individuals united in a singular subject that exists (and can change) in process. 
Marx thus establishes a dynamic of reciprocal determination between individuals 
and the (total) social subject: ‘just as society itself produces man as man, so is 
society produced by him’.65 Whilst a certain degree of reciprocity between 
individuality and the collective totality can be found in Hegel’s works on spirit – 
albeit with well-known speculative deformations – the mode of relationality 
                                                          
64 Balibar, The Philosophy of Marx, p. 32. 
65 Marx, ‘Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts’, in Early Writings, p. 349. 
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constituting this circuit remains ideal and consists in merely representational or 
logicized connections, whereas for Marx the circuit is articulated practically, by 
real human activity.  
 
ii) Practical object: the ‘mediating instrumental field’ 
 
In the terms of Marx’s theoretical orientation and method, the enquiry into the 
logic of the ‘body politic’, the political structure of the social subject, with which 
he began, has become an enquiry into the global structure and functional logic of 
the practical relations governing the realization of objective activity within a 
collaborative totality. But beyond the social interconnections between individuals 
enabling and giving form to this activity – the threshold of comprehension 
delimited by a theory of ‘transindividual practice’ – its objective structure, the 
external, ‘natural’ conditions that confront the social subject, as well its relations 
to these conditions, remains to be determined, even as a general, trans-historical 
form, before it is grasped in its historical concretion. We must ask then, in what 
consist the objective conditions which constitute practice are in turn transformed 
by it? Social relations are obviously also conditions of practice, and possess a 
certain degree of objectivity for the individual inscribed within them, but they are 
not purely self-constituting and the practices that they structure are not enacted 
directly or immediately back upon those relations (that is, they may pertain to 
objectivity, but they are not objective). Instead praxis is an activity mediated 
through the practical relation to the object, to externality.66 It is the manuscripts 
written jointly by Marx and Engels in 1845-6, historically known as The German 
Ideology, which, complementary to Marx’s theses On Feuerbach, offer an initial 
explication of this relation to the object of praxis by reintroducing one of the key 
themes dealt with in Marx’s 1843-4 writings – the relation between humanity and 
nature as the basis for ‘life’, as the ‘real reality’, the actual in process. If the 
dialectical recognition of the subject’s mediation through the object is entirely in 
keeping with Hegel’s philosophy, it is the irreducibly ‘natural’ status of the object 
                                                          
66 ‘These natural conditions of existence, to which he relates as to his own inorganic body, are 
themselves double: (1) of a subjective and (2) of an objective nature. He finds himself a member 
of a family, clan, tribe etc. – which then, in a historic process of intermixture and antithesis with 
others, takes on a different shape ; and, as such a member, he relates to a specific nature (say, here, 
still earth, land, soil) as his own inorganic being, as a condition of his production and 
reproduction.’ Marx, Grundrisse, p. 490. 
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(as well as, ultimately, the subject) that is speculative idealism’s undoing, as Marx 
recognised in his early critique of that philosophy: 
Abstraction comprehending itself as abstraction knows itself to be 
nothing: it must abandon itself – abandon abstraction – and so it arrives at 
an entity which is its exact opposite – at nature. Thus, the entire logic is 
the demonstration that abstract thought is nothing in itself; that the 
absolute idea is nothing for itself; that only nature is something.67 
The residual exteriority of the object to the subject, that is retained from 'old 
materialism' in the theses On Feuerbach (and equally acknowledged – if only 
implicitly – by idealism), has an underlying correspondence with the realm of 
nature, of natural being. What the practical subject-object relation thus consists in 
is a relation of the living subject to the natural conditions that confronts it as its 
object. But – and again Marx’s scrambling of the idealism-materialism antithesis 
is key here – the object as nature is not conceived of dumbly as matter, as 
intuited, any more than the subject could be taken to be an immaterial, self-
grounding will; rather, owing to its mediation through the subject in the unity of 
practice (just as much as the subject is itself mediated through this natural 
relation) it must be grasped as a practical object – a concept first introduced by 
Sartre but given a more developed theoretical articulation by Echeverría.68 The 
practical object is exterior to the subject (so ‘natural’) but endowed with ‘sense’ 
or a specific determination of being according to its functions (symbolic and 
‘real’) within the practical totality encompassing them both; defined by its 
capacity to respond – either immediately or through its practical transformation – 
to the historical needs of that subject, regardless of whether it is a product of 
previous praxis or an untransformed natural material. The object of practice 
therefore always, necessarily, has a socio-practical objectivity that transcends, and 
is irreducible to, its purely ‘natural’ – which is to say, empirically intuited – 
qualities. This objectivity (gegenstandlichkeit) is the ‘general form’ or global 
context within which anything can appear in opposition to the subject as the 
possible object of its activity:69  
                                                          
67 Marx, ‘Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts’, in Early Writings, p. 397. 
68 Cf. Sartre, Critique of Dialectical Reason, Volume 1, p. 45; Echeverría, ‘Use-value: Ontology 
and Semiotics’, pp. 30-32. 
69 It is then deployed by Marx in the context of specific historical forms of objectivity, such as 
‘value-objectivity’ (wertgegenstandlichkeit). 
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Whichever element of nature, be it physical, chemical, vital, psychic; 
whichever fact, be it material or spiritual, etc., whichever parcel of 
exterior or interior reality, whichever section of material, of whichever 
materiality it may be, when it is integrated into a social process of 
production and consumption, of the reproduction of a social subject, 
constitutes that which we could call a practical object, or an object that has 
a social natural form.70 
The only possible mode of being in which nature can confront the social subject, 
is therefore as already mediated by it, so that, as Lukács puts it in History and 
Class Consciousness, ‘nature’s form, its content, its range and its objectivity are 
all socially conditioned’.71 (This has important effects, for example, in terms of 
the relation between individual members of the social body and the objective 
world that confronts them, as the objectivity of the world may be mediated and 
stamped with a particular practicality at the level of the social totality, but this 
practical significance my escape or be denied to individuals – here lies the basis 
for the ‘fetish character’ of capitalist commodities.) Marx differentiates between 
the two principal forms of practicality: the object and instrument of practice, the 
former being that which is worked upon and the latter that which facilitates the 
work, augmenting the productive powers of the human body by functioning as its 
‘inorganic body’. The practical object, taken as the totality of individual objects 
and instruments operative and available within a society (just as the social subject 
incorporates all of its individual members), as well as the techniques proper to 
them, articulates external nature as ‘an objective totality gifted with a distributive 
intentionality’.72 It is this practical object, the ‘mediating instrumental field’ of all 
practice, that provides the objective ‘premises’ of human actuality, which a logic 
of social actuality must analyse and critique (in conjunction with the subjective 
aspect) if it is to be a science of ‘actual historical man’ rather than mere ‘man’. 
 
iii) Natural-historical being: praxis as production 
 
                                                          
70 Echeverría, La Contradicción Entre el Valor y el Valor de Uso en El Capital de Karl Marx 
[1983], Mexico City: Itaca, 1998, p. 15. 
71 Lukács, History and Class Consciousness [1923], translated by Rodney Livingstone, London: 
Merlin Press, 1971 p. 234. 
72 Echeverría, ‘Use-value: Ontology and Semiotics’, p. 30. 
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Praxis, as the foundational process through which human existence attains its 
concrete actuality, is therefore constituted in the active relations between the 
practical object and the social subject, ‘a certain mode of production or stage of 
industry is always conjoined with a certain mode of social interaction or stage of 
society’, Marx and Engels announce.73 The former corresponds to a natural 
totality that is given sense according to its ‘instrumental operativity’, that is, 
incorporated (or ‘totalized’, in the Sartrean sense) within a practical context that 
determines its objective character; the latter to a collaborative community ‘in 
their given social connection’.74 There is an important dialectical mediation at 
work between these two poles or totalities in their concrete connection. On the 
one hand, the intensive relational composition of the social subject depends on 
and responds to the structure of the ‘mediating instrumental field’ and the 
techniques through which its praxis is realized, on the other, the very 
‘practicality’ of that field is an expression and result of the relations and 
objectives posited by the social subject. So whilst nature is socialized by its 
incorporation within a specifically human process of activity, human social 
existence is itself ‘naturalised’ by its incorporation within the broader 
physiological functioning of natural life, as reproduction. Marx had already noted 
this reciprocity in 1844, although in much more general terms: 
An objective being acts objectively, and it would not act objectively if 
objectivity were not an inherent part of its essential nature. It creates and 
establishes only objects because it is established by objects, because it is 
fundamentally nature. In the act of establishing it therefore does not 
descend from its 'pure activity' to the creation of objects; on the contrary, 
its objective product simply confirms its objective activity, its activity as 
the activity of an objective, natural being.75 
Even in Marx’s early texts, ‘consistent naturalism’ was the ‘unifying truth’ of 
both materialism and idealism that superseded their theoretical separation. The 
‘consistency’ at stake here would precisely be the recognition of a dialectical 
                                                          
73 Marx and Engels, ‘Feuerbach’, in Carver and Blank, Marx and Engels's "German ideology" 
Manuscripts, p. 71. 
74 ‘Marx indicates how bourgeois political economists transformed the properties of things, which 
are formed by their relation in a particular whole, by their roles and functions in a particular 
process, into fixed, substantial properties, independent of relations in a historically transitory 
whole.' Zeleny, The Logic of Marx, p. 25.  
75 Marx, ‘Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts’, in Early Writings, p. 389. 
100 
 
interpenetration between humanity’s ‘natural’ and ‘socio-historical’ being; that 
the human cannot be abstracted from nature – '{as if} man is not 
always confronted with a historical nature and a natural history' – but is rather 
realised in and through it, as part of it:76 
Man lives from nature – i.e., nature is his body –and he must maintain a 
continuing dialogue with it is he is not to die. To say that man’s physical 
and mental life is linked to nature simply means that nature is linked to 
itself, for man is a part of nature.77  
If the medium of this ‘dialogue’ is the active conjunction of social subject and 
practical object, its language or code is established by Marx and Engels through 
their association of the natural materiality of  'the human body’ (Feuerbach’s 
‘flesh and blood’) with the practical form of its expression, as ‘needs and 
labour'.78 These are categories which fall neither on the side of the social or the 
natural but must be grasped dialectically as socio-natural, or more precisely, 
natural-historical.79 Corporeality, humanity’s natural or objective being, is given 
an immediately historical dimension in so far as it is only ever expressed in the 
form of the particular needs and capacities driving and realising social life, and at 
the same time human subjectivity, in whichever historical and social 
circumstances it is operative and in spite of whichever specific higher goals and 
projects it might posit, is bound to its necessary mediation through the ‘natural’ 
processes sustaining its biological existence. The concrete totalisation of this 
double-process is therefore grounded in the unity of the reproduction of natural 
life through historical means; that cyclical movement which fulfils the vital needs 
of the social subject on the basis of the resources, techniques and knowledges 
available to it in its given circumstances (geographically, ethnically, culturally, 
etc..). In their famous passage on the natural foundations of history, Marx and 
Engels declare that: 
                                                          
76 Marx and Engels, ‘Feuerbach’, in Carver and Blank, Marx and Engels's "German ideology" 
Manuscripts, p. 51. 
77 Marx, ‘Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts’, in Early Writings, p. 328. 
78 Marx and Engels, ‘Feuerbach’, in Carver and Blank, ‘Marx and Engels's "German ideology" 
Manuscripts, p. 34 (my emphasis). 
79‘Natural history is not a synthesis of natural and historical methods, but a change of perspective.’ 
Adorno, ‘The Idea of Natural-History’ [1932], translated by Robert Hullot-Kentor, in Things 
Beyond Resemblance: Collected Essays on Theodor W. Adorno, New York and Chichester: 
Columbia University Press, 2006, p. 261.  
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We have to make a start with the Germans, who are devoid of premises, 
by setting forth the first premise of all human existence, and therefore of 
all history, namely the premise that men have to be in a position to live 
in order to be able to “make history”. But living requires above all else 
eating & drinking, shelter, clothing & yet other things. The first historical 
act is therefore the production of the means to satisfy these needs, the 
production of material life itself, & indeed this is a historical act, a 
founding condition of all history, which must be fulfilled today, on a daily 
& hourly basis, just as it was thousands of years ago, simply for men to 
stay alive.80 
This passage is crucial and marks the point at which human activity, praxis, is 
designated in its specificity as ‘production’, which takes place according the 
demands, and as the realization of, a specifically natural process of life. Even 
where critical and post-Hegelian philosophies acknowledged the constitutive role 
of nature or the natural dimension of human existence, it was in almost all cases – 
with Schelling perhaps being the notable exception – restricted to a merely 
secondary status in terms of the determination of the actual, having no effective 
presence other than as an expression or objective product of subjectivity, which, 
conversely had to pay no such conceptual tribute to nature. The subject was given 
monopoly over all process (for example in Kantian philosophy, where the 
lawfulness of nature is a product of subjectivity) and even the concept of ‘life’ 
was considered in terms of rational consistency or development (eminently, for 
Hegel). Here however, this unilateral primacy is disrupted, because any possible 
process of subjective development, all history, has its premises and actuality in 
the ‘mundanity’ of those everyday processes that are the basis for natural life. 
This natural basis of social being is not an incidental fact, but forms the essential 
and irreducible content of the totality of practices, objects and relations that 
constitute the ‘production of material life’, which in any particular configuration, 
however culturally or technically mediated, nonetheless remain delimited by the 
‘regularities proper to matter’ in its natural functioning. 
What exactly are these ‘regularities’, on Marx’s account? And how do they 
inform the modes of historical existence and their transformation that remains the 
                                                          
80 Marx and Engels, ‘Feuerbach’, in Carver and Blank, ‘Marx and Engels's "German ideology" 
Manuscripts, p. 63. 
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horizon and object of his theoretical engagement? From the mid 1840’s Marx not 
only developed a far more sophisticated conception of how the reciprocal process 
of subject-object constitution was structured socially and materially, but also 
came to a unique and decisive perspective on the natural-objective structure of its 
unity. Alfred Schmidt claims that ‘when he engaged on his analysis of the social 
life-process, thus concretizing the concept of appropriation, Marx went far 
beyond all the bourgeois theories of nature presented by the Enlightenment'.81 
Marx developed his ideas of the natural basis grounding the realization of the 
social production process through his close interest, along with Engels, in new 
discoveries and theoretical innovations in the natural sciences.82 Energetics, in 
particular, was one of most important fields of scientific enquiry at this time, and 
Marx drew on one aspect of this broad theory, making use of the concept of 
metabolism (stoffwechsel), which describes the circulation of energy or matter 
between an organic system and its environment. As John Bellamy Foster defines 
it:  
It captures the complex biochemical process of exchange, through which 
an organism (or a given cell) draws upon materials and energy from its 
environment and converts these by various metabolic reactions into the 
building blocks of growth. In addition, the concept of metabolism is used 
to refer to the specific regulatory processes that govern this complex 
interchange between organisms and their environment.83 
                                                          
81 Schmidt, The Concept of Nature in Marx, p. 79. 
82 ‘We knew that Marx and Engels had both filled multiple notebooks with extracts from, and 
commentaries on, the leading natural science writers of their time. We also knew that these 
notebooks covered a wide range of scientific fields – physics, chemistry, biology, physiology, 
geology, and agronomy – in each of which the analysis of energy dynamics occupied an important 
if not central position. In fact, as we studied the matter further we discovered that Marx and 
Engels had some familiarity with and in some cases had closely studied the works of many of the 
scientists involved in the development of thermodynamics (both the first and second laws) – 
including Hermann von Helmholtz, Julius Robert Mayer, James Prescott Joule, Justus von Liebig, 
Jean-Baptiste Joseph Fourier, Sadi Carnot, Rudolf Clausius, William Thomson, Peter Guthrie Tait, 
William Grove, James Clark Maxwell, and Ludwig Eduard Boltzmann. . In addition, we knew that 
Marx had attended numerous public lectures on natural science in the years leading up to and 
following the publication of Capital, Volume I in 1867, and that among these was a series of 
lectures by the English physicist John Tyndall, author of Heat Considered as a Mode of Motion. 
Tyndall, a major figure in the developing physics in his own right, was the principal advocate of 
the ideas of J.R. Mayer – one of the co-discoverers of the conservation of energy (the first law of 
thermodynamics).’ John Bellamy Foster and Paul Burkett, ‘Metabolism, Energy, and Entropy in 
Marx's Critique of Political Economy: Beyond the Podolinsky Myth’, Theory and Society, Vol. 35 
(1), Feb 2006, p. 112. 
83 John Bellamy Foster, Marx’s Ecology: Materialism and Nature, New York: NYU Press, 2000, 
p. 160 (my emphasis). 
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Marx appropriated this notion of material interchange and its ‘regulatory 
processes’ and began to incorporate it, from the 1850’s onwards, as an essential 
aspect of his theory of praxis that would explain its structure as a natural process, 
as ‘part of nature’, with a greater determinacy than had previously been possible. 
As a metabolism, the interaction between the subjective and objective factors of 
the practical process denotes an active and transformative relation to nature 
delimited by a conservationist economy, a process of working upon the object 
through an exchange of material (or energy) between an organic and inorganic 
totality which, as Carlos Oliva points out, is the basis for every process of organic 
life, ‘the form in which the primary [natural] relation is given, common not only 
to the animal and the human being, but we could presuppose to every being that 
exists and reproduces itself.84 At the same time, however, the metabolic aspect of 
praxis is not for Marx reducible to the merely quantitative fact of a purely 
energetic transfer but also implies, qualitatively, a change of form on the part of 
the interacting totalities and the matter exchanged, brought about, or borne, by 
this interchange.85 This leap from the quantitative to the qualitative – 
characteristically associated with dialectical development – is essential in 
unifying Marx’s multi-layered analysis of the reproductive process and transforms 
the function and meaning of the metabolic concept in Marx’s discourse, which 
‘for all its scientific air, is nonetheless speculative in character’.86 
As a generalized process, systematically basic to the functioning of the 
natural world, metabolism carries out, or rather carries with it, what the naturalist 
philosopher and physiologist Jacob Moleschott described as the ‘eternal 
circulation of material’ through its various forms.87 For Marx, human practice 
also participates in and is bound by the laws of metabolic interchange in that it 
‘can only proceed as nature does […] can only change the form of the materials’ 
through, in Pietro Verri’s terms, ‘composition and division’ rather than ‘acts of 
                                                          
84 Schmidt, The Concept of Nature in Marx, p. 76; Carlos Oliva Mendoza, ‘Los diagramas de 
Bolívar Echeverría: producción, consumo y circulación semiótica’, Valenciana 6 (11), Jan-Jun 
2013, pp. 189-90. 
85 ‘Marx follows Hermann and Liebig in declining to reduce the content of the energy income and 
expenditure to pure energetic terms.’ ‘For Marx and Engels, the emphasis was on irreversible 
change and qualitative transformation.’ Foster and Burkett, ‘Metabolism, Energy, and Entropy in 
Marx's Critique of Political Economy’, p. 121, 111. 
86 Schmidt, The Concept of Nature in Marx, p. 76. Cf. also, Foster, Marx’s Ecology, ch. 5. 
87 Jacob Moleschott, cited in Schmidt, The Concept of Nature in Marx, p. 87. Critical of Schmidt’s 
account, Foster downplays the influence of Moleschott on Marx’s appropriation of the metabolic 
concept, cf. Marx’s Ecology, p 161. 
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creation’.88 ‘Forms’ here denotes the practicality of the object, an objectivity, as 
we have seen, determined entirely by its specific function in the practical process 
of production and consumption, by the functional position it occupies there: as its 
function changes, so do its determining characteristics, i.e., (in their unity) its 
form. In identifying this form-determining and -altering activity with a metabolic 
basis, Marx’s theory of praxis is imbued with a basic physiological dimension – 
‘the everlasting nature-imposed condition of human existence […] common to all 
forms of society in which human beings live’ – that functions to mitigate any 
residual presence of the ideal productivity and ‘ghostly battles’ which mark its 
philosophical genesis, binding the form giving and consuming process to an 
underlying physical substrate which possesses its own processual ‘logic’.89 
 
Against nature 
 
But whilst the human metabolism with nature conforms to the general functioning 
of physiological reproduction, it does so in a distinctive and singular manner 
through which it ‘transcends’ its status as a purely ‘animal’ process. This 
transcendence emerges as a result of the characteristic under-determination of the 
‘regulatory processes’ governing the form of the interaction between human 
activity and its natural-practical object. Human reproduction cannot be mapped 
onto any instinctually given image of the sociality or technique that would 
constitute the praxis through which it is realized – a corollary of the negative 
essentialism already established in thesis IV and the German Ideology 
manuscripts. There is no generically fixed form of the metabolic interaction itself, 
nor, resultantly, of the forms given to natural material in the labour process or the 
social subjects produced by consumption. The human life process may of 
necessity obey certain basic bio-physical conditions but, as Echeverría argues, the 
‘determination of its concrete figure is nevertheless delivered over to the side of 
freedom’ such that ‘the reproduction of its animal materiality is the bearer of a 
reproduction that transcends it, that of its social materiality’.90 This moment of 
transcendence that lacerates the natural order, that ‘trans-naturalizes’ human 
                                                          
88 Marx, Capital vol. 1, p. 133, (my italics); Pietro Verri, cited by Marx in a footnote to the 
previous comment. 
89 Marx, Capital vol. 1, p. 290. 
90 Echeverría, ‘”Use-value”: Ontology and Semiotics’, p. 27. 
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reproduction (to take Echeverría’s term) from an animal to socio-natural process, 
was identified by Georg Simmel  as the foundational basis for the subject-object 
distinction: 
The fact is that, unlike animals, humanity does not integrate itself 
unquestioningly into the natural facticity of the world but tears loose from 
it, confronts it, demanding, struggling, violating and being violated by it 
and it is with this first great dualism that the endless process between the 
subject and the object arises.91 
It is precisely here, with the idea of a constitutive transnaturalization of human 
reproduction, that the connection is established between the two essential 
moments of Marx’s theory of praxis – of its natural and historical dimensions – 
that are bound together as dialectically interpenetrating poles of a single ‘socio-
natural’ process. If, up to this point, Marx’s thought appears to be susceptible to 
the same criticism levelled against Kant in relation to the subsumptive relation 
between concepts and intuitions, and which Hegel could only displace with 
recourse a speculative operation of closure – namely, offering a progressive 
elaboration of the constituents of actuality (nature and history) that draws them 
together asymptotically without ever being able to resolve them into a definitive 
unity – at this point their hypostatised heterogeneity is overcome. In bringing the 
develop of each aspect to the point of its mediation through the other, as already 
the other, Marx is genuinely able to repose this opposition between form and 
content as one between substance and form, which is to say that of a unified self-
acting process, a disjunctive synthesis in an open movement of self-explication.92 
This is also, then, the precise moment that discloses the possibility of a material 
subjectivity, promised in the first thesis On Feuerbach, one that transcends the 
objective closure of the metabolic process as purely physical whilst vindicating 
                                                          
91 Georg Simmel, ‘The Concept and Tragedy of Culture’ [1911], translated by David Frisby and 
Mark Ritter, in Simmel on Culture: Selected Writings, edited by Mike Featherstone and David 
Frisby, London: Sage, 1997, p. 55. 
92 ‘If the question of the relation of nature and history is to be seriously posed, then it only 
offers any chance of solution if it is possible to comprehend historical being in its most extreme 
historical determinacy, where it is most historical, as natural being, or if it were possible to 
comprehend nature as a historical being where it seems to rest most deeply in itself as nature.’ 
Adorno, ‘The Idea of Natural-History’, p. 260; Cf. Echeverría, ‘En este número’, Cuadernos 
Politicos 37, July/September 1983, p. 3: 'If already in the Grundrisse of 1857 [Marx] saw the 
labour process “incorporated” as “matter” into the capital “form”, in the 1861-3 manuscript he 
tried to see it, not as a reality in-itself untouched by a (capitalist) mode of operation external to 
it, but as a “substance” affected essentially by the capitalist “form” that, formally or really, it 
allowed to exist.’ 
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the materialist consistency of freedom and necessity on the basis of Lucretius’ 
dictum that ‘out of nothing, nothing comes’.93 The transnaturalized condition of 
human activity summons a subjectivity, both necessitated and potentialized by the 
lack of natural or instinctive support guiding the reproductive process, to select a 
concrete social form for human existence that recodes or re-totalizes the merely 
natural ‘first nature’ of its animal life. In exercising this capacity and producing 
new forms for its own existence according to the complex historical interplay 
between natural limits and social boundaries, the human supersedes its status as a 
particular animal and instead lays claim to the universality of organic being, 
which it takes as a substance that it can manipulate in a (theoretically) limitless 
manner, although only as a horizon of historical possibility (and on somewhat 
ambiguous terms): 
Whereas the animal is bound, in his appropriation of the world of objects, 
to the biological peculiarities of his species, and hence confined to definite 
regions of the world, the universality of man is signified by the fact that he 
can appropriate, at least potentially, the whole of nature.94 
As Kant established, the possibility of such a universal activity and selective 
development is conditional upon the effective presence of an autonomous source 
of will-determination guiding praxis, whose exercise Marx locates primarily in 
the act of labour.95 As ‘an exclusively human characteristic’, labour is 
distinguished from organic activity as such by its unique temporal structure, in 
which the spontaneous and conscious positing of a telos precedes and determines 
its concrete actualisation. The anticipatory conceptualisation of the results of 
labour, the projected ideal that propels and guides the process in the absence of an 
instinctive schema, is for Marx what ‘distinguishes the worst architect from the 
best of bees’, and at a more fundamental level is the condition of possibility for 
the subjective capacity that ultimately determines the form given to human 
                                                          
93 This motto appears twice in Capital: vol. 2, p. 408; vol. 1, p. 323. C.f. in the context of capitalist 
production, Grundrisse, p. 304: ‘Nothing can emerge at the end of the process which did not 
appear as a presupposition and precondition at the beginning.’ 
94 Schmidt, The Concept of Nature in Marx, p. 80. 
95 ‘As the sole being on earth who has reason, and thus a capacity to set voluntary ends for 
himself, he is certainly the titular lord of nature, and, if nature is regarded as a teleological system, 
then it is his vocation to be the ultimate end of nature; but always only conditionally, that is, 
subject to the condition that he has the understanding and the will to give to nature and to himself 
a relation to an end that can be sufficient for itself independently of nature, which can thus be a 
final end, which, however, must not be sought in nature at all.’ Kant, Critique of the Power of 
Judgement [1793], §83. 
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reproduction, the historical actuality of the social process in toto. This capacity 
emerges in the course of labour, as ‘a process by which man, through his own 
actions, mediates, regulates and controls the metabolism between himself and 
nature’ in order to give a new form to the worked-upon matter.96 The ‘subjective’ 
moment of praxis therefore emerges when a practical intentionality (that we 
cannot call rational or ‘free’ in an unqualified sense, but whose functioning is 
unintelligible on the basis of purely biological determinations alone) intervenes to 
direct the metabolic process according to its own pre-conceived goal: 
At the end of every labour process, a result emerges which had already 
been conceived by the worker at the beginning, hence existed ideally. Man 
not only effects a change of form in the materials of nature; he also 
actualizes [Verwirklicht] his own purpose in those materials. And this is a 
purpose he is conscious of, it determines the mode of his activity with the 
rigidity of a law, and he must subordinate his will to it. This subordination 
is no mere momentary act. Apart from the exertion of the working organs, 
a purposeful will is required for the entire duration of the work.97 
The effective presence of a ‘spontaneous’ purposive intentionality within the 
labour process is therefore what displaces the purely natural determination of 
human reproduction, and instaurates in its place what Echeverría calls, following 
Sartre and Heidegger, ‘an autonomous dimension of being: that of human 
existence’.98 The autonomy at stake here, however, is neither pure nor final nor 
absolute in the sense established by Kant in his practical philosophy, where there 
was ‘in man a power of self-determination, independently of any coercion 
through sensuous impulses’.99 Instead, for Marx, this autonomy from natural 
determination is relative rather than absolute, and should be taken to indicate the 
opening of an interstitial phase that suspends the ontological continuity of the 
natural life process, and in which the realization of vital functions is carried out 
according to an independent logic, irreducible to the behavioural principles 
encoded in the biological structure of the human animal. It is this – socio-
historical – logic, in its transcendence of the regulatory order of biological being, 
                                                          
96 Marx, Capital vol. 1, p.283. 
97 Ibid, p.284 (translation modified). 
98 Echeverría, ‘El Dinero y el Objeto de Deseo’, in Ilusiones de Modernidad, Mexico City: Era, 
1995, p. 76. 
99 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A534/B562. 
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that constitutes the conditioned form of freedom proper to the practical 
subjectivity of the social individuals and the historical content of its multiple 
realizations. If a ‘principle’ of determination could be singled out as that which 
guides (and limits) the exercise of this autonomous willing it would have to be 
derived immanently from global practical context delimited by a conjunction of 
the subjective and objective factors of the reproduction process as a whole (in any 
particular ‘socio-ethnic’ instance). 
In labouring, practical subjectivity ‘proves the truth’ of this autonomy by 
externalizing or objectivising its ideal in a concrete product – a practical object or 
use-value – and thereby effects a transition from subjective into objective form, 
actualising itself. For Marx, labour is ‘the manifestation of [the worker’s] 
personal skill and capacity – a manifestation which depends on his will and is 
simultaneously an expression of his will.’100 This expression does not only appear 
in the course of the labour process but also subsists in the intentional form given 
to the product. The fluid subjectivity of labour in process – what Marx refers to as 
‘pure restlessness’, recalling Hegel’s negative – metabolically undoes and 
transforms the fixity of objective conditions, it ‘must seize on these things, 
awaken them from the dead’ and infuse them ‘with vital energy for the 
performance of the functions appropriate to their concept and to their vocation’ 
(i.e., the end that subjectivity assigns to them). Labour consumes the object (both 
as raw material and instrument of labour), dissolving the hard fixity of its 
objectness, subjectivising it, whilst at the same time it fixes its own free 
subjectivity in an external form, congeals its motility and objectifies itself in the 
product:101  
This form-giving activity consumes the object and consumes itself, but it 
consumes the given form of the object only in order to posit it in a new 
objective form, and it consumes itself only in its subjective form as 
activity. It consumes the objective character of the object – the 
indifference towards the form – and the subjective character of activity; 
forms the one, materializes the other.102 
                                                          
100 Marx, MECW vol. 30, p. 93 (my emphasis). 
101 Marx, Capital vol. 1, p. 289. 
102 Marx, Grundrisse, p. 301. 
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Labour is not only consumed, but also at the same time fixed, converted 
from the form of activity into the form of the object; materialized; as a 
modification of the object, it modifies its own form and changes from 
activity to being.103 
Through the labour process subject and object therefore infuse one another, 
neither is what it was before the process begun, formally or physically, each has 
given and taken from the other. Every instance of transformative, or practico-
critical, activity conforms to this doubly-determined structure of the human 
metabolism, realized through a complex series of transformative interactions. 
Considered only from the perspective of the first phase of the social 
process – production – labour functions as the medium of actualisation through 
which the subject shapes the external objectivity of the world, imposing its own 
will and creative freedom upon actuality by virtue of its formation of the object 
that it subsumes under its own practical telos. But as this telos is nothing but a 
function of its own reproduction process, of its anticipated self-constitution, 
then – just as for the Kantian and Hegelian subject – the act of subsumptively 
determining the object also reciprocally determines the actuality of the social 
subject, as realized in the second phase of the social process with the 
consumption of the object: 
Not only do the objective conditions change in the act of reproduction, 
e.g. the village becomes a town, the wilderness a cleared field etc. , but 
the producers change, too, in that they bring out new qualities in 
themselves, develop themselves in production, transform themselves, 
develop new powers and ideas, new modes of intercourse, new needs 
and new language.104 
In the moment of consumption, the practical intention that was expressed in 
labour and objectified in the form of the product is ‘actualised’: 
‘A product becomes an actual product only by being consumed. For 
example, a garment becomes an actual [wirkliches] garment only in the act 
of being worn; a house where no one lives is in fact not an actual 
[wirkliches] house; thus the product, unlike a mere natural object 
[Naturgegenstand], proves itself to be, becomes, a product only through 
                                                          
103 Ibid, p. 300 (my emphasis). 
104 Ibid, p. 494. 
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consumption. Only by decomposing the product does consumption give 
the product the finishing touch; for the product is production not as 
objectified [Tätigkeit] activity, but rather only as object for the active 
[tätige] subject’105  
The product is therefore not only determined by its purpose or role insofar as it is 
inscribed within a practical totality, as something for the active subject, a 
potential practical object, but reaches its highest degree of actuality in the 
moment of its destructive absorption or transformation by the subject. The 
object’s status as ‘for the subject’ (its practicality) is realized and affirmed in 
actu, when it ‘steps outside this social movement [of circulation] and becomes a 
direct object and servant of individual need, and satisfies it in being consumed.’106 
For Marx this too is a trans-naturally determined process, realized under a 
particular socio-historical form which ‘produces, both objectively and 
subjectively, not only the object consumed but also the manner of its 
consumption.'107 Consumption, finally then, is an affirmation of the form of the 
object, of the intentional practicality given to matter in the course of the labour 
process (although not, of course, in every case). This is so, not only in terms of its 
direct effect, in the satisfaction of a need that would affirm its immediate practical 
functionality, but also, indirectly, because in being consumed the object is 
‘subjectivised’ and gives form to the consumer whose vital subjectivity is 
reproduced by means of it: ‘it alone creates for the products the subject for whom 
they are products.’108 This is the same social subject that will collectively enact 
the first phase of the cycle again, so the form given to the subject in the moment 
of consumption shapes the possibilities of its future productive activity. 
Consumption therefore ‘reacts in turn upon the point of departure and initiates the 
whole process anew.’109 Stuart Hall emphasizes the centrality of this mediation in 
the generation of new historical needs and capacities: 
Consumption produces production by creating the need for ‘new 
production’. It is crucial, for the later discussion of the determinacy of 
production in the process as a whole, that what consumption now does, 
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strictly speaking, is to provide the ‘ideal, internally impelling cause’, the 
‘motive’, ‘internal image’, ‘drive’ ‘purpose’ for re-production. Marx 
stresses ‘new production’; strictly speaking, and significantly, it is the 
need to re-produce for which consumption is made mediately 
responsible.’110  
There is thus a second, aggregate effect borne by the reproductive process across 
its cyclical realisations. Viewed globally, in terms of the general effects and 
functionality of production and consumption as a whole, the basic autonomy at 
work in productive labour expresses and enacts, not only the immediate 
reproduction of the social subject, but also the creative constitution of its concrete 
identity, what Echeverría refers to as a ‘project’ of self-construction, where:  
‘the form that a good that has been produced has is never neutral or 
innocent; it always has a concrete use-value that determines, in turn, the 
form that the subject that will consume it should have. Labour has a 
poiétic dimension; its giving form is a realization, Marx says. It is an 
invention and the carrying out of a project; a project that is only 
immediately the construction of a thing, which indirectly but ultimately is 
the construction of the subject itself.’111 
When the social process is grasped as a totality, as a process of socio-natural 
reproduction, we can see how praxis gives form not only to the objects and in turn 
the subjects, of practical life, but also to the very form of the process itself, how 
reproduction is a mediating form of ‘self-activity’ (Selbstbetätigung). The true 
activity of the social subject, then, is consummated in this reproductive process of 
production/consumption, as that through which it gives form to its own sociality, 
to its ‘socio-natural form’ of existence. This forms the consistent materialist basis 
of Marx’s thinking, even in its most historically specific contexts, such as in 
Capital: 
Whatever the social form of the production process, it has to be 
continuous, it must periodically repeat the same phases. A society can no 
more cease to produce than it can cease to consume. When viewed, 
therefore, as a connected whole, and in the constant flux of its incessant 
                                                          
110 Stuart Hall, ‘Marx’s Notes on Method: A ‘reading’ of the ‘1857 Introduction’, Cultural Studies 
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111 Echeverría, ‘“Use-value”: Ontology and Semiotics’, p.29. 
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renewal, every social process of production is at the same time a process 
of reproduction.112 
 
Reproduction-development 
 
The differentia specifica of the human metabolic relation, of its reproduction 
process as a whole, is its constitutive under-determinacy in purely ‘animal’ terms 
and the corresponding genesis of a socio-historical subjectivity that prosthetically 
undertakes this determining function. This account of ‘trans-naturalized’ 
reproduction, elaborated by Marx and presented schematically by Echeverría in 
his 1984 essay ‘La Forma Natural de la Reproduction Social’ (‘The Natural Form 
of Social Reproduction’) is the most developed ‘general’ account of the structure 
of the practical process and its social structure, conceived as a totalizing but 
mobile relationship between subject and object.113 It is the basic theoretical 
framework through which a materialist account of social actuality can be 
developed. In his reconstructive account of this ‘general form’ Echeverría 
transposes Marx’s conception of the specificity of human labour into a conception 
of the specificity of human reproduction, arguing that because human praxis is not 
bound to any pre-established instinctual image – and, indeed, is distinguished by 
this lack of ‘natural support’ – its concrete content must always be given form 
according to the particular ‘political’ organization of practical life that governs it. 
This is the ‘basic politicity’ inherent to the ‘socio-natural form of reproduction’. 
The social subject must therefore consciously and necessarily subsume the natural 
(‘animal’) life process under a socio-historically determined form of political 
community in order to realize it. At the same time, because such a form is always 
inscribed within a cyclical temporality of biological reproduction 
(production/consumption) that must continually – and metabolically – re-establish 
its own validity – that is, the functional correspondence of the ‘system of 
productive capacities’ and the ‘system of needs for consumption’ – the social 
process of establishing and modifying the form of human existence is always ‘in 
play’ and subject to change through the practical, collective action of its 
                                                          
112 Marx, Capital vol.1, p. 711. 
113 ‘La “forma natural” de la reproducción social’, Cuadernos Políticos 41, Jul–Dec 1984, pp. 
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individual members in these two basic phases (it is therefore, necessarily, a 
dynamic politicity with a disjunctive structure). This contestability and dynamism 
is what distinguishes the socio-natural form of reproduction from purely natural 
being, which, according to Hegel, knows only repetition.114 The active relation is 
determined, on the one hand, in its productive or creative moment as labour or 
production – the moment of objectification – and, on the other, in its receptive, 
affirmative or destructive moment as consumption or enjoyment (genuss) – the 
moment of subjectivation: ‘The person objectifies himself in production, the thing 
subjectifies itself in [consumption]’, Marx states in the Grundrisse.115 They form 
the two modalities of the metabolic relation to nature as it is conceived in process: 
in first moment as the realization of the subject through production of the object, 
and in the second as the realization of the object in consumption that (re)produces 
the subject. The realization of the human’s animal reproduction is therefore 
necessarily and exclusively tied to the reproduction of a socio-political order, and, 
vice versa, so too is that socio-political order bound to the fulfilment of the basic 
physiological reproduction of the social subject. Not only, therefore, are the 
natural and social aspects of human existence mediated through one another – in 
spite of their non-identity - but, as Echeverría points out, humanity – precisely in 
its capacity ‘to take the sociality of human life as a substance to which it can give 
form’, to ‘transnaturalize’ its ‘animal’ existence, and thus act as a ‘subject’ – re-
establishes the general lawfulness of nature, at the same time as it transcends it.116 
This is also why ultimately, for Schmidt, ‘the different economic formations of 
society which have succeeded each other historically have been so many modes 
of nature’s self-mediation.'117 
There are at least three principal levels of systematic functioning dialectically 
interwoven in this conception of the reproductive process as the most general 
structure of social materiality. Each of these acts as a delimiting condition on the 
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subsequent, but is nonetheless underdetermined in relation to it, and re-signified 
or rearticulated by the one that follows, giving it a greater concretion in its 
specification of the actuality of the process as a whole. These are, firstly, the 
mechanical processes occurring within space and time, the basic interaction of 
physical objects within a closed system as a whole (intuitive materiality or the 
general lawfulness of nature). Secondly, the physiological reproduction process of 
organic life in the cycle of metabolic transformations, of the integration and 
expulsion of matter/energy through which an organic totality is able to maintain 
its vital functioning; animal reproduction. Thirdly, the historically determined but 
radically open collective and technical form of the activities and objects that make 
up the specifically human realization of the reproductive process, ‘culture’, ‘mode 
of life’, or what Echeverría calls the ‘socio-natural form’ of reproduction. Each 
successive process must meet the basic conditions set by the previous, more 
ontologically basic order, but at the same time supersedes the possibilities of 
signification or ontological registration (i.e., actuality) proper to that systemic 
level. Each process is thus subsumed and re-coded by principles of unity and 
coherence given by the higher one without at the same time abolishing its 
determining presence or internal logics of organisation and action. This recalls 
Marx’s assertion that 'properties of a thing do not arise from its relation to other 
things, they are, on the contrary, merely activated by such relations ' and reaffirms 
the sense in which social existence is defined as a process of natural-history, 
where the realisation of natural functions has no independent ‘sense’ outside of its 
distinct historical forms of concretion and the social context enabling them.118  
This grounding of the historicity of praxis in the socio-natural reproduction 
process is what, ultimately, distinguishes Marx´s materialism in its most 
developed ‘general’ structure – as a theoretical totality. But it is a unique form of 
constitutively underdetermined totality that escapes the closure of idealist 
philosophical systems, because it displaces the process of the production of 
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actuality – the reciprocity of the subject as act and of the object as its product – 
from its enclosure within both the circuit of consciousness (Kant) and the 
speculative development of absolute (Hegel), rendering it no longer the exclusive 
doing of a subject that would be produced or affirmed a priori (process as 
tautology for idealism) and locating it instead in the historical process in its – as 
yet to be determined – concrete ‘density’ and variability. It is now a genetic 
subjectivation as much as an immanent objectivation, an active and incidental 
production of a subject that in turn acts through the praxis in which it loses it pure 
character as ‘prime mover’ and is instead mediated and co-constituted by the 
objective forms of its realization, thus suffering the continual and simultaneous 
loss and re-assumption of its power to give form to the object, itself and the total 
reproductive process. The process of constitution is no longer the sovereign work 
of a will that would be merely in contradiction with itself, but is instead mediated 
through the objective forms of its realisation, so that the quality of being a subject 
(in what would be its critical-idealist conception) is only a possible and partial 
predication of the individuals that enact the practical process. Hence Sartre’s 
assertion that praxis is ‘an experience both of necessity and of freedom’.119 In 
terms of a realisation of the rational – however ambivalent such an ideal is 
rendered by the critique of an ideality independent of non-ideal, practical actuality 
– a self-determining or genuinely free subject is only the horizon of the 
revolutionary process, not its premise. 
This under-determinacy not only leaves Marx’s theory of social reproduction 
open to the possibility of historical concretion, but in fact demands this concretion 
if it is to attain a properly critical character. By itself, a theory of reproduction in 
its general form is insufficient to account for the specific ‘logics’ or ‘forms’ of the 
different structures of socio-natural being and their transformation in process, 
because the unity of its moments do not form a self-concretising subject capable 
of establishing substantial form (this would be to reinstate Hegel’s idealism of 
immanent development). As Hall points out, production and consumption are: 
linked by an ‘inner connection’. Yet this ‘inner connection’ is not a simple 
identity, which requires only the reversal or inversion of the terms of the 
syllogism into one another. The inner connection here passes through a 
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distinct process. It requires what Marx, in his earlier critique of Hegel, 
called a ‘profane’ history: a process in the real world, a process through 
historical time, each moment of which requires its own determinate 
conditions, is subject to its own inner laws, and yet is incomplete without 
the other.’120 
The problem that follows from this, and that will form the basis for an 
engagement with the concrete actuality of the capitalist mode of reproduction and 
the role of subsumption within it, is that of how the abstract freedom of labour 
and the disjunctive temporal structure of the reproduction process acts as the 
bearer of this ‘profane’ historical development (supra-cyclically), and conversely 
how the ongoing process of historical development and transformation penetrates 
the cycle itself, stamps its concrete character (both subjectively and objectively) 
and determines the horizons and mediations of form determining activity within 
the immediate context of reproduction. In its developed processual form, the idea 
of natural history taken up from Marx by Adorno, can be thought of as 
‘reproduction-development’: the process of social reproduction ‘bears’ within it 
an (at least potential) dynamic of historical development whilst historical 
development always occurs through the a necessary realisation of the 
reproduction of individuals and their social relations. The significance of this 
dialectical couplet lies in the fact that by mediating both reproduction and 
development through one another the dual process of their reciprocal realisation 
and determination remains theoretically open, it cannot be specified apriori or 
speculatively with reference to either one of the poles alone, nor to a fixed 
configuration that would overdetermine their open possibilities, as Read 
emphasizes: 
the interrelations of production, consumption, and distribution could be 
considered as the exposition of a thought of immanence in that it is 
opposed to both the theoretical assertion of a transcendental scene of 
determination that remains exterior to that which it determines (as in most 
forms of economism) or the assumption of a concealed transcendental 
foundation (as in the anthropological ground of classical economics). A 
thought of immanence requires that all of the relations (production, 
                                                          
120 Hall, ‘Marx’s Notes on Method’, p. 124. 
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distribution, and consumption) must be thought both as effect and cause of 
each other.121 
The social reproduction process forms a dynamic totality to which all social 
relations and determinations are internal, and from which they ultimately derive 
their systemic ‘meaning’. Much like the subject for Kant and Hegel, this 
‘structure in process’ constitutes the compositional totality that defines Marx’s 
developed materialism. For Marx, however, the totalisation of the reproductive 
process remains effective without thereby implying a theoretical closure or 
structural overdetermination by which the form and meaning of those internal 
relations and determinations would be established apriori in virtue of the 
process grasped in its abstractly general structure. Instead, the historical 
specific conjunction between the elements of reproduction and their ongoing 
development is a necessary supplement to the theory if it is to produce critical 
knowledge. The idea of a ‘general form’ of reproduction does not rest on any 
naturalistic (i.e., fixed) conception of needs and capacities, nor is not meant to 
indicate an original, final or ideal state any more than ‘simple commodity 
circulation’ denotes a discrete historical stage in the development of capitalism 
– it is a ‘layer’ or phase in a process of conceptual concretion that specifies 
only minimal conditions but not their realised form. Marx is thus able to think 
history through reproduction without resorting to its totalisation, completion or 
abortion, which in Hegel’s philosophy ‘closes’ the possibilities of form, 
composition and development, as Schmidt highlights: 
For Hegel, as well as Marx, reality is a process: ‘negative’ totality. In 
Hegelianism, this process appears as a system of reason. That is as a 
closed ontology, from which human history sinks to the level of being 
its derivative, a mere instance of its application. By contrast, Marx 
emphasises the independence and the openness of historical 
development, which cannot be reduced to a speculative logic that all 
beings must forever obey. Hence ‘negativity’ comes to refer to 
                                                          
121 Read, The Micro-Politics of Capital, p. 50. 
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something which is limited in time, while ‘totality’ implies the whole of 
the modern relations of [re]production.122 
To reach a concrete conception of this totality, the general theory has to pass 
through the synchronic multitude of particular forms and grasp their total 
articulation, not only statically, but as a living dynamic unity: ‘Production in 
general. Particular branches of production. Totality of production’ (following 
the logical schema: universality, particularity, singularity).123 In doing so, the 
transhistorical scope of the categories on which this materialism of the social 
reproduction process is based must be mediated through their historically 
specific forms of concretion, and vice versa, as Joseph Fracchia writes: 
Such categories depict transhistorical constants, crucial aspects of all 
historical epochs and, therefore, essential to the analysis of any given 
epoch. But it is precisely their ‘transhistoricity’ that renders them 
abstract. In order to reach the level of historical specificity, the 
particular content of these categories within a given socio-economic 
form must be determined, as must the categorial constellation that is 
peculiar to that form and consists of both transhistorically abstract and 
historically specific categories.124 
This dialectical tension between transhistorically abstract and historically 
specific categories is absolutely fundamental to the critical effectivity of 
Marx’s materialism, allowing it distinguish between, for example, ‘the 
universal determinants of […] labour, which it has in common with every other 
manner of working’ and specific form taken by labour under capitalist 
conditions.125 The historically transient character of this latter form – value – is 
obfuscated by bourgeois political economy, which naturalises it as an inherent 
aspect of all productive human activity. Marx’s deconstruction of the apparent 
naturalness of value works precisely by contrasting it against the ‘universally 
necessary’ – but at the same time negative, insubstantial – categories of 
                                                          
122 Schmidt, History and Structure, p. 31 (modified translation given in Riccardo Bellofiore and 
Tommaso Redolfi Riva, ‘The Neue Marx-Lektüre: Putting the critique of political economy back 
into the critique of society’, Radical Philosophy 189, Jan/Feb 2015, p. 28). 
123 Marx, Grundrisse, p. 86. 
124 Joseph Fracchia, ‘On Transhistorical Abstractions and the Intersection of Historical Theory and 
Social Critique’, Historical Materialism 12 (3), 2004, p. 128 (my emphasis).  
125 Marx, MECW vol. 30, p.64 (my emphasis). 
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reproduction, demonstrating the centrality of this materialist framework to his 
critique of political economy, and establishes:  
‘the relation between the synchronic study of the capitalist mode of 
production and the diachronic reflection required to delineate 
capitalism’s historical specificity – the relation, that is, between social 
critique and historical theory.’126  
In this sense, reproduction in general ‘is an abstraction, but a rational 
abstraction’, and even though, like labour, it ‘makes a historic appearance in its 
full intensity only in the most developed conditions of society’ its critical 
validity is no less forceful and integral to the comprehension of actual social 
forms. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Beginning with the contradictions of the idealist account of actuality in which 
conceptual and subjective relations functions to speculatively enclose and 
overdetermine activity or process, Marx (along with Engels in many important 
respects) adopts a series of increasingly coherent and comprehensive conceptual 
frameworks uniting actuality, activity and social being, moving from praxis to 
production/consumption and finally to social reproduction, as the most 
determinate general structure within which the production of actuality and the role 
of subsumption within that production can be thought. How does this materialism 
of the social reproduction process impact upon the problem of subsumption as it 
is inherited from idealist philosophy? Firstly, Marx’s materialism challenges the 
sovereignty of concepts taken independently of their practico-social mode of 
existence, placing the status of conceptual categories into question on the basis of 
non-conceptual conditions. At the same time however, Marx does not simply 
install a new conception of the relationship between conceptuality and practice 
that would transcend the particularity of every context in which it exists, he goes 
further, abolishing the possibility of a universally valid configuration between 
these two spheres that could be grasped theoretically. In doing so he displaces the 
problem of knowledge into the sphere of critical-historical analysis, opening the 
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way for a multitude of socio-historical logics. A limited autonomy of the 
intellectual sphere is nonetheless preserved, whilst it is simultaneously grounded 
on the socio-practical forms from which it must ultimately derive its meaning and 
validity. The task of criticism must be to develop the relation between any sphere 
of partial truth (i.e. region of specific practicality) and the combined and living 
totality or force-field within which it moves. It is precisely from the unique shape 
of this relationship that the meaning and actuality of any form or pratice must be 
established (rather than simply being able to reduce it to the totality unilaterally, 
as ‘economism’ does). This relationship between specific social forms, be they 
intellectual or ‘manual’, and the totality of composition can only be developed in 
the basis of a historically specific ‘categorial constellation’ defining the 
configuration and development of reproductive moments, because:  
In all forms of society there is one specific kind of production which 
predominates over the rest, whose relations thus assign rank and 
influence to the others. It is a general illumination which bathes all the 
other colours and modifies their particularity. It is a particular ether 
which determines the specific gravity of every being which has 
materialized within it.127 
It is through subsumption under the historically specific categories of 
(re)production that the determinate forms and ‘logic’ of social being proper to a 
society are generated. Subsumption under conceptual categories is thus 
supplanted within Marx’s materialism by a far broader and more dynamic theory 
of subsumption under social categories. It is from here that a theory of capitalist 
subsumption emerges, as the historically specific logic of domination in the 
bourgeois epoch. But even as Marx progresses to this concrete level and focuses 
his theoretical energies on the system of economic categories, the critical force of 
this transhistorical framework is not lost, simply condensed into two decisive 
concepts: ‘use-value’ (or ‘natural form’) and ‘concrete labour’. It is these that are 
subsumed by the abstract categories of capital and that adopt specific social forms 
as a result, as well as generating a specific set of conflicts and tendencies 
immanent to both production and reproduction. But even in spite of the systematic 
and expansive character of that subsumption, retaining the core co-ordinates of 
                                                          
127 Marx, Grundrisse, pp. 106-7. 
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Marx’s materialism is vital in affirming the critical insistence that ‘society is no 
solid crystal, but an organism capable of change, and constantly engaged in a 
process of change.’128  
                                                          
128 Marx, Capital vol. 1, p. 93. 
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3. Capitalist Subsumption: Abstraction in Action 
 
 
The contradistinction that Marx establishes is always between the 
use-value stratum or socio-natural form of the process of 
production/consumption and the stratum of value (valorising itself) 
or socio-capitalist form that subsumes or subordinates the first.1 
 
For [the bourgeois] only one relation is valid on its own account — 
the relation of exploitation; all other relations have validity for him 
only insofar as he can subsume them under this one relation; and 
even where he encounters relations which cannot be directly 
subordinated to the relation of exploitation, he subordinates them 
to it at least in his imagination.2 
 
When Marx, in his ‘critique of political economy’, begins to outline the idea of a 
‘subsumption of labour under capital’ he explicitly draws together two discourses 
that have a crucial but unresolved relationship in his work. These have been the 
subject of the first two sections of this thesis. The first, the philosophical-critical 
concept of subsumption, describes a relation and process of logical form-
determination through which heterogeneous elements are integrated and unified 
within a self-sufficient totality (paradigmatically the transcendental or absolute 
subject). The second, Marx’s materialism of the social (re)production process – 
that reacts critically upon and emerges from the first through a negation of its 
ideal and subjective character – establishes an account of social form-
determination grounded in collective human praxis and ‘the sum of relationships 
and conditions’ that constitute it as a historical ‘structure-in-process’ at the same 
time as being constituted by it.3 
‘Subsumption under capital’, or capitalist subsumption, involves a 
peculiar synthesis of these two ideas of form determination: the logical and the 
                                                          
1 Bolívar Echeverría, ‘Esquema de El Capital’ [1977], in El Discurso Crítico de Marx, Era, 
Mexico City, 1986, p. 56. 
2 Marx and Engels, German Ideology, p. 434 (trans. modified). 
3 I take the term ‘structure-in-process’ from Zeleny, Logic of Marx, p. 217 (fn). Schmidt alights 
on a similar formulation – ‘system in process’ – in History and Structure, p. 47. 
123 
 
social. Not only, as we have established, do logical or abstract relations form a 
limited and partial moment of the socio-practical life world (the domain of 
thinking, science and ideology), but, where capitalist relations of production 
prevail, a certain mode of abstract conceptuality (the abstraction of economic 
value) develops a pseudo-autonomous social existence – a ‘purely social’ or 
‘spectral’ objectivity – that comes to shape that world, becomes its dominant 
principle of organisation and movement, as well as forming the basis for one of 
the primary modes of exercising power within it. Hans-Jurgen Krahl pointed 
towards this distinguishing aspect of capitalism when he argued, commenting on 
Marx’s ‘introduction’ of 1857, that ‘Marx tries to demonstrate that, precisely in 
capitalist society there exists a determinate connection between abstraction and 
reality.’4 The ‘determinate connection’ alluded to here is subsumptive: in 
capitalist societies the concrete (society and its practical process of reproduction) 
is mediated, determined, unified and repressed by the abstractions of capital, 
which, as Marx says, come to act as the ‘functions’ by which individuals and their 
activity are related, brought into community and realised. It is in this sense that in 
capitalist society we find reproduced on the level of material practice and social 
relations the subsumptive structure of form-determination and conceptual 
incorporation expounded in the philosophical systems of Kant and Hegel. 
Abstract universals (value-forms) give shape to the concrete by subsuming and 
mediating distinct elements (social individuals, nature) – the ‘particulars’ 
agglutinated according to the concept or function which they are subsumed under. 
Capital thus fulfils a form-determining function at the level of the 
historical being of the human. Once capitalist economic relations take hold of the 
circulation and production of social wealth, pre-existing practices, identities and 
forms of sociality are transformed by their subsumption under its peculiar logics 
of commodification, quantification and accumulation. 'The strength of capital’, 
Richard Gunn notes, ‘is its capacity to re-form pre-capitalist relations as its own 
mediations and thereby to translate them into modes of existence of itself'.5 This 
particularising internalisation is the subsumptive procedure par excellence: 
                                                          
4 Hans-Jürgen Krahl, ‘La introducción de 1857 de Marx’, in Karl Marx, Introducción a la 
crítica de la economía política de 1857, México: Cuadernos de Pasado y Presente, 1978, p. 15. 
5 Richard Gunn, ‘Marxism and Mediation’, In Common Sense 2, July 1987, p. 61 This is a 
process described at qualitatively differing degrees of depth by Marx with the concepts of 
‘formal’ and ‘real’ subsumption. 
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capitalist economic relations have a logical and ‘impersonal’ character and 
subsumption under them involves integration along a vector of abstract 
universality rather than through singular or arbitrary modes of interpersonal 
valuation and domination. Thus when Marx claims in the Grundrisse that 
‘individuals are now ruled by abstractions, whereas earlier they depended on one 
another’, it expresses the qualitative transition in the form of political 
subordination brought about by capitalist relations.6 At the same time however, 
despite their abstractness, the ‘external’ social relations and ‘impersonal power’ 
through which the forms of value live and under which individuals are subsumed, 
‘are very far from being an abolition of 'relations of dependence'; they are rather 
the dissolution of these relations into a general form’.7 So despite its concrete-
abstractness (and even a number of ‘progressive’, or at least politically 
ambivalent, tendencies) subsumption under capital must therefore be recognised 
as a new historical figure taken by domination and exploitation in the modern 
epoch: ‘catastrophic violence in the latest form of injustice’, to use Adorno’s 
formulation.8 Capital, as a mediating economic relation made ‘automatic subject’ 
of the social reproduction process, is not simply a process of abstract domination 
(as Moishe Postone would have it), but also the mystified form through which the 
social power of the dominant class is exercised and reproduced.9 
The aim of this chapter is to critically comprehend the conditions, 
structure and effects of this ‘general form’ of abstract relationality in terms of the 
specific manner in which it comes to rule over, form, or ‘subsume’ individuals 
and the social process of production. It is the practical processes and forms 
                                                          
6 ‘The definedness of individuals, which in the former case appears as a personal restriction of the 
individual by another, appears in the latter case as developed into an objective restriction of the 
individual by relations independent of him and sufficient unto themselves.’ Marx, Grundrisse, p. 
164. 
7 Marx, Grundrisse, p. 164.  
8 Adorno, ‘Reflections on Class Theory’ [1942], translated by Rodney Livingstone, in Can One 
Live after Auschwitz? A Philosophical Reader, edited by Rolf Tiedemann, Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2003, pp. 93-94. Marx’s comments on the wage-relation also affirm this: ‘The 
constant sale and purchase of labour-power, and the constant entrance of the commodity 
produced by the worker himself as buyer of his labour-power and as constant capital, appear 
merely as forms which mediate his subjugation by capital. […] This form of mediation is 
intrinsic to this mode of production. […] It is a form, however, which can be distinguished only 
formally from other more direct forms of the enslavement of labour and the ownership of it as 
perpetrated by the owners of the means of production.’ ‘Results of the immediate production 
process’ [1863-5], in Capital: a Critique of Political Economy, Vol. 1, p. 1063. 
9 Cf. Moishe Postone, Time, Labor and Social Domination: a Reinterpretation of Marx’s 
Critical Theory, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993. 
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through which the abstractions of value are actualised that is at stake here and 
that I take as my object of enquiry, rather than a critique of their status as 
abstractions. Marx is clear that it is not simply the abstractness of capitalist 
relations, but rather their social autonomisation – the fact that they are 
‘intellectual (geistige) relations that take on a life of their own’, as Adorno put it – 
which is the source of their socially oppressive character as well as their 
(practical) truth.10 For Marx, ‘those who consider the autonomization 
(Verselbstständigung) of value as a mere abstraction forget that the movement of 
industrial capital is this abstraction in action.’11 Abstraction per se is not the 
critical issue here, then, instead the primary concern is to grasp capital as an 
economic abstraction in the process of becoming concrete, ‘in action’, and as a 
result the concrete becoming a ‘perverted’ (verrukt) reality that is not ‘ruled by 
reason’ or collective interest but by the logic of boundless accumulation, such that 
‘in modern bourgeois society all relations are in practice subsumed under the one 
abstract monetary and commercial relationship.’12  
In this respect my contention is that subsumption under the ‘repressive 
abstraction’ of the value-form and its expanded reproduction is the defining 
aspect of capitalist power. It names the process of subordination specific to capital 
(such that subsumption and subordination in the context of capital are at times 
used synonymously by Marx) and distinguishes the form of social reproduction 
corresponding to it from all other previously (and currently) existing forms of 
social organisation and class oppression. It is, therefore – and it is on this point 
that the critical justification of this thesis is premised – precisely through an 
understanding of capitalist subsumption that we can most comprehensively grasp 
the nature of the domination that arises on the basis of capitalist social relations. 
This view, and this importance ascribed to the concept of subsumption by 
it, represents a departure from typical accounts of both capitalist power and 
                                                          
10 Adorno, ‘Über Marx und die Grundbegriffe der Soziologischen Theorie’ [1962], in Hans-
Georg Backhaus, Dialektik der Wertform: Untersuchungen zur Marxschen Ökonomiekritik, 
Frieburg, Ca ira-Verlag, 1997 (draft translation by Chris O’Kane and Verena Erlenbusch, 
forthcoming in Historical Materialism); Krahl affirms this: ‘Abstraction, as Marx understands 
it, is repressive abstraction. Capitalist production, as production for production and not for 
consumption, forces upon individuals an abstraction defined by Marx as abstraction from 
interests, needs and use-values.’ Krahl, ‘La introducción de 1857 de Marx’, p. 30. 
11 Marx, Capital vol. 2, p. 185. 
12 Cf., Peter Osborne, ‘The Reproach of Abstraction’, Radical Philosophy 127, 
September/October 2004, p. 21; Marx and Engels, The German Ideology, p. 433 (translation 
modified). 
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capitalist subsumption, including, in a certain sense, Marx’s own account. Marx’s 
presentation of the concept from the early 1860s onwards focuses primarily on the 
distinction between the ‘formal’ and ‘real’ modes of labour’s subsumption, and 
the majority of interpretations limit themselves to following this lead. By contrast, 
without disregarding this distinction (indeed, it remains crucial) I believe it is 
necessary to develop a far more wide-ranging and dynamic theory of capitalist 
subsumption, as the concept of capitalist domination as such and the key to 
thinking the structure and development of capitalist societies as well as the modes 
of antagonism and resistance within them. But there are theoretical difficulties 
here which are, at least in part, textually grounded. Whilst Chris Arthur rightly 
notes that the concept of subsumption 'is important to the whole architectonic of 
the presentation of Capital', its place and function change with each successive 
set of working manuscripts in which Marx developed his ‘mature’ critique of 
political economy.13 Most notably, and perhaps symptomatically, explicit 
discussion of subsumption is almost completely eradicated from the published 
text of Capital itself (although its presence can be registered throughout the 
entirety of the long sections on absolute and relative surplus-value production) 
marking, as Gilbert Skillman has identified, ‘a fundamental change in the 
structural logic of [Marx’s] critique’.14 Marx was apparently uncertain about the 
status of the concept, and despite there being no explicit textual evidence to 
justify Marx’s ‘puzzling decision to obscure and downplay’ the account of 
subsumption in the published version of Capital, what he presents there is ‘a 
                                                          
13 Arthur, C.J., ‘The Possessive Spirit of Capital: Subsumption/Inversion/ Contradiction’, In Re-
reading Marx: New Perspectives after the Critical Edition, edited by R. Bellofiore and R. 
Fineschi, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009, pp. 148-62. The manuscripts are those collected 
as the Grundrisse (1857-9), the 1861-3 manuscripts, the 1863-5 manuscripts and finally first 
volume of Capital (along with manuscripts that would be incorporated into Engel’s editions of 
volumes 2 and 3). The extent to which this four sets of manuscripts can be viewed as versions of a 
single coherent ‘work’ is a matter of debate. Dussel follows the editors of the MEGAII in 
assuming they do constitute four ‘drafts’ of his critique of political economy, cf. Dussel, E., ‘The 
Four Drafts of Capital: Toward a New Interpretation of the Dialectical Thought of Marx’, 
Rethinking Marxism, 13 (1), 2001, pp. 10-26. A different view is offered by Heinrich in 
‘Reconstruction or Deconstruction? Methodological Controversies about Value and Capital, and 
New Insights from the Critical Edition’, in Re-reading Marx, pp. 71-98 (esp. the table on pp. 86-
7). Cf. also: Patrick Murray, ‘The place of ‘The results of the immediate production process’ in 
Capital’, in Re-reading Marx, pp. 163-177; William Clare Roberts, ‘Abstraction and Productivity: 
Reflections on Formal Causality’, In Marx and Contemporary Philosophy, eds. A. Chitty and M. 
Mclvor, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2009, pp. 188-201; Gilbert Skillman, ‘The Puzzle of 
Marx's Missing "Results": A Tale of Two Theories’, History of Political Economy, 45 (3), 2013, 
pp. 475-504. 
14 Skillman, ‘The Puzzle of Marx's Missing "Results"’, p. 479. 
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highly abbreviated and elliptical account of [the subsumption of labour under 
capital] in which its core concepts are neither defined nor fully characterized’.15 
In light of these ambivalences, any theory of capitalist subsumption will of 
necessity be a reconstruction. This is what I undertake in the following two 
chapters, firstly aiming to consolidate and contextualise Marx’s fragmented 
comments about capitalist subsumption at the level of exchange and production, 
with particular reference to his 1861-3 manuscripts and the ‘Results of the 
Immediate Production Process’ from 1863-4 (in this chapter); secondly 
addressing the weaknesses and ambiguities in Marx’s discussion, problematizing 
a number of interpretive strategies and proposing, finally, a comprehensive 
account of capitalist subsumption as a transformative dynamic operative at the 
level of social reproduction and historical development (in the following chapter). 
By drawing on the materialist framework developed above it is possible to 
comprehend the valorization process of capital, not as the unceasing logical 
movement of an ‘abstract, self-moving other’ in relation to which class 
antagonism would be a secondary effect, but rather in terms of its contradictory 
articulation with the ‘socio-natural’ basis in human practice and the ongoing 
contestation and transformation of social reality that arises both spontaneously 
and contingently from this conflictual relation.16 
 
The conditions of subsumption: so-called original accumulation 
 
The initial act and moment of labour’s subsumption, and the first form which its 
confrontation with capital takes, is its commodification: the subsumption of 
labour (and wealth, more generally) under exchange-value that is the condition 
for its sale and purchase. Only once inscribed within the commodity-form can the 
formative capacities of labour, as labour-power, relate to capital, be appropriated 
and set to work as one of its ‘organs’. Capital’s functioning as well as the 
existence of labour within capitalist societies, the entire movement of social 
reproduction in this form in fact, is thus dependent upon the establishment and 
perpetual re-enactment of the exchange relation between them. For Marx, this is a 
                                                          
15 Skillman, ‘Production Relations in Agrarian Capitalist Development: A Comment on Das 
(2012)’, Review of Radical Political Economics, November 27, 2015: 
http://rrp.sagepub.com/content/early/2015/11/25/0486613415616212.full.pdf+html 
16 Postone, Time, Labor, and Social Domination, p. 278.  
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relation of dialectical interpenetration in which ‘Capital […] presupposes wage-
labour; wage-labour presupposes capital. They condition each other; each brings 
the other into existence.’17 
 But this mutual presupposition, however valid it may be once capital has 
taken hold of the social process, is nonetheless tautologous from a historically 
critical perspective. The dependence of labour and capital on one another which 
attracts them in their commercial circulation, even their commensurability as 
values, is not a ‘naturally’ given condition or disposition of human social being. 
This is the ahistorical fantasy asserted by bourgeois political economy, which, as 
Ellen Wood charges, adheres to a circular ‘account of historical development in 
which the emergence and growth to maturity of capitalism are already prefigured 
in the earliest manifestation of human rationality’.18 Instead, for Marx, the 
commodification of labour – along with the entire capitalist mode of production 
based upon it – is a peculiar state of affairs that must be produced and therefore 
has a specific historical origin, a causality irreducible to that generated 
immanently once capitalist social relations are established: 
This relation has no basis in natural history, nor does it have a social basis 
common to all periods of human history. It is clearly the result of a past 
historical development, the product of many economic revolutions, of the 
extinction of a whole series of older formations of social production.19 
Marx refers ironically to this historical genesis, satirizing a concept derived from 
Adam Smith, as ‘so-called original accumulation’ (sogenannte ursprüngliche 
Akkumulation): ‘an accumulation which is not the result of the capitalist mode of 
production but its point of departure’.20 It is through such an ‘accumulation’ of 
social wealth that the most immediate circumstances of labour’s subsumption 
under capital first arise, namely: 
                                                          
17 Marx, Wage labour and capital [1847], edited and translated by Friedrich Engels, 
https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1847/wage-labour/ch06.htm [accessed June 
2015] 
18 Ellen Meiksins Wood, The Origin of Capitalism: a Longer View, London: Verso, 2002, p 4. 
Wood has convincingly argued against this error, particularly insofar as it is reproduced 
unconsciously by Marxist historiography: ‘Since historians first began explaining the 
emergence of capitalism, there has scarcely existed an explanation that did not begin by 
assuming the very thing that needed to be explained. Almost without exception, accounts of the 
origin of capitalism have been fundamentally circular: they have assumed the prior existence of 
capitalism in order to explain its coming into being. […] Capitalism always seems to be there, 
somewhere; and it only needs to be released from its chains.’ pp. 3-4. 
19 Marx, Capital vol. 1, p, 273. 
20 Ibid, p, 873; Marx, Grundrisse, p. 590. 
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The confrontation of, and the contact between, two very different kinds of 
commodity owners; on the one hand, the owners of money, means of 
production, means of subsistence, who are eager to valorize the sum of 
values they have appropriated by buying the labour-power of others; on 
the other hand, free workers, the sellers of their own labour-power, and 
therefore the sellers of labour.21 
What is at stake in so-called original accumulation is therefore a division of social 
classes based on a differential relationship to property, the monopolistic 
accumulation of productive wealth in the hands of one class and the complete 
dispossession of these means from the other. But whereas the ideological 
conception of ‘previous accumulation’ taken up from Smith by Torrens tells the 
story of a gradual process of diligent stockpiling by industrious individuals, Marx 
shows how such ‘robinsonades’ occlude the violent and conflictual character of 
this accumulation, which begins with ‘the expropriation of producers’, primarily 
peasants. The processes of ‘original accumulation’ from which the capital-labour 
relation arises follow a political rather than purely economic logic, and consist in 
a restructuring of society that dissolves the old social bonds tying communities 
together and people to their means of survival (typically land), before 
recomposing them into social classes distinguished on the basis of property 
ownership, those ‘two very different kinds of commodity owners’. As the basic 
constituents of production that ‘really belong together’, labour and the means of 
production through which it can be realized (verwirklicht) are torn apart from 
each other, have their immediate practical unity within the social reproduction 
process annulled, such that they end up standing opposed to each other in the 
guise of ‘independent persons’ with antagonistic interests.22 Not only does this 
effect a separation of the ‘social subject’ from its ‘practical object’, there is also a 
separation of individuals from each other, a liquidation of the social subject’s 
collective unity and the introduction of a mediating form of competitive sociality 
in juridical property relations between ‘free and equal’ persons.23 Communities 
                                                          
21 Marx, Capital vol. 1, p, 874 (my emphasis). 
22 ‘The historic process was the divorce of elements which up until then were bound together; its 
result is therefore not that one of the elements disappears, but that each of them appears in a 
negative relation to the other – the (potentially) free worker on the one side, capital (potentially) 
on the other.’ Marx, Grundrisse, p. 503 
23 As Luca Basso points out in his recent book, for Marx ‘the recognition of free and equal 
individuals, and their subsumption under an abstract social power, are two ‘sides’ of the same 
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and communal forms of property (such as common lands) are thus dissolved into 
atomised legal subjects and their private property, as in the famous case of the 
‘enclosure acts’ which Marx takes as an exemplar of this form of accumulation by 
expropriation. 
In the case of England at least, the expropriation of peasants from the 
lands that are their means of production and subsistence was for Marx the 
‘starting point’ of the transition to a capitalist mode of production and labour’s 
subsumption, ‘the premiss on the basis of which the sale and purchase of labour-
power can proceed and living labour can be absorbed into dead labour as a means 
of maintaining and increasing it, i.e. of enabling it to valorize itself’.24 This ‘law-
making violence’ inaugurated a whole new set of conditions under which 
society’s reproduction could take place, based on ‘the transformation of feudal 
exploitation into capitalist exploitation’.25 On the one hand, there was an immense 
concentration of objective wealth in the hands of landowners and capitalists. On 
the other, there was a mass ‘liberation’ (i.e., expulsion) of labour from both its 
feudal obligations and its means of subsistence, leaving it ‘vogelfrei’ (‘free as a 
bird’) – both free to buy and sell its property as it chooses, without obligations of 
a lord or master, but also free of anything to buy or sell other than its own 
subjective capacity to toil, ‘that very labour-power which exists only in [its] living 
body’.26 
However, even when ‘a mass of ‘free’ and unattached proletarians was 
hurled onto the labour-market by the dissolution of the bands of feudal retainers’, 
it was by no means an automatic result that capital found at its disposal a willing 
and able reserve of productive labourers, happily awaiting exploitation.27 As 
Marx notes, at the dawn of capitalism, ‘The propertyless are more inclined to 
become vagabonds and robbers and beggars than workers.’28 What ensued after 
the decomposition of the peasantry was therefore a process of coercive 
subjectivation, of ‘bloody legislation against the expropriated’ in which the state 
deployed an apparatus of violence and repression, of ‘grossly terroristic laws’ 
                                                                                                                                                              
coin’. Marx and Singularity: From the Early Writings to the Grundrisse [2008], translated by 
Arianna Bove, Chicago: Haymarket, 2013, p.2. 
24 Marx, ‘Results’, p. 1017. 
25 Marx, Capital vol. 1, p. 875 
26 Ibid, p, 272. 
27 Ibid, p. 979. 
28 Marx, Grundrisse, p. 736. 
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intended to ameliorate those newly ‘denuded subjectivities’ to a buyer’s market. 
Marx itemizes some of the techniques of violent schematization that arose in that 
moment – torture, imprisonment, branding, enslavement – all designed to elicit in 
the worker a willingness to give up sovereignty over their own life-activity at a 
price expedient to the ‘rising bourgeoisie’: ‘Disgraceful proceedings of the state 
which employed police methods to accelerate the accumulation of capital by 
increasing the degree of exploitation of labour.’29 Jairus Banaji highlights the 
importance of these coercive policies by pointing out that whilst forms of waged 
labour existed in many different places and times throughout history ‘what was 
distinctive about agrarian, mining and industrial capital was not the existence of 
wage-labour markets but their forcible creation’.30 
The ultimate effect of all of this ‘immediate extra-economic violence’ 
(Außerökonomische unmittelbare Gewalt), was, historically speaking, to set in 
motion the economic cycle and ‘logic’ of capitalist accumulation (‘accumulation 
by exploitation’) whose conditions can then perpetuate themselves as if they were 
‘natural laws of production’. The historical function of the processes identified by 
Marx as ‘so-called original accumulation’ is to inscribe subjects of labour within 
a social configuration in which their subsumption to capital is underwritten both 
materially (in their separation from ‘all the objects needed for the realization of 
[their] labour-power’ as well as through regulative mechanisms such as ‘relative 
surplus populations’) and ideologically (insofar as it ‘develops a working class 
which by education, tradition and habit looks upon the requirement of that mode 
of production as self-evident natural laws’).31 By offering destitute proletarians no 
other means for their reproduction other than to bring themselves to the market 
place, to present their subjective capacity in the form of objective wealth, a 
commodity to be exchanged (the use-value ‘promise’ of labour-power), their 
social being is systematically captured within the representational order of 
economic value proper to capitalist reproduction.32 It is this formalisation and 
                                                          
29 Marx, Capital vol. 1, p. 905. 
30 Jairus Banaji, ‘Reconstructing Historical Materialism: Some Key Issues’, 2009 (my 
emphasis): http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/16000/1/Conference%20paper%20%28revised%29.pdf 
[accessed Dec 2015]. 
31 Marx, Capital vol. 1, pp. 272-3; p. 899. 
32 Cf. Wolfgang Fritz Haug, ‘Commodity aesthetic revisited: Exchange relations as the source 
of antagonistic aesthetization’, Radical Philosophy 135, January/February 2006, pp. 18-24. 
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generalization of labour as a commodity that first opens the possibility of its 
subsumptive internalisation to capital through exchange.  
But just as it has no natural or eternal basis, there is no necessity or innate 
historical tendency toward this dispossession and commodification of labour. 
Rather, it is the outcome of a series of complex and diverse processes of social 
transformation shaped by multiple inter- and intra-class conflicts, geopolitical 
upheavals and commercial and technological innovations (which, although 
concentrated in England, were not the endogenous outcome of a ‘hermetically 
sealed’ domestic or even exclusively European context).33 It is also crucial to 
note, as Bonefeld and Tomba do, that both ‘accumulation by dispossession’ and 
state-arbitrated coercion against those who ‘refuse to work’ are permanent, rather 
than ‘exceptional’, features of any society that reproduces itself on a capitalist 
basis, albeit to varying degrees of spread and density (this is something about 
which Marx was equivocal).34 Rather than extraordinary-violence simply 
subsiding into ‘the dull compulsion of economic relations’ once wage relations 
are generalized, we can detect a far more complex oscillation between the two, 
one that is modulated by the struggles between class actors and for the most part 
arbitrated by state institutions. Here, however, from a ‘genetic’ standpoint, it is 
sufficient merely to grasp the violence of separation in terms of its significance as 
a historical intervention in the social reproduction process (the substance of social 
being) that precipitates a mutation in its structure (its historic form). Through it, 
the process through which society reproduces itself begins to be recomposed 
according to a new politico-economic order based on class property and capitalist 
relations of production. This mutation is the condition of possibility for labour’s 
                                                          
33 Cf. Alexander Anievas and Kerem Nisancioglu, How the West Came to Rule, London: Pluto, 
2015, chs. 6&7; ; Massimiliano Tomba, Marx’s Temporalities, translated by Peter D. Thomas 
and Sara R. Farris, Chicago: Haymarket, 2013, pp. 167-8: ‘The state’s intervention in conflicts 
is an instrument that aims to monopolise violence and neutralise conflicts, not simply to look 
after the affairs of one class. Given the fact that, in some historical periods, there may be 
conflicts between different segments of the ruling classes, and between these and other non-
proletarian and not fully synchronised sectors, like smallholders and declassed middleclass 
strata, what emerges is a conflict between political temporalities that may have different 
outcomes. The state-mechanism attempts to synchronise these temporalities, even by using 
asynchronous temporalities against each other.’ 
34 On the issue of ‘permanent primitive accumulation’, see Bonefeld, ‘History and Social 
Constitution: Primitive Accumulation is not Primitive’, The Commoner, Debate 1, March 2002: 
http://www.commoner.org.uk/debbonefeld01.pdf [Accessed Jan 2014]; Bonefeld, ‘Class 
Struggle and the Permanence of Primitive Accumulation’, Common Sense 8, November 1988, 
pp. 54-66; Tomba, Marx’s Temporalities (appendix). 
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subsumption under the commodity form of capital and gives rise to a whole new 
set of relations, conflicts and dynamics which are immanent to that subsumption.  
 
Exchange: Subsumption under Value 
 
The separation of social elements (individuals and means of production) effected 
by those processes gathered under the euphemism of ‘original accumulation’ thus 
forms the ‘historic presupposition’ of the capitalist social relation through which 
those elements are subsequently composed and reproduced. The point at which 
the extraordinary transition to this mode of production ceases is the point at which 
the separation of productive elements congeals into the determinate social forms 
proper to capital, those forms that, in their practical articulation, are both the 
starting point and result of capitalist production – its systematic presuppositions 
(commodity, money, wages, abstract labour, credit, etc.). Through these forms, 
Bonefeld argues, ‘the historic form of primitive accumulation is raised to a new 
level where its original form and independent existence is eliminated (or 
cancelled) at the same time as its substance or essence (Wesenhaftigkeit) is 
maintained, putting it on to a new footing.’35 Capital’s ‘historical’ presuppositions 
are therefore ‘suspended (aufgehoben) in its being’, carried over into the 
‘systematic’ presuppositions that are reproduced on an ever expanded scale once 
production on a capitalist basis is underway. (This separation of the historic and 
systematic is, to say the least, problematic, and we will complicate it further 
below, but it here serves a useful heuristic function – to distinguish between 
‘conditions of [capital’s] becoming’ and ‘results of its presence’).36 The social 
forms of capital are precisely those modes of objectivity, then, under which 
labour, and society as a practical totality, are subsumed in the course of their 
realization and reproduction on a capitalist basis. More specifically, they are 
abstract forms of wealth – the practical object through which society reproduces 
itself – registered economically as value and ‘autonomised’ as capital, a ‘social 
relation existing as being-for-itself’.37 
                                                          
35 Bonefeld, ‘History and Social Constitution’, p. 4. 
36 Marx, Grundrisse, p. 460 
37 Ibid, p. 302. Echeverría highlights the objectivism guiding Marx’s theoretical approach: ‘to 
speak of the contradiction between value and use-value is to make a biased reference to society's 
reproduction process as such; it is to deal with society by way of the object through which it 
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The most ‘elementary’ of these forms is the commodity, which Marx 
famously takes as the starting point of his exposition in Capital. It is as 
commodities that the separated elements of production are brought to market by 
their different owners and schematized in the act of exchange; as a commodity 
then, that labour comes to be subsumed by capital. This schematization is 
possible, firstly, because the commodity is ‘the immediate unity of use-value and 
exchange-value’; its internal structure conjoins the transhistorical socio-practical 
objectivity of the product of labour with an abstract economic objectivity specific 
to capitalist society (the value that is expressed relationally as a quantitative 
equivalence between different commodities).38 Rotta and Teixeira conceptualize 
the distinction between these two aspects of the commodity as one between 
concrete and abstract wealth and remind us that, just as with concrete and abstract 
labour, these are ‘not two types of wealth but the two co-existing determinations 
of the same wealth produced in capitalism’.39 Co-existing determinations which 
nevertheless, Chris Arthur argues, correspond to ‘two different regions of being in 
which what is present in the one region is absent in the other’.40 It is this Janus-
faced objectivity that leads Marx to describe the commodity as ‘an immediate 
contradiction’ and Hans-Jürgen Krahl to suggest that whilst its ‘concept is real’ 
(i.e., socially actual) ‘it is a negative phenomenon.', i.e., cannot be grasped 
empirically, or even in practical terms, but only critically, dialectically, by ‘the 
power of abstraction’ as Marx says in his preface to the first volume of Capital.41 
                                                                                                                                                              
reproduces itself, which is to say, of its wealth, of the products/goods that it produces and 
consumes. When we speak of value and use-value we make reference to the reproduction of the 
produced and consumed object. The theory selects a determined element of that process in order to 
– in analyzing it – discover or specify determinate characteristics of the global contradiction. This 
methodological procedure avoids for a moment the entirety of the reproduction process and 
adjusts itself exclusively to an object: to the object in so far as it is produced and consumed in 
order to give rise precisely to that process of reproduction.' La Contradicción Entre el Valor y el 
Valor de Uso en El Capital de Karl Marx’ pp. 10-11; Seen in this way Marx’s method might be 
correlated methodologically with what Sartre referred to as ‘totalizing compression’, Critique of 
Dialectical Reason, Volume 2 (Unfinished): The Intelligibility of History [1985], Edited by Arlette 
Elkaïm-Sartre, translated by Quintin Hoare, London and New York: Verso, 1991, p. 49. 
38 Marx, Capital vol. 1 [1867], cited in Helmut Reichelt, ‘Social Reality as Appearance: Some 
Notes on Marx’s Conception of Reality’, translated by Werner Bonefeld, in Human Dignity: 
Social Autonomy and the Critique of Capitalism, edited by Werner Bonefeld & Kosmos 
Psychopedis, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005, p. 31. 
39 Tomas Nielsen Rotta and Rodrigo Alves Teixeira, ‘The Autonomisation of Abstract Wealth: 
New insights on the labour theory of value’, Cambridge Journal of Economics, 1 June 2015: 
http://cje.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2015/05/31/cje.bev028.full.pdf?keytype=ref&ijkey=
qQFYIkZcO9H4s7y, p. 4. 
40 Arthur, ‘The Spectral Ontology of Value’, Radical Philosophy 107, May/June 2001, p. 34. 
41 Krahl, ‘La introducción de 1857 de Marx’, p. 27; Marx, Capital vol. 1, p. 90. 
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We have already seen in the analytic of the reproduction process what, in 
its most general (historically underdetermined) sense, the content of this wealth in 
its concrete or ‘natural form’ of objectivity is: ‘considered as use-values, they are 
both material conditions of labour and products of labour’, i.e., goods for 
consumption (be it productive or unproductive) whose practical significance is 
determined by their situation and effects within a process of social reproduction.42 
By contrast, the content of the commodity in its ‘value form’ is nothing more than 
an abstractly conceived quantum of society’s total wealth, into which ‘not an 
atom of matter enters’.43 It is devoid of any reference to the commodity’s specific 
practicality, the concrete qualities of the labour that gave rise to it or the technical 
structure of the society to which it belongs. Instead, the commodity’s value is 
determined solely by the portion of total social labour time objectified in it (that 
is, labour that is socially necessary and abstractly general – ‘abstract labour’); it is 
thus only temporally that value registers a connection with the social process to 
which it belongs, although this is expressed concretely in the form of the relative 
magnitudes in which one commodity exchanges for another, its exchange-value. 
The ‘immediately contradictory’ structure of the commodity bears the 
internal opposition of these two modes of social objectivity: a socio-natural form 
(use-value) and a socio-capitalist form (value).44 It is important to clarify that 
what is at stake in this opposition is not reducible to the distinction between 
matter and form, or the ‘natural’ and ‘social’ dimensions of the commodity.45 In 
order to avoid this distortion we must retain the distinction Marx makes central in 
his theses On Feuerbach between ‘sensuousness’ (sinnlichkeit) and ‘intuition’ 
(anschauung). Sensuousness, for Marx, is not a matter of passive intuition but of 
intentional interaction with the object in the determinate context of a social 
                                                          
42 Marx, Theories of Surplus-Value (addenda) [1863]: 
https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1863/theories-surplus-value/add1.htm [accessed 
August 2015] 
43 Marx, Capital vol. 1, p 138. 
44 Cf. Echeverría, La Contradicción Entre el Valor y el Valor de Uso en El Capital de Karl 
Marx’. 
45 This is an equivocation (in part present in Marx’ own writings) that persists in much 
contemporary Marxist theory, e.g., Michael Heinrich, in An Introduction to the Three Volumes 
of Karl Marx’s Capital [2004], translated by Alexander Locascio, New York: Monthly Review, 
2012, pp. 40–41: ‘The “natural form” of the chair is simply its material composition (for 
example, whether it is made of wood or metal). “Social form”, on the other hand, means that 
the chair is a “commodity”’. 
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process of production and consumption; ‘sensuousness as practical activity’.46 As 
established in the previous chapter, sensuousness already implies social form by 
virtue of its practically derived significance and as such exceeds merely empirical 
qualities and the ‘single individual’ to which they pertain, hence its 
characterisation as socio-natural, as constituted in the historical dialectic of the 
metabolism between nature and humanity. This practical objectivity is a quality 
basic to wealth in all forms of society, although it is only in its capitalist form that 
it takes the form of use-value (i.e., as an internal aspect of the commodity) and 
that it becomes a theoretically salient category in contradistinction to exchange 
value.47 By contrast, insofar as the commodity is a value, it ‘changes into a thing 
which transcends sensuousness’ – i.e., concrete practical objectivity.48 Its value-
form not only negates the immediate empirical qualities (the ‘proto-form’) of the 
object as use-value does, but it also involves a second, historically unique 
negation – of the practical significance the commodity carries as a use-value. The 
‘supersensousness’ of the value-form dissolves that qualitative character into a 
merely quantitative magnitude, a simple relation of equivalence with other goods. 
So whilst both use-value and value are social objectivities, one is practico-
concrete (socio-natural) and the other is abstract-economic (socio-capitalist). 
It’s not clear, however, that we can already speak of a subsumption when 
dealing abstractly with the commodity. In fact, in terms of its formal structure the 
commodity presents only a contradiction (‘sensuous-supersensuousness’) without 
its resolution through the subsumption of one term under the other. The 
commodity also has a long history, its social existence stretching back several 
millennia at least, long before the preponderance of capitalist relations (Aristotle, 
for example, famously refers to the coexistence of use-value and exchange value 
                                                          
46 Herbert Marcuse, Heideggerian Marxism, Edited by Richard Wolin and John Abromeit, 
Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, 2005, pp. 98-9. Marcuse’s account is 
interesting but insufficiently developed. For a richer account cf. Echeverría, ‘El materialismo 
de Marx’. 
47 ‘The problem of the ‘natural-ness’ of social forms and of the definitions of ‘use-value’ appears 
emphatically in real life only when capitalist development shatters everywhere the millennial local 
equilibria between the system of needs for consumption and that of productive capacities; when, 
in the imperialist enterprise, European Man experienced the relativity of its humanity.’ Echeverría, 
‘Use-value: Ontology and Semiotics’, pp. 23-4. 
48 Marx, Capital vol. 1, p. 163. 
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in things in the Politics).49 But once the wealth of society as such takes the form 
of a vast collection of commodities, and individuals are instutionalized as their 
owners, ‘free’ legal subjects whose principle social relation is based on exchange, 
then, already, from a social standpoint an asymmetrical relation between the two 
poles of the commodity emerges.50 This is because under conditions of 
generalized commodity circulation and the private division of social labour – 
when useful things are ‘produced for the purpose of being exchanged’ – it is on 
the basis of the economic rather than practical content of the commodity that 
productive elements of society as a whole are schematised and brought into 
community; it is only as value and not as practical object that the product of 
labour has an immediately ‘social’ existence (although this is not to suggest that 
the social aspect of use-value disappears altogether, only that it is subject to 
mediation, distortion and repression by value).51 Once comprehended on the level 
of capitalist society as a whole, then, the commodity reveals a structural 
overdetermination of its inner form whereby ‘use-value is universally mediated 
by exchange-value’.52 And it is on this level that it must be grasped, for as 
William Clare Roberts points out, like the other social forms of capital, the 
commodity cannot ‘without grave distortion, be broken down into or analysed in 
terms of individual agents performing individual actions for the sake of individual 
goals.’53 Generalized commodity circulation is a situation that presupposes ‘the 
whole system of bourgeois production […] before exchange-value appears as the 
simple point of departure on the surface.’54 Marx’s analysis of the commodity 
therefore refers not to some imagined historical phase or ‘model’ of pre-capitalist 
                                                          
49 Aristotle, Politics I.1257a, translated by B. Jowett, in The Complete Works of Aristotle: The 
Revised Oxford Translation vol. 2, edited by Jonathan Barnes,  Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1984. 
50 ‘The reciprocal and all-sided dependence of individuals who are indifferent to one another 
forms their social connection. The social bond is expressed in exchange value’, Marx, 
Grundrisse, p. 157. It is this socialising function of exchange that at the level of appearance 
gives rise to the commodity’s ‘fetish character’. 
51 Marx, Capital vol. 1, p. 166; ‘In the modern or capitalist epoch, the objects produced and 
consumed by society can exist only as socially effective objects – produced by some, consumed 
by all – that is to say, can only circulate, amongst the individuals that compose the social 
subject in so far they have a value and are thus exchanged for one another as commodities.’ 
Echeverría, ‘Valor y Plusvalor’ [1978], El Discurso Ciritico De Marx, p. 86. 
52 Marx, ‘Results’, p. 951. 
53 Roberts, ‘Abstraction and Productivity’, p. 189. 
54 Marx, Grundrisse, cited and translated in Banaji in ‘From the Commodity to Capital’, in 
Value: The Representation of Labour in Capitalism [1979], edited by Diane Elson, London: 
Verso, 2015, p. 29. 
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commodity production but dialectically to the process and relations through 
which the immediacy of its contradiction is suspended (exchange, production and 
finally reproduction).55 The social function and effects of the commodity as 
determined within a capitalist context, when it ‘first becomes the general form 
[…] that every product has to assume’, are unique.56  
Capitalist social relations thus involve the instauration of the commodity 
as the elementary form of social wealth, a form whose value aspect stands over 
and above the qualitative particularity of its use-values aspect and subsumes it as 
a result of its subjection to commercial circulation. There is, in fact, at this first 
level of the contradiction between capital and labour, a double subsumption at 
work. 
Firstly, the generalized subsumption of use-value to exchange-value, ‘sale 
and purchase seize hold of not only surplus production but also subsistence itself'; 
all goods are both in principle (i.e., in their production/appropriation) and in 
practice subject to exchange.57 The predominance of exchange establishes a 
sphere of universal economic equivalence to which all goods belong, a sphere 
composed of value, as abstract labour in objectivised form, ‘dead labour’ as Marx 
often refers to it. 
Secondly, and most importantly, commodification becomes the primary 
mode of socialisation, not only for goods in society, but also the activity of the 
producers themselves, who, compelled by their freedom from external property 
(along with the coercive techniques enumerated above), participate in exchange 
by presenting their labour in the commodity-form, as labour-power. This has 
phenomenological as well as directly practical consequences in so far as it 
generates a historically new relation of the worker to his or her own activity: ‘the 
totality of the free worker’s labour capacity appears to him as his property, as one 
of his moments, over which he, as subject, exercises domination, and which he 
maintains by expending it.’58 The peculiar representational practice at work here 
schematizes labour’s subjective activity in objective form, formalizing its ‘sense’ 
or ‘presence’ within an economic order of being (this is the core of Marx’s early 
                                                          
55 Cf. Martha Cambell, ‘The Transformation of Money into Capital’, in In Marx’s Laboratory, 
pp. 149-175. 
56 Marx, MECW vol. 30, p. 313. 
57 Ibid, p. 313. 
58 Marx, Grundrisse, p. 465 (my emphasis). 
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critique of private property and money as alienation).59 The extensive reach of 
this order and the dominant actuality of its abstractness is grounded in the 
political relations by which individuals are inscribed within demarcated class 
positions, forced to operate within the ‘exclusive realm of Freedom, Equality, 
Property and Bentham’.60 Thus we can see that ‘what is reproduced and produced 
anew’ as a result of the separation of labour and means of production ‘is not only 
the presence of these objective conditions of living labour, but also their presence 
as independent values’.61 Under capitalist social conditions all things stand in 
relation to one another as values and being such a thing is the condition for 
‘social’ existence. This transpires in a process of ‘reification’ through which even 
that which is not inherently objective, an external object, ‘that very labour-power 
which exists only in [the worker’s] living body’, is given a thing-like objectivity, 
is socially constituted as discretely alienable.62 Thus not only does 
commodification involve the abstractive reduction of the qualitative to the 
quantitative, of use-value to exchange value, it also depends on a specific act of 
temporal dissociation between alienation (Entäusserung) and manifestation 
(Äusserung) whereby, in Kant’s formulation, ‘I must be able to think that I am in 
possession of this object independently of being limited by temporal conditions, 
and so independently of empirical possession’.63 The commodification of labour 
is nothing but this thought actualised at the level of social objectivity and practice. 
‘Labour-power’ synthesizes these two reductions, giving future concrete activity 
the form of an abstract quantum of objectified labour, as what is bought is the 
promise of a specific ‘expenditure of vital forces’ whilst what is paid for is the 
                                                          
59 The social actuality of this representational practice is key to grasping the way in which abstract 
labour is posited as the ‘purely social’ form of concrete labour, as Fausto notes: '[i]t is not the 
biological reality of the universality of labour […] that constitutes abstract labour, but rather the 
positing of this reality, and, in this sense, the positing is not biological any more.’ Cited in Mario 
L. Robles-Baez, On the Abstraction of Labour as a Social Determination’, In The New Value 
Controversy and the Foundation of Economics, edited by Alan Freeman, Andrew Kliman 
and Julian Wells, Cheltenham and Northampton: Edward Elgar, 2004, p. 152. 
60 Marx, Capital vol. 1, p.280. 
61 Marx, Grundrisse, p. 462. 
62 Marx, Capital vol. 1, p.272; ‘The only thing distinct from objectified labour is non-
objectified labour, labour which is still objectifying itself, labour as subjectivity. Or, objectified 
labour, i.e. labour which is present in space, can also be opposed, as past labour, to labour 
which is present in time . If it is to be present in time, alive, then it can be present only as the 
living subject, in which it exists as capacity, as possibility; hence as worker.’ Marx, Grundrisse, 
p. 272. 
63 Kant, ‘Metaphysics of Morals’ [1797], in Practical Philosophy, edited and translated by 
Mary J. Gregor, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999, §4b. 
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past labour needed to produce those vital forces. The worker ‘sells [the]mself as 
an effect. [They] are absorbed into the body of capital as a cause, as activity.’64 
This representational formalisation of labour as the labour-power 
commodity is the single most important aspect of subsumption under commodity 
exchange as well as being the key to Marx’s critique of classical political 
economy, as he himself stressed: 
Political Economy has indeed analysed, however incompletely, value and 
its magnitude, and has uncovered the content concealed within these 
forms. But it has never once asked the question why labour is represented 
(darstellt) by the value of its product and labour-time by the magnitude of 
that value.65 
It also forms the basis for Marx’s account of capitalist exploitation, given that it is 
from the differential between what this labour-power is worth (the value of the 
subsistence goods needed to reproduce it) and what it is capable of (the value that 
it can generate during the time it is employed) that surplus-value arises.  
Subsumption to commodity circulation subverts the ‘traditional’ (i.e., pre-
modern) relationship between the practical object and the social subject (in both 
its synchronic and diachronic aspects): rather than consumption needs and 
productive capacities directly constituting the unity of the social process – 
however unevenly production and consumption may be historically organised and 
distributed – they now become ‘universally mediated’ and unified by the 
abstractions of value. Exchange relations thus replaces the violent schematization 
underlying the ‘code’ of pre-capitalist societies with the abstract and dynamic 
schematisation of the market, along with its displaced and deferred violence 
whereby the power of individuals over one another resides in the power of their 
commodities. This effects a uniquely modern displacement of the political itself, 
sublimates direct political contestation into economic competition and transforms 
an immediately ‘political’ community into an economic community made up of 
abstractly free, self-interested individuals and their administrative-institutional 
                                                          
64 Marx, Grundrisse, p. 674. 
65 Marx, Capital vol. 1, pp. 173-4. I am using Banaji’s modified translation from ‘From the 
Commodity to Capital’, p. 31. 
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regulation, subsuming them within what Hegel famously conceptualised as 
‘bourgeois civil society’ (bürgerliche Gesellschaft).66 
The reality of this inversion and displacement, as Marx had already argued 
in 1844, is most clearly expressed in the external objectivity and ‘seemingly 
transcendental power’ of money, in which ‘the unfettered domination of the 
estranged thing over man becomes manifest’.67 It is in the form of money that the 
abstraction of value overcomes its own negativity and achieves an independent, 
‘sensuous’ existence beyond its relational, ‘supersensuous’ inherence in the body 
of the diverse use-values that bear it.68 Money is a commodity amongst all others, 
and yet it is the one commodity whose ‘natural specificity is extinguished’ and 
that counts directly as a ‘universal material representative’ of value – it is value – 
‘not only a form, but at the same time the content itself. […] general wealth 
realized, individualized in a particular object’, ‘the true generality [Allgemeinheit] 
of exchange value in substance and in extension’.69 As the commodity whose use-
value is its exchangeability, money functions uniquely as a ‘socially objective 
measure of value’, which as Tony Smith points out ‘is a necessary precondition 
for generalized commodity exchange’, thereby linking the commodity and money 
together systematically as the core of Marx’s value-theory.70 Money is the crucial 
mediating form through which the order of value is actualised concretely and 
penetrates into the order of use-value in its ‘self-sufficiency’, which is why for the 
Marx of 1844 it signals the ‘corporeal existence’ of alienation. In practical terms, 
the social autonomisation of the value-abstraction in money is expressed in the 
fact that in the capitalist ‘stage of production’ it is money that mediates all 
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commodity exchanges (in the metamorphoses, C-M, M-C, etc.), acts as the nexus 
through which the essential elements of the reproduction process are brought into 
relation, ‘forms the starting-point and the conclusion of every valorisation 
process’ and, crucially, schematizes future and past (or abstract and concrete) 
labour in the exchange of labour-power for wages.71 
It is in this last function that money enables the initial moment of labour’s 
subsumption under capital, its absorption and command under an abstract social 
power and its representational positing as abstract labour in the act of exchange.72 
This is central to Marx’s value-theoretical account of capitalist power, as Diane 
Elson points out: 
The domination of the abstract aspect of labour, in the forms of value, is 
analysed, not in terms of the obliteration of other aspects of labour, but in 
terms of the subsumption of these other aspects to the abstract aspect. That 
subsumption is understood in terms of the mediation of the other aspects 
by the abstract aspect, the translation of the other aspects of labour into 
money form.73 
 As Marx narrates so compellingly in his chapter on ‘The Sale and Purchase of 
Labour-Power’ from the first volume of Capital, the owner of labour-power and 
the owner of money meet on the market and exchange their respective goods 
(labour-power and money wages), which are schematized as equivalent sums of 
value. In doing so, the owner of money, the capitalist, is able to buy the right to 
command and direct a certain amount of the worker’s labour time. From the 
perspective of circulation Marx calls this ‘a simple sale and purchase, a simple 
relation of circulation, like any other’, in the sense that both parties are formally 
free, exchange commodities of equal value, and enter ‘willingly’ into the 
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exchange (although this situation is conditioned for the labourer, as we have seen, 
by the freedom from owning any property). Nonetheless, even though ‘the 
specific and distinctive character of the transaction is not apparent’, this 
seemingly equal exchange is ‘coloured’ by its peculiar content, that of the use-
value of labour-power: ‘With his money, the money owner has [..] bought 
disposition over labour capacity so that he can use up, consume, this labour 
capacity as such, i.e. have it operate as actual labour, in short, so that he can 
have the worker really work.’74 This is crucial, because what appears as a merely 
formal metamorphosis in value terms – of money into commodity and commodity 
into value – in fact contains concealed within it a relation of subjugation: 
Through the mediation of its sale and purchase it disguises the real 
transaction, and the perpetual dependence which is constantly renewed, by 
presenting it as nothing more than a financial relationship. […] The 
constant renewal of the relationship of sale and purchase merely ensures 
the perpetuation of the specific relationship of dependency, endowing it 
with the deceptive illusion of a transaction, of a contract between equally 
free and equally matched commodity owners.75 
The compulsion to waged labour, of submission to the command of the capitalist 
as a condition of possibility of the worker’s survival inherent in the class structure 
of capitalist society, i.e., in the juridical separation of labour from its objective 
means of realisation, is therefore concealed by the surface appearance of a purely 
voluntary exchange. As Pierre Macherey explains  
this exchange occurs within the framework of a power relation wherein 
one party, the seller, occupies the subordinate position and the other, the 
buyer, the dominant position, enabling the latter to impose their interests. 
[…] the miracle that the system of wage-labor performs consists in 
separating power from its action by artificially creating conditions that 
allow a power to be considered independently from its action, as if a non-
acting power, a power that would not be active, would still be a power. 
From the physical point of view, this is more than a mystery: it is an 
absurdity.76  
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This point is key, because it renders explicit the degree to which capitalist 
subsumption in actu is premised upon the ordination of individuals within 
structurally determined class positions, through which the majority section of the 
body politic is separated from the practical object of its reproduction, thereby 
allowing relations of domination to traverse the laws of the market imperceptibly. 
Through the exchange that separation is then – temporarily – suspended: ‘[labour] 
is made into a real activity through contact with capital—it cannot do this by 
itself, since it is without object’.77 This is what undergirds labour’s mediation by 
and dependency on capital, which it requires in order to make the transition from 
capacity (Vermögen) or potency (dynamis) to an effectively actualised power 
(kraft).78 
Historically, this exchange of labour-power for wages is how the 
reabsorption of dispossessed workers into capitalist production processes 
primarily (although not exclusively) took place (and indeed is how it continues to 
do so). Money therefore appears as a definitive factor in the dissolution of non-
capitalist modes of reproduction and their incorporation into the circuits of 
capitalist accumulation, as Marx points out: 
Money wealth neither invented nor fabricated the spinning wheel and the 
loom. But, once unbound from their land and soil, spinner and weaver 
with their stools and wheels came under the command of money wealth. 
[…] When the formation of capital had reached a certain level, monetary 
wealth could place itself as mediator between the objective conditions of 
life, thus liberated, and the liberated but also homeless and emptyhanded 
labour powers, and buy the latter with the former.79 
But also ‘logically’, once established, the wage is ‘one of the essential mediating 
forms of capitalist relations of production, and one constantly reproduced by 
those relations themselves.’80 It is what enables the transition from labour’s 
subsumption under commodity-value to its subsumption under capital, because 
the purchase of labour-power is the basis for its subsequent determination as 
activity that is productive for capital, that can be set to work in order to valorise 
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and therefore becomes capital: ‘through the exchange with the worker, capital has 
appropriated labour itself; labour has become one of its moments, which now acts 
as a fructifying vitality upon its merely existent and hence dead objectivity.’81 It is 
the means by which the worker, qua living labour, qua labour-power commodity 
is incorporated into capital, functionally determined as one of the elements (the 
essential element in fact) of its life-process: variable capital. 
This functional determination, or what Marx calls ‘functional form’ in the 
second volume of Capital, is in general what constitutes belonging to capital or 
being as capital.82 It has a mode of operation distinct from value-determination, 
which, although still practically constituted, is simply an abstractly differential 
relation (an ‘axiomatic of abstract quantities’, in Deleuze and Guatarri’s terms).83 
Marx is clear that, contra political economy, capital and its forms (e.g., fixed, 
circulating) cannot be defined empirically or statically, cannot be reduced to some 
set of ‘natural properties’ possessed by things in themselves:  
The crude materialism of the economists who regard as the natural 
properties of things what are social relations of production between 
people, and qualities which things obtain because they are subsumed 
under these relations, is at the same time just as crude an idealism, even 
fetishism, since it imputes social relations to things as inherent 
characteristics, and thus mystifies them.84 
In themselves money and commodities are no more capital than means of 
production and subsistence are.85 
Capital is, rather, constituted processualy, through and as a ‘social relation of 
production’ within which elements and forms are situated functionally; it is an 
internally structured totality that particularizes itself in those things that it 
determines – subsumptively – as its own moments (conceptually, the model for 
such a totality is the subject, eminently in its Hegelian conception, as authors such 
as Arthur and Dussel have argued).86 A discrete social element therefore becomes 
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capital only by virtue of being assigned a place in the total process of capitalist 
accumulation, what Marx refers to as capital’s life-process (lebensprozess). This 
is how it can be the case ‘that many things are subsumed under capital which do 
not seem to belong within it conceptually’.87 The historically specific function 
given to productive and economic elements within capitalist reproduction 
transforms their social and practical character, as Patrick Murray has pointed out:  
Marx argues that commercial forms such as the commodity, value, money, 
capital, wages and wage-labor, interest, rent, merchants’ capital, usurers’ 
capital, and more are all ancient, but, in modern capitalism, all of these 
forms are co-determined in new ways which required reconceiving all 
these categories and how they belong together. That task lies at the heart 
of Marx’s project in Capital, where, for example, the truth of the 
commodity in capitalism is shown to be that commodities are commodity 
capital. The recognition of different senses of all these commercial terms, 
and of capital in particular, opens the door to multiple equivocations.88 
In this sense subsumption under capital is fundamentally about incorporation 
within and subjection to the internal hierarchy of its multiple determinations and 
the new objectivity given to the subsumed elements as a result of this co-
determination. (Here the moment of incorporation corresponds to the wage 
exchange described above, whilst it is in the phase of production that subjection 
to its inner hierarchy and telos takes place – that is, firstly a formal or passive and 
secondly a substantial or active mode of integration and domination). As Murray 
mentions in the citation above, the ‘truth’ (i.e. the social content) of commodities 
is dialectically transformed once they are understood as elements in the circuit of 
capital, the same is true for money, means of production and labour-power, they 
all ‘receive this specific social character only under certain particular conditions 
that have developed historically’.89 So although the key to Marx’s critique of 
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political economy lies in labour’s subsumption to capital, the same process of 
functional determination affects all other elements of production incorporated into 
the capitalist production process through their monetary purchase. For example, 
productive capital (raw materials, technology, premises, etc.) which by exchange 
comes into the capitalist’s possession and is thus constituted as a moment in the 
process of capital accumulation, that is, as constant capital. 
As a social relation of production capital thus acts as a unifying or 
synthetic force, it is the subject that ‘composes’ the production process, the 
universal in which the particular labourers as well as the objective elements of 
production are given unity. It is through the economic exchange relation that 
capital integrates the constituents of production whose original unity is 
fragmented by processes of primitive accumulation. It merely executes or 
concludes the (subsumptive) judgement whose premises have already been 
posited materially: ‘Capital proper does nothing but bring together the mass of 
hands and instruments which it finds on hand. It agglomerates them under its 
command.’90 But in doing so, an inversion is effected, because for the individual 
workers who are related to each other ‘in a purely atomistic way’ capital appears 
as ‘a unity falling outside them’, it is ‘the concentration of many living labour 
capacities for one purpose’ and thus posits ‘itself as the independent and external 
unity of these many available existences.’91 Capital is therefore the subject that 
unifies and directs this process, whilst the workers have become functionally 
determined as its moments and means: ‘Individuals are subsumed under social 
production; social production exists outside them as their fate; but social 
production is not subsumed under individuals, manageable by them as their 
common wealth.’92 This is the basic meaning of the alienation and inversion of 
the social productive powers of labour with which Marx constantly engaged and 
which drives the revolutionary problematic, although at the level of exchange 
relations this can only be grasped in formal terms, through the metamorphoses of 
money into commodities and commodities into money. It is in the alternate phase 
of production, in the using up of the labour power commodity, its productive 
consumption – which Marx describes as ‘a process qualitatively distinct from the 
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exchange […] an essentially different category’ – that this circulatory movement 
is shown to contain ‘a real metabolism’.93 Here the ‘physiognomy’ of the dramatis 
personae change as ‘the buyer and the seller enter into a new relation with each 
other’, giving rise to a whole new set of conflicts and determinations of capitalist 
subsumption.94  
 
Subsumption in production 
 
If, as Marx argues, ‘the relations of capital are essentially concerned with 
controlling production’, we have nonetheless seen how this can only occur via the 
economic mediation of commodity exchange: the subsumption of labour, as well 
as wealth as such, under the commodity-form of value and exchange relations.95 
The circulatory processes that take place on the surface of capitalist society, that 
is, ‘socially’, are the means which enable a very different logic and form of power 
to obtain ‘privately’, within the arena of production. Here, in a mode that is the 
direct result and expression of those conditions established through ‘so-called 
original accumulation’ and reproduced by capitalist social relations themselves, 
the basic constituents of production are brought together – their separation is 
‘superseded’ – in the course of a labour process that is directed under the 
command of the capitalist and organized around a specifically capitalist end: the 
production and realisation of surplus-value. When we shift our focus to this 
sphere, production, we see that with their command over labour, the right to 
which has been bought with wages, the capitalist compels the worker to perform 
surplus labour, to produce an excess of economic value over and above what they 
receive in order to reproduce their own existence as living labour; that is, to be 
productive of and for capital rather than themselves. As such, both capitalist and 
worker cease to be merely different kinds of sellers, but truly enact the real class 
roles determined for them socially: 
The capitalist, who exists only as a potential purchaser of labour becomes 
a real capitalist only when the worker, who can be turned into a wage-
labourer only through the sale of his capacity for labour, really does 
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submit to the commands of capital. The functions fulfilled by the capitalist 
are no more than the functions of capital – viz. the valorization of value by 
absorbing living labour – executed consciously and willingly. The 
capitalist functions only as personified capital, capital as a person, just as 
the worker is no more than labour personified.96  
The command structure and power relation that operates internally to capitalist 
production therefore enacts the second moment of labour’s subsumption, its 
functional determination as a moment of capital – of value valorising itself – on 
the basis and in the course of its active realisation as a metabolic process of 
practical form-determination. In the same moment that human labour forms a 
concretely useful good, its subjection to the command of the capitalist ensures 
that it also forms abstract wealth – in excess of what it receives in order to do so. 
Human practice is here subjected to and stamped with the character of a 
historically specific form of domination and exploitation: ‘The labour process 
posited prior to value, as point of departure – which, owing to its abstractness, its 
pure materiality, is common to all forms of production – here re-appears again 
within capital, as a process which proceeds within its substance and forms its 
content.’97  
The capitalist production process therefore consists in an ‘immediate unity 
of the labour process and the valorization process’; an articulation of concrete 
labour as a form-giving and socially reproductive activity with abstract labour as 
an activity that valorizes capital and augments the social wealth of the capitalist 
class. These two elements of capitalist production, capital and labour, are repulsed 
in their contradictory objectives (as qualitative/quantitative totalisations) but at 
the same time attracted by their mutual dependence, the fact that ‘the labour 
process is only the means whereby the valorization process is implemented’, 
whilst, as we have seen, ‘labour itself is productive only if absorbed into capital, 
where capital forms the basis of production, and where the capitalist is therefore 
in command of production.’98 
the means of production, the material conditions of labour — material of 
labour, instruments of labour (and means of subsistence) — do not appear 
                                                          
96 Marx, ‘Results’, p. 989-90 (my emphasis). 
97 Marx, Grundrisse, p. 304. 
98 Marx, ‘Results’, Capital vol. 1, p. 991; Grundrisse, p. 308. 
150 
 
as subsumed to the labourer, but the labourer appears as subsumed to 
them.  He does not make use of them, but they make use of him.  And it is 
this that makes them capital.  Capital employs labour.  They are not means 
for him to produce products whether in the form of direct means of 
subsistence, or of means of exchange, commodities.  But he is a means for 
them — partly to maintain their value, partly to create surplus-value, that 
is, to increase it, absorb surplus-labour.99 
Here, the ‘immediate contradiction’ of use-value and value internal to the 
commodity form is raised to a more concrete or deeper level within the total 
social process – from the static level of objective form to the active level of the 
processes whereby that form is constituted – and similarly here the contradiction 
finds its ‘resolution’, or at least neutralization, in the subsumption of the former 
under the latter. In this case, however, the subsumption effects not only a mode of 
abstract formalisation, a representative framework of equivalence that regulates 
exchanges, but rather an active, end-directed mediation that regulates productive 
activity according to the logic and life-process of capital, so that ‘the labour 
process is as it were incorporated in [the valorisation process], subsumed under 
it’.100 
In order to grasp exactly how the subsumption of the labour process under 
capitalist command and the imperative to valorise affects its forms and functions, 
let us return to the concepts of labour and the labour process conceived from the 
standpoint of their general-abstract form, in their ‘pure materiality’ as the 
necessary metabolic basis of the social reproduction process. Marx describes the 
labour process comprehensively in a long passage from his 1861-3 draft of 
Capital, worth quoting at length, as: 
a process in which the worker performs a particular purposive activity, a 
movement which is both the exertion of his labour capacity, his mental 
and physical powers, and their expenditure and using-up. Through it he 
gives the material of labour a new shape, in which the movement is 
materialised […] Whilst labour materialises itself in this manner in the 
object of labour, it forms it and uses up, consumes the means of labour as 
its organ. The labour goes over from the form of activity to the form of 
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being, the form of the object. As alteration of the object it alters its own 
shape. The form-giving activity consumes the object and itself; it forms 
the object and materialises itself; it consumes itself in its subjective form 
as activity and consumes the objective character of the object, i.e., it 
abolishes the object’s indifference towards the purpose of the labour. 
Finally, the labour consumes the means of labour, which likewise made 
the transition during the process from mere possibility to actuality, by 
becoming the real conductor of labour, but thereby also got used up, in the 
form in which it had been at rest, through the mechanical or chemical 
process it had entered.’101 
Marx here makes explicit the double, socio-natural character of the labour 
process, as at once a process with a ‘purely natural’ basis, as a physical/chemical 
process, and at the same time as a process that transcends that first order of 
functioning and is defined as an ‘overcoming’ of the merely natural form of the 
object – it’s ‘indifference towards the purpose of the labour’. That indifference is 
negated by the labour activity which gives a new form to the object, a ‘purposive’ 
or practical form intended to satisfy some ‘particular need’ intelligible only from 
the standpoint of the reproductive totality within which the worker and object co-
exist. In the moment of labour (as well as in the moment of consumption) the 
relations that connect the two dimensions of reproduction – the system of 
productive capacities and the system of consumption needs – are put into play, 
subject to affirmation, interpretation and contestation, and given concrete 
realisation. 
So what then occurs when this process proceeds on the basis of the 
capitalist relation of production? When the worker alienates the right to determine 
the realisation of this activity and it comes under the command of the capitalist?  
What the worker has alienated to the capitalist for a specified duration is 
‘the expenditure of his life's energy, the realization of his productive faculties’.102 
Even though the capacity to appropriate and give form to nature is inherent in and 
inseparable from the living body of the productive-subject – is ‘his movement and 
not the capitalists’ – it nonetheless becomes the property of the capitalist that can 
be used-up in order to valorise and thereby increase the mass of his or her capital: 
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‘the capitalist supervises the worker, controls the functioning of labour capacity 
as an action belonging to him.’103 The imposition of capitalist command upon the 
labour process is the imposition of a particular – capitalist – purpose upon the 
labour, which displaces and disrupts any ‘organic’ connection between the 
worker’s conscious regulation of their metabolic relation with the materials and 
means of labour and the overall end toward which the labour is directed, between 
the constitution of the form of the object and the form itself, the object’s 
‘instrumental operability’ within the reproduction process. This connection is now 
mediated by capital, depends on capital for its unity. The worker’s activity, which 
‘depends on his will and is simultaneously an expression of his will’ must only 
satisfy the ‘private’ needs of its capitalist-owner, not the ‘public’ needs of the 
social subject nor the individual needs of the labourer. 104 In the absence of this 
social or individual meaning, labour is performed only to secure the wages 
required by the worker to sustain their life:  
Labour is for [them] just effort and torment, whereas it belongs to the 
capitalist as a substance that creates and increases wealth, and in fact it is 
an element of capital, incorporated into it in the production process as its 
living, variable component.105 
Labour as conscious regulation is thus recoded as an (unconscious) moment in an 
external – or at least excessive – system or life-process, that of capital. 
Unconscious because its subsumption under the valorization process enacts its 
transition to an order of functional intelligibility that is indifferent and alien to the 
concrete content of the labour itself – the production and accumulation of abstract 
wealth – and where it counts only as abstract labour. Just as social production, 
therefore, recodes the natural processes underlying the human-nature metabolism 
as practically significant, so too in a similar sense does capitalist production 
recode the labour process as economically significant, as value-producing labour. 
This significance, as content and goal, is superimposed upon the process of the 
objectification of labour in use-values, or practical objects, a process that capital 
both represses and depends upon. We can thus see how through labour’s 
subsumption ‘a relation of domination and subordination enters the relation of 
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production itself’ and that ‘this derives from capital’s ownership of the labour it 
has incorporated and from the nature of the labour process itself’.106 
 
Formal subsumption under capital 
It would, however, be both theoretically insufficient and methodologically 
inconsistent to attempt to understand this subsumption as active upon the labour 
process conceived in these ahistorical, general-abstract terms, ‘in no specific 
economic determinateness […] divorced from all particular historical 
characteristics’.107 In his discussion of the labour process in the 1861-63 
manuscripts, Marx is clear that ‘to what extent the character of the labour process 
is itself changed by its subsumption under capital is a question that has nothing to 
do with the general form of the labour process’ (although, as we have seen, a 
conception of this general form is the condition of intelligibility for those 
changes).108 The determination of labour process as capitalist does not emerge ex 
nihilo, ‘nor drop from the sky’ and neither is the concrete form of the labour 
which capital comes to dominate general and indeterminate, but rather belongs to 
‘production at a definite stage of social development’, is concrete and historically 
specific. ‘Capital did not begin the world from the beginning, but rather 
encountered production and products already present, before it subjugated them 
beneath its process’.109 Thus what is subsumed under capital at the outset of this 
‘encounter’ are non-capitalist production processes belonging to a pre-existing 
form of social reproduction (most notably, in the case of Britain, feudalism): 
Historically, in fact, at the start of its formation, we see capital take 
under its control (subsume under itself) not only the labour process in 
general but the specific actual labour processes as it finds them 
available in the existing technology, and in the form in which they have 
developed on the basis of non-capitalist relations of production.110 
How does capital take hold of and re-determine these labour processes 
as its own? In order to conceptualise this process Marx makes use of the 
concept of subsumption in its most explicit and widely recognized sense, in the 
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distinction between the ‘formal’ and ‘real’ modes of labour’s subsumption to 
capital, a distinction intended to clarify the manner in which the domination of 
capital is operative within the production process. Different forms of 
subsumption capture the diverse ways that capitalists exercise their power in 
order to accumulate – and transform society in the process.  
Initially, Marx says, capital ‘only subsumes [the labour process] 
formally, without making any changes in its specific technological 
character’.111 In this phase, which Marx calls ‘formal subsumption’, production 
takes on a capitalist character purely at the level of the social relationship that 
constitutes it.112 That is, without any ‘material’ transformation of a pre-existing 
labour process. The social basis upon which it takes place is nonetheless 
transformed into an economic relation between capitalist and wage-labourer, so 
that through the exchange of ‘equivalents’ the compulsion and exploitation of 
the former by the latter can occur simply by virtue of their ‘differing economic 
functions’. Roberts points out that as capitalist production is defined by its 
adherence to the circulatory formula M-C-M’, ‘everything required for 
production, including the workers’ ability to work, must enter into production 
through sale and purchase’.113 So unlike the relations of directly political 
domination that characterised feudal societies (for example), where surplus 
labour was often extorted through violent means, with formal subsumption, the 
domination of capital over labour consists primarily in this ‘money 
relationship’, ‘in the worker’s subjection as worker to the supervision and 
therefore to the command of capital or the capitalist’:114 
The subsumption is formal, in so far as the individual worker, instead of 
working as an independent commodity owner, now works as a labour 
capacity belonging to the capitalist, and therefore under his command and 
supervision; also works no longer for himself but for the capitalist; the 
means of labour, moreover, no longer appear as means to the realisation of 
his labour: his labour appears instead as the means of valorisation — i.e. 
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113 Roberts, ‘Abstraction and productivity’, p. 192. 
114 Marx, MECW vol. 30, p. 93 (my emphasis). 
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absorption of labour — for the means of labour. This distinction is formal 
in so far as it can exist without causing the slightest alteration of any kind 
in the mode of production or the social relations within which production 
takes place.115 
Marx is somewhat misleading here when he writes that the social relations of 
production are unchanged by formal subsumption. In fact, in so far as it marks a 
new form of domination occurring within the production process, it is only at the 
level of social relations that formal subsumption’s effects can be registered. The 
political and social significance of this domination can be grasped in terms of the 
peculiarity of the supervision relation, a form of command and compulsion 
legitimated by the juridical relation between the seller of labour power and the 
one who consumes it – the ‘legal fiction’ that underwrites the ‘forced’ labour of 
‘free’ subjects.116 The capitalist buys the right to exert their command over 
labour’s activity in the production process, and then – crucially – uses this right to 
ensure that the work is carried out with sufficient productivity to generate surplus-
value, to ensure that their M will return to them as M’.  
In this sense, the power exercised in the formally subsumed labour 
process, whilst directly interpersonal, must nonetheless be understood as directed 
toward the satisfaction of external and abstract pressures – namely those of 
competitive exchange. The capitalist does not dominate the worker in order to 
directly satisfy their own consumption needs, but precisely in order to maximise 
the value objectified in the commodities they have commanded their workers to 
produce, a value that is determined by socially established standards of 
productivity. Hence, the capitalist exerts their authority over the worker in order 
to ensure that these standards of productivity are met (or beaten): ‘the capitalist 
will make sure that the worker really works, works the whole time required, and 
expends necessary labour time only, i.e., does the normal quantity of work over a 
given time’.117 In this sense, through the juridical command relation, the capitalist 
really acts as capital personified, executes the judgement in which labour is 
particularised as capital, as productive of and for capital. The formally subsumed 
                                                          
115 Marx, MECW vol. 30, p.262 
116 Cf. Riccardo Bellofiore, ‘A Ghost Turning into a Vampire’, in Re-reading Marx: New 
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labour process thus acts as ‘the general foundation of the capitalist system’ 
through its establishment of an exploitative economic relation between capital and 
labour founded on a developed and widespread network of competitive 
commodity exchange. 
Understanding the temporal aspect of this command relation, which is 
itself directly linked to the temporal aspect of value, is essential to grasping what 
is at stake both in capitalist exploitation as such, as well as the different modes of 
subsumption employed by capital as strategies for intensifying this exploitation.  
Underlying the capitalist production process understood as a process of 
valorization is the injunction that the worker objectify more social labour in the 
commodities they produce than is taken away in the form of wages; it is this 
‘surplus’ that capitalist command must coerce form the workers. To this end, for 
capital, and thus for the capitalist, ‘labour does not count as productive activity 
with a specific utility, but simply as value-creating substance, as social labour in 
general which is in the act of objectifying itself and whose sole feature of interest 
is its quantity’.118 (It is in this sense that the subsumption of the labour process 
under the valorization process is a logical extension of the subsumption of use-
value under value; it is the imposition of abstract value-logic at the active level of 
production). Because the value at stake here only represents the quantity of labour 
objectified in commodities in temporal terms, that is as ‘definite masses of 
crystallised labour-time’, the only means by which capitalists can realise their aim 
of extracting surplus-value from the labour force lies in establishing, maintaining 
and increasing a part of the working day in which workers are forced to perform 
surplus labour – that is, ‘beyond the point at which the worker would have 
produced an exact equivalent for the value of his labour-power’.119 Formal 
subsumption – understood not only as a partial mode but as the ‘general 
foundation’ of every capitalist production process – can thus be grasped, 
conceptually, as the introduction of a time relation in the production process, as 
the division of the working day into two parts: that in which necessary labour (for 
the reproduction of the labourer) is performed and that in which surplus labour 
(for the benefit of the capitalist) is performed:  
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The productivity of capital consists in the first instance — even if one only 
considers the formal subsumption of labour under capital — in 
the compulsion to perform surplus-labour, labour beyond the immediate 
need; a compulsion which the capitalist mode of production shares with 
earlier modes of production, but which it exercises and carries into effect 
in a manner more favourable to production.120 
The distinctiveness of the mode of exploitation introduced with formal 
subsumption lies in the way in which this division between necessary and surplus 
labour is concealed by the ‘free’ exchange between the buyer and seller of labour 
power that is its precondition. At the surface-level of the social process, in 
circulation, the working day appears as one single block of time, because the 
wage-form represents it as such, with the worker selling their labour to the 
capitalist for a working day that does not distinguish between its necessary and 
surplus portions. Hence it is that the wage relation appears to be an exchange of 
equivalents (in the sense of erscheinen, necessarily taking the form of), even 
though it is on the basis of this time division that the possibility of capitalist 
exploitation and its increase arises: 
The fact that half a day's labour is necessary to keep the worker alive 
during 24 hours does not in any way prevent him from working a whole 
day. Therefore the value of labour-power, and the value which that labour-
power valorizes [verwertet] in the labour-process, are two entirely 
different magnitudes; and this difference was what the capitalist had in 
mind when he was purchasing the labour-power.121 
Marx contrasts this mode of exploitation with the direct forms of extracting 
surplus labour used under feudalism, for example, where a certain amount of 
surplus product or money was demanded as tribute, or simply where specified 
amounts of working days were openly demanded from peasants as corvée, both 
under the threat of violence. Where the labour process is subsumed to capital, 
however, and is initiated under the guise of commodity exchange, the exploitation 
of surplus labour is ‘not directly visible’ but remains submerged in the ‘antinomy, 
of right against right’.122 
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Because the productivity (for capital) of a formally subsumed labour 
process depends solely on the length of the working day for which labour-power 
is bought, it is bound to the production of absolute surplus-value, which Marx 
describes as the ‘material expression’ of formal subsumption. Capitalists, both 
individually and as a class, strive to force the duration of surplus labour to its 
maximum in order to increase the quantity of value produced by their capital in 
absolute terms, i.e., as simply an addition to the total quantity of value in society. 
Conversely, ‘equally bearing the seal of the law of exchange’, the workers 
constitute themselves as an opposite force, striving to reduce the hours for which 
they must toil in order to reproduce themselves.123 In the section from Capital on 
‘the production of absolute surplus-value’ Marx charts the struggles over the 
length of the working day, and the legislation introduced by the British state to 
mitigate capital’s ‘insatiable appetite for surplus labour’, which, at the dawn of 
the industrial revolution in Britain, threatened to drive the working class to 
complete exhaustion.124 Formal subsumption thus introduces a dynamic of 
integration/transcendence which takes the immediately political form of a struggle 
over time, of the time of the worker’s life abducted by the capitalist in order to 
valorise their capital. 
Without altering the actual process of labour in any way there are 
nonetheless two other factors aside from the duration of labour which can be 
manipulated by individual capitals in order to potentially increase the production 
of absolute surplus value. Firstly, the capitalist may enlarge the scale of 
production by introducing increases ‘in the volume of the means of production 
invested, and in the number of workers under the command of a single 
employer’.125 Secondly, there are techniques for increasing the intensity of labour 
by simply forcing the workers to exert a greater effort via supervision and 
coercion. What is key to formal subsumption, however, is that despite these 
modifications, the specific material-practical content of the activity undertaken by 
the worker remains unchanged from its pre-capitalist form and any potential 
increases in the production of surplus value remain strictly within the ambit of 
subjective relations, of capitalist command-relations. As we shall see, once capital 
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begins to alter this intensive content of labour, it brings about an epoch making 
change in the society’s form of reproduction. 
Departing from Das’ account, we can characterise formal subsumption 
through the following ensemble of conditions taken on by the labour process 
when brought under the formal economic command of the capitalist: 
1. There is no extra-economic obligation or coercion directly underpinning 
relations of production; that is, labourers, who do not own means of 
production, are generally free to choose their employers. 
2. No more labour time is used in production than is socially necessary; 
there is competition to reduce the cost of production of commodities for 
sale, suggesting that the law of value is operating.  
3. An economic relation of supremacy and subordination exists at the 
point of production, as the worker is supervised by the capitalist.  
4. The means of production and consumption are bought on the market (by 
the capitalist) and confront the worker as capital. 
To which we can also add that: 
5. The actual labour processes themselves are unchanged by capital’s 
ownership of the labour process. The scale and intensity of labour may be 
increased, but the specific technical-metabolic character of the activity 
remains as it was prior to capitalist control. 
6. Labour-power is exchanged for wages. (There are also important non-
waged forms of exploitation by capital, but they fall under the rubric of 
‘hybrid forms’ as we shall see below).126 
 
Hybrid forms 
 
In his various discussions of formal and real subsumption Marx also mentions 
briefly the existence of various ‘hybrid forms’ (zwitterformen) through which 
surplus-value is ‘extorted’ by capitalists without the production process being 
even formally subsumed to their command.127 Like formal subsumption, a 
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financial rather than political relationship characterizes such forms and is the 
basis for the exploitation of labour by capital, but without the mediation of a 
direct wage and without instituting specific relations of production between the 
producers and the capitalist.128 ‘Instead’, Marx says, ‘the capitalist merely steps 
between these independent workers and the definitive purchaser of their 
commodities as middleman, as merchant’, or alternatively, as a usurer, and ‘feeds 
on them like a parasite’.129 In this sense, the exploiter acts as at best a kind of 
proto-capitalist, bearing the ‘antediluvean’ forms of usurer’s or merchant’s 
capital, whilst the workers utilise what are at least ‘nominally’ their own means of 
labour and carry out production independently. Marx gives the example of the 
usurer’s capital in the Indian Ryot system, which: 
advances raw materials or tools or even both to the immediate producer in 
the form of money. The exorbitant interest which it attracts, the interest 
which, irrespective of its magnitude, it extorts from the primary producer, 
is just another name for surplus-value. It transforms its money into capital 
by extorting unpaid labour, surplus labour, from the immediate 
producer.130 
This type of exploitation presupposes, if not the complete dispossession 
that characterizes the double freedom of wage-labour, then a nonetheless 
sufficient degree of immiseration such that producers are willing to enter into 
exploitative relationships, even in the absence of ‘political restraints’ obliging 
them to do so, in order to gain access to the money or means of production needed 
for their subsistence. The economic dependency conditioning this exploitation 
                                                                                                                                                              
they are 'from Marx’s standpoint more accurately understood as involving no subsumption of 
labor at all’ – and argues instead that they be more adequately thought of as ‘hybrid forms of 
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and the maintenance of producers at a subsistence level (or in many cases even 
worse) is why Banaji has described the relationship as effectively constituting a 
‘concealed wage’.131  The idea that capitalist exploitation can proceed even 
without contractual wage relations is not only borne out as a prevalent 
phenomenon by extensive historiographic research, but is also supported by Marx 
himself in various texts, for example in The Class Struggles in France where, 
referring to the French peasantry, he states that: ‘under the pretence of being a 
private proprietor […] their exploitation differs only in form from the industrial 
proletariat. The exploiter is the same: capital’. 132 Marx also emphasizes this in the 
case of the Ryot, who:  
does not work under alien direction, for another and under another, and 
thus he is not subsumed as a wage labourer to the owner of the conditions 
of production. These therefore do not confront him as capital. Thus even 
the formal capital-relation does not take place, still less the specifically 
capitalist mode of production. And yet the usurer appropriates not only the 
whole of the surplus value created by the Ryot, i.e. all the surplus produce 
over and above the means of subsistence necessary for his reproduction, 
but he also takes away from him part of the latter, so that he merely 
vegetates in the most miserable manner. The usurer functions as a 
capitalist in so far as the valorisation of his capital occurs directly through 
the appropriation of alien labour, but in a form which makes the actual 
producer into his debtor, instead of making him a seller of his labour to the 
capitalist.133 
The existence of ‘hybrid forms’ must therefore be associated with, on the one 
hand, processes of ‘accumulation by dispossession’ and the concentration of 
wealth and means of production by a capitalist class and, on the other hand, with 
the propagation of money-mediated market relations. As such, hybrid forms of 
subsumption must be figured within a broad constellation of capitalist social 
relations and circulatory agglomerations. 
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As Murray has argued, there are two primary senses in which Marx refers 
to hybrid subsumption. On the one hand these forms can be ‘transitional’ 
(Uebergangsformen), acting as the basis for the historical emergence of formal 
subsumption, and appearing in a variety of guises at the dawn of capitalist 
production. But in addition to this they also endure as ‘accompanying forms’ 
(Nebensformen) alongside properly capitalist (i.e., industrial) production relations, 
and are even produced anew, either directly or indirectly, by both formal and real 
subsumption.134 Industrial capital can interact with hybrid forms and incorporate 
them within its circuits, it can also enhance its grasp of labour by its contrast with 
such forms or can also take advantage of such forms as outsourcing mechanisms 
when state intervention, class struggle, economic crises or simply competition 
with other capitals deter its direct contraction of labour, as Das has highlighted 
with reference to agricultural production in India.135 In this sense hybrid forms 
must be grasped not simply as residual forms of exploitation, but as a 
permanently present strategy of exclusion and outsourcing that is functional for 
capital as a strategic response to both cost-cutting drives and class resistance. 
Even where ‘pre-capitalist’ forms of production are maintained or 
reabsorbed into capital’s accumulation process, Marx argues that their 
‘physiognomy is completely changed’ as they ‘acquire a new and specific 
historical character under the impact of capitalist production’.136 The use of 
organicist language here is not incidental. As we have seen, the actuality of social 
forms derives from their functional determination within the reproductive life-
process of a social subject. It therefore makes reference to the adaptation or, 
perhaps more appropriately, mutilation of social forms by their incorporation 
within a social reproduction process that proceeds on a capitalist basis. Such an 
incorporation, Marx stresses, ‘heightens the exploitation of the producer, drives it 
to its uttermost limits, without in any way […] introducing the resulting 
heightened productivity of labour and the transition to the specifically capitalist 
mode of production’.137 Indeed, it is precisely their exclusion from the ‘normal’ 
conditions of capitalist exploitation and their associated production costs that 
characterizes the inclusion of ‘surplus populations’ under hybrid forms, allowing 
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the capitalist ‘to speculate directly upon the misery of the workers.’138 In this way, 
hybrid subsumption is not simply residual but rather ‘is itself the EXTRANEOUS 
PRODUCE of the capitalist mode of production’.139 What occurs under such 
forms ‘is exploitation by capital without the mode of production of capital’, which 
simply worsens the conditions under which the worker works:140 
makes labour sterile, places it under the most unfavourable economic 
conditions […] Here in fact the means of production have ceased to 
belong to the producer, but they are nominally subsumed to him, and the 
mode of production remains in the same relations of small independent 
enterprise, only the relations are in ruins.141 
 There are many examples, both historical and current, of such forms and 
their importance is far from negligible to the reproduction of capitalist societies. 
As ‘transitional’, Banaji argues that they ‘were never of purely limited scope or 
passing significance’ even though, as Murray notes, ‘the concept is marginal to 
Capital’s systematic dialectic’.142 In the form of exploitative credit 
‘accompanying’ circuits of industrial capital, hybrid subsumption today pervades 
the life of the rural poor on a mass scale in ‘developing’ countries such as Mexico 
and India (where Skillman points out ‘moneylending at usurious rates has seen a 
dramatic resurgence’).143 It should be clear, then, that the diverse forms of 
‘hybrid’ subsumption constitute an integral element of the overall dynamic of 
capitalist domination, even if they are characterised by the indirect form taken by 
the relations of exploitation. 
 
Real subsumption: the objective positing of capitalist command 
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Whilst the formal subsumption of the labour process is significant in introducing 
capitalist relations into production, it does not yet for Marx signal a properly 
capitalist mode of production, because the technical organisation and objective 
means by which labour is carried out remain unchanged; what capital commands 
is a labour process structured around the requirements of an ‘archaic’ mode of 
production. As such, and even accounting for the potential increases in the scale 
and intensity of labour that subsumption under the command of a single capitalist 
presents, these labour processes come into contradiction with capital’s unceasing 
drive to increase the production of surplus-value. Most obviously, this 
contradiction takes the form of the social and natural limits to the working day 
which place constraints on the amount of surplus labour capitalists can effectively 
demand from a formally subsumed workforce. So following the establishment of 
capitalist social relations of production, once the capitalist has command of the 
labour process, a second strategy of increasing surplus-value becomes available: 
the transformation of the actual material content and technical structure of the 
labour process in order to increase productivity – what Marx calls the ‘real 
subsumption’ of labour under capital. Real subsumption involves the 
development of the social productive power of labour through the technical re-
organisation of the labour process, through the implementation of co-operation, 
divisions of labour, machinery and industrial technology, etc. in such a way that 
capital can overcome the barriers to accumulation present when it has only 
formally subsumed the labour process. 
The dynamic driving real subsumption must be understood as 
simultaneously operative across two levels of the social process: individual 
capitals and total social capital. The technical transformations brought about with 
real subsumption are directly motivated by private competition between 
individual capitals vying to accumulate surplus-value. By introducing 
productivity-raising innovations which competitors do not possess, and thereby 
lowering their production costs, Marx shows that an individual capital can benefit, 
either by selling their commodities above their ‘real’ value and reaping extra-
ordinary profits, or by simply reducing prices and outselling competitors 
(reducing the rate of turnover, etc.). Nonetheless, although not centrally or 
socially planned, these innovations have a crucial aggregate effect once 
generalised amongst the majority of producers throughout society: they reduce 
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wages by lowering the value of the commodities needed for the reproduction of 
the workforce. In this way, the value-component of the working day dedicated to 
necessary labour shrinks. So, rather than increasing the amount of surplus labour 
extorted from the worker by simply making the working day longer – as with 
formal subsumption – capitalists are able to take advantage of productivity 
increases to appropriate a greater proportion of value produced in the same 
duration of labour. (Remembering that value is produced only by the socially 
useful expenditure of human energy, nerves, muscles, brain, etc. and, therefore, 
that if the material productivity of labour increases within a fixed time period, no 
extra value is created. Rather, the same quantity of objectified labour will be 
distributed amongst a greater number of products, thus making each individual 
commodity the bearer of less value). This is why the real subsumption of the 
labour process brings about the possibility of relative surplus-value production, 
i.e., increases in surplus-value only relative to total value-production rather than 
in absolute terms.  
In the face of natural and social limits, therefore, capitalists find another 
technique for ensuring constantly increasing accumulation: altering the material 
content of the labour process and the technical means and methods of working in 
a manner adequate to the demands of valorisation. In doing so, ‘the entire real 
form of production is altered and a specifically capitalist form of production 
comes into being (at the technological level too).’144 Real subsumption and the 
production of relative surplus-value that accompanies it consummates the 
dominance of capitalist relations within society’s reproduction process, because 
not only does production take the form of a process actively directed towards the 
augmentation of value, but this goal is inscribed in the concrete reality of its 
diverse particular moments and determines its means, methods and development; 
the entire production process comes to be progressively determined by, as and for 
capital. 
Marx conceptualises three primary forms in which the transformations 
associated with real subsumption occur: co-operation, division of labour and 
manufacture, and lastly, machinery and large-scale industry.  
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i) Co-operation 
 
Marx defines co-operation generally as ‘the direct collective labour – unmediated 
by exchange – of many workers’ aimed at a shared goal, the production of the 
same use-value.145 It is the ‘basic form’ of real subsumption and the ‘general form 
upon which all social arrangements for increasing the productivity of labour are 
based’.146 Where the division of labour and machinery are introduced as 
successive forms, it is always as ‘specifications’ of co-operation that rely on and 
presuppose it as their principle (just as all three of them presuppose the exchange 
relations brought about by formal subsumption). But co-operation is also treated 
by Marx as a specific form, existing alongside manufacture and industry and 
conceptually distinct from them. Taken in this sense, Marx calls it the ‘most 
rooted in nature, the crudest and the most abstract of its own varieties’, 
presumably because versions of it can be found in almost every historical form of 
human society.147 However, as a specific aspect of real subsumption, it has a more 
precise meaning. 
Although the concentration of many workers under one capital was 
already the case when the subsumption of the labour process was merely formal, 
those workers may in many cases have continued to undertake their labour 
individually and in separate locations, and therefore consumed the same quantity 
of materials and means of labour as they would have done previously. This 
changes with capitalist co-operation, where many individual workers are 
agglomerated in the same location by a capital and undertake their work 
simultaneously. This still in no way alters the technical structure and organisation 
of the labour process itself, and so primarily the difference is ‘purely 
quantitative’, but it nonetheless offers the possibility of some subtle qualitative 
increases in productivity over and above a bare multiplication of the individual 
labour-powers, in addition to opening the way to further modifications of the 
labour process. Most obviously, many workers labouring in the same space will 
require a smaller outlay on constant capital than if they were working in separate 
locations, as they share resources like buildings, tools and materials. As more 
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labourers are employed to work co-operatively, individual differences in skill and 
strength tend to even out, meaning that the labour employed attains an average 
level of intensity. There are also potentially greater capacities unleashed by the 
many workers acting in unison – Marx uses the example of lifting a heavy weight 
– which ‘the isolated worker is completely incapable of developing’.148 Marx 
describes this as the unleashing of ‘a new productive power, which is intrinsically 
a collective one’.149  
This collective power signals a heightened realisation of human social 
being, as ‘when the worker co-operates in a planned way with others, he strips off 
the fetters of his individuality and, and develops the capability of his species’. 
Such a heightened socialisation of labour and its productive powers is something 
which, for Marx, is consistently developed by capitalist production, as its most 
significant progressive consequence. But as something brought about under 
capitalist conditions, these capacities are confiscated from the workers and 
transposed into a productive power of capital, they are ‘gifted’ to capital for 
nothing (as with the discoveries of science), given that the capitalist pays only for 
individual labour-powers, not their potential collective productivity. This gives 
rise to a phenomenological inversion that constitutes the most important effect of 
co-operation as a form of real subsumption. It is worth quoting Marx’s discussion 
of this inversion from 1861-3 at length here: 
The capitalist buys not one but many individual labour capacities at the 
same time, but he buys them all as isolated commodities, belonging to 
isolated, mutually independent commodity owners. Once they enter into 
the labour process, they are already incorporated into capital, and their 
own cooperation is therefore not a relation into which they put themselves; 
it is the capitalist who puts them into it. Nor is it a relation which belongs 
to them; instead, they now belong to it, and the relation itself appears as a 
relation of capital to them. It is not their reciprocal association, but rather a 
unity which rules over them, and of which the vehicle and director is 
capital itself. Their own association in labour — cooperation — is in fact a 
power alien to them; it is the power of capital which confronts the isolated 
workers. In so far as they have a relation to the capitalist as independent 
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persons, as sellers, it is the relation of isolated, mutually independent 
workers, who stand in a relation to the capitalist but not to each other. […] 
They find that they are agglomerated. The cooperation which arises from 
this agglomeration is for them just as much an effect of capital as the 
agglomeration itself. Their interconnection and their unity lies not in 
themselves but in capital, or, the social productive power of their labour 
arising therefrom is a productive power of capital. just as the power of 
individual labour capacity not only to replace but to increase itself — 
surplus labour — appears as a capacity of capital, so does the social 
character of labour and the productive power which arises from that 
character. 150 
With formal subsumption capitalist control of production was simply 
superimposed upon the labour process by virtue of ownership of its elements, 
making the presence of capital as an externally enforced mediation explicitly 
manifest: the capitalist purchased the inputs and received the final product bearing 
the unpaid labour of the workers. But once capital begins to act as the unifying 
force and subject of the composition of the labour process, its mediation of 
production becomes essential and indispensable to its internal character. With real 
subsumption capital is the relation that brings all of the elements of production 
together in a material as well as economic sense, that brings about the 
concentration and articulation of many individual productive temporalities into a 
single co-ordinated process and that gives rise to augmented social productive 
powers. Because the social form of the co-operative labour process is formed 
‘quite independently of the individual labourers’ it confronts them as a property 
of capital, and in this way it really is, in a sense, capital that produces, whilst 
workers merely act as its organs. ‘Not merely at the level of ideas, but also in 
reality, the social character of his labour confronts the worker as something not 
merely alien, but hostile and antagonistic, when it appears before him objectified 
and personified in capital.’151 As such, labour is not only functionally determined 
by capital as part of its circulatory life-process, that is, formally, but is now also 
subsumed in material terms, in its concrete realisation, that is, really. 
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 Marx argues that the ‘twisting and inversion’ (verdrehung und 
verkehrung) realised here on a material level ‘takes on a form that is all the more 
real the more on the one hand their labour-power itself becomes so modified by 
these forms that it is powerless as an independent force, that is to say, outside this 
capitalist relationship, and that its independent capacity to produce is 
destroyed’.152 This modification, as we will see, is the essential tendency of real 
subsumption and acts ‘as a band with which capital fetters the individual 
workers’, because through the innovations it introduces ‘capital gains a monopoly 
on productivity’, as Roberts points out, and becomes ‘hegemonic’, meaning that 
non-subsumed labour cannot be realised competitively, is unable to carry on 
independently and will therefore perish unless it is incorporated into the capitalist 
production process. 153 Whilst the form of co-operation introduced by capitalists is 
merely ‘simple’, however, this hegemony and the concreteness of the inversion 
and dependency it introduces into production remains subtle. It is only once 
capital begins to truly recompose the labour process that its revolutionising effects 
on production and in the subsumption of workers are truly felt. 
 
ii) Division of labour and manufacture 
 
It is the development of simple into distributive co-operation within a single 
production process that marks the transition to the division of labour in the system 
of manufacture for Marx. The division of labour in production ‘develops the 
differentiation of social labour’ by an analysis of the labour process into its 
constituent elements or ‘partial operations’ that are then recombined within a 
single productive totality – the workshop unified under the command of the 
capitalist. This involves on the one hand a ‘subdivision of the operations and 
subsumption under them of definite multiple numbers of workers’ and on the 
other ‘their combination in one mechanism’. In this way manufacture ‘seizes 
labour-power by its roots’, because instead of distinct tasks being carried out in 
succession by the same individual worker, as was the case even with simple co-
operation, they are here distributed amongst a large group of workers, each of 
whom specialises in the realisation of one particular function and therefore refines 
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its efficiency.154 This differentiation and integration of distinct activities in turn 
reacts back upon the social division of labour in that it can precipitate the 
aggregation of multiple distinct handicrafts, previously separated, in the same 
workshop producing a single commodity, in such a manner that the realisation of 
each particular craft and its tools are altered in light of the specific production 
process it forms part of. Alternatively, partial operations previously forming an 
organic unity with other actions within a particular craft can become isolated as 
the unique product of discrete capitals. ‘Here division and combination condition 
each other’, Marx argues, as traditional processes are broken down and 
subsequently recomposed in forms more adequate to the end of valorisation; what 
therefore took place on a political and economic level with ‘so-called primitive 
accumulation’ has its parallel within the practical structure of the labour process 
itself.155 
The system of manufacture characterised by such a division of labour 
brings about a transformation in the ‘temporal structure’ of the labour process. 
With its subdivision into partial operations the activity of each labour-power is 
materially decoupled from the production process of a commodity in its entirety, 
becoming instead an isolated moment of its realisation. ‘The complementarity of 
the different processes is here transferred from the future to the present’ as the 
various operations are completed side by side rather than serially.156 This 
synchronicity of different specialised functions increases the efficiency of the 
labour process hugely, and has the effect of further breaking down natural and 
practical limits to unceasing production and raises the productive power of the 
‘collective working organism’ to a far greater degree that simple co-operation was 
capable of. It is this heightened productivity that drives capitalists to implement 
and refine the division of labour in their workshops. Specialised workers, 
subsumed under their specific functions, develop in accordance with this system 
and perform their assigned operations with ‘virtuosity’. But for the workers 
themselves this comes at the cost of monotony and dissociation from the product 
of their labour, as the rhythm of their activity is no longer set by the full 
production process of a single commodity with its various stages and techniques, 
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but is instead marked by the incessant repetition of particular minute tasks. (This 
is also reflected objectively in the means of labour, the practical object through 
the wealth of society is reproduced, as well as specialised tools, designed for 
particular rather than general applications). Whereas previously an individual 
worker would have possessed the knowledge, skills and objective means to see 
this process through to the completion of the product, in the system of 
manufacture individuals produce only a partial, one-sided, aspect of it and are 
thus reduced to personifications of each isolated stage, which they perform 
monotonously: 
This independence becomes solidified, personified, when each simple and 
monosyllabic process of this kind becomes the exclusive function of a 
particular worker or a definite number of workers. They are subsumed 
under these isolated functions. This work is not divided among them; they 
are divided among the various processes, each of which becomes the 
exclusive life-process of one of them — in so far as they function as 
productive labour capacity. The heightened productivity and complexity 
of the production process as a whole, its enrichment, is therefore 
purchased at the cost of the reduction of labour capacity in each of its 
specific functions to nothing but a dry abstraction — a simple quality, 
which appears in the eternal uniformity of an identical function, and for 
which the whole of the worker’s productive capacity, the multiplicity of 
his capabilities, has been confiscated.157  
The actuality of capital’s abstraction reaches a new degree here as the 
individual worker’s life-activity and identity as producer no longer even 
corresponds to a particular product – a product to whose objectivity they become 
increasingly indifferent – but simply to the repetitive completion of a single, 
uncreative, ‘abstract’ function. Marx, perhaps problematically, suggests that this 
‘constant labour of one uniform kind disturbs the intensity and flow of a man’s 
vital forces, which find recreation and delight in the change of activity itself’ and 
that it ‘converts the worker into a crippled monstrosity by furthering his particular 
skill […] through the suppression of a whole world of productive drives and 
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inclinations'.158 Whether such recourse to a positive essentialism is taken 
seriously or not, what is clear is that with the division of labour in production the 
conception of labour as techne is seriously attenuated and the reality of human 
practice takes on an increasingly abstract and simple quality: ‘in every craft it 
seizes, manufacture creates a class of so-called unskilled labourers’.159 Both the 
organic unity and anticipatory organisation of the series of actions that constitute 
the entire process of producing a single discrete commodity fall to the side of 
capital, ‘knowledge judgement and will […] are faculties now required only for 
the workshop as a whole’, whilst:160 
for the worker himself no combination of activities takes place. The 
combination is rather a combination of the one-sided functions under 
which every worker or number of workers is subsumed, group by group. 
His function is one-sided, abstract, partial. The totality which is formed 
from this is based precisely on his merely partial existence and isolation in 
his separate function. It is therefore a combination of which he forms a 
part, but it depends on the fact that his labour is not combined.161 
This has the effect of strengthening and intensifying the real subsumption 
of labour initiated with simple co-operation, where capitalist relations of 
production constituted a merely ‘temporary connection’ between the elements of 
production, ‘a contiguity, which by the nature of things may easily be dissolved’. 
In that case, the domination of capital had not yet cemented itself as an 
indispensable technical mediation but rather emanated from the will and authority 
of the capitalist, but with the system of manufacture it begins to do so, because of 
the way in which workers are individually subsumed in their functions and 
connected to other workers only as ‘appendages’ to the workshop, as fragments of 
themselves that cease to function outside of it. This intensifies the conditions 
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under which the worker is isolated and dependant on their subsumption under 
capital: 
Originally he had to sell to the capitalist, instead of the commodity, the 
labour that produced the commodity, because he was not in possession of 
the objective conditions for the realisation of his labour capacity. Now he 
has to sell it because his labour capacity only continues to be labour 
capacity in so far as it is sold to capital. Thus he is now subsumed under 
capitalist production, has now fallen under the control of capital, no longer 
just because he lacks the means of labour, but because of his very labour 
capacity, the nature and manner of his labour; now capital has in its hands 
no longer just the objective conditions, but the social conditions of 
subjective labour, the conditions under which his labour continues to be 
labour at all.162 
So even though ‘the workers form the building blocks’ of the combined workshop 
it is not ‘subsumed under them as a united group’.163 Capital has been 
autonomised as the rational principle of the overall production process which 
‘confronts the workers as an external power, dominating and enveloping them, in 
fact as the power of capital itself and a form of its existence, under which they are 
individually subsumed, and to which their social relation of production 
belongs’.164 This inversion intensifies the degree to which real subsumption 
‘strips off the form of production for subsistence, and becomes production for 
trade’, the only barrier to which, given its indifference to individual needs, being 
‘the magnitude of the capital itself’.165 Here, the minimum level of capital needed 
to form a competitive enterprise begins to rise as the technical complexity of the 
single productive organism increases, further dwarfing the productive significance 
of the individual worker.166 In this way manufacture ‘is the first system to provide 
the materials and the impetus for industrial pathology’, although this pathology is 
only realised once the despotism of capitalist command begins to develop the 
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objective forms peculiar and adequate to the accumulation process of capital: 
machinery.167 
 
iii) Machinery and large-scale industry 
 
The material inversion, separation and integration characteristic of real 
subsumption – that proceeds on the basis the social relations introduced with 
labour’s formal subsumption and develops through the stages of co-operation and 
manufacture – achieve their apotheosis in large-scale industry based on 
machinery, the technical from of production most adequate to the valorisation of 
capital: 
The increase of the productive force of labour and the greatest possible 
negation of necessary labour is the necessary tendency of capital, as we 
have seen. The transformation of the means of labour into machinery is 
the realization of this tendency.168  
What distinguishes the stage of large-scale industry is the complete revolution it 
brings about in the instrument of labour, in the ‘practical object’ that mediates the 
metabolic transformation of nature, from tools (which are shared by both simple 
co-operation and manufacture, undergoing only minor modifications in the latter) 
to machinery: ‘once adopted into the production process of capital, the means of 
labour passes through different metamorphoses, whose culmination is the 
machine, or rather, an automatic system of machinery’.169 Machinery is not 
simply a larger or more complex tool, which would still require its operation to 
originate in a human source, but a self-moving mechanism which can perform its 
functions free of the limits of ‘the human frame’ (for example, the maximum 
number of implements operable or the maximum speed of working); ‘it is the 
machine which possesses skill and strength in place of the worker, is itself the 
virtuoso’.170 The entire technical paradigm of human civilisation accrued over 
millennia and culminating in the system of manufacture (the human as a ‘tool 
making animal’) is thereby superseded with machine production, which no longer 
seeks to refine a labour process based on human physical capacities but rather 
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harnesses vast forces of nature in order to function with a degree of power and 
scale inaccessible even through the co-ordinated cooperation of huge numbers of 
human labourers.  
In machinery this is achieved by developing the principle of a ‘rational’ 
division of labour designed to maximise the efficiency of the production process – 
that same principle underlying manufacture – but in a manner that surpasses the 
barriers set by its foundation in co-ordinated manual labour: 
Here we have again the co-operation by division of labour which is 
peculiar to manufacture, but now it appears as a combination of machines 
with specific functions. […] In manufacture, it is the workers who, either 
singly or in groups, must carry on each particular process with their 
manual implements. The worker has been appropriated by the process; but 
the process had previously to be adapted to the worker. This subjective 
principle of the division of labour no longer exists in production by 
machinery. Here the total process is examined objectively, viewed in and 
for itself, and analysed into its constitutive phases.171 
The scientific analysis of the labour process that accompanies industrial 
production is thereby liberated from an ‘anthropological schema’ of labour, 
objectifying in the means of production an entirely new rhythm and motion 
founded on the life process of capital rather than the worker.172 It transforms the 
workshop into the factory, ‘an automaton consisting of numerous mechanical and 
intellectual organs’, an ‘articulated system’ of processes and machines whose 
‘regulating principle’ is an ever perfected continuity of production, a drive to 
eliminate all interruptions to the labour process. 173 But this refinement of 
productivity is not done for intrinsically technical ends or to maximise the 
production of use-values for the sake of their consumption, but only insofar as it 
intensifies the objectification and appropriation of labour and nature by capital:  
Like every other instrument for increasing the productivity of labour, 
machinery is intended to cheapen commodities and, by shortening the part 
of the working day in which the worker works for himself, to lengthen the 
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other part, the part he gives to the capitalist for nothing. The machine is a 
means for producing surplus-value.174 
Whilst reducing necessary labour-time to an absolute minimum, machinery at 
the same time creates new means and incentives to extend the working day as 
far as possible, pushing absolute surplus-value production ‘to its uttermost 
limit’. Large-scale industry drives production away from natural or human 
temporalities and toward the unceasing, homogenous continuum of the time of 
accumulation. With its introduction at the end of the eighteenth century, Marx 
notes, ‘every boundary set by morality and nature, age and sex, day and night, 
was broken down.’175 
This occurs primarily by a further intensification of the abstraction and 
simplification of human labour introduced with manufacture. However, in this 
case this does not proceed by way of technical specialisation as it does in 
manufacture, but rather by its opposite, a generic ‘specialisation in passivity’ 
based on ‘completely simple labour’ characterised by ‘uniformity, emptiness and 
subordination to the machine’.176 Large-scale industry ‘robs the labour of its 
singularity’, reducing it to its most average, undifferentiated and replaceable 
quality, to the extent that it precipitates the mass employment of women and 
children through its abolition of skill and dexterity from the labour process.177 
‘Here the last remnant of the worker’s satisfaction in his own labour disappears, 
to be replaced by absolute indifference, which is itself conditioned by the labour’s 
lack of real content.'178 Because machinery does not require direct operation, but 
rather functions automatically and requires only ‘supplementary assistance’, the 
activity of the workforce becomes ‘determined and regulated on all sides by the 
movement of the machinery, and not the opposite’.179 The worker is displaced 
from the centre of the labour process to its margins by the system of machinery, 
‘cast merely as its conscious linkages’, overseeing its operation as ‘watchman and 
regulator’ rather than ‘chief actor’.180 By the same token, the principle of 
capitalist command, which seeks to ‘pump out’ the maximum quantity of effort 
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from labour-power in every moment of its use, not only emanates from the 
subjective relations between capitalist and worker but is objectively imprinted 
into the technical structure of the means of production themselves, as Kliman and 
McGlone argue:  
‘with machinery, it is no longer just competition in the market, the threat 
of unemployment, and the watchful eye of the foreman that force workers 
to produce according to [socially necessary labour time]; rather, the 
production process is designed such that the workers' activity must keep 
pace with the unyielding pace of the machine.’181  
Even without extending the working day machinery can increase the productivity 
of labour by dictating the pace of work, resulting in a ‘condensation of labour 
time, in which every part of the time increases its labour content’ and through 
which ‘the pores of time are so to speak shrunk through the compression of 
labour.’182 
All this occurs not simply in the neutral drive to increase material 
productivity, but bearing all the contradictions that the exploitation of labour by 
capital generates, and raising them to their highest degree. Whereas with formal 
subsumption the conditions of labour produce for the workers ‘an alien 
circumstance’, with the full realization of real subsumption under the factory 
system this ‘antithesis or alienation develops further, into an antagonistic 
contradiction’.183 The means of production themselves stand over living labour 
as an oppressive force, ‘animated by the drive to reduce to a minimum the 
resistance offered by man, that obstinate yet elastic barrier’.184 All of the 
productive powers embodied by machinery, as well as the system of scientific 
knowledge that is its basis, whilst serving to reduce necessary labour to a 
minimum suffer a ‘dialectical inversion’ with real subsumption such that both 
in practice and in their forms of appearance they confront the worker as 
‘weapons’ serving only to raise their exploitation and domination to the highest 
possible degree: 
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Here too past labour — in the automaton and the machinery moved by it 
— steps forth as acting apparently in independence of [living] labour, it 
subordinates labour instead of being subordinate to it, it is the iron man 
confronting the man of flesh and blood. The subsumption of his labour 
under capital — the absorption of his labour by capital — which lies in the 
nature of capitalist production, appears here as a technological fact. The 
keystone of the arch is complete. Dead labour has been endowed with 
movement, and living labour only continues to be present as one of dead 
labour’s conscious organs. The living connection of the whole workshop 
no longer lies here in cooperation; instead, the system of machinery forms 
a unity, set in motion by the prime motor and comprising the whole 
workshop, to which the living workshop is subordinated, in so far as it 
consists of workers. Their unity has thus taken on a form which is tangibly 
autonomous and independent of them.'185 
Large-scale industry thus represents the culminating form of capital’s social 
autonomisation and domination. It is no longer the individual producer-subjects 
who consciously regulate their metabolism with nature but the machine, whose 
scientific conception already guarantees the carrying out of labour on a 
capitalistic basis. The human is no longer the subject of production – the one who 
consciously gives form to the product – but has become the implement of 
capital’s own anticipatory conceptualisation.186 This conceptualisation becomes a 
specific area within the social division of labour, as science, design and 
technological innovation, or where it does persist within a single enterprise is 
nonetheless separated off from the direct labour involved in the production of 
concrete commodities, as the distinct activity of ‘research and development’.187 
                                                          
185 Marx, MECW vol. 34, pp. 29-30. 
186 'The combination of this labour appears just as subservient to and led by an alien will and an 
alien intelligence – having its animating unity elsewhere – as its material unity appears 
subordinate to the objective unity of the machinery, of fixed capital, which, as animated 
monster, objectifies the scientific  idea, and is in fact the coordinator, does not in any way relate  
to the individual worker as his instrument; but rather he himself  exists as an animated 
individual punctuation mark; as its living isolated accessory.’ Marx, Grundrisse, p. 470. 
187 ‘The full development of capital only takes place – or capital has only posited the mode of 
production corresponding to it – when the means of  labour is not merely formally determined 
as fixed capital but is superseded in  its immediate form, and fixed capital confronts labour 
within the production  process as machinery. The entire production process then appears no 
longer as subsumed under the immediate skill of the worker, but as technological application of 
science. Capital thus tends to impart a scientific character to production, and immediate labour 
is reduced to a mere moment of this process.’ Ibid, p. 699. 
179 
 
Through the ‘enormous development of scientific powers’ underlying industrial 
production workers become tendentially dispensable and replaceable (although of 
course industry also produces a hierarchy of workers and creates a class of 
technically skilled workers) as their capacity to labour and to resist is increasingly 
delimited by the preset modes of operation built into the system of machinery. It 
was in this sense that Marx suggested that ‘it would be possible to write a whole 
history of the inventions made since 1830 for the sole purpose of providing 
capital with weapons against working class revolt’.188 Castillo Mendoza 
emphasizes this, arguing that with machinery, ‘technique operates as an artefact 
of power subsumed as a mediation of the political in the factory, constituted in the 
structure most suitable to impose vigilance and discipline, and to neutralize the 
control of workers over work. In it, the workers now have ‘a social relation of 
production’ amongst themselves, and with the capitalist, in the organic interior of 
capital.’189 
 
Conclusion 
 
Through its subsumption of labour, capital ‘radically remoulds all its social and 
technological conditions’, dissolving and recomposing relations, practices and 
instrumental means in order to meet the demands of competitive valorisation and, 
ultimately, expanded reproduction.190 The exposition of formal, hybrid and real 
modes of this subsumption charts the various strategies and tendential process 
through which the capital relation, and the class domination that it sustains, attain 
a more concrete existence, a more effective subordination of labour and a deeper 
penetration into the material structure of the social reproduction process as a 
whole. From first appearing as an external and arbitrary mediation imposed upon 
producers from outside, or at the level of exchange, capitalist power develops into 
a ‘technological fact’, built into the labour process as its material presupposition 
and thereby displacing and diversifying the sources of class antagonism beyond 
the surface level of intersubjective (albeit ‘impersonal’, i.e., economic) social 
relations. But this distinction between forms is not an empiricist typology or 
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historical periodisation of different forms of production but an intensive 
conceptual differentiation regarding the modes in which capital’s exploitation and 
domination of labour’s productive activity can be structured, as well as the 
material and social effects that result from them.191 
We have seen how from its most subtle, formal incarnation right up to its 
most developed, real form, this subsumption functions through a dual figuration 
or form-determination. Firstly, there is the specific conjunction of accumulated 
historical acts, monetary and commodity forms, and the permanence of an entire 
legal-economic apparatus governing the circulatory mode in which wealth moves 
across society in the course of its reproduction. Taken all together these factors 
constitute the plane of economic representation upon which discrete elements are 
inscribed as alienable and commensurable property through their 
commodification and subsumption under the social forms of value. Secondly, 
there is a specific form-determination of production, both in terms of the social 
relations which govern it (capitalist command and direction of co-ordinated 
labour) and the objective-technical structure of labour process itself (from co-
operation to machinery). These two latter factors combined institute a dimension 
of direct subordination in the ‘hidden abode’ of production through which the 
realisation of labour is consciously regulated and refined as a means to valorise 
capital. 
The relation of capitalist subsumption is therefore constituted through the 
combination of two series of form-determining mechanisms that establish the 
presence and action of labour on two distinct but interconnected levels of social 
actuality – that of value (being) and that of capital (process). The two moments of 
figuration, occurring in exchange and production, mutually presuppose each other 
as the basic conditions of this subsumption and, crucially, whilst both are 
necessary, neither is sufficient for this subsumption without the other (hybrid 
forms in which capitalist control of production is indirect and supported by 
contextual socio-economic factors notwithstanding). This is something Diane 
Elson has argued with reference to Marx’s value theory: 
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The process of exploitation is actually a unity; and the money relations 
and labour process relations which are experienced as two discretely 
distinct kinds of relation, are in fact onesided reflections of particular 
aspects of this unity. Neither money relations nor labour process relations 
in themselves constitute capitalist exploitation; and neither one can be 
changed very much without accompanying changes in the other.192 
The unity of the two sets of relations binds together the ‘logical’ discourse of 
formal metamorphoses in circulation (M-C-M’) with the ‘materialist’ discourse of 
metabolic synthesis in production underlying the movement expressed in the first, 
to constitute the realisation and expansion of capitalist exploitation.193 
In the first instance commodification and wage relations are necessary for 
labour’s formal alienation as labour-power (the transition which forms the basis 
for the transformation of money into capital and the possibility of surplus-value) 
and incorporation into capital as variable capital, property of the capitalist. As 
Marx states, ‘without the exchange of variable capital for labour-power the total 
capital could not valorize itself and so the formation of capital and the 
transformation of the means of production and means of subsistence could not 
take place’.194 This first (circulatory) form-determination, in the unity of its 
moments, ‘is an inescapable condition for capital, a condition posited by its own 
nature, since circulation is the passing of capital through the various conceptually 
determined moments of its necessary metamorphosis – its life process.’195 Equally 
however, the production process is necessary for purchased labour-power to 
valorise capital by objectifying itself in a commodity product. So once under the 
                                                          
192 Diane Elson, ‘The Value Theory of Labour’, p. 172. 
193 As Kant argued, the possibility of a subsumptive relation between two heterogeneous elements 
or orders depends on their schematic adaptation, their mediation through a third thing common to 
them both. The dialectical character of this process exceeds mere inclusion or the nominal 
exteriority of what is simply ‘not-yet’ subsumed. This is what the ‘secret’ of schematic synthesis 
proved in Kant’s thought: that inclusion, or representation under a concept, only grasps the 
completed subsumptive procedure from the standpoint of its conceptualised result, but that this 
alone is tautological. The very thing to be explained is the possibility of a logical identity between 
heterogeneous elements, hence the need for a theory of mediation and synthesis, that is, the 
formation of the manifold according to the concept. Marx too grasps this and his account of the 
subsumption of labour in production is precisely a dialectical account of subsumption and 
synthesis – the valorisation process and the labour process – in which the formation of labour (in 
the sense of ‘activity’) by capital determines the fact and degree of its value productivity. 
Crucially, Marx recognises that this process of synthetic formation is not unilateral and that 
capitalist command is required to negate the independent subjectivity of a commodity with 
‘variable’ effects, this struggle is exactly what gives rise to the dynamic of subsumption. 
194 Marx, ‘Results’, p. 1017. 
195 Marx, Grundrisse, p. 658. 
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command of the capitalist variable capital is used up in order to generate the 
surplus which can then be accumulated. It is only through this process that the 
variable capital – labour – acts as capital, which is to say, is functionally 
determined as a moment of its valorisation process, subsumed under it. Because 
of the privileged function assigned to the exploitation of labour within the 
capitalist economy, the productive capacity of the labour process is of paramount 
concern for individual capitals in their competitive development. So even though, 
from the standpoint of circulation, ‘the production process appears simply as an 
unavoidable middle term, a necessary evil for the purpose of money-making’, the 
material configuration of the production process becomes one of the most 
intensive sites in which the effects of capitalist domination manifest 
themselves.196 It is precisely here that we find the second moment of (material) 
form-determination.  
These two phases of figuration are therefore intertwined as the constitutive 
poles of capitalist production as a whole – i.e., the total process (Gesamtprozeß) 
of expanded reproduction implicit in the capitalist social relation – each one 
acting as the necessary mediation of the other. In addition, or rather, as a result, 
they constitute the two levels of form-determination which are bound together and 
reproduced as the basis of capitalist power: commodification and alienation in 
circulation, and subjection and exploitation in production. They are the two basic 
aspects of capitalist domination and the two modalities of form-determination, 
both equally essential to its functioning. Capitalist subsumption must therefore be 
grasped comprehensively as a process that unfolds across both the sphere of 
economic objectivity and the sphere of practical objectivity tied together by a 
single unified relation of reproduction. The internal correlation of the two series 
which structures and regulates the social process as it unfolds in practice is the 
basis for the ongoing division and composition of the social totality, the 
distribution of resources and labour power across various branches and, with the 
increasing socialisation of labour, of the integration of reproductive practices 
within a single world market. This is entirely consistent with the double-character 
of the subsumptive procedure in its ‘critical-philosophical’ version, as an 
operation that functions to both individuate elements and bring them under the 
                                                          
196 Marx, Capital vol. 2, p. 137. 
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subsuming order, and at the same time give them unity within that order, insofar 
as it designates the structural logic of the compositional totality within which they 
are situated. 
It is vital to note, however, that there is no inherent unity between 
commodity exchange and labour outside of their historically specific capitalist 
articulation.197 For Marx ‘the labour process as such has nothing to do with the act 
of purchasing the labour capacity on the part of the capitalist’, whilst at the same 
time, ‘the concept of the commodity in and for itself excludes labour as 
process’.198 And yet the two moments presuppose one another insofar as taken 
together they form the ‘life-process’ of capital, which involves the constant 
movement of values between production and circulation, between the ‘positing’ 
of surplus-value in the former and its realisation in the latter. They are not simply 
bound together in mutual indifference, but ‘constantly run into one another and 
interpenetrate, and in this way their distinguishing features are continuously 
blurred’.199 The unity of these two moments of subsumption – corresponding to 
exchange and production, subsumption of labour to the commodity and value, and 
subsumption to capital and the valorisation process – therefore constitutes the 
distinctive synthesis of the capitalist social relation, and the articulation through 
which the labour process is determined practically as ‘for capital’, as a moment of 
its own being ‘which proceeds within its substance and forms its content’.200 
Crucially, the tendency of capitalist subsumption instituted materially with 
labour’s real subsumption is to guarantee the reciprocity of exchange and 
production through a progressive adequation and adaptation of the two moments 
such that each becomes increasingly inherent and integral to the other’s 
functioning, reinforcing their overall dynamic. Capitalist production intensifies 
commodification and capitalist circulation drives the development of subsumption 
in production. The initial indifference of commodity exchange and the labour 
process is thus progressively negated as their unity within the capitalist social 
relation becomes a social and material fact imprinted in their inner structure.  
                                                          
197 As Banaji argues, ‘by late antiquity, both wage-labour and capital (the basic elements of the 
capitalist mode of production) were fully formed but that their conjunction was much less 
obvious. It took another five centuries before something like a capitalist system began to 
emerge in the Mediterranean.’ Theory as History, p. 130. 
198 Marx, MECW vol. 30, pp. 65-6; vol. 34 p. 71. 
199 Marx, Capital vol. 3, p. 135 (translation modified). 
200 Marx, Grundrisse, p. 304. 
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But even within the terms of the articulation specified by this distinctive 
synthesis, the correlation of the two spheres is not fixed but in a perpetual process 
of contestation and transformation. This transformative dynamic is immanent to 
the logic of subsumption itself, which, even with its culmination in real 
subsumption, does not mark the ‘completion’ of a transition but rather installs a 
program of ‘complete (and constantly repeated) revolution’ in the social and 
material conditions of the reproduction process. In this sense, the relation between 
the forms of subsumption cannot be contained within the reductive framework of 
an evolutionary, ‘internalist’ conception of necessary stages experienced by each 
and every individual capital (and giving rise to an impoverished framework of 
more or less ‘developed’ capitals and regions). Rather, the way in which the 
process of subsumption unfolds across the spheres of production and circulation 
constitutes a fluid dynamic (of which the forms would be contemporaneous 
moments) capable of realising itself on a social scale with radically diverse local 
results. So whilst Marx’s analysis of subsumption forms is limited to the terms of 
a single production process, even in spite of the constitutive character of exchange 
relations, it is clear that the conditions of subsumption in production and, indeed, 
of their unity with capital’s circulatory conditions, is the unity-in-indifference of 
multiple competing capitals. This presents the necessity of thinking subsumption 
on a social scale, or at the level of these multiple processes, all of which have 
their unity within the reproductive framework of society as a total structure-in-
process. This throws up new problems regarding the conceptualisation of 
capitalist subsumption, new forms and contradictions emerging from the conflict 
between capital and labour conceived ‘globally’, and inscribes the theory of 
subsumption within the critical context of an open process of historical 
development. 
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4. From Schema to Dynamic 
 
Throughout the presentation of Capital Marx necessarily poses the 
oppositions and contradictions within the unity of ‘capital-in-
general’ but finds himself pointing beyond the structure of this 
work, moving tangentially to its theoretical line of development. 
Repeatedly, rupture, dislocation and crisis appear, but are 
premature. They are foreclosed; confined to being immanent 
moments for a fresh enquiry. Yet Marx’s dialectic must be open, it 
cannot be confined to an identity of difference like that of Hegel. 
The tangential moments of Capital must be bent back together to 
form a new presentation. But this lies beyond Capital itself; it 
underlies its incompleteness, and thus the incompleteness of 
Marx.1 
 
If production has a capitalist form, so too will reproduction.2 
 
The account of capitalist subsumption found in Marx’s writings outlines a theory 
of the synthetic structure, conflictual character and developmental tendency 
immanent to the production process of capital. Through the subsumption of living 
labour under the commodity-form and the labour process under the command and 
logic of the valorisation process, capital appropriates and directs – first ‘socially’ 
and then ‘materially’ – the form-determining capacity of human praxis in its 
metabolism with nature. In doing so capital shapes this metabolism according to 
its own interests both quantitatively (in the duration and intensity of labour) and 
qualitatively (in the technical organisation and objective telos of the metabolism). 
With its culmination in ‘real subsumption’, this synthesis establishes a 
transformative dynamic that not only modifies the technical basis of the labour 
process but also, as its mediated result, sets in motion a revolutionary 
recomposition of the social reproduction process that affects its historical 
development in a decisive manner. It is to this that Marx and Engels refer when 
they famously declare in their Manifesto that ‘the bourgeoisie cannot exist 
                                                          
1 Felton C. Shortall, The Incomplete Marx, Aldershot: Avebury, 1994, p. 467. 
2 Marx, Capital vol. 1, p. 711. 
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without constantly revolutionising the instruments of production, and thereby the 
relations of production, and with them the whole relations of society’.3 At the core 
of Marx’s theory of subsumption, then, a fundamental connection is posited 
between the immanent tendency of capitalist production (its synthetic ‘logic’ of 
form-determination) and the reproduction and development of capitalist society 
(its ‘history’ or ‘real movement’). This corresponds directly to the second 
problematic associated with the critical concept of subsumption: the constitutive 
relation between the discrete acts of subsumptive form-determination and the 
compositional totality within which those acts occur. It is at the level of this 
relation that Marx’s profound theoretical breakthrough occurs in relation to the 
thought of subsumption, allowing him to grasp the effects and actuality of 
capitalist social forms without overdetermining them with reference to a closed 
structure of composition (be it ‘reciprocal’ as in Kant, or speculatively totalised as 
in Hegel). However, insofar as Marx presents the dynamic of the subsumption-
forms in the linear mode of an abstract-logical progression, a number of 
fundamental ambiguities arise concerning how this tendency is actualised 
concretely and how it is thereby integrated into the historical unfolding of the 
double movement – reproduction-development – that characterizes the social 
process (as established at the close of chapter 2). The Brighton Labour Process 
Group highlighted this in 1977, noting that on the one hand ‘the relation between 
capital and labour, at a general social level, cannot be derived from, or reduced to, 
the capital-labour relation within production’, whilst on the other, ‘the actual 
structure of the [labour] process is not historically determined by the abstract 
logic of capital accumulation, since capitalist production relations can only be 
reproduced as a totality of social relations’.4 If we cannot map the dynamic of 
subsumption onto a historical or systematic account of the total social process in 
any direct or schematic way then further mediations are required to render its 
effects intelligible at a social level. But if it is a case of ‘holding them fast at the 
beginning’ in order to make their ‘development possible without confounding 
everything’ (as it is with wages) or of later correcting ‘the idealist manner of the 
presentation, which makes it seem as if it were merely a matter of conceptual 
                                                          
3 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, ‘Manifesto of the Communist Party’ [1848], in MECW Vol. 6, 
p. 487. 
4 Brighton Labour Process Group, ‘The Labour Process’, Capital & Class 1, 1977, pp. 23-4. 
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determinations and of the dialectic of these concepts’, then that further 
development and correction is conspicuously absent in Marx’s own writings, 
blocking the way to a richer conceptualisation of the process of capitalist 
domination and social recomposition in its ‘fluid’ motion.5 
The insufficiency of Marx’s account has two principal aspects, each of 
which generates a distinct although related set of problems which have shaped 
subsequent attempts to think subsumption socially and historically.  
Firstly, subsumption is considered by Marx only ‘generically’ in relation 
to an individual production process, that is, in terms of the antagonistic command 
relation between capital and labour in production. So although, for example, both 
competition and the reproduction of labour-power are invoked functionally by 
Marx in order to explain the mechanisms driving the dynamic of subsumption, the 
impact of these (and other) factors in determining how the dynamic actualises 
itself on a social level, where multiple capitals and modes of exploitation are 
combined, as well as how that actualisation in turn shapes those factors, are left 
external to the theory.6 It thus opens the way for uncertainty surrounding the 
relation between the abstract dynamic of the subsumption-forms and their spatial 
and historical distribution and interaction, resulting in a number of readings which 
crudely project Marx’s logical exposition of the forms onto linear schemas of 
historical development. 
Secondly, Marx’s comments on subsumption bear the mark of a wider 
discursive tension present in Capital in that they are developed from the internal 
standpoint of capital’s accumulation process. So whilst subsumption marks the 
crucial moment of integration/resistance through which not only production but 
society as a whole is recomposed, if this is grasped from just one pole of the 
capital-labour contradiction in an idealist fashion, solely as a moment of capital’s 
‘systematic dialectic’, the complex mediating role of the subsumptive moment is 
reduced to a logical residue, a passive artefact of capital’s ‘spontaneous’ progress. 
This lends itself to a functionalist reduction of class struggle and social 
reproduction and an economistic, capital-centric account of historical 
                                                          
5 Marx, Grundrisse, p. 817; p. 151. 
6 On Marx’s abstract treatment of competition see Michael Heinrich, ‘Reconstruction or 
Deconstruction?’, p. 82; for one account Marx’s incomplete treatment of the reproduction of 
labour-power see Michael A. Lebowitz, Beyond Capital: Marx’s Political Economy of the 
Working Class (2nd ed.), London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003. 
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development that attenuate the critical deconstructive core of Marx’s wider 
theoretical-revolutionary project. At the outset of the previous chapter I noted 
Marx’s seeming ambivalence toward the concept of subsumption, and the 
instability of its role within his critique of political economy. In this context, 
Marx’s vacillation and ultimate repression of the concept can be seen as 
symptomatic of the tension in which the discourse of subsumption sits with 
respect to the dialectical structure of Capital, the former constituting a shift of 
perspective on capitalist power and exploitation that disrupts the ‘organic unity’ 
of the latter’s categorial system.7 
Taken together, these two spaces of ambiguity produced by the 
abstractness of Marx’s linear form-exposition constitute a significant theoretical 
problem, and not merely one to be resolved empirically. In what follows I attempt 
to extend and develop Marx’s insights into the subsumption of labour by capital 
(reconstructed in the previous chapter) in a non-linear and non-economistic 
manner open to the highly complex dynamic of antagonism that grounds the 
concrete development and effects of the process of subsumption at a ‘social scale’ 
(i.e. at the level of ‘reproduction-development’). This involves re-orienting the 
perspective on subsumption found in Marx such that the contradictory articulation 
and ongoing conflict over the form-determination of social being takes theoretical 
precedence over the dialectic of capitalist accumulation in its systematic totality, 
thereby undoing the tendential or ‘provisional’ closure effected in Capital (a 
closure in which social reproduction, understood in the broadest sense, is only 
registered as a moment of capital’s accumulation process, because of Marx’s 
treatment of capital as an ‘organic system’).8 In order to do so, I first problematize 
                                                          
7 In this sense, the discourse of subsumption runs asymmetrically to this systematic progression of 
economic categories. As Patrick Murray notes, the ‘Results of the Immediate Production Process’ 
in which Marx expounds one of his richest accounts of capitalist subsumption, ‘does not advance 
the dialectical train of reasoning in Capital.’ Murray, ‘The place of ‘The results of the immediate 
production process’ in Capital’, p. 173.  
8 The problem of closure is broadly to do with the analytic relation between ‘system’ or ‘logic’ 
and ‘history’ or ‘totality’ as I will explore further below. As Albritton summarizes: ‘The issue of 
levels of analysis continually comes up in Capital itself, but Marx never actually formulates such a 
conception, and hence leaves completely open the question of how to relate the theory of capital's 
inner logic to the history of capitalism. Often Marx moves from one level to another […] without 
signalling the reader. Marx's use of many expressions in his struggle to differentiate the theory of 
capital's inner logic from more concrete levels of analysis, indicates that he never came to grips 
with this problem. Some of the contrasts that are to be found in the three volumes of Capital are: 
«the inner nature of capital versus competition», «the ideal average versus actual movement of 
competition», «basic forms versus special study of competition», «general character versus 
detailed forms», «general analysis of capital versus competition», and «general structure of capital 
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a number of strategies for conceptualising the dynamic of subsumption in a 
socially comprehensive manner which have been proposed within Marxist theory. 
These positions, I argue, reinstate or consolidate such a closure, dissolving the 
critical-deconstructive character of the theory by collapsing reproduction into 
production, either diachronically (via historical totalisation) or synchronic (via 
systematic totalisation). Overcoming the conceptual, empirical and interpretive 
weaknesses underlying these perspectives requires treating the relation between 
process of subsumption in production/circulation and the other spheres of social 
reproduction in an experimental fashion that resists any pre-determined closure or 
finality. This is key not only insofar as those other spheres react back upon 
production as its determining conditions, but also in so far as they constitute 
further, necessary sites in which capitalist subsumption unfolds, something 
Alberto Castillo Mendoza has highlighted: 
subsumption appears as an expression of a global process that cannot be 
reduced to the incorporation of labour, science, technology, etc., but rather 
many other dimensions – cultural, political, etc., will be established as 
conditions for the reproduction of capitalist society or come to form an 
active part of the composition itself of capital in order to assist its 
movement in the expansive articulation “production/reproduction” of 
surplus value. All this brings with it both the complex subsumption of 
individuals in the social division of labour, with its deepening as 
subsumption in the class structure and in dominant ideas, and its necessary 
and strategic articulation with the system of private property, the 
structuring of the state, the development of productive forces, the 
generalization of exchange and the consolidation of large-scale industry. 
Furthermore, this weave of articulations serves, not only to enhance each 
one of the mechanisms, alluded to in their specificity, but, above all, to 
reinforce the socio-structuring implication of the subsumption of 
                                                                                                                                                              
versus concrete detail». […] the theory of capital's inner logic is the mere tip of the iceberg so to 
speak with respect to a complete study of capitalism.’ Robert Albritton, ‘Returning to Marx's 
"Capital": a Critique of Lebowitz's "Beyond Capital"’, History of Economic Ideas, Vol. 11 (3), 
2003, p. 97. 
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individuals under the logic of a social organization regulated by the 
indispensable and permanent valorization of capital.9 
Such a ‘weave of articulations’ is the horizon of a comprehensive theory of 
capitalist subsumption, as the regulatory and transformative action of capital upon 
the reproduction of society in its totality. Orienting the theory adequately toward 
this horizon poses the necessity of going both extensively beyond the analysis of 
subsumption in exchange/production, as well as intensively into the 
interconnection and development of subsumption forms at ever more concrete 
levels of the reproductive process, implying an ongoing engagement with a vast 
range of empirical, historical and theoretical materials.10 The aim of this chapter 
is far narrower than that demanded by such an endeavour and proceeds critically, 
aiming to undermine closed, schematic readings of the dynamic of subsumption 
and arguing that it should instead function as a critical framework for conducting 
further research. In this latter sense subsumption has a unique role due its crucial 
mediating function within capitalist society given that it marks the point of 
antagonism at which divergent logics of form compete to determine the course of 
social reproduction. Finally I set out two basic co-ordinates through which 
subsumption can be theorised in relation to the production/reproduction 
relationship, focusing firstly on the formation of subjectivity and secondly on the 
political form of reproduction and the question of the state. 
 
Historicity and closure 
 
It is necessary to consider the dynamic of labour’s subsumption by capital beyond 
the immediate production process and instead as a process that traverses and 
interpenetrates the movement of social reproduction on multiple levels and in 
diverse ways. In the course of twentieth century Marxism the problematic of how 
to think this extension was posed, but in almost every case in a manner that 
entirely absorbed it into and overdetermined it by a secondary problematic, that of 
historical transition or the historicity of ‘capitalism’, with the effect of seriously 
                                                          
9 Carlos Alberto Castillo Mendoza, ‘Notas introductorias sobre subsunción del trabajo en el 
capital’, p. 9. 
10 For a recent exchange the adopts this orientation see Das, ‘Reconceptualising Capitalism’ and 
Gilbert L. Skillman, ‘Production Relations in Agrarian Capitalist Development: A Comment on 
Das (2012)’, Review of Radical Political Economics (online), November 27, 2015: 
http://rrp.sagepub.com/content/early/2015/11/25/0486613415616212.full.pdf+html 
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distorting the reception of the concept of capitalist subsumption and undermining 
its critical force. Whilst these two problematics must indeed be thought together if 
an adequate response to either is to be constructed, the weakness of such 
approaches is that they have thought them together in the mode of an unmediated 
logical identity, rather than a complex – and crucially, underdetermined – 
interrelation. In this way, the dynamic of subsumption and more specifically the 
transition from ‘formal’ to ‘real’ subsumption was and indeed continues to be 
deployed as the basis for constructing a periodisation of ‘capitalism’ and its 
political landscape. In its most general and ‘benign’ form this simply collapses 
into a crude empiricism of social forms concerned with where the lines between 
the ‘formal’ and ‘real’ epochs to be drawn: 1848, 1914, 1968? Or what criteria 
can be singled out as the marker of this monumental transition: The end of the 
gold standard, the rise of communication technologies, ‘post-fordism’, etc... 
These are largely inconclusive and yet interminable debates. In its more extreme 
and better known variant, however, this thesis has generated the theoretically 
problematic and empirically dubious, if nonetheless provocative, diagnosis that 
asserts the historical completion or totalisation of the dynamic of subsumption, 
not just in the sphere of the traditionally conceived workplace but across the full 
compass of human life, penetrating the realms of culture, leisure, education, affect 
and sociality as such. I take Theodor Adorno’s model of ‘total administration’ and 
Antonio Negri’s account of the ‘real and total subsumption of labour’ as the 
exemplars and historical precedents of this tendency.11 In both, the concept of 
subsumption is deployed in order to characterize the particular mode of capitalist 
domination in the present period as total in its colonization of the social world or 
life of humanity; a vision of complete integration in which any exteriority of 
(living) labour to capitalist command has been dissolved. This is a tendency that 
continues to hold currency in Marxist literature, as evinced in a passage from 
Frederic Jameson’s recent book on volume one of Capital in which he re-
articulates his earlier conception of postmodernity within the conceptual 
terminology of subsumption. He refers to the present as: 
                                                          
11 Theodor W. Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, translated by Robert Hullot-Kentor, London: Athlone, 
1997, p. 17; Negri, ‘Crisis of the Crisis-State’ [1980], in Revolution Retrieved: Selected Writings 
on Marx, Keynes, Capitalist Crisis and New Social Subjects 1967-1983, translated by Ed Emery 
and John Merrington, London: Red Notes, 1988, p. 95. Another early, although less influential 
example of this tendency is Jacque Camatte’s Capital and Community [1976], translated by David 
Brown, London: Unpopular Books, 1988. 
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a stage of ‘subsumption’ in which the extra-economic or social no 
longer lies outside capital and economics but has been absorbed into it 
[...] Where everything has been subsumed under capitalism, there is no 
longer anything outside it.12 
Jameson’s words are a symptomatic of the degree to which this thought has 
become an unconscious cultural orthodoxy in leftist theory.13 As Stewart Martin 
points out, if the vision of life’s subsumption is not always adopted 
unequivocally, it is at least ‘plausible to consider it as the regulative idea of a 
number of theories of late capitalism.’14 
Antonio Negri is responsible for producing perhaps the most notorious 
and problematic variant of this ‘totalised’ account of capitalist subsumption, 
which went on to become established as a central tenet of the ‘post-Operaista’ 
paradigm that would be continued in his own influential work with Hardt and 
developed by Virno and Lazzarato in conjunction with the concept of ‘immaterial 
labour’. The emergence and development of Negri's reading is best contextualised 
with a sensitivity to the conjunctural significance of the revolutionary experiences 
of 60s and 70s Italy.15 There are two lines of thought derived from the 
‘Operaismo’ which developed immanently to that experience that are crucial to 
Negri’s account of subsumption. First, the so-called ‘Copernican turn’ which, in 
                                                          
12 Frederic Jameson, Representing Capital: A Reading of Volume One, London and New York: 
Verso, 2011, p.71. 
13 So much so that Harry Harootunian lambasts it as a ‘a familiar story in cultural studies, a staple 
of current accounts among Marxists and non-Marxists alike that has become a classic cultural 
cliché’, whilst simultaneously reproducing its premise: that the concept of real subsumption 
corresponds to ‘capitalism as a completed totality’. Marx After Marx: History and Time in the 
Expansion of Capitalism, New York: Columbia University Press, 2015, introduction.   
14 Stewart Martin, ‘Pedagogy of Human Capital’, Mute Magazine, Vol. 2 (8), 2008, p. 38. Whether 
formulated in the framework of subsumption, postmodernity or otherwise, such pronouncements 
tend to gravitate around iconic moments of defeat for the left in its historic forms, particularly ’68 
and ’89. E.g., for Negri: ‘May ’68 is not simply an important date in terms of the student revolt or 
the emergence of new intellectual or moral desires within the intermediate classes of society; it is 
also a moment of extraordinary significance, above all in terms of the realization of capitalist 
domination of society; in other words, in terms of real subsumption.’, ‘N for Negri: Antonio Negri 
in Conversation with Carles Guerra’, edited and translated by Jorge Mestre et al., Grey Room 11, 
Spring 2003, p. 105; This chronology has been reproduced recently by Jason Read, The Micro-
Politics of Capital: Marx and the Prehistory of the Present, Albany: SUNY Press, 2003, p.137. 
15 For a contextualisation of those struggles and their impact upon the formation of workerist and 
post-workerist thought see: Steve Wright, Storming Heaven: Class Composition and Struggle in 
Italian Autonomist Marxism, London, Pluto, 2002; Finn Bowring, ‘From the mass worker to the 
multitude: A theoretical contextualisation of Hardt and Negri's Empire’, Capital & Class 28 (2), 
Summer 2004, pp. 101-132; Alberto Toscano, ‘Chronicles of Insurrection: Tronti, Negri and the 
Subject of Antagonism’, Cosmos and History, Vol 5 (1), 2009, pp. 76-91. Mario Tronti, ‘Our 
Operaismo’, New Left Review 73, January/February 2012: https://newleftreview.org/II/73/mario-
tronti-our-operaismo. 
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the face of ‘extreme left-wing militancy and rapid industrial expansion', inverted 
capital’s traditional theoretical privilege as the active force driving historical 
change.16 For the ‘Operaisti’ it was the intransigence of the working class that 
propelled the movement of society, forcing capital to continually develop social 
and technical strategies in order to retain its grip over labour’s productive but 
resistant energies. This is what grounds the dynamic of progression from formal 
to real subsumption for Negri. Second was the transition from the concepts ‘mass 
worker’ and ‘social capital’ to the ‘social factory’ and ‘social worker’. The 
political engagement of Tronti, Negri and others in early 60s had led to the 
identification of the mass worker as the ‘class-protagonist’ emerging at the nexus 
of Taylorism, Fordism, Keynesianism and ‘the planner state’.17 But following the 
intense economic and political turmoil of the following two decades the 
conditions of struggle were perceived to have changed to the extent that a new 
form of political subjectivity was operative; one based not solely on conflicts 
played out on the factory floor, but rather whose antagonism with capital ‘covers 
all the time of life, and invests all of its regions’.18 Negri’s account carries Marx’s 
prognosis of the progressive socialisation of both capital and the worker to the 
point at which their antagonistic relation, classically thought of as limited to the 
point of production, is ‘totalised’ with ‘the real subsumption of world society 
under capital’.19 
  For Negri, then, the period of ‘real subsumption’ marks a new phase of 
intensity in capitalist class relations, one in which ‘capital constitutes society’ 
directly, because ‘the mechanism of the production and reproduction of labour 
power is wholly internal to capital.’20 As he describes it, real subsumption 
is a hegemony of capital without limits. Here the form of capitalist 
production has intervened in and occupied every space in society. Society 
itself has been converted into a factory. The walls of the central factory 
have come down, so to speak, and the whole of society has been invaded 
                                                          
16 Bowring, ‘From the mass worker to the multitude’, p. 104. 
17 Negri, ‘Archaeology and Project: The Mass Worker and the Social Worker’ [1982], in 
Revolution Retrieved, pp. 102-114. 
18 Negri, ‘The Constitution of Time’ [1981], In Time for Revolution, London and New York: 
Continuum, 2003, p. 28. 
19 Negri, Marx Beyond Marx: Lessons on the Grundrisse [1979], translated by Harry Cleaver, 
Michael Ryan and Maurizio Viano, London: Automedia/Pluto, 1991, p. 121 (my emphasis). 
20 Ibid, p. 114; ‘Interview with Toni Negri’ [1980], in Revolution Retrieved, p. 126. 
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by the factory regime and, consequently, by a generalized disciplinary 
regime. This subsumption is, precisely, a real subsumption of society by 
capital; society is configured in a disciplinary way through the 
development of the capitalist system. This is the situation in which we 
have found ourselves since the middle of the twentieth century.21 
This position, developed most comprehensively in two texts written whilst Negri 
was imprisoned in the early 80s, ‘The Constitution of Time’ and ‘Archaeology 
and Project’, is theoretically premised on ‘the breakdown of the regulatory 
principles of capitalist development’, the fundamental mediations of the capital-
labour relation as conceived of by Marx: ‘the market; value; the division between 
production and reproduction, etc.’22 More specifically, the possibility of a direct 
confrontation staged between ‘social capital’ and the ‘social worker’ arises from 
the ‘dialectical resolution’ or ‘complete realization’ of the law of value, which in 
Marx’s account (whose validity Negri consigns to a historical past) integrates the 
two essential moments of capitalist domination – exchange and production – by 
regulating the multitude of individual transactions and productive activities 
carried out across the social body. Enucleating the value-theoretical core of 
Marx’s theory of capital means, most significantly for Negri’s account, that time 
as measure no longer mediates the exploitation of labour. This principle, which 
for Marx not only regulates the economy but motivates every transformation in 
the structure of capitalist production (extension of the working day, introduction 
of machinery, replacement of fixed capital, etc.) dissolves, because the distinction 
upon which it is based, that between value and use-value, no longer holds: ‘there 
is no longer an external vantage point upon which use value’ i.e., the sphere of 
concrete needs and capacities ‘can depend’.23 Through ‘the complete socialisation 
and abstraction of all the productive and reproductive segments of labour’, labour 
is rendered ‘materially homogenous’ and thus ‘immeasurable’, eliminating the 
quality/quantity opposition through which it is commodified and thus related to 
capital. But although their classical ground is thereby abolished, capitalist 
command and exploitation do not disappear for Negri, they are rather transposed 
                                                          
21 Negri, ‘N for Negri’, p. 105. 
22 Negri, ‘Archaeology and Project’, p. 114 
23 Negri, ‘The Constitution of Time’, p. 25. This is a well-worn trope of post-modern theory, but is 
also reproduced in a number of guises within Marxism, e.g., in Tomba, Marx’s Temporalities: 
‘Value has supplanted use-value, such that the individual no longer experiences use-value, but 
rather value and the status that value confers.’ pp. 61-2.   
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onto a level of social immanence such that the whole of society now functions as 
a productive totality internal to capital, without any exogenous source of 
antagonism: 
‘The capitalist supersession of the law of value — what Marx calls the 
process of real subsumption — dislocates the relations of exploitation as a 
whole. It transforms exploitation into a global social relation. […] What 
does it mean to struggle against capital when capital has subjugated all of 
lived time, not only that of the working day, but all, all of it. Reproduction 
is like production, life is like work.’24 
 The divergences from Marx’s own views on real subsumption are vast 
here, but it is the collapse of production and reproduction into one another, such 
that they are ‘now in parallel and on equal terms’, that poses the greatest problem 
in Negri’s account.25 By projecting the dynamic of subsumption, which in Marx is 
restricted to the analytic level of the immediate production process of an 
individual capital, directly onto the social totality in its historical development, 
and simultaneously announcing its completion (a paradox we will come to 
shortly) the determining presence of the value-form and its circulatory 
mechanisms are repudiated as an anachronistic artefact of a bygone cycle of 
struggle. Consequently, Negri lapses into a theoretical ‘productivism’ in which 
the moment of economic mediation central to Marx’s thought is jettisoned and a 
logic of domination specific to the production process is applied wholesale to the 
social totality: ‘the real subsumption of labor can't but be (in the same moment) 
real subsumption of society’ which is also to say that it has ‘become the 
production of that same society.’26 But how, then, is ‘the exploitation of society 
under the control of capital’ structured, if not according to the commodification 
and temporal measure of labour?27 Negri may well assign this breakdown to 
historical conditions rather than his own theoretical decision, rhetorically asking 
‘when the entire time of life has become the time of production, who measures 
whom?’, but as Dauve and Nesic wryly point out, actually existing capitalist 
practices do not conform to this picture: ‘Managers know their Marx better than 
                                                          
24 Negri, Marx Beyond Marx, xvi. 
25 Negri, ‘Archaeology and Project’, p. 114. 
26 Negri, Marx Beyond Marx,  p. 124. 
27 Negri, ‘Archaeology and Project’, p. 113.                                
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Toni Negri — they keep tracing and measuring productive places and moments to 
try and rationalise them more and more’.28 
As I argued in the previous chapter, it is only through the inner unity of 
production and exchange that labour’s subsumption under capital functions, that 
is, both formally and durationally. It is in light of this that the contradictions of 
Negri’s historicist take on real subsumption become manifest, and reveal the 
limits of his productivist ontology. Negri leapfrogs over the necessity of this 
relation by simultaneously holding two seemingly incompatible positions on real 
subsumption: that it is both ‘real and total’.29 In doing so he places its status as 
subsumption in doubt. Logically speaking, as Hegel established and Marx 
recognised, a relation of subsumption is a dialectically unresolved relation that 
remains stuck in an abstract opposition of universal and particular without passing 
over into a higher unity (this is precisely what makes subsumption inadequate in 
Hegel’s dialectical development of the concept and perfectly adequate in Marx’s 
description of the capital-labour relation).30 Negri seems to grasp the paradox of 
an accomplished subsumption, if only in a single passage, written in 1972: 
Marx made certain predictions regarding advanced capitalist development; 
he described lucidly the moment in which the law of value would come to 
be extinguished and labour would be no longer subsumed but formally 
suppressed within capitalist command. All this is now present reality.31 
The paradoxical apotheosis and completion of labour’s subsumption reveals itself 
to in fact mark the transition out of subsumption to capital and into suppression 
within ‘command’ as the form of domination characterizing contemporary 
capitalist power for Negri. Because value – more precisely competition over 
surplus-value – is no longer the organisational logic guiding production, Negri 
                                                          
28 Negri, ‘The Constitution of Time’, p. 29; Gilles Dauvé & Karel Nesic, ‘Love of Labour? Love 
of Labour Lost…’ [2002], translated by Endnotes, in Endnotes 1, p. 135. Negri, however, is 
unperturbed by such objections: ‘While it is evident that this kind of discourse [of real 
subsumption] entails excessively sweeping generalizations in terms of the examples or ideas put 
forward as models, and any number of objections can be raised with respect to these, it is 
nevertheless the case that we are dealing with objections that serve to enrich the framework 
without invalidating it as a whole.’ ‘N for Negri’, pp. 105-6. 
29 Stewart Martin also highlighted this paradox in paper entitled ‘What is the subsumption of life 
by capital?’, delivered at the 10th Annual Historical Materialism Conference, ‘Making the World 
Working Class’, held in London, 7-10 November 2013. 
30 Hegel, Science of Logic, ‘The Judgement’ and ‘The Syllogism’; Marx, letter to Engels, 9 
December 1861, MECW Vol. 41, p. 332. 
31 Antonio Negri, preface to ‘Crisis of the Planner-State: Communism and Revolutionary 
Organisation’ [1971], in Revolution Retrieved, p. 48. 
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resorts to an ontologically grounded theory of exploitation that takes place 
'outside any economic measure’ and whose ‘economic reality is fixed exclusively 
in political terms’.32 This displaces the ‘dull compulsion of economic relations’ 
and the accumulation process with a unifying form of power identified simply as 
‘command’: ‘once within real subsumption, we pass from the aporia’ (of use-
value’s relation to value) ‘on to a pure and simple tautology’.33 Whereas for Marx 
value was an end in itself (expressed succinctly in the general formula M-C-M’) 
and command over production a means to realise that end, Negri sees command 
as the end in itself of capital in the phase of real subsumption: ‘Command 
becomes even more fascistic in form, ever more anchored in the simple 
reproduction of itself, ever more emptied of any rationale other than the 
reproduction of its own effectiveness.’ 34  
Because this command must ‘be exercised in a way that is intrinsic to the 
totality of social relations’, traversing the entire reproduction process and 
‘forming a homogeneous tissue of exploitation’, it totalises all social conflict 
within the ambit of a singular, ontological opposition.35 This point is crucial, 
because it demonstrates the loss of Marx’s dynamic conception of power, as 
composed of a multiplicity of interacting but heterogeneous forms that orbit 
around a central contradiction, And its replacement with an ahistorical Spinozist 
ontology of power, internally differentiated as potentia and potestas. In Negri’s 
conception the contradiction between capital and labour is recoded as a 
differentiation within time itself; of its ‘proletarian’ pole on the one hand and its 
‘capitalist’ pole on the other, where the former is the ‘multiplicitous’ time of 
productive, constituent activity and the latter is the ‘empty’, constituted time of 
‘analytical command’. What is pernicious about capitalist command under real 
subsumption, on this account, is not social division (as was contested by the mass 
worker’s ‘refusal of work’) but the displacement of the productive multiplicity of 
collective time into the form of an abstract totality:  
‘[real subsumption] is a unity which is founded on the overcoming of the 
capitalist capacity to impose the asymmetry of power along vertical axis 
                                                          
32 Negri, ‘Oltre la legge di valore’ [1994], cited in Steve Wright, ‘Reality check: Are We Living In 
An Immaterial World?’, in Mute 2 (1), 2005: http://www.metamute.org/editorial/articles/reality-
check-are-we-living-immaterial-world [accessed Jan 2016]. 
33 Negri, ‘The Constitution of Time’, p. 25. 
34 Negri, ‘Crisis of the Crisis-State’ [1980], in Revolution Retrieved, p. 95. 
35 ‘Interview with Toni Negri’, p. 126; Negri, ‘Crisis of the Crisis-State’, p. 95. 
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that traverse life; it is a unity that imposes itself at the level of the 
horizontality of the collective: so, not the division of the class in itself, but 
separation of the time of social composition from the time of the totality of 
exploitation.’36 
Because of Capital’s dependency on the omniversal time which it at the same 
time denies, this separation has the Sisyphean quality of an ‘activity of negation 
of an irrepressible antagonism’.37 As the form of domination shifts from measure 
to ‘command’ under conditions of real subsumption, it is for Negri the state that 
enforces command, both undertaking exploitation and absorbing the resistance of 
living labour (the two moments having become indiscernible). In the absence of 
the coercive function of time-as-measure, the continued ‘institutional’ 
management of this separation becomes the state’s project, in its role as the 
‘active non-being’ that actualises command. The conflict of capital and labour 
thus plays itself out as an opposition between the ‘internal time’ of composing 
subjects (good) and the ‘external time’ of the composition itself (bad) 
underwritten by the state. capitalist power is no longer understood by Negri in 
terms of the extraction of surplus value by individual, competing enterprises, but 
rather as social capital’s capacity to systematize and mould collective time, in 
order to produce ‘a surplus of command’.38   
This gives rise to a double conflation; on the one hand of exploitation and 
political repression, on the other of productive practices and political resistance. It 
is the state whose activity subtracts the ‘ontological plenitude’ from productive 
time of living labour: ‘The state operates under the necessity of removing the 
collective dimension and the productive autonomy of time, of temporal being, 
because their emergence means antagonism.’39 Whilst correspondingly capital has 
produced an immediately social worker, directly capable of communism without 
party or any other form of collective institutional mediation. At level of political 
subjectivity, the labouring activity which gives content to the capitalist 
composition is not distinguished in kind from political acts which might challenge 
                                                          
36 Negri, ‘The Constitution of Time’, p. 75. 
37 Ibid, p. 84. 
38 Ibid, p. 66. 
39 Ibid, p. 80. 
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the system as a whole.40 This is because the productive time of creative labouring 
is already the time of liberation – ‘the matter that weaves together the 
productivity of being is the collective time of liberation, which is the same as 
production’ – lacking only the adequate social form of collectivity within which 
this content can flourish unhindered.41 Negri thus claims ‘communism is a 
constituting praxis’, but if it is the ‘real movement’ that abolishes the social form 
of contemporary society, what then distinguishes it as a specific, politically 
charged (i.e., revolutionary) form of praxis from constituting praxis as such (i.e., 
human activity, labour)? A properly revolutionary theory would have to situate 
itself critically with relation to those practices that actively constitute and 
contribute toward the reproduction of capitalist power and those which carry the 
potential to disrupt it and introduce alternative logics of reproduction. This 
demands a more developed account of the complex and changing relation 
between the ‘basic politicity’ of ‘everyday’ praxis and the ‘specific politicity’ of 
revolutionary and counter-revolutionary praxis. But such a relation and therefore 
the possibility of this critical perspective is only obscured by the ontological 
reductionism of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ forces of composition, a tendency taken to its 
extreme by Hardt and Negri when they melt these opposed poles down into the 
essential figures of ‘empire’ and ‘multitide’, in a manner that erases the internally 
structured field and diverse forms of capitalist power. As Noys points out: 
‘they extrapolate the tendency to an achieved state of capitalism’s own  
fantasy of itself, and so overwrite this realised fantasy back onto its 
existent forms. In doing so they neglect the contradictory tendencies of 
subsumption, in which formal and real subsumption do not simply form 
discrete historical stages, but also heterogeneous ensembles and 
strategies.’42 
The aporetic double status of real subsumption – as at once totalised and 
by the same token suspended – is thus only an expression of a deeper 
                                                          
40 This is a problem recognised by Virno, but only insofar as it is treated as a historically actual 
condition: ‘political action now seems, in a disastrous way, like some superfluous duplication of 
the experience of labor, since the latter experience, even if in a deformed and despotic manner, has 
subsumed into itself certain structural characteristics of political action.’ Paolo Virno, A Grammar 
of the Multitude: For an Analysis of Contemporary Forms of Life, translated by Isabella Bertoletti, 
James Cascaito and Andrea Casson, Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2004, p. 51. 
41 Negri, ‘The Constitution of Time’, p. 109. 
42 Benjamin Noys, The Persistence of the Negative: A Critique of Contemporary Continental 
Theory, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2010, p. 127 
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contradiction in Negri’s thought, that between its ontological and historical 
commitments. Negri’s is an unmistakably theological take on real subsumption, 
which takes it to be both a specific historical stage and also the consummate 
unveiling of an ontological conflict underlying all of history. As such, the schema 
of antagonism outlined above tends toward a fundamental opposition of forces 
indifferent to concrete historical determinations and the agency of individual 
diverse individuals, capitals and states seems to disappear in favour of an 
automatic antagonism which is given at the level of being. In light of this we must 
ask how the ontological opposition unveiled by the realisation of the dynamic of 
subsumption relates to the ongoing process of reproduction-development, that is, 
history.43 It’s clear that Negri’s account of Real subsumption cannot adequately 
resolve this without enacting a closure through the ontological overdetermination 
of struggle. As such, subsumption for Negri is best thought of as what Haug has 
called (referring to ‘immaterial labour’) a ‘non-concept’, or a marker drawing 
together a constellation of different positions and relations on a totalized plane of 
political conflict. But this plane cannot be grasped in any determinate sense that 
would open itself to the concrete specificity of struggles, because as Negri himself 
observes, and in keeping with the Spinozist notion that ‘determinatio negatio est’, 
‘what do resistance, revolt, and revolution signify within subsumption? They 
signify everything and nothing.’44 
 
Subsumption as ‘total administration’ 
 
A similar emphasis on the historical totalisation of capitalist domination 
circumscribes Theodor Adorno’s attempts to think capitalist subsumption in its 
widest social implications. Adorno, together with Horkheimer, describe in 
Dialectic of Enlightenment a stage of ‘totalitarian capitalism’ in which the 
reduction of ‘the overwhelming mass of the population […] to mere objects of 
administration, which preforms every department of modern life right down to 
language and perception, conjures up an illusion of objective necessity before 
                                                          
43 As Alberto Toscano points out: ‘The mere positing of a duality, say between Empire and 
multitude, without the conflictual composition that can provide this duality with a certain degree 
of determinateness, can arguably be seen to generate a seemingly heroic, but ultimately ineffectual 
horizon for theoretical analysis and political militancy.’ ‘Chronicles of Insurrection’, p. 89. 
44 Negri, ‘N for Negri’, p. 106. 
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which they believe themselves powerless.’45 The subsumption of individuals 
under capitalist relations of production has, for Adorno, ‘integrated all internal 
human characteristics’ such that ‘people are now totally controlled’.46  
Retaining the more general philosophical sense of the concept, specifically 
that given to it the context of Kantian epistemology, Adorno’s use of subsumption 
is not explicitly grounded in the technical distinction Marx makes between its 
formal and real modes, or even limited to the labour process. As such it is not 
nominalized in virtue of a specific social content, but rather refers to a generic 
conceptual operation (‘identifying judgment’) which, when applied to the context 
of ‘late’ capitalist society, becomes synonymous and interchangeable with other 
related – and in fact for Adorno more socially substantive – concepts such as 
‘integration’, and ‘administration’. But for Adorno and Horkheimer, this 
generality of subsumption is key because it manifests the connection, incipiently 
present in Marx, between conceptual and social abstraction, seeing them both as 
expressions of the same underlying tendency proper to enlightenment reason – 
that of adequating the particular to the universal in manner that liquefies any 
excessive individuality.47 In this way conceptual equivalence is read as an 
expression of the broad historical tendency to ‘the systematic domination over 
nature’, which lies at the root of all forms of domination, from class, as ‘the social 
subsumption of atoms to a general concept that expresses their constitutive as 
well as heterogeneous relations’, to the annihilating racism of Nazi Germany, 
which was founded on ‘the complete abstraction of subsuming human beings 
under arbitrary concepts and treating them accordingly’48 
                                                          
45 Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment [1944], Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2002, p. 30 
46 Ibid, p. 187; Adorno, ‘Late Capitalism or Industrial Society?’ [1968], translated by Rodney 
Livingstone, in Can One Live after Auschwitz? A Philosophical Reader, edited by Rolf 
Tiedemann, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003, p. 117. 
47 Kant is taken as an avatar of instrumental rationality in its enlightened form, insofar as for him 
‘reason is the agency of calculating thought, which arranges the world for the purposes of self-
preservation and recognizes no function other than that of working on the object as mere sense 
material in order to make it the material of subjugation. The true nature of the schematism which 
externally coordinates the universal and the particular, the concept and the individual, case, finally 
turns out, in current science, to be the interest of industrial society. Being is apprehended in terms 
of manipulation and administration. Everything – including the individual human being, not to 
mention the animal – becomes a repeatable, replaceable process, a mere example of the conceptual 
models of the system.’, Horkheimer and Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment, p. 65.  
48 Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, p. 255; Adorno, Negative Dialectics [1966], Translated by E.B. 
Ashton, London: Routledge, 1973, p. 236. 
202 
 
For Adorno the primacy of the problem of subsumption establishes an 
inner unity between methodological and political concerns. In the theoretical 
register, Horkheimer had already counted subsumption under universal concepts 
amongst the procedures of ‘traditional theory’, which he and Adorno contrasted to 
dialectics as a ‘critical theory’.49 But more fundamentally, at the level of the 
social practice which determined theoretical consciousness, conceptual 
equivalence formed ‘the prevailing principle of reality’ of an ‘administered 
world’ as subsumption to the value-form and commodity exchange.50 It was 
Alfred Sohn-Rethel who had first suggested this connection to Adorno in the 
1930s with his conception of exchange as a process of conceptual abstraction 
established not in thought but in ‘the action alone’, and therefore a ‘real 
abstraction’.51 For Sohn-Rethel, it was because exchange established equivalence 
in practice, by wiping out the ‘entire empirical reality of facts, events and 
description’ differentiating use-values, that equivalence in thought became 
possible; the ‘social synthesis’ of diverse commodities effected by money thus 
                                                          
49 Horkheimer, ‘Traditional and Critical Theory’ [1937], in Critical Theory: Selected Essays, 
translated by Matthew J. O'connell et al, New York: Continuum, 1972, pp. 188-243; ‘The central 
nerve of the dialectic as a method is determinate negation. It is based on the experience of the 
impotence of a criticism that keeps to the general and polishes off the object being criticized by 
subsuming it from above under a concept as its representative. Only the critical idea that unleashes 
the force stored up in its own object is fruitful; fruitful both for the object, by helping it to come 
into its own, and against it, reminding it that it is not yet itself.’ Adorno, Hegel: Three Studies, p. 
80. 
50 Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, p. 83; Peter Osborne, ‘Living with Contradictions: The Resignation 
of Chris Gilbert’, Afterall 16, Autumn/Winter 2007: 
http://www.afterall.org/journal/issue.16/living.contradictions.resignation.chris.gilbert.an [accessed 
Dec 2015] 
51 Alfred Sohn-Rethel, Intellectual and Manual Labor: a Critique of Epistemology [1970], 
translated by Martin Sohn-Rethel, London and Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1978, p. 20ff. This 
conception of ‘real abstraction’ remains rather limited however insofar as it conceives of the 
reality of the abstraction simply by virtue of the fact that it is an action rather than more 
comprehensively in terms of its effects ‘in action’, i.e., as shaping and guiding concrete social 
reality and its conflicts (cf. ch. 3 of this thesis). Simply that it is the actualisation of an ideality 
does not establish the full ‘reality’ of value, given that diverse forms of ideality and abstraction 
co-exist and interact with value throughout the social process, all of which possess different 
functions, effects and potentialities, which is to say, different social actualities. As Alberto 
Toscano and Brenna Bhandar argue in relation to race: ‘we cannot treat the question of the 
practical reality of abstraction as one which is simply adjudicated at the (very abstract) level of the 
formal analysis of capital. What we would seem to require is a way of thinking the articulation 
between distinct and sometimes independent modalities of abstraction. We would need to be able 
to think the articulation between events and processes of abstraction/dissolution (the moments of 
primitive accumulation or accumulation by dispossession); the ‘unconscious’ abstracting social 
practices (as grasped, for instance, in Sohn-Rethel’s account of the exchange-abstraction); the 
high-level logic of abstraction intrinsic to value as a social form of capitalism; and the relatively 
autonomous and deliberate practices and devices of abstraction (scientific, mathematical, 
linguistic, but also political and juridical) that are either articulated with real abstraction or posed 
by it as its ‘presuppositions’.’ Brenna Bhandar and Alberto Toscano, ‘Race, Real Estate and Real 
Abstraction’, Radical Philosophy 194, november/december 2015, p. 11. 
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forming the material basis for the conceptual synthesis of disparate 
representations.52 Adorno, influenced by Sohn-Rethel’s idea of the unconscious 
but real conceptuality of exchange, highlighted this point in a seminar on Marx 
delivered in 1962:53 
Exchange itself is a process of abstraction. Whether human beings know 
or not, by entering into a relationship of exchange and reducing different 
use values to labour values they actualize a conceptual operation socially. 
This is the objectivity of the concept in practice.54 
Because capitalist society is founded on the universalisation of exchange, this 
subsumption of the qualitative individuality under the value-form becomes ‘the 
objective abstraction to which the social process of life is subject’ (the Kantian 
convertibility of universal validity and objectivity is important here insofar as it 
establishes exchange as both the principle of social totality and, correspondingly, 
the basis for a theory of fetishism).55 Generalised exchange thus brings about ‘a 
conceptuality which holds sway in reality itself’, acting upon the vast mass of 
exchangers ‘behind their backs’ as a law of survival (or not, as the case may be), 
binding them together and delimiting their activity through a monetary rather than 
directly practical nexus.56 As Belliofiore and Riva point out, for Adorno: 
                                                          
52 Ibid, pp. 48-9. 
53 Adorno refers to Sohn-Rethel as ‘the first to point out that hidden in this principle [the 
transcendental], in the general and necessary activity of the mind, lies work of an inalienably 
social nature.’ Negative Dialectics, P. 177; other members of the Frankfurt school, however, 
(Horkheimer in particular) were far less approving of Sohn-Rethel’s thesis. Cf. Josh Abromeit, 
‘Max Horkheimer and the Foundations of the Frankfurt School’, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2011, pp. 384-5. 
54 Adorno, ‘Über Marx und die Grundbegriffe der Soziologischen Theorie’ (draft translation by 
O’Kane and Erlenbusch); Bellofiore notes a similar argument made by Colletti, which is also 
limited by its basis in a theory generalised exchange. Bellofiore, ‘A Ghost Turning into a 
Vampire’, p. 180. 
55 The key link is Marx’s description of the commodity as the ‘universally necessary social form 
of the product’ (‘Results’, p. 949) just as in Kant the transcendental object is the universally 
necessary form of all objective experience. Cf. also: ‘The crucial difference between the 
dialectical and the positivistic view of totality is that the dialectical concept of totality is intended 
'objectively', namely, for the understanding of every social individual observation, whilst 
positivistic systems theories wish, in an uncontradictory manner, to incorporate observations in a 
logical continuum, simply through the selection of categories as general as possible. In so doing, 
they do not recognize the highest structural concepts as the precondition for the states of affairs 
subsumed under them.’ ‘Introduction’ [1969] to Adorno et al. The Positivist Dispute in German 
Sociology, Translated by Glyn Adey and David Frisby, London: Heinemann, 1976, p. 14; Adorno, 
‘Late Capitalism or Industrial Society?’, p. 120; cf. also Christian Lotz, ‘Capitalist 
Schematization: Political Economy, Exchange, and Objecthood in Adorno’, Zeitschrift Für 
Kritische Theorie 36, 2013, pp. 110-123. 
56 Adorno, ‘Sociology and Empirical Research’, in The Positivist Dispute in German Sociology, p. 
80. 
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‘exchange is the synthetic principle that immanently determines the connection of 
every social fact’ and ‘the principle of mediation that guarantees the reproduction 
of society through a process of abstraction’57 
It is this objective validity of the exchange abstraction that, on Adorno’s 
account, becomes socially totalising in ‘late capitalism’, not only governing the 
noisy sphere of circulation, but penetrating all those hitherto ‘independent’ realms 
of life (independent from exchange relations, at least) and subjecting them to 
‘total administration’. The best known and enduring illustration of this diffusion 
of economic logic is the industrialisation of culture, famously depicted in 
Dialectic of Enlightenment, that produces ‘art's total subsumption under 
usefulness’ and ‘the process of identifying, cataloging, and classifying’ that is 
fully realised in that which has been ‘rigorously subsumed’.58 Tracing back the 
isomorphism between mental and practical abstraction, Adorno and Horkheimer 
argue that the culture industry’s ‘prime service to the customer is to do his 
schematizing for him’, following the trend of mass production to replace ‘a real 
act of synthesis’ with ‘blind subsumption’ (it is in this sense, an extension of 
social function of money).59 The individual, as object, becomes a site of 
colonisation by the exchange relations they effect as subject. In a fascinating 
fragment from Minima Moralia, entitled ‘Novissimum Organum’, Adorno 
suggests that 
the ‘alteration of the technical composition of capital’ is prolonged within 
those encompassed, and indeed constituted by, the technological demands 
of the production process. The organic composition of man is growing.60 
These phenomena all express the extension of objective abstraction and its 
correspondent industrial methods to every sphere of the social process.  
Such descriptions of the integrative effects of industrial logic resonate 
strongly with Marx’s account of capitalist subsumption, for example his portrayal 
of industrial labour as a ‘specialisation in passivity’. Indeed, one can find 
occasional remarks which intimate toward a deeper reflection on the dynamic of 
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subsumption on Adorno’s part, for example his assertion that ‘the forces of 
production are mediated more than ever by the relations of production’, the 
‘Novissimum’ fragment referred to above, or when he describes ‘a shift in the 
inner economic composition of cultural commodities’.61 But in substance a 
developed theory of subsumption is absent from Adorno’s conception of capitalist 
domination. Instead, it is primarily through the frame of exchange relations and 
their reifying power that the regime of ‘total administration’ is conceived. If 
Adorno speaks of capitalist subsumption, then, it is subsumption under the 
commodity-form, rather than capital. The influence of Lukács, who treated the 
commodity as ‘the central, structural problem of capitalist society in all its 
aspects’, looms large here.62 Ingo Elbe summarizes the limits of Lukács’ 
approach: 
Although the first to understand the character of capitalist rule the way 
Marx did – anonymous, objectively mediated, and having a life of its own 
– the “founding document” of Western Marxism, Lukács’ History and 
Class Consciousness, avoids a reconstruction of Marx’s theory of 
capitalism. Instead of an analysis of Marx’s dialectic of the form of value 
up to the form of capital, which in the theory of real subsumption offers an 
explanation of the connection – so decisive for Lukács – between 
commodification and the alienated structure of the labor process, one finds 
merely an analogizing combination of a value theory reduced to the 
“quantifying” value-form (due to an orientation towards Simmel’s cultural 
critique of money) and a diagnosis, oriented towards Max Weber, of the 
formal-rational tendency of the objectification of the labor process and 
modern law.’ 63 
Whilst Adorno was sceptical of Lukács’ romantic critique of reification as false 
consciousness (rather than the ‘reflexive form’ of what is ‘objectively untrue’), 
these criticisms are broadly valid for his own understanding of the mechanisms of 
capitalist domination insofar as he fails to theorise them beyond the level 
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exchange relations and equivalence in any comprehensive manner. Adorno’s 
philosophically sophisticated account of the ‘socialization’ effected by the 
fetishism does allude to the ‘decisive connection’ in that ‘historical materialism is 
the anamnesis of the genesis’ that critically deconstructs fetishized forms, 
(whereas political economy succumbs to ideology by taking them at face value).64 
But the full dialectical deconstruction of these forms ‘remains in embryo in 
Adorno’s writings’ and, as his student Helmut Reichelt would later note, is 
limited to ‘the terrain of asseveration’, because the genesis of the commodity-
form is not constructed at the level of the social reproduction process in toto or 
even followed through into an analysis of the production process. 65 Restricting it 
instead to the exchange principle, Adorno establishes the horizon of his theory of 
domination as the totalisation of the fetish-character in an integrative apparatus of 
‘mass deception’ through which ‘illusion dominates reality.’66 
If, then, for Negri the completion of subsumption is dependent on the 
abolition of economic equivalence, raising production to the status of an 
ontological absolute, the inverse is true for Adorno, who forwards a 
‘circulationist’ theory of subsumption in which commodity exchange ‘provides 
the objectivity valid model for all essential social events’ and is the ‘law which 
determines how the fatality of mankind unfolds’.67 As such he too, like Negri, 
misses the crucial inner connection between exchange and production, 
commodification and valorisation, in which the subsumptive dynamic of capitalist 
power is grounded.68 This is especially clear in the way that Adorno theorises the 
economic structure of domination in a world of ‘total administration’. For 
Adorno, ‘human beings continue to be subject to domination by the economic 
process’ in the face of which ‘the individual is entirely nullified’, but at the same 
                                                          
64 Alfred Sohn-Rethel, Geistige und korperliche Arbeit. Zur Epistemologie der abendländischen 
Geschichte, cited in Bellofiore and Riva, ‘The Neue Marx-Lektüre’, p. 26. 
65 The so-called ‘The Neue Marx-Lektüre’ instigated by Adorno’s students arose in response to 
these issues as ‘a project to deepen and even to ground Adorno’s critical theory of society’ in 
Marx’s critique of political economy. Bellofiore and Riva, ‘The Neue Marx-Lektüre’, p. 26. 
66 Theodor Adorno, ‘Sociology and Empirical Research’, p. 80. 
67 Ibid. 
68 As Christian Lotz argues: ‘Adorno, in other words, does not see that the commodity form cannot 
be reduced, to exchange and, instead, needs to be put in relation to all other economic categories 
that Marx unfolds. Put differently, Capitalist schematisation does not simply consist of the 
exchange principle that takes away the uniqueness of things and turns them into something 
universal (as Adorno often seems to suggest); rather, the whole distinction of use and exchange is 
itself the result of capitalist reproduction. Accordingly the schema that we are in search of cannot 
be identical with the exchange principle.’ ‘Capitalist Schematization’, p. 119. 
207 
 
time he speaks of ‘the absence of a theory of surplus value’ or an ‘objective 
theory of value’ adequate to ‘late’ capitalism.69 So whereas in the late 1940s he 
described individuals as ‘the mere agents of the law of value’, it’s not clear that 
for Adorno the market continues to regulate capitalist domination in its 
‘totalitarian’ form. Horkheimer, too, wrote in 1943 of ‘the now vanishing sphere 
of circulation’ and ‘the gradual abolishment of the market as a regulator of 
production’, such that the social process was no longer determined by 
‘anonymous processes’ but rather ‘decided or convened upon by elites’.70 In this 
they were both influenced by Freidrich Pollock’s idea of ‘state capitalism’, which 
asserted that liberal market capitalism had been replaced by a mixed or command 
economy ruled over by monopolistic conglomerates and bureaucratic structures, 
and that as a result the profit motive had been replaced by the power motive. The 
extent to which Adorno and Horkheimer adopted Pollock’s theory is debated – 
Deborah Cook, for example, argues that Adorno’s concept of ‘administration’ 
referred to the manipulations of the welfare state rather than Pollock’s all-
encompassing ‘state capitalism’ – and they certainly rejected his optimistic 
conclusions (the ‘undialectical position that in an antagonistic society a non-
antagonistic economy was possible’) but nevertheless they clearly affirmed the 
notion of a new era of capitalism in which domination did not take place solely, 
or even primarily, on the basis of anonymous economic mediations.71 
‘Administration’ thus signals a purer and more integral form of class 
domination than the free play of market forces. Ironically, and in spite of his 
exaggerated emphasis on the formal moment of exchange, this leads Adorno to a 
similar conclusion to Negri, namely that in the absence (or at least qualitative 
diminution) of an autonomous mechanism of economic regulation (value) 
capitalist command (‘the steering of economic forces’) increasingly becomes a 
function of political power. The totalisation of capitalist subsumption brings about 
an indiscernibility – if in essence rather than appearance – of the economic and 
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political moments, as relations of production ‘have ceased to be just property 
relations; they now also include relations ranging from those of administration on 
up to those of the state, which functions now as an all-inclusive capitalist 
organisation.’72 This view, however, scrambles the structural relations that 
distinguish and relate the different moments of the social reproduction process, as 
well as the different sources of social power, in Marx’s thought, unifying them 
under the rubric of a singular controlling logic that reduces individuals to ‘simple 
objects of administration’: 
‘material production, distribution, and consumption are administered 
jointly. Their boundaries flow into one another, even though earlier within 
the overall social process they were at once different form one another and 
related, and for that reason they respected what was qualitatively different. 
Everything is now one.’73 
There is a degree of equivocation in Adorno’s writings about the 
completeness and character of this totalisation, with different texts both across 
and within periods conveying different impressions. An illuminating comment 
from its 1969 preface asserts that ‘the development toward total integration 
identified’ in Dialectic of Enlightenment had ‘been interrupted but not 
terminated’.74 That Adorno and Horkheimer reserved terms such as ‘total 
integration’ and the ‘integral state’ to their discussions of Nazi Germany and the 
USSR gives us grounds for thinking that they distinguished between 
‘administered’ and ‘dictatorial’ forms of subsumption (echoing Marcuse’s 
‘repressive desublimation’ thesis distinguishing the cultural forms of oppression 
in ‘east’ and ‘west’), although because considered expressions of the same 
underlying tendency the distinction is not made programmatically. At a more 
methodological level, this ambiguity is qualified by an important difference 
between totality and totalisation, connected to the fact that the unity of society is 
thought dialectically by Adorno as both true and untrue, True, because ‘there is no 
social fact which is not determined by society as whole’, untrue because it 
projects a systematic coherence and completeness onto an incomplete and 
incoherent reality, one that is ‘not in itself rationally continuous’ nor ‘at one with 
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its subjects’.75 Noting that the systematization in social sciences (‘traditional 
theory’) merely mimics the real systematisation of an administered world, the 
principle of Adorno’s negative dialectics is to demonstrate the falseness of this 
whole. This is based on the non-identical opposition of society’s character as both 
subject and object (that is, the product of human praxis but also a structure 
existing independently, ‘over and against’ it): ‘Society as subject and society as 
object are the same and yet not the same.’76 
Nonetheless, at a less abstract level the exclusive dependency of Adorno’s 
theory of capitalist domination on the exchange relation and its ‘real abstraction’ 
raises the problem of closure on a different front, insofar as it elevates the 
principle of equivalence to a social absolute encompassing all mediating – that is, 
practically constitutive – activity: ‘the totality of the process of mediation’.77 The 
closure to other categories of social mediation that this presupposes, specifically 
those of production (not to mention those external but essential to capital’s 
accumulation process), theoretically extinguishes the socio-technical dynamic of 
transformation constituted between the relations and forces of production that is 
decisive in modern society. The dynamic of subsumption, which grounds the 
reproductive unfolding of a social process under the condition of capital, is 
therefore occluded by Adorno in favour of a vague but all-encompassing 
administrative apparatus in its ‘irresistible progress’. But failing to grasp the 
internal logic of capitalist constitution as a process in motion leaves Adorno open 
to his own charge of immobilizing history ‘in the unhistorical realm, heedless of 
the historical conditions that govern the inner composition and constellation of 
subject and object.’78 As Krahl forcefully argued, ‘Adorno’s negation of late 
capitalist society has remained abstract, closing itself to the need for the 
specificity of specific negation’.79 This is partly due to Adorno and Horkheimer’s 
view that the logic of technical rationalisation deployed in real subsumption is 
simply a manifestation of instrumental reason, submerging capital’s historically 
specific forms and structure in their meta-narrative of natural heteronomy, and 
partly to do with Adorno’s methodological orientation toward negative critique 
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elaborated above. The two tendencies converge in Negative Dialectics, where, 
Krahl remarked, ‘the concept of praxis is no longer questioned in terms of social 
change in its specific historical forms’.80 
In this way, Adorno’s theory not only enacts a closure to the 
comprehension of actual social conditions, but also to the possibility of their 
revolutionary transformation. For Krahl, ‘Adorno deciphered origin and identity 
as the dominant category of the sphere of circulation […] but the same theoretical 
tools which allowed Adorno this insight into the social totality, also prevented 
him from seeing the historical possibilities of a liberating praxis’.81 Instead 
Adorno’s thought suffers from an ‘objective inadequacy’, in that it theoretically 
asserts the primacy of praxis whilst being simultaneously unable to register that 
praxis at the level of conjuncturally specific ‘organisational categories’.82 This 
more fundamental form of closure places the connection of social critique to a 
revolutionary horizon in crisis in Adorno’s thought, because whilst it remains 
programmatically committed to a theoretical negation of subsumption, it 
nonetheless lapses into an abstract defence of the non-identical that is at the same 
time theoretically bound to its foreclosure.83 By focusing solely on undoing the 
‘anamnesis of the genesis’, the critical deconstruction of objective illusion 
supplants practice rather than clearing the way for it or forming an organic 
moment in the construction of a new genesis. In this way Adorno’s critique 
cannot but be mobilized as a radical defence of the individual (both the social 
individual and the individual work of art) which for him is the political other to 
the all-encompassing command of the identitarian capital-state. This outcome 
both vindicates Krahl’s charge that Adorno ‘remained transfixed’ by bourgeois 
individuality and also explains his retreat into the aesthetic, as the privileged site 
of critique in an unfree society: ‘the question posed by every artwork is how, 
under the domination of the universal, a particular is in any way possible.’84 If a 
theory of subsumption is to supersede such closure, however, and retain a critical 
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force, it must be open to the determinate comprehension of the incomplete and 
therefore contestable processes of domination as well as the forms of collective 
identity and action that would be the conditions for transcending those processes. 
 
Rejecting periodisation 
 
Whilst the theoretical positions presented in the work of Negri and Adorno are 
products of highly specific theoretical and political trajectories which I have not 
dealt with in depth, they nonetheless serve to exemplify the contradictions and 
limits of an interpretation of the dynamic of subsumption that i) deploys it in an 
unmediated way to construct a periodisation of capitalist society ii) asserts its 
completion in a phase of ‘total subsumption’ marked by the breakdown of the 
core structural distinctions – particularly of the economic and the political – 
through which the social process is organised on capitalist basis (i.e., those that 
give rise to the dynamic on the first place). Followed through into its latter form, 
we have seen how this reading of subsumption enacts a theoretical closure and 
overdetermination of the social process through its diachronic totalisation of 
capitalist subsumption, foreclosing the possibility of further qualitative 
development based on capital’s inner dynamic as well as the possibility of 
transcendent praxis that is indissolubly bound up with it. In this context, Stewart 
Martin has noted ‘the intense ambivalence that the contention of capital’s 
subsumption of life has produced within neo- and post-Marxist thought’.85 There 
is a stark contrast here between the pessimism of first generation Frankfurt school 
thinkers, along with others like Baudrillard, for whom it marks ‘the exhaustion of 
anti-capitalist politics, even its imagination’ (the management of desires and 
‘growing organic composition of the human’) and then the quasi-theological 
optimism of Negri and other ‘post-operaists’ for whom it ‘demonstrates the very 
creativity and growing autonomy of living labour, which capital only subsumes as 
an increasingly thin membrane of control, predisposed to disintegrate’ (‘the 
communism of capital’).86 Yet despite their divergent valuations of its political 
repercussions, for both poles of this tendency the historical completion of 
subsumption dissolves the possibility of an ongoing social struggle structured 
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through the law of value, the distinction between living labour and labour-power, 
and the distinct but interlocking mechanisms of capitalist and state power. By 
doing this, these theories lose precisely what is critically forceful in the theory of 
subsumption: its specification of the structure and forms of capitalist domination 
and the points of antagonism at which the dialectic of integration/transcendence 
unfolds. The terrain of conflict instead becomes vague and generalised as a single 
form of command regulating the social process, whether ontologically or natural-
historically conceived. As Martin argues, ‘the consequences for the struggle 
against capitalism are self-evidently profound: the dissipation, if not outright 
negation, of the basic antagonism between living labour and capital.’87 
These contradictions can be traced back to a number of obvious theoretical 
inconsistencies with this theory of subsumption as Marx describes it. 
Firstly, the distinction between formal, real and hybrid subsumption only 
applies directly to an individual production process, they are not concepts of 
social totality. This means that different capitals, branches and forms of 
production can and will, in the same historical moment, be at different levels of 
capitalist development, and furthermore in uneven interaction with each other 
(indeed, Marx says that as the process of subsumption matures in one branch of 
industry it can act as a condition for the incipience of subsumption in another). It 
is not, therefore, viable to totalise all production processes in society as being at 
the same conceptual stage of development. Even the same industries are subject to 
radical asymmetries in the structure of production, such that highly technical 
methods might be employed in some parts of the globe or aspects of the labour 
process while extremely rudimentary methods still dominate elsewhere. The 
identification of forms of subsumption with phases of a social totality’s 
development misprises the theoretical function of the distinction between them, 
which is to register change and difference in the relations between capital and 
labour at the level of a production process. That is, to grasp conceptually the 
diverse and changing modes of social and material command employed by a 
capital in the course of its expanded reproduction. The complexity of concrete 
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configurations of subsumption forms and their dynamics of change is not only a 
theoretical postulate, it is documented in a vast number of empirical studies.88  
Secondly, the forms of subsumption may be presented by Marx as 
‘logically’ successive, but this tells us very little about the actual chronology of 
their appearance or the necessity of their development –in the context of a specific 
production processes. Given that real subsumption is effective in even the most 
rudimentary rationalisations of the labour process – for example, in the 
implementation of co-operation – the historical gap separating formal from real 
subsumption is in many cases negligible, if present at all; the wage relation is 
established and the labour process is immediately subject to re-organisation. By 
contrast, it is also the case that capitalists may maintain the labour process in 
conditions of formal or hybrid subsumption indefinitely, or even ‘revert’ back to 
formal or hybrid methods, provided that it remains profitable to do so. Capital has 
no inherent imperative to technological progress for its own sake, only to 
accumulation: so if there is a potential to increase profits then capitals will 
introduce technical innovations, but if, for example, factors such as low wages 
and poor environmental and safety regulations keep the cost of production 
‘competitive’ then there may be little incentive to do so (agriculture and 
extractive industries would be good examples of this).89 There is thus no 
necessary linearity to the transition between forms, only a competitive drive to 
maximise accumulation by whichever means possible. 
Lastly, if it is implausible to posit a homogenous stage of subsumption 
across all labour processes then the claim that all of ‘life’, or ‘the social’ has been 
subsumed is even more questionable. The developments brought about by real 
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subsumption do of course have impacts that radically re-shape the reproductive 
process as a whole, and theorising these impacts demands going beyond Marx’s 
account, but nonetheless, for them to be impacts of subsumption under capital 
they must be mediated through the distinct phases of exchange and production 
(the latter being the only meaningful site in which we can speak of ‘real 
subsumption’) rather than derived from one or the other alone. Much more 
fundamentally, however, to assume a direct subsumption of ‘life’ is possible is to 
collapse one of the central distinctions through which capitalist social relations 
are structured: that between living labour and the labour-power commodity, 
thereby jettisoning the theory of commodification. The thesis of a ‘total 
subsumption’ conflates production and reproduction into one all-encompassing 
process, with no exteriority, meaning that capital not only consumes labour-
power, but also directly produces it.  
Whether taken to its extreme as a completion, or deployed more naively as 
an instrument of periodisation pertaining to an ongoing process of capitalist 
development it’s clear that to historicize the forms of subsumption in any way is 
to suffuse the concept with an evolutionism by transposing a developmental logic 
immanent to the individual onto the whole without a sensitivity to the 
qualitatively distinct mediations operative at this higher level of totalisation. The 
effect of this is to reinstate a dogmatic stagiest conception of history internally to 
‘capitalism’, and thus to situate the concept of subsumption within what Jairus 
Banaji has referred to as ‘the whole tradition of abstract historical formalism’ 
from which Marxist theory has suffered.90 It is clear that the theory of 
subsumption forms must be decoupled from any such attempts at crude and all-
encompassing periodisation and questionable whether anything other than the 
most heuristic and qualified periodisations can play a part in our understanding of 
the core dynamics of capitalist power. As Simon Clarke points out: ‘periodisation 
does not solve the problem which gave rise to it, that of getting beyond the static 
fetishism of simple ‘essentialist’ structuralism, because it merely proliferates 
structures which remain, each in their turn, equally static and fetishistic.91 At any 
one time capital’s domination of the total social process must be understood as 
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mediated and dispersed across a multiplicity of sites, each with their own 
determinations and results, as well as modulated by ‘innumerable different 
empirical circumstances, natural conditions, racial relations, historical influences 
acting from outside, etc.’ whose effects cannot be prescribed in advance by a 
‘supra-historical’ theory but demand concrete analysis.92 A robust theory of 
subsumption would have to be open to all these sites and factors, rather than 
homogenising and overdetermining them, allowing the specific configurations of 
the reproduction process to come into view. As Sayer points out, rather than 
focussing on carving up history into abstract chunks, ‘it is more important to 
establish the actual combinations of forces and relations of production that exist 
and work out how they cohere and function.’93 
 
Systematic and reproductive totality 
 
If we reject the assumption that the dynamic of subsumption can be used to 
meaningfully distinguish between different epochs or phases of capitalist world-
history, how then can we think the relation between that dynamic (of form-
determination) and the process of society’s reproduction-development 
(composition)? How could we go about constructing a more mediated conception 
of capital’s ‘becoming’ that opens itself to further levels of complexity both in 
terms of the real relations and conditions structuring the social process and the 
points of potential rupture and resistance to its rule by capital? In the first place, 
this would seem to require relegating the problem of chronology – that of when or 
in what sequence the forms can be ordered – and instead posing a different one – 
that of the distribution, interaction and development of subsumption forms. This 
would also seem to suggest, much more broadly, a turn away from a directly 
‘historical’ reading of Marxist categories (encompassing a spectrum of positions, 
from ‘stageist’ orthodoxy right up the ‘heterodox’ Marxisms that nonetheless deal 
with present conditions under the unifying and reductive rubric of ‘real 
subsumption’) and toward a ‘systematic’ reading capable of comprehending the 
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combination of categories and relations within an internally differentiated 
conceptual totality. 
The concept of ‘mode of production’ (Produktionsweise) is the obvious 
referent here, as the totality with which Marx is generally understood to have 
thought the unity of social forms and relations, each mode possessing its own 
historically unique ‘laws of motion’. Situating the forms of subsumption within 
such a totality and its ‘laws’ would thus seem to hold the key to their 
comprehension on a social scale. The initial problem with such an approach, as 
raised in chapter 2, is the instability and inconsistency of meaning Marx gives 
to the concept of mode of production in his writings, as numerous 
commentators have pointed out and extensive debates have evinced. These 
meaning range from narrow descriptions of relations and methods of the 
immediate production process, to an all-encompassing concept of social reality 
as such. In his discussion of subsumption Marx tends toward the former, for 
example when he describes real subsumption as giving ‘the very mode of 
production a new shape’ and thereby creating ‘the mode of production peculiar 
to [capital].’94  On this account, the concept of a ‘specifically capitalist mode of 
production’ is associated exclusively with real subsumption, denoting a labour 
process that has been formed by capital in the course of its subsumption under 
the valorisation process. This would suggest that Marx accords causal priority 
to the relation of subsumption, such that the mode of production is an effect of 
this relation. Elsewhere, Marx confirms this, according a far broader effectivity 
to subsumptive relations than the mode of production, when he states that with 
real subsumption ‘a complete (and constantly repeated) revolution takes place 
in the mode of production, in the productivity of the workers and in the 
relations between workers and capitalists’.95 At other points, however, Marx 
inverts this picture, and it is the mode of production that acts upon the labour 
process and ‘radically remoulds all its social and technological conditions’.96 
Despite these slippages, the mode of production is clearly not simply acted 
upon by the relations that form it, but also generates its own social effects. 
With the introduction of large-scale industry ‘the capitalist mode of production 
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has already seized upon the substance of labour and transformed it’.97 In 
addition, the creation of a class with nothing to sell but their own labour-power 
‘is due not only to the nature of the contract between capital and labour but also 
to the mode of production itself’.98 The reciprocity at work here recalls the 
infamous passage from Capital in which Marx declares that 
The specific economic form, in which unpaid surplus labour is pumped 
out of direct producers, determines the relationship of rulers and ruled, as 
it grows directly out of production itself and in turn, reacts upon it as a 
determining element.99 
Taken in the narrower sense that Marx employs in these passages, the mode of 
production cannot itself be the conceptual totality within which subsumption 
occurs, but forms only a partial moment or site of a broader totality 
incorporating subsumption relations and modes of production. 
Jairus Banaji, in an important intervention into the debate around modes 
of production in 1970s, sought to resolve this difficulty by distinguishing sharply 
between two senses of the term in Marx’s writings: a narrow conception limited 
to the labour process, as in the above citations, and a second far broader 
conception of a ‘historical organisation of production’ or ‘social form of 
production’ (Marx’s own terms).100 According conceptual priority to the latter, 
Banaji criticized the identification of a mode of production with a single mode of 
exploitation (or subsumption) and instead forwarded a much more expansive 
conception internally differentiated by diverse forms and configurations of 
exploitation: 
To take modes of production first, these, for Marx, comprised the 
‘relations of production in their totality’ (as he says in Wage Labour and 
Capital), a nuance completely missed by Marxists who simply reduce 
them to historically dominant forms of exploitation or forms of labour, for 
example, positing a slave mode of production wherever slave-labour is 
used or ruling out capitalism if ‘free’ labour is absent. The underlying 
assumption here is that Marx means by relations of production the 
relations of the immediate process of production, or what, in a perfectly 
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nebulous expression, some Marxists call the ‘method of surplus-
appropriation’. But the immediate process of production can be structured 
in all sorts of ways, even under capitalism.101 
By distinguishing between a totality of ‘relations of production’ and the 
multiplicity of ‘forms of exploitation’ in its various production process, Banaji 
conceives of modes of production as ‘objects of much greater complexity’, 
‘impenetrable at the level of simple [i.e., ‘general’] abstractions’ – e.g., the 
dynamic of subsumption.102 This makes room for a much more nuanced 
understanding of a capitalist totality that acknowledges the flexibility of 
combinations and diversity of forms – both formal and real – that its exploitation 
of labour takes:  
Relations of production are simply not reducible to forms of exploitation, 
both because modes of production embrace a wider range of relationships 
than those in their immediate process of production and because the 
deployment of labour, the organisation and control of the labour-process, 
‘correlates’ with historical relations of production in complex ways. 
The brilliant historiographic work undertaken by Banaji not only offers 
illuminating illustrations of the complexities of this correlation but also prompts 
fundamental theoretical questions that tarry with the problem of subsumption at 
its root. Acknowledging the diversity and complexity of forms of capitalist 
exploitation displaces the conceptual totality within which those forms are 
thought from the analytical level of mode of production (narrowly conceived) to 
an expanded notion of ‘social relations of production’, the sum of forms and 
processes through which capital’s accumulation process functions, i.e, ‘capital’ 
itself in what Marx called its ‘Gesamtprozeß’ (total process). However, the 
fundamental issue of mediation and co-constitution between capital and its other – 
labour and nature – is not resolved through such a displacement, which only gives 
us a new ‘definite totality of historical laws of motion’.103 The subsumption of 
labour forms an integral moment of this totality and must be analysed as such – as 
I have done in the previous chapter – but this still only leaves us with the abstract 
dynamic as an effect of these historical laws (albeit one liberated from a narrative 
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of linear historical concretion). Is even an expanded conception of ‘mode of 
production’ or ‘social relations of production’, then, an adequate resource for 
constructing the mediations necessary to critically grasp the relation between the 
dynamic of subsumption in the labour process and social reproduction-
development?  
Recently a number of Hegelian Marxists from a ‘systematic dialectics’ 
perspective have affirmed this, most notably Christopher Arthur.104 Arthur aims at 
a critical reconstruction of the capitalist mode of production’s inner logic, 
drawing on a supposed homology between Hegel’s logic and Marx’s Capital in 
order to develop a ‘systematic dialectic of capital’. What is key in terms of the 
connection with Hegel here is the understanding of capital as an ‘organic system’, 
something which Marx himself asserted frequently, referring to ‘the physiology of 
the bourgeois system […] its internal organic coherence and its life-process’105 
For Arthur, capital’s life-process forms a logical totality in the mode of Hegel’s 
idea, ‘a self-moving system of abstract forms’ which ‘reproduces all the relevant 
conditions of its existence in its own movement.’106 This movement is driven by 
the logic of the value-form given in the general formula M-C-M’, but, Arthur 
notes following Marx, in order to reproduce itself in this way, such that ‘all 
presuppositions of the system are also posited by the system’, capital has to take 
hold of production and reform it to match this end, which drives the dynamic of 
subsumption: 
‘Because the material reality of production is given to capital, rather than 
created by it, capital has to shape this material into a ‘content’ more or less 
adequate to it; this I call the ‘form determination’ of the ‘content’. It 
cannot be achieved through ‘formal’ subsumption alone; it requires real 
changes to the production process so as to make possible capital’s fluidity 
in its other.’107 
Arthur’s own account is not entirely dissimilar to Marx’s, despite its hyper-
idealised presentation (conceptual developments appear as constantly driven by a 
logical necessity, or the ‘inadequacy’ of certain forms and relations to the existent 
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totality in which they are situated). The problem with such a position is that a 
systematically totalised conception of capitalist relations of production, 
appearing, in Marx’s words, as ‘an a priori construction’, is taken to be a closed 
logical totality within which relations of subsumption are necessarily situated and 
can be explained, rather than merely from which and in tension with an external 
other that the dynamic of subsumption is produced. This is because Arthur 
comprehends the subsumption of labour from the standpoint of what is 
functionally necessary for accumulation to take place, so that the mediation 
effected by labour’s subsumption is already assigned its function as a mediation 
of capital, rather than substantively between capital and what lies beyond it, 
turning subsumption into the explanans rather than the explanandum (this is 
structurally identical to Kant’s problem, we can recall, giving rise to the need for 
a schema). This characterizes the process of subsumption as a spontaneous and 
unilateral effect of capital grasped as a self-moving, ideal structure, an ‘abstract 
totality’ that imposes itself upon the historical process unilaterally. Arthur does 
acknowledge that ‘the system is prey to antinomies and is ‘rooted in real 
differences […] opposites incapable of reconciliation’, but these antinomies and 
differences are only comprehended in the mode of their functionalist overcoming 
– in terms of what capital ‘must do’ to meet its goal of self-expansion. 
Perceptively, Arthur notes that subsumption ‘marks an aporia in this ambition’, 
and as such he treats the forms of subsumption as ‘mixed’ rather than ‘pure’ 
categories, because of their material ‘content’, but nonetheless this fails to 
generate new determinations regarding the process of capitalist domination. So 
whilst ‘the deconstruction of capital’s repression of what is truly other is in 
order’, this deconstruction is offered only in the most abstract terms in Arthur’s 
account, with labour’s subjective potential for resistance and rupture appearing as 
nothing more than a postulate of contradiction. It is not clear in which way, if at 
all, this postulate could be further concretised via his closed functionalist model. 
As Werner Bonefeld notes, Arthur ‘rightly argues that the dialectical method 
deals with ‘a given whole’, and he wrongly treats this whole as a closed logical 
system. […] The peculiar character of capitalist social relations cannot be found 
in some logic of immanent abstractness’.108 
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  What is significant here is that Arthur’s development of the value-form 
into a systematic dialectic of capital threatens to impose a synchronic form of 
theoretical closure on the necessarily open relationship between subsumption and 
the reproduction-development of the social formation. Arthur posits the radical 
separation of dialectical and historical development in a manner that jettisons the 
latter from the object of theoretical enquiry, and in doing so concedes too much to 
Hegel and heeds too little of Marx’s critique of idealism. Capital is an organic 
system but not one with an independent, self-moving and ahistorical existence. So 
despite Marx’s criticism of Hegel for considering the ‘real as the product of 
thought concentrating itself, probing its own depths, and unfolding itself out of 
itself’, because capital is understood by Arthur to be structured homologously to 
Hegel’s idea, this autonomous and one-sided developmental movement is 
reinstated as capital’s reality.109 Arthur’s strategy is grounded in the assumption 
that ‘right from its first sentence the object of Marx’s Capital is indeed 
capitalism’, meaning that capital’s accumulation process, understood as a 
systematic totality, is identical in essence with a socially reproductive totality and 
only has to ‘posit itself’ through subsuming labour in order to secure that 
reproduction.110 Arthur’s view internalises the reproduction of society 
exhaustively to the expanded reproduction of capital, and correspondingly 
reduces question of the relation between subsumption and social reproduction-
development to the question of the relation between subsumption and the essential 
relations of capitalist accumulation (i.e., back to our starting point). Arthur is 
correct to identify, contra Negri and Adorno, that ‘what is ontologically 
constitutive of capital is the process (not an originally given, or finally 
accomplished, state) of reification’, but his conception of processual openness is 
entirely devoid of material and historical determinations.111 Capitalist 
subsumption, however, is a mediating synthetic category with practical-historical 
conditions and effects that are more complex than those functionally presented at 
the level of capital’s expanded reproduction process in abstracto. It is precisely 
this ‘excess’ of material effectivity that gives capital, through the real 
subsumption of productive forces, it’s unique and epoch-making power. Ignoring 
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these – or at least, relegating them to yet to be explored levels of concretion 
beyond the ‘ontological ground of capitalism’ – misses the decisive role played 
by the dynamic of subsumption in the reproduction-development of societies 
under the condition of capital, reducing the couplet to just one of its poles, an 
empty, functionalist notion of reproduction derived from capital’s logic of 
accumulation. In this way Arthur’s pure dialectic of capital represses theoretical 
comprehension of real development and is itself incapable of systemic change, 
standing in opposition to a naïve conception of empirical history. In this regard 
Alfred Schmidt’s comments regarding the relation between systematic and 
historical elements in materialist thought are strikingly pertinent: 
The categorial expression of the relations of production investigated by 
Marx rested, in a mediated and/or unmediated sense, on their history. To 
the extent to which the thinking process is autonomous in relation to its 
subject matter and does not slavishly copy it, it leads to theoretical 
construction. Further, to the extent to which this process remains 
objectively related to the material of history (and continuously subjects 
itself to control so as not to ossify into an empty “system”), it approaches 
the level of a critical historiography. Both aspects, relative independence 
and dependence of the thinking process vis-à-vis the historical basis, 
belong together. […] Whoever has established clarity concerning the 
objectively contradictory relationship between history and “system” in 
Capital will not fuse, identify or separate the historical and logical but 
rather will seek to determine the weight and place of these moments in 
accordance with the level attained by the cognitive process.112 
 
Mediating reproduction and development 
 
In light of these criticisms, adequately theorising the impact of capitalist 
subsumption on the social process demands avoiding two forms of closure: a 
diachronic form that would totalise that impact historically and a synchronic form 
that would totalise it systemically. Instead, conceived openly, the dynamic of 
subsumption not only affects but also mediates these two aspects of the social 
                                                          
112 Schmidt, History and Structure, p. 66 (my emphasis). 
223 
 
reproduction process, bringing them into relation in the way that it implants a 
logic of social development within the structure of reproduction itself, making 
real change a basic systemic presupposition rather than a contingency or nominal 
tendency. This produces the specific historical logic of ‘uninterrupted 
disturbance’ proper to capitalist production, at the core of which is a complexity 
surrounding the relation of its being and becoming. Marx grasps this complexity, 
if only opaquely, in a crucial passage from the Grundrisse on which the entire 
problem of closure can be seen to turn: 
 It must be kept in mind that the new forces of production and relations of 
production do not develop out of nothing, nor drop from the sky, nor from 
the womb of the self-positing Idea; but from within and in antithesis to the 
existing development of production and the inherited, traditional relations 
of property. While in the completed bourgeois system every economic 
relation presupposes every other in its bourgeois economic form, and 
everything posited is thus also a presupposition, this is the case with every 
organic system. This organic system itself, as a totality, has its 
presuppositions, and its development to its totality consists precisely in 
subordinating all elements of society to itself, or in creating out of it the 
organs which it still lacks. This is historically how it becomes a totality. 
The process of becoming this totality forms a moment of its process, of its 
development.113 
It is important to analytically distinguish the two levels of ‘being’ and ‘becoming’ 
operative here, in order to grasp how their articulation exceeds Marx’s own 
conscious presentation. On the one hand, at the level of ‘being’, the mutual 
presupposition of relations and the positing of presuppositions is, Marx says, like 
‘every organic system’, i.e., a reproductive totality: a systematic totality of 
relations that exists in and through the process of reproducing its subjective and 
objective conditions. So the capitalist mode of production too is, for Marx, a 
reproductive totality – reproduction is the mode of its ‘composition’. On the other 
hand, at the level of the system’s ‘becoming’ capital is dependent on a mode of 
development that is also a negation or absorption of extant social forms, wealth 
and practices and their ‘subordination’ to itself. Capital’s becoming is based on 
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subsuming social elements and ‘organizing’ them through its own logic of 
reproduction. The difficulty with this organic model, however, lies in the idea of 
completion. The ‘completed’ bourgeois system that Marx refers to is capital at the 
point at which it can reproduce itself and its conditions: 
The capitalist process of production, therefore, seen as a total, connected 
process, i.e. a process of reproduction, produces not only commodities, not 
only surplus-value, but it also produces and reproduces the capital-relation 
itself; on the one hand the capitalist, on the other the wage-labourer.114 
But at the same time capital can never reach a ‘completed’ state of being insofar 
as its own reproductive logic is based on unceasing accumulation of new wealth. 
There is no ‘simple’ capitalist reproduction. Without self-expansion capital is not 
capital, its circulatory movement is, echoing Hegel’s description of dialectical 
development, ‘a spiral, an expanding curve, not a simple circle’.115 The capitalist 
system always demands more and – as the most characteristically ‘modern’ form 
of society – is in a perennial state of unrest. This means that capital’s being is 
development, its mode of existence is a ceaseless and insatiable movement of 
becoming (‘constant revolutionising of production, uninterrupted disturbances of 
all social conditions, everlasting uncertainty and agitation distinguish the 
bourgeois epoch from all earlier ones’).116 Yet it is never adequately developed, 
each cycle is inadequate compared to the next, and so it ‘moves in contradictions 
which are constantly overcome but just as constantly posited’.117  
This dialectical slippage between being and becoming is what grounds the 
capitalist system’s openness, as a historical rather than natural organic system 
(although in one sense at least, this distinction ultimately comes down to ‘relative 
speeds’) and as such as a system whose being must be grasped in the double 
articulation reproduction-development (recalling, as I argued in chapter 2, that 
this hyphenated pairing is the active or processual form of ‘natural-history’). The 
key to this articulation is the constitutive role of subsumption. Because capital is 
never fully complete it is in a continual process of becoming whose form may 
fixed axiomatically (in the ‘general formula’ M-C-M’) but whose material content 
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is variably generated by a constantly intensifying subsumption of social elements 
with, as Echeverría describes it, 'a progress of totalitarian reach, both extensive 
and intensive, (as planetarization and technification respectively)’.118 This means 
that it is continually caught in the struggle over integration/transcendence with 
labour (as well as nature) which plays itself out primarily in process of 
production. It is in production that those elements directly mediate capital’s 
becoming, become moments of its own process, insofar as they determine its 
capacity to valorise itself and therefore develop through accumulation. But the co-
ordinates of this struggle far exceed production, because these elements are 
actively conditioned and mediated by the factors, relations and practices which 
shape the overall dynamics of accumulation, traversing the entire social process 
with a quasi-independence from capitalist command. Marx hinted at this when he 
wrote that capital ‘steps as it were from its inner organic life into its external 
relations’.119 These external relations are not limited to the sphere of exchange but 
pertain to entire compass of forms and practices that determine the compositional 
totality within which that ‘inner organic life’ subsists and upon which it depends. 
In reality then, capital’s becoming is nothing but the expression of its successes 
and failures in the struggle over subsumption at a social scale. Deconstructing 
this struggle and development in terms of the real practices and forms of social 
being through which society reproduces itself is the basis for an open 
investigation of capitalist subsumption as a contested dynamic of transformation ( 
a ‘moving’ rather than a static contradiction). As Marx says, ‘political economy 
perceives, discovers the root of the historical struggle and development’.120 Such 
a deconstruction is premised on the non-identity of capitalist reproduction and the 
socially reproductive totality, despite their historical interpenetration, and the 
assumption that the interpenetration itself is the object of critical social research 
(of which capital as a ‘mode of production’ forms just one aspect or ‘layer’).  
Marx himself however, in reducing his treatment of this broader sense of 
reproduction (of social relations and their conditions, productive subjects and 
objective wealth) to the inner dynamics of capital’s overall accumulation process, 
once again raises the threat of a theoretical closure that undermines the 
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deconstructive reading of subsumption. There are various aspects to this 
‘provisional’ or ‘tendential’ closure in Marx’s critique of political economy. 
Michael Krätke refers to ‘at least three heroic abstractions’ through which Marx 
constructed a ‘complete and closed system of capitalist relations’: ‘the abstraction 
from the diversity or variety of capitalism, the abstraction from the development 
or history of capitalism, and, last but not least, the abstraction from the capitalist 
world system’.121 Shortall, Lebowitz and Bonefeld also take up the problem of 
closure with reference to Capital but focus instead on the neutralization of the 
variable dimension of class struggle and the subjectivity of labour which is 
supplanted with a functional-economistic model of the social process. As Shortall 
explains: 
While Marx describes in graphic detail how the rhythms of the 
accumulation of capital impose themselves, and thereby regulate the 
conditions of the working class, he is still only concerned with the 
working class as object; in itself, as the simple aggregation of individual 
workers, as an objective condition for capital’s accumulation. […] The 
worker, now the working class, remains as mere object regulated by the 
rhythms of the objective laws of the dialectic of capital.122 
Or in Bonefelds account: 
In Marx, there exists a glimpse of economic closure when he argues that 
the value of labour is solely determined by labour time necessary to 
reproduce labour power, a value which consists of moral and historical 
elements which are imposed on capital through the class struggle. This 
closed formulation is surprising, since the moral element mentioned by 
Marx relates to the permanent radical reproduction and production of the 
separation [between capital and labour] and the permanent radical 
reproduction and revolutionising of the natural conditions on which, in 
turn, capital depends at the same time.123 
The issue raised in all of these accounts is that in falling into an ‘objectivism’ of 
economic laws, Marx's critique of political economy forecloses a theoretical 
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comprehension of the active potential of labour (as well as other non-economic 
forces and practices) to disrupt or resist capital's accumulation process (other than 
as an abstractly registered possibility). But this active element is nonetheless 
assumed insofar as the inner dynamic of capitalist subsumption on which the 
accumulation process rests presupposes a constant running up against that which 
lies beyond the closed organic totality, a totality whose closure is constantly 
undone by this need and placed into question, contested by the externality upon 
which its reproduction depends. As Lebowitz argues, ‘there cannot be a self-
reproducing totality in Capital because the necessary presuppositions for capital 
are not all results of itself but, rather, depend on something outside of capital as 
such.’124 This highlights a tension internal to Marx’s discourse between what 
Karatani calls ‘a structurally determined topos where subjectivity cannot freely 
intervene’ and the necessary openness to that which exceeds the system, 
interrupts it, contests it, but also ultimately acts as the substance through which it 
lives by subsuming it within its own life process. 125 Shortall cites theoretical 
exigencies as the reason for Marx’s introduction of closure, suggesting that Marx 
adopted the standpoint of political economy and ‘bracketed’ extra-systematic 
factors in order to deconstruct bourgeois society’s self-illusion and reveal the 
cloaked relations of domination that ground it, the objectification of the worker 
through primitive accumulation, commodification and subsumption to capital in 
production. But the closure in Marx’s discourse remains ‘provisional’ (as opposed 
to the ‘capital-logic’ and ‘systematic dialectics’ interpretations where this closure 
is methodologically absolutized with reference to the object of knowledge). So: 
the questions of class struggle, rupture and crisis are always implicit in 
Marx's exposition in Capital. While Marx must provisionally close off 
such questions in order to develop his exposition of the dialectic of capital, 
he never severs them completely; they are always presupposed.126 
Marx’s writings are thus marked by an ambiguity regarding capital’s systematic 
completeness and, as Krätke notes, closure of the system is interrupted by 
constant ‘deviations’ that are increasingly forceful, particularly with respect to the 
                                                          
124 Lebowitz, The incomplete Marx by Felton Shortall (review article), Historical Materialism 3, 
1998, p. 185. 
125 Kojin Karatani, Transcritique, translated by Sabu Kohso, Cambridge and London: MIT Press, 
2003, p. 288. 
126 Shortall, The Incomplete Marx, p. 122. 
228 
 
history of capitalism, so that in fact ‘what appear to be digressions from ‘pure’ 
logical expositions are crucial parts of his argument, pointing to the ‘openings’ 
and ‘systematic gaps’ of the capitalist mode of production as well as to the logic 
of its ‘inner development’.127 Schmidt, echoing Adorno, similarly refers to the 
synthesis of systemic and anti-systemic impulses in Marx’s thought: 
‘Marxian economics is a system and at the same time not a system, for 
what forms the totality of bourgeois society is equally that which pushes 
beyond it. As an immanent critic, Marx assumes that the relationships he 
investigates exist “in pure form corresponding to their concept.” But as a 
critic, he knows how little (not only in England in that period) that is the 
case.’128 
At stake in this problem of ‘provisional’ closure is the relation between 
the economic-analytic and the critical-deconstructive aspects of Marx’s discourse 
– that is, between the ‘political economy’ and the ‘critique’. The former points to 
a functional totality of economic relations that constitute bourgeois society as a 
structural unity, but the latter, in deconstructing the apparent naturalness of the 
fetishized economic forms taken by the system, points toward the real processes, 
practices and subjects that constitute but also exceed and resist the modes of 
social being generated by capital: ‘the totality of social praxis (begriffene Praxis) 
that constitutes, suffuses and contradicts the apparently objective ‘logic’ of 
capital’.129 It is the excessive and actively resistant character of the latter totality 
that remains problematically ambiguous with relation to the provisionally closed 
‘organic system’. When Marx wrote to Lasalle that his work was ‘at once an 
exposé and, by the same token, a critique of the system’, was the point to replace 
the system of bourgeois political economy with a ‘truer’ self-grounded theoretical 
totality in which exploitation and destruction is revealed to be a generic part of its 
inner determination? (Truer, here, because denaturalised and demystified, shown 
to depend upon historically specific and therefore alterable conditions.) Or was it, 
going further, to open up something akin to what Benjamin called a ‘constellation 
saturated with tensions’ – between the totalising integrative movement of the 
system and the de-totalising (and speculatively re-totalising) transcendent 
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movement of the resistant elements brought into its orbit – thus enabling a 
situated analysis of the ongoing practices and processes of class conflict that 
constitute social experience?130  
The ambiguity regarding the relation of the bourgeois system to its 
historical becoming is brought to the fore through the problem of subsumption, 
because subsumption is the key process that mediates the connection between the 
formal value-representational surface of the capitalist economic system and the 
‘totality of social praxis’ upon which it is founded and which it takes as its 
substance.131 The excess that is bracketed by Marx’s closure needs to be re-
introduced here if we are to grasp subsumption as more than just a unilateral 
function of the formal accumulation process, which is the standpoint Marx’s 
critique simultaneously adopted and aimed to deconstruct.132 This firstly requires 
acknowledging the way in which the factors through which the entire process of 
accumulation begins – most importantly the value and productivity of labour-
power – are politically (socially, culturally, geographically, etc.) determined by 
conflictual processes both within and beyond the domain of ‘economic’ relations, 
and that these determinations constitute the terrain upon which the specific 
struggle over subsumption in production is played out. This secondly means 
recognising that the dynamic of subsumption is not only driven and shaped in its 
actualisation by these concrete determinations but at the same time recomposes 
and transforms them. The entire system of the production, circulation and 
accumulation of value that moves through the dynamic of subsumption therefore 
has at its base this politically-charged dynamism, although it is registered within 
the economic logic of the accumulation process only as the ‘variable’ aspects of 
labour-power. One can abstract away from these concrete historical dimensions of 
accumulation and domination for the purposes of theoretical clarification, but 
ultimately they must be reincorporated in order to critically comprehend the 
forces of composition, conflict, resistance and rupture animating the social 
process and subsisting through the sphere of economic relations, because 
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‘between equal rights, force decides’.133 The two reciprocal movements of 
affection – between the individual acts of subsumptive form determination in 
production and the consistency of the compositional totality – thereby generate an 
open movement of historical development (via reproduction) that cannot be given 
at the level of a hermetically closed logical-economic system. 
 
Subjejctivation and living labour 
 
Reintroducing the variability of factors animating the dynamic of subsumption 
and the historical movement of reproduction-development means, in the first 
place at least, giving theoretical life to the subjectivity and action of labour, which 
in Marx’s discourse continually appears but is just as constantly repressed by the 
provisional closure of the ‘systematic’ standpoint. For Marx, labour must be 
understood to be ‘variable’ and active in two senses, corresponding to the two 
poles of its commodity status. The variability of its ‘value’: the level of 
subsistence determined by ‘moral and historical’ elements; and the variability of 
its ‘use-value’: the level of its productivity for capital, determined in the struggle 
over subsumption in production. Both of these factors are indissolubly bound up 
with the dynamic of subsumption, particularly in its ‘real’ form, and constitute a 
resistant force shaping the overall dynamic of accumulation and its impact upon 
the social process as a whole. What is key here is how those resistant forces 
exceed the system’s internal logic and react back upon it whilst nonetheless being 
bound to it as a condition of their existence. Which is to say, how the 
reproduction of human society (considered as a practical totality, composed of 
wealth in its ‘natural form’) and the reproduction of capital (considered as an 
economic totality, composed of wealth in its ‘value form’) dialectically 
                                                          
133 The theoretical force of Capital lies precisely in Marx’s use of the ‘power of abstraction’ to 
uncover the inner connections and movement as well as outward forms characterizing the system 
of capitalist domination at its ‘purest’ level. Nonetheless, if this is to be developed into a critical 
frame through which to engage with real dynamics and practical configurations emerging from the 
struggle over the subsumption and recomposition of social elements, it is necessary to break 
through the systemic impulse (as Marx himself did in many places) that leads to a flattening out of 
the concrete contours and antagonistic character of the social process. E.g., ‘in order to examine 
the object of our investigation in its integrity, free from all disturbing subsidiary circumstances, 
we must treat the whole world of trade as one nation, and assume that capitalist production is 
established everywhere and has taken possession of every branch of industry’. Marx, Capital vol. 
1, p. 727 (fn); p. 344. 
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interpenetrate and unfold in their contradictory movements.134 These two opposed 
logics of reproduction constitute a further, final moment of the subsumptive 
relation, played out at the level of the social totality, completing the series of 
opposition, contradiction and subsumption between capital and labour: use-
value/value; labour-process/valorisation process; social reproduction 
process/capitalist reproduction process. 
In Capital, however, labour’s reproduction appears as a systematic 
necessity posited in abstractly functionalist terms as a calibrating principle of 
accumulation, ‘the absolutely necessary condition for capitalist production’.135 In 
both its ‘productive’ and ‘unproductive’ moments labour’s activity seems to be 
absorbed within the capitalist totality: 
From the standpoint of society, then, the working class, even when it 
stands outside the direct labour process, is just as much an appendage of 
capital as the lifeless instruments of labour are. Even its individual 
consumption is, within certain limits, a mere aspect of capital’s 
reproduction.136 
Marx demonstrates this in his reproduction schemas at the end of volume two of 
Capital, where insofar as the working class purchase the means to reproduce 
themselves back from the capitalist class with their wages, their consumption 
appears within capital’s life-process as one if its essential conditions (the means 
of realising surplus-value). Marx therefore brackets the independent existence of 
living-labour, reducing its reproduction to the functions it fulfils for the 
reproduction of capital. In one sense, this is entirely fitting with the standpoint of 
the capitalist totality, which reduces the worker to ‘nothing more than labour in its 
being-for-itself’, i.e., the labour-power commodity.137 But the ‘certain limits’ 
mentioned above by Marx are crucial in opening the system to an independent 
qualitative dimension beyond capital’s unilateral control and direct interest, 
because whilst the capitalist must cede a wage to the worker in order to ensure his 
or her reproduction they do not directly oversee that reproduction. Unlike the act 
of exchange which effects the formal metamorphosis of money-wages into means 
                                                          
134 Cf. Chapter 2 of this thesis; Echeverría, La Contradicción Entre el Valor y el Valor de Uso en 
El Capital de Karl Marx.  
135 Marx, Capital vol. 1, p. 716. 
136 Ibid, p. 719. 
137 Marx, Grundrisse, p. 304. 
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of subsistence and commodity-capital into money-capital, the act of 
‘unproductive’ consumption itself, which Marx described in 1857 as the 
‘destructive antithesis to production’, is a moment of praxis which occurs outside 
of the circuit of capitalist accumulation. This is why Marx argues that it ‘actually 
belongs outside economics’.138 
This peculiar structure of consumption as both independent of direct 
capitalist command but simultaneously a ‘fait social’ is vital for thinking the how 
the dynamic of subsumption operates at the level of reproduction (i.e., in the 
contradiction between the society conceived as a practical totality and society 
conceived as an abstract-economic totality). This is because the unproductive 
consumption through which the labour-power commodity is reproduced 
physiologically (as a bundle of nerves, muscles, organs, etc.. capable of abstract 
social labour), is also a process of production that involves the qualitative 
formation of the potentially resistant subjectivity which capital strives to both 
utilise and subjugate in its mission to self-valorise. There is thus an ‘invisible 
thread’ of continuity linking the struggles over production with the reproductive 
processes that lie outside of the economic domain, which is to say, linking 
labour’s use-value and value aspects. As an extensive materialist-feminist 
literature forcefully argues, it is thus crucial to mitigate Marx’s tendential value-
reductionism when it comes to the question of labour’s subjectivation through 
consumption (a reductionism that contrasts starkly with his vivid accounts of 
subjectivation through subsumption in production) and to situate the conflicts 
over capitalist subsumption both within and beyond the bourgeois economic 
totality, a ‘totality’ whose self-sufficient unity is an ideological illusion (this also 
opens the problem of subsumption up to vast literature on consumption, social 
welfare and the culture industry).139 The process of consumption cannot, of 
course, be dissociated from the economic logic determining the production of the 
                                                          
138 Ibid, p. 89; Ben Fine notes the theoretical space opened by this caesura in capitalist control: 
‘how do we account for the flexibility in consumption that is a necessary consequence of the value 
of labour-power being realised in money form (that is, take-home pay and not a bundle of 
goods)?’, Ben Fine, ‘Debating Lebowitz: Is Class Conflict the Moral and Historical Element in the 
Value of Labour-Power?’, Historical Materialism 16 (3), 2008, p. 109. 
139 For an overview of some of the foundational positions cf. Materialist feminism: a reader in 
class, difference, and women's lives, edited by Rosemary Hennessy and Chrys Ingraham, New 
York: Routledge, 1997; for a recent contribution to the debate cf. the articles collected in the 
dossier ‘Gender and Capitalism: Debating Cinzia Arruzza’s “Remarks on Gender”’, Viewpoint, 
May 4, 2015: https://viewpointmag.com/2015/05/04/gender-and-capitalism-debating-cinzia-
arruzzas-remarks-on-gender/ 
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practical objects through which it is realised, or from the circulatory flows 
determining the distribution and accessibility of those objects, but it must be 
recognised that the qualitative dimensions of subjectivation cannot be registered 
in quantitative value terms alone, and require a theoretical mediation that 
‘correlates’ economic movements with the underlying non-economic processes 
that shape the subjectivity of those who labour for and against capital. At this 
level considerations of the role of the state are essential, given that capital’s mode 
of existence is founded on an inner drive to negate the conditions of labour-
power’s reproduction by reducing them to an absolute minimum whilst extracting 
the absolute maximum surplus-labour (it ‘lives the more, the more labour it 
sucks’).140 Marx shows that Capital would indeed have begun annihilating the 
working class in Britain if they had not resisted and, ultimately, the state had not 
stepped in secure their reproduction by legislative means. Here too, the state 
presents a sphere of social action external to the organic system of bourgeois 
production (if not independent of it) and yet at the same time absolutely 
presupposed by it. 
The principal problematic surrounding the subjectivity of labour is that of 
the relation of living workers to their own labour activity, a relation at stake in so 
many of the key moments of Marx’s critique: ‘original accumulation’, fetishism, 
abstract labour, personification, commodification, subsumption. For Marx, this 
relation only emerges as problematic in the first place by virtue of the dissociation 
of the worker and their labour produced by the historically specific conditions of 
‘separation’ in which capitalism predominates: 
Already the fact that it is labour which confronts capital as subject, i.e. the 
worker only in his character as labour, and not he himself, should open 
the eyes. This alone, disregarding capital, already contains a relation, a 
relation of the worker to his own activity, which is by no means the 
‘natural' one, but which itself already contains a specific economic 
character.141 
                                                          
140 Marx, Capital vol. 1, p. 342. 
141 Marx, Grundrisse, p. 310. This dissociation of intentionality and productive capacity is the 
most acute expression of the separation of subjective and objective elements of production and 
their economic synthesis: ‘It is not the unity of living and active humanity with the natural, 
inorganic conditions of their metabolic exchange with nature, and hence their appropriation of 
nature, which requires explanation or is the result of a historic process, but rather the separation 
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Marx explores this relation at the level of the commodity (where the labour-power 
commodity is the bearer of labour as use-value) and production (where concrete 
labour is the bearer of abstract labour) – but what precisely occurs with this 
relation at the level of reproduction (where the living workers are the ‘practical 
bearers’ of capitalist social production process)?142 Here, as Lebowitz argues, 
‘what underlies the struggle against capital and drives beyond capital is the 
contradiction between the worker’s self and her conditions of life.’143 That is, the 
capacity of living labour, as an individual and speculatively as a class, to assert its 
own being in manner that opposes, exceeds and transcends its status as the mere 
bearer of a ‘substance’ that is ‘seized upon’ by capital in production.144 There, 
where the worker ‘no longer belongs to himself but to capital’, a specific set of 
conflicts and mediations are in play, but these are dependent upon the obverse 
moment in which the worker reproduces their own capacities as well as the 
reproduction of an overall context in which labour exists as a substance for 
capital¸ both of which introduce different but connected sets of conflicts and 
mediations. The overall articulation of all of these processes within a capitalist 
framework is one defined by the practical dissociation of the capacity to act, to 
shape reality according to a conscious plan, from the living bearer of that 
capacity, the subject of that plan. This why Marx asserts that: 
at the level of material production, of the life-process in the realm of the 
social – for that is what the process of production is – we find the same 
situation that we find in religion at the ideological level, namely the 
inversion of subject into object and vice versa.145 
This movement of inversion is built into the dynamic of subsumption, driving it 
and at the same time shaping it, and thus implying a constant and changing 
process of subjectivation (or, we might even say, de-subjectivation). On one side 
the productive subject enters into the production process, where it struggles to 
assert itself against the capitalist command that would reduce it to mere object, 
bare capacity to work, on the other the subject enters the contiguous sphere of 
consumption where its intentionality faces no direct capitalist control, but is 
                                                                                                                                                              
between these inorganic conditions of human existence and this active existence, a separation 
which is completely posited only in the relation of wage labour and capital.’ Ibid, p. 489. 
142 Cf. Marx, Capital vol. 3, p. 957. 
143 Lebowitz, Beyond Capital, p. 154. 
144 Marx, MECW vol. 30, p. 274. 
145 Marx, Capital vol. 1, p. 990. 
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nonetheless constrained by that which has already been decided in production, the 
practical form inscribed within the body of the product as a use-value. 
This movement of de- and re-subjectivation takes on a distinctively new 
configuration where the dynamic of subsumption asserts itself in production in its 
‘real’ form. With real subsumption the bind between the reproduction of capital 
and the reproduction of labour is both intensified and qualitatively transformed, 
because the two circuits are not simply bound together through mutual economic 
dependence (as formal subsumption implies) but materially interpenetrate at the 
point at which the products of a properly capitalist mode of production enter into 
the consumption of the working class. Marx theorised this in terms of the relation 
between real subsumption and relative surplus value – which can only be 
produced once the goods consumed by the working class lower in value, thereby 
reducing the ‘necessary’ part of the working day. As the effects of real 
subsumption are ‘socialised’, passing through mediated circuits of reproduction 
they assert themselves economically in terms of the ‘value’ of labour-power. But 
the effects of this movement cannot be registered in economic terms alone, 
because it implies not only a transformation of the material and social mode of 
production, the means and manner of labour, but also, as a result, an entirely 
transformed product which provides the objective social context in which the 
subjectivity of the working class is formed as well as realised.146 Here the 
development of the productive subject and development of the capitalist economy 
interpenetrate, because as the ‘density’ of capitalist subsumption intensifies, it 
produces decisive effects at the level of human needs and capacities, just as it 
does at the level of total social capital: 
The production of relative surplus value, i.e. production of surplus value 
based on the increase and development of the productive forces, requires 
the production of new consumption; requires that the consuming circle 
within circulation expands as did the productive circle previously. Firstly 
quantitative expansion of existing consumption; secondly: creation of new 
                                                          
146 This also points to the irreducibility of formal and real subsumption to absolute and relative 
surplus-value, despite their interconnection. There is a different idea of relation at stake (material 
and political, rather than economic) as Patrick Murray notes: ‘the categories of formal and real 
subsumption force the question – where the correlative terminology of absolute and relative 
surplus value does not – 'subsumption of what under what'. The only answer to the question 'under 
what?' is under a specific social form, notably, capital.’ ‘The place of ‘The results of the 
immediate production process’ in Capital’, p. 174. 
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needs by propagating existing ones in a wide circle; thirdly: production of 
new needs and discovery and creation of new use values. In other words, 
so that the surplus labour gained does not remain a merely quantitative 
surplus, but rather constantly increases the circle of qualitative differences 
within labour (hence of surplus labour), makes it more diverse, more 
internally differentiated.147 
The subjectivity of labour therefore evolves in parallel with the expanded 
development of capital but it is not reducible to it, generating a non-linear 
dynamic irreducible to the reproduction of capital or labour alone, but grounded 
reciprocally in the movement of the two cycles. 
The inner connection posited between the composition of capital and the 
composition of the worker is therefore bound up with the question of productive 
forces and capitalist technology. Marx clearly identifies a strong correlation 
between the technical dimension of real subsumption and the formation of the 
worker’s subjectivity, as demonstrated in the previous chapter. In this sense the 
dynamic of capitalist subsumption moves contradictorily with respect to living 
labour. On the one hand it constantly strives to increase the productive powers of 
labour through a technification of the labour process and the development of the 
productive forces, whilst on the other it represses – as a condition of this 
technification being at the same time a means to increase the valorisation of 
capital – the subjective dimension of living labour that asserts itself in the 
conscious regulation of its metabolism with nature. This conscious regulation is 
displaced by managerial, scientific and technical forms of control which 
determine the realisation of labour over and against the subjective intentions of 
the workforce. The contradiction, however, appears in a one-sided, mystified 
form so long as the technical-economic aspects of real subsumption pertaining to 
the reproduction of capital enclose and displace the socio-natural aspects 
pertaining to the concrete form of living labour’s social reproduction, because as 
Echeverría argues: 
The effectiveness of the instrumental field is not reducible to its productivity; 
this is only its quantitative determination – the degree to which the global 
instrument enables the subject to dominate or transform nature. Effectiveness 
                                                          
147 Marx, Grundrisse, p. 408. 
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is the qualitative content of productivity; it establishes an entire defined 
horizon of possibilities of form for the global object of production and 
consumption. In this sense, in presenting certain possibilities of form and 
leaving aside others, in being ‘specialized’ in a determinate axiological 
direction, the global effectiveness itself possesses a particular form, which 
rests upon the technological structure of the instrumental field.148 
Grasped as a qualitative totality, the process through which society reproduces 
itself not only endows the objects and in turn the subjects of practical life with a 
specific form, but also shapes the form-giving process itself, constituting 
reproduction as a process of ‘self-activity’ through which the subject transforms 
its own social being via the mediation of its activity upon the object.149 The 
dynamic of subsumption introduces a specific logic of domination internal to this 
form of historical action, by dissociating the capacity to determine the form given 
to the product of labour from the labour which forms it. With real subsumption 
this dissociation becomes a material-technical fact, insofar as the objective 
structure of the instrumental field increasingly presupposes (within ‘certain 
limits’) social reproduction on a capitalist basis.150 Real subsumption therefore 
                                                          
148 Echeverría, ‘Use-value: Ontology and Semiotics’, p. 31. 
149 'When we consider bourgeois society in the long view and as a whole, then the final result of 
the process of social production always appears as the society itself, i.e. the human being itself in 
its social relations. Everything that has a fixed form, such as the product etc., appears as merely a 
moment, a vanishing moment, in this movement. The direct production process itself here appears 
only as a moment. The conditions and objectifications of the process are themselves equally 
moments of it, and its only subjects are the individuals, but individuals in mutual relationships, 
which they equally reproduce and produce anew. The constant process of their own movement, in 
which they renew themselves even as they renew the world of wealth they create.’ Marx, 
Grundrisse, p. 712. 
150 This effects of this on the internal composition of productive subjects are profound, if highly 
variable. In very general terms, Echeverría describes the way in which capital: ‘[rebuilds] not only 
the means of production and their technical consistency, but also the subject of production. It does 
this according to its own capitalist “project”, that is, a project that pursues the total subordination 
of social life under the insatiable demand of economic value to increase its magnitude. The 
capitalist mode of production fashions or pieces together a peculiar type of human being, 
according to its need for suitable caretakers of capitalist wealth; this is a human being 
characterized mainly by a way of life founded on a productivist self-repression (entsagung, opfer), 
one who has completely interiorized the mercantile [i.e., capitalist] trend to surplus-value 
productivity. For him living in capitalism and living for capitalism are the same thing. The homo 
capitalisticus is the human being that has followed the imperative demanding or “calling” coming 
from capital; that has subordinated himself to the gravitation of capital on the human subject of the 
reproduction-process, precisely that gravitation identified by Max Weber as the “spirit of 
capitalism” (der geist vom kapitalismus).’ Echeverría, ‘“Blanquitud.” Considerations on Racism 
as a Specifically Capitalist Phenomenon’, 2009: 
http://www.bolivare.unam.mx/ensayos/Considerations%20on%20racism.pdf [Accessed Oct 
2015]; Negri too emphasizes the co-parallel evolution of capitalist and proletarian composition, 
although as an isomorphism tracing linear stages of subsumption: ‘The other subject, the working 
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operates as a mechanism of indirect capitalist regulation of the social 
reproduction process (and so by implication, of subjectivation) that complements 
and supports the direct forms of capitalist regulation active in production 
(although not without a certain degree of practical ambivalence, given that the 
transformations of the instrumental field effected by capital function necessarily 
but not exclusively to reinforce exploitation and accumulation, other uses and 
abuses of that field may indeed be possible). This is the sense in which Marcuse 
argued that ‘technology has become the great vehicle of reification – reification in 
its most mature and effective form’, a thought taken up by Krahl as the imperative 
to transform the critique of political economy into a ‘critique of political 
technology’.151 
 
The generative dynamic 
 
The key to grasping the openness of the dynamic of subsumption at the level of 
the social reproduction process lies in the double character of subsumption as at 
once a formal metamorphosis and at the same time an ‘underlying’ process of 
material synthesis. Marx’s analysis of subsumption in production offers an 
incredibly rich theorisation of the processes and techniques of material synthesis 
through which the valorisation of capital is effected by means of a capitalist 
controlled labour process. But Marx conceptualises the transformative dynamic 
resulting from that synthesis, which is not only driven by class conflict but also 
necessarily exceeds production and is mediated through the entire social process, 
only from the standpoint of an abstract logic of total social capital’s expanded 
reproduction. This leads Marx to characterize the dynamic of subsumption 
functionally, as a ‘spontaneous’ effect of accumulation, when he claims that a 
‘specifically capitalist mode of production [i.e., real subsumption] arises and 
                                                                                                                                                              
class subject, must emerge, since capitalist subsumption does not efface its identity but just 
dominates its activity; this subject must emerge precisely at the level to which the collective force 
of social capital has led the process. If capital is a subject on one side, on the other labor must be 
a subject as well. Above all, it must be a subject modified by its relation with capital. In the 
successive process of the subsumptions, capital modifies the class composition, driving it to ever 
higher degrees of unity under and within its domination.’ Marx beyond Marx, p. 123. 
151 Herbert Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man: Studies in the ideology of advanced industrial 
society [1964], London and New York: Routledge, 2007, p. 172; Krahl, ‘The Philosophy of 
History and the Authoritarian State’ [1971],  translated by Michael Shane Boyle and Daniel 
Spaulding, Viewpoint, September 25, 2014: https://viewpointmag.com/2014/09/25/the-
philosophy-of-history-and-the-authoritarian-state-1971/ 
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develops spontaneously on the basis of the formal subsumption of labour under 
capital’.152 As Das rightly notes, however, ‘the transition to real subsumption with 
associated technological change is not automatic, but is a protracted process, 
mediated by class struggle which occurs in the context of a whole host of factors, 
including capitalist state interventions.’153 It is the conflicts between living agents 
– both capitalists and workers – unfolding amongst all of those economic and 
extra-economic factors that ultimately determines how the dynamic acts upon the 
social and material factors of production, and therefore how it reshapes the 
reproduction process as a whole.154 These conflicts are basic to capitalist 
reproduction and therefore the dynamic is always active, but despite this it cannot 
                                                          
152 Marx, Capital vol. 1, p. 645. 
153 Das, ‘Reconceptualising capitalism’, p. 179. Das explores this idea with reference to a number 
of case studies that are of note because of the importance of working class resistance and state 
interventions in shaping the dynamic of subsumption. E.g., ‘in the 1960s and the 1970s, rice fields 
owned by capitalist farmers were the hotbed of agrarian class tension in Kerala. Supported by 
multiple unions, including those organized by communist parties, laborers launched political 
action demanding higher wages and better working conditions including an eight-hour day. 
Agrarian capitalists responded by retrenching workers, many of whom had worked for them on a 
long-term basis. They resorted to casualization of employment. They used tractors to reduce their 
dependence on laborers. Workers often reacted by forcibly harvesting rice. They were supported 
by the pro-labor governments in power which refused to intervene on behalf of capital in labor 
disputes. In Kuttanad area (in Allepey district), the rice bowl of Kerala, laborers even broke up 
some tractors. This was reminiscent of the Luddite movement Marx talks about in Capital. Unions 
themselves would send in a large number of laborers to farms to complete the harvest in a few 
hours. Farm owners gradually lost control over the process of recruiting laborers.’ P. 189. 
154 Considered on a social scale, new determinations and problems pertaining to the dynamic arise 
that are not evident at the level of the immediate production process, where distinct forms of 
subsumption (formal, real, hybrid) are analytically separable and empirically identifiable. For 
example, the socially regulative effects of the practical objects produced under conditions of real 
subsumption enter into and thus impact upon subjects, processes and spheres of social activity 
well beyond the productive zones in which they originate. This means that real subsumption in 
one enterprise, branch of industry or region can – and indeed necessarily does – affect other 
production processes where formal or hybrid forms operate. This is why the distinction between 
subsumption-forms lose their explanatory power beyond the immediate production process, and 
must be articulated as components of a dynamic that functions at the level of the reproductive 
totality. As interconnected moments of the dynamic, hybrid, real and formal subsumption can be 
deployed as ‘flow concepts’ that express and explain difference across time and space, therefore 
forming the basis for a critical investigation into the ‘weave of articulations’ regulating the 
composition and relations uniting productive sectors, populations, practices and institutions. Here 
the subjectivising effects of capitalist subsumption can be registered, even in the absence of direct 
capitalist command, at the level of the opposed but interlocking systems of capital and labour’s 
reproduction. (I borrow the idea of ‘flow concepts’ from Patrick Murray, who uses them in 
relation to absolute and relative surplus-value. The basic point, that the concepts tell us more 
about changes than about static states, holds here for the different forms of subsumption employed 
by capital in the immediate production process. Rather than limiting them to materially or 
historically descriptive concepts the different forms should be internalised within a dynamic 
conception of the process of reproduction-development that constitutes the third and final site of 
capitalist subsumption. Cf. Murray, ‘The Social and Material Transformation of Production by 
Capital: Formal and Real Subsumption in Capital, Volume I’, in The Constitution of Capital 
Essays on Volume I of Marx’s Capital, Edited by Riccardo Bellofiore and Nicola Taylor, 
Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004, p. 248.) 
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be translated into a deterministic teleology or schema of material development, 
because that development is only ever a secondary effect of the struggle over 
valorisation and accumulation, which is the real content of capitalist 
development.155 Capital must accumulate, but how it does so and the wider 
material effects of this imperative cannot be given at such a high level of 
abstraction. To translate this injunction into a technical teleology is to mystify the 
real motivations unconcealed by the theory of capitalist subsumption, as 
Echeverría argues: 
The theory of subsumption conceives of the apparently natural development 
of modern technology, together with that which would be, on one side, its 
essential effect – the 'perfection' of the productivity of labour – and, on the 
other, it's 'incidental' effect – the destruction of the producer-subject as well 
as of nature -, as a process that, far from proceeding from the spontaneously 
progressive need to apply the advances of science to production, is rather set 
loose by a regressive social necessity, that of perfecting the exploitation of 
the labour force.156 
 The dynamic of subsumption does not thus primarily denote technological 
change (although this is its most pronounced and tangible manifestation) but 
rather expresses the multiple strategies capitalists deploy against workers in order 
to try and maximise exploitation and reproduce their capital in expanded form. 
There is no doubt that capitalist subsumption is characterised by immense 
advances in the technical complexity and force of production, at least at certain 
points in global chains of production, but it is quite feasible – particularly where 
the cost of labour is low – that the dynamic inhibits or excludes technical 
advances in production, as ‘property owners can respond to class struggle against 
formal subsumption by way of reinforcing formal subsumption and/or introducing 
hybrid subsumption (which includes mercantile-usury based exploitation).’157 So 
against the widespread assumption, highlighted by Chakrabarty, ‘that “real” 
capitalism means “real” subsumption’, Das argues that ‘it is the absence of the 
logic of real subsumption that contributes to the specificity of these [less 
                                                          
155 ‘Political Marxists’ have also emphasized this point with reference to the transition debate: ‘the 
systematic drive to revolutionize the forces of production was result more than cause.’ Wood, The 
Origin of Capitalism, p. 67. 
156 Echeverría, ‘En este número’, p. 2. 
157 Ibid, p. 179. 
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developed] societies as capitalist societies’.158 The flexibility with which the 
dynamic of subsumption affects the social relations and material configuration of 
production within the frame of global capitalist accumulation means that it is 
never purely transitional in the sense of progression to specified state, but rather 
inscribes productive units (whether individual enterprises, regions, industries, 
etc.) within an internally differentiated reproductive totality engaged in a constant 
process of development. 
So whilst the dynamic of subsumption presupposes unceasing social 
transformation and, where real subsumption is in effect, brings about ‘a complete 
(and constantly repeated) revolution’ in social conditions, the transformative 
force of the dynamic cannot be adequately comprehended at the level of closed 
logical-systemic discourse, because it is not an abstract repetition but an 
expansive, changing, historical movement. Here the model of knowledge based 
on an organic totality – ‘the special laws that regulate the origin, existence, 
development and death of a social organism and its replacement by a higher one’ 
– breaks down and Marx’s caution regarding the limits of the dialectical form of 
presentation become salient.159 The importance of consumption (considered in the 
widest possible sense) and the processes of subject formation proper to it in 
determining the conflicts over subsumption and therefore the course of historical 
development highlights not only the internal incompleteness of Capital as a 
system, but its extensive dependency on another system, that of the life of labour 
(not to mention the presence of a political-institutional apparatus at both the 
national, international and transnational levels which supports and guarantees the 
reproduction of its basic premises). ‘Capitalist society’, understood in this way is 
not a single systematic totality, but must be comprehended as an (at least) double-
sided, contradictory articulation of opposed but interlocking reproductive systems 
with conflicting ‘logics’ of existence. In the course of its own realisation, then, 
the accumulative logic of the bourgeois system must interact with historically 
specific conditions, practices and institutions in order is to satisfy its own 
(logically required) conditions of expanded reproduction. The concrete content of 
this interaction is generated both in its intensive and extensive movement; the 
                                                          
158 Dipesh Chakrabarty, Provincialising Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference,  
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000, p. 50; Das, ‘Reconceptualising Capitalism’, p. 185 
(my emphasis). 
159 I. I. Kaufman, cited in Marx, Capital vol. 1, p. 102. 
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deepening of control and productivity of those regions of the social process 
already entwined within the circuits of capital and the colonisation of new spaces, 
populations, practices and resources. But in both directions there is no 
accomplished or ‘normal’ state of subsumption and the possible paths of 
development are as vast as they are uneven. The interpenetration between 
capital’s logic and its historical development can therefore no more be derived 
from a closed logical system than from ‘a general historico-philosophical theory’, 
as Marx argued in his famous letter to the editors of Otecestvenniye Zapisky.160 
The dynamic always points beyond its linear-logical structure and demands a 
critical engagement with the conjunctural specificity of social forms and 
struggles. Marx’s later writings and correspondence indicate an increasing 
recognitions of the limits of systematic closure and the need for empirical 
sensitivity, as well as a methodological orientation toward the spheres of 
externality that disrupt the self-sufficiency of capital as an ‘organic system’ and 
place the question of development (which is implied in and in turn implies 
reproduction) firmly in the field of a complex amalgam of ‘realities’ whose 
conjunction is contested. He arrived at this standpoint, Tomba argues, ‘by making 
an idea of the development of the forces of production interact with the concrete 
responses of history; that is to say, the histories of the struggles that, interacting 
with the atemporal historicity of capital, co-determine its history.'161  
An open, interactionist approach to the way in which the dynamic of 
subsumption connects production and reproduction shatters all stagiest and 
teleological assumptions regarding capitalist historical development. Through this 
perspective, more and less ‘developed’ capitalist regions do not appear as more or 
less ‘complete’, they are simply those regions whose reproduction has been 
subject to a greater duration and/or intensity of formation by capital’s logic of 
accumulation (including the sense in which the very spatial basis of that 
reproduction is accordingly altered thus modifying the regional character in 
question for example from intersocietal to international to transnational modes of 
differentiation and interaction). The development of such regions therefore bears 
more traces of this formation, and the processes of subsumption (specifically of 
                                                          
160 Marx, Letter to the editor of the Otecestvenniye Zapisky, 1877, translated by Donna Torr: 
https://marxists.anu.edu.au/archive/marx/works/1877/11/russia.htm [accessed Feb 2016]. 
161 Tomba ‘Historical Temporalities of Capital: an Anti-Historicist Perspective’, Historical 
Materialism 17 (4), 2009, p. 46. 
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commodification and capitalist production techniques) are more virulent, more 
entrenched within the reproductive logic of the social body (i.e., the conjunction 
of a system of productive capacities and a system of consumer needs).162 This is 
the sense in which Marx talks of capital driving beyond ‘all traditional, confined, 
complacent, encrusted satisfactions of present needs, and reproduction of old 
ways of life’.163 But emptied of teleological significance, this should not imply 
that pre-existing practices and forms of social existence are simply ‘erased’ or 
replaced by fully-developed capitalist forms of life. Capital, as the accumulation 
of abstract wealth, posits no use-value content directly, as Echeverría contends:  
Indispensable as it is to the concrete existence of modern social wealth, 
capitalist mediation cannot assert itself as an essential condition for its 
existence, nor can it synthesize a genuinely new figure for it. The totality 
shaped by it, even when it really does penetrate the process of 
reproduction and is expanded as one of the technical conditions of this 
process, is the result of a forced totalization. It maintains a contradictory 
polarity: is constituted by the relations of integration or subordination of 
"natural wealth" under a form imposed on it.164 
The dynamic of subsumption introduces a logic of social recomposition into the 
production process, but only by wrapping itself around, redeploying and 
reinventing those ‘figures’ of life which it encounters and runs up against. In 
doing so, these aspects of the social process are mutated, deformed, suppressed or 
intensified, inverted or abolished. But in whichever way the gradual and 
progressive re-shaping of this content unfolds, it nonetheless does so in a manner 
that depends upon and works within this social substance and its crystallised 
historical elements, which form the indispensable medium of capital's realization. 
As the mediating role of capital within the reproduction process becomes socially 
                                                          
162 Cf. Kratke, ‘On the History and Logic of Modern Capitalism: The Legacy of Ernest Mandel’, 
p. 123: ‘Marx did not just refer to a difference in terms of more or less here; there is a qualitative 
change involved, the ‘higher’ form being, in fact, something else and something more complex, 
more complicated – even more prone to inherent ‘contradictions’. Although Kratke does also pose 
this in somewhat teleological terms: ‘The higher the level of capitalist development, the closer one 
gets to the very end of this specific economic system.’ Marx certainly believed that capitalist 
production ‘leads towards a stage at which compulsion and the monopolization of social 
development (with its material and intellectual advantages) by one section of society at the 
expense of another disappears’, but whether this ‘leading’ can be compressed into a linear 
developmentalism is questionable. Marx, Capital vol. 3, p. 958.  
163 Grundrisse, p. 410. 
164 Echeverría, ‘Modernity and Capitalism (15 Theses)’. 
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dominant it progressively recodes the practical significance (social actuality) of 
those elements, functionally form-determining them according to the social logic 
of abstract accumulation. Capital thus forces an ever greater dependency upon its 
accumulative mediation which superimposes itself upon and subsumes the use-
value content of social reproduction, giving rise to Mendoza’s ‘weave of 
articulations’ as it reshapes the economic and technical basis of reproduction in a 
process that is both globally integrative and locally generative.165 This is 
something Giacomo Marramao has emphasized, against the idea that capital is a 
purely homogenising force, claiming that even ‘the current phase of modialisation 
[…] is characterised by an ambivalent structure, signalled by the paradoxical 
coexistence of two aspects: technical-scientific uniformity and ethical-cultural 
differentiation.166 In this sense we can analytically separate and critically think 
together the forms of direct regulation integral to the dynamic of capitalist 
subsumption (commodification, supervision, technification) and those locally 
determined ideological and epistemic forms, structures of law, politics, violence 
and pleasure, etc. with which the dynamic interacts, giving rise to the diverse 
realisations of capitalist social reproduction and the differential distribution of 
economic functions at a global level. In so-called ‘advanced’ regions, then, the 
subsumptive dynamic can simply be seen to have penetrated the ‘elementary 
civilizationary substratum’ of reproduction with a greater ‘density’, generating a 
deeper process of conflictual development marked by this ‘contradictory 
polarity’. This indicates, however, no greater proximity to either the perfection or 
supersession of that mediating dynamic, because that which we have come to 
know as capitalist ‘society’ and ‘culture’ is only an effect of this contradiction in 
its unfolding and deepening, without a coherent ‘holistic’ or ‘internally’ 
programmatic logic of overall development (that is, a developmental logic that 
could be given ‘purely’ either at the ‘cellular’ or ‘organic’ level). This practical 
                                                          
165 As Marcus Taylor argues: ‘While capital may indeed seek to rewrite social life to further the 
cause of ‘endless accumulation’, it does not do so – to twist a famous maxim – in conditions of its 
own choosing… I prefer to talk of capital as a process that constantly inhabits, remakes, and is 
fundamentally remade in its interactions with institutional forms, regimes of value and alternative 
temporalities that have their lineage in other histories and modes of being.’ Marcus Taylor, 
‘Histories of World Capitalism, Methodologies of World Labour,’ 2010: http://www.eisa-
net.org/be-bruga/eisa/files/events/stockholm/Taylor%20-
%20Histories%20of%20World%20Capitalism.pdf [accessed April 2015]. 
166 Giacomo Marammao, The Passage West: Philosophy after the age of the nation state [2003], 
translated by Matteo Mandarini, London and New York: Verso, 2012, p. 214. 
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incoherence of accumulation and its subsumptive mechanisms is especially 
evident in capital’s propensity to produce non-development in tandem with its 
immense technical advances, and, in its most extreme expressions, non-
reproduction: surplus population, crisis, environmental destruction, war and 
death. That tankers dump grain into the oceans, entire towns lie uninhabited and 
the cost of life-saving medications is arbitrarily inflated whilst human populations 
are denied the right to reproduce for lack of property or exploitability testify to 
the brute fact (summarized in the ‘general law of capitalist accumulation’) that 
capital, whilst commanding the greatest productive powers yet known to human 
civilisation, resolves them in the blind compulsion to incessantly reproduce social 
reality as a scene of ‘absolute artificial scarcity’.167 At the same time however, the 
dynamic of subsumption cannot but give rise to new means, needs and forms of 
intercourse which point beyond the limited framework of capitalist forms of 
reproduction. The struggle over and against subsumption is not only a struggle to 
protect those subjective and objective elements that have not yet been absorbed, 
but also a struggle to redeem those that bear the greatest mark of this society, to 
provide them with new forms and functions within social reality by giving that 
reality itself a new form. ‘It is as ridiculous to yearn for a return to that original 
fullness’ Marx reminds us ‘as it is to believe that with this complete emptiness 
history has come to a standstill.’168 
 
Conclusion 
 
At stake in capitalist subsumption conceived on ‘a social scale’ is the conflict of 
two opposed and contradictory ‘logics’ of reproduction vying to determine the 
possibilities of social action and thereby the course of historical development. As 
a virulent mediation, capital imposes itself upon and within the social 
reproduction of living labour and its lifeworld, interrupting the practical-material 
correspondence between production and consumption with its abstract 
productivist agenda. In this way, Marx notes, ‘only capital has subjugated 
historical progress to the service of wealth’, by displacing the logics of form-
determination proper to the multitude of social elements and reproductive 
                                                          
167 Echeverría, ‘Modernity and Capitalism (15 Theses)’. 
168 Marx, Grundrisse, p. 162. 
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configurations drawn into the orbit of capital’s life-process and subjecting them to 
the exigencies of accumulation.169 This process of displacement, absorption and 
formation, however, demarcates a field of tension marked by struggle and 
impugnation, a process that in the course of its own realisation is torn between the 
two opposed imperatives: production for the sake of living or living for the sake 
of production. The struggle is not only over the possibility, degree, quality and 
balance of reproduction, but also over the development and transformation of that 
which is reproduced. But if reproduction and development are both given, the 
question is how? And to what end? Here is where the dynamic comes into force 
as a key concept, drawing the boundaries of integration/transcendence where the 
conflict over the form-determination of the social process itself plays out. This is 
a contested developmental process that is far from ‘complete’, ‘total’ or ‘absolute’ 
in its social reach and effects, but rather constitutes the base of the ongoing 
conflicts characterizing the reality towards which a theory of capitalist 
domination must orient itself. A critical engagement with this reality must remain 
open to the complexity and changeability not only of the particular forms of 
command and exploitation in production but to the relation between those discrete 
sites of subsumption and the compositional totality that conditions and is 
conditioned by them, the entire ‘weave of articulations’ regulating the force field 
within which these struggles play out. Here the theory must mitigate the systemic 
impulses to totalisation that would enact closure upon the process either 
diachronically (as the historical completion of labour and society’s real 
subsumption) or synchronically (as the reproductive self-sufficiency and unity of 
a logically complete capitalist system). Rejecting such closure opens the way for a 
far more fruitful engagement with an actively disputed social reality, in which the 
idea of a dynamic of subsumption can be deployed in order to make sense of the 
specific forms, regulatory mechanisms and general configurations of domination 
shaping that reality in disperse and varied ways. Sensitivity to the fluidity and 
incompleteness of the dynamic also immanently indicates further spheres of 
critical engagement, not only intensively, at more concrete levels of empirical and 
historical engagement, but across other social ‘sites’ and ‘logics’ that modulate 
                                                          
169 Ibid, p. 590. 
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and co-determine the forms and motions taken by the reproductive process, most 
obviously: politics and state powers, race and gender.170 
Registered at this level capitalist subsumption takes on a third form, 
following subsumption via commodification and subsumption in production, 
corresponding to the subsumption of the social reproduction process under the 
process of capitalist accumulation. This develops the opposition between use-
value and value contained in the commodity, and the opposition of the labour 
process and the valorisation process synthesized in production, into the opposition 
between the two principle dimensions of reproduction in modernity: that 
concerned with the production and consumption of material wealth that sustains 
the historical existence of human civilization (what Echeverría terms the ‘natural 
form of social reproduction’) and that concerned with the production and 
accumulation of abstract wealth (expanded capitalist reproduction).171 Like the 
other dyads, these two aspects form a ‘contradictory unity' in which a relation of 
subsumption overdetermines the determinate connection between the two 
opposed poles. At each successive level of mediation and concretion, the 
capitalist pole strives to subsume, control and ultimately refound the material 
dimension proper to living labour. These two modes of comprehending the social 
                                                          
170 To take one recent allusion to this co-determination: ‘Arguably, “race” has never been 
deployed so variably nor constructed so contingently and quixotically in the subordination of truth 
to power and life to death as it has since the beginning of the long downturn of the 1970s and its 
heightening into global recession and industrial restructuring in the 1980s […]. One cannot, 
therefore, understand surplus populations without understanding how the geographical dynamics 
of accumulation have become increasingly racialized. Nor can one understand the shifting forms 
of racialization without taking into account the hierarchical regimes of reproduction that constitute 
them.’ Michael McIntyre and Heidi J. Nast, ‘Bio(necro)polis: Marx, Surplus Populations, and the 
Spatial Dialectics of Reproduction and “Race”’, Antipode 00 (00), 2011, p. 2. 
171 ‘The theoretical nucleus of the Marxian critique of political economy resides in the affirmation 
that the process of economic life in the modern epoch – of the production, circulation and 
consumption of its social wealth – is ruled, in a schizoid manner, by the simultaneous validity of 
two different strata of necessity that contradict one another with distinct grades of radicality. The 
first of these strata of necessity would be that which is generated in the ‘natural form’ of social 
existence, which is to say, in the scenario where wealth is constituted by use values, produced or 
not produced, that reproduce and consolidate the life of society by interconnecting the concrete 
historical system of consumption needs that it experiences with the equally historical concrete 
system of production capacities that it has at its disposal. The second of these strata, superimposed 
upon the first, would be that which is generated in social existence as commercial [mercantil] 
existence, which is to say, in the scenario where the elements of social wealth only have validity 
in the play of exchanges of one for another, given that the reproduction of human life, converted 
into a private matter, appears identified with the triumph of each particular commodity in its 
competition with the others to realise on the market, in an profitable manner, the value that it 
claims to have by virtue of the objectified Labour which is in it.’ Echeverría, Circulación 
Capitalista y Reproducción de la Riqueza Social, Apunte crítico sobre los esquemas de K. Marx, 
Mexico City: UNAM, Facultad de Economía / Quito: Nariz del Diablo, 1994, p. 12. 
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reproduction process as a systematic totality do not, however, form an exhaustive 
‘ontological’ distinction, they do not correspond to two ‘realities’, but are posed 
by Marx as the basis for his deconstruction of political economy and the 
spontaneous ideology of equilibrium and liberty that is generated by capitalist-
market social relations. Insofar as Marx’s critical theory is anti-functionalist, it is 
because it destroys the apparent coherence, stability and naturalness of capital as 
an ‘organic system’ by demonstrating the tension of this system with the other 
system, that of the production, circulation and consumption of wealth in its 
‘natural form’ (a system which is already constituted in the tension between its 
social and natural levels of existence, as I argued in chapter 2). As Capital strives 
to subsume productive activity under its command and logic it progressively 
internalises and transforms the content of this human substratum (its ‘substance’), 
but this subsumption, as the crucial mediating point of transition between the two 
poles, occurs within a given context – the reproductive framework that unites both 
aspects in a contradictory totality. It is this framework, in all its concrete historical 
determinations and possibilities that is revealed by the deconstruction of the 
apparent capitalist totality.172 
This means understanding the actuality of the subsumptive dynamic 
beyond (although not in separation from) the purely ‘economic’ and in light of the 
multiple relations of power, collectivity, opposition and action through which the 
                                                          
172 Although there is a contradiction between the expanded reproduction of capitalist wealth and 
the reproduction of practical wealth and an irreducibility of either system or its forms to one 
another, Marx makes a revealing statement when he claims in vol. 2 of Capital that ‘money in 
itself is not an element of real [capitalist] reproduction’ but must be transformed into additional 
productive capital, ‘new social wealth’, if ‘real accumulation, an expansion of production’ is to 
occur (pp. 565-7). Here we see that the opposition and subsumption between the two systems is 
fundamentally registered (although not fully comprehended) at the level of the practical 
composition of the social totality. In this sense the most fundamental question posed as a result of 
Marx’s critique of political economy seems to be how and it what form practical wealth is (and 
indeed might be) organised, distributed and consumed within the social life process, considered as 
a process of both reproduction and development. Elsewhere Marx too asserts the need for a 
material analysis at the level of the reproductive totality: ‘As long as we were dealing with 
capital's value production and the value of its product individually, the natural form of the 
commodity product was a matter of complete indifference for the analysis, whether it was 
machines or corn or mirrors. This was always simply an example, and any branch of production 
whatever could equally serve as illustration. What we were dealing with then was the actual 
immediate process of production, which presented itself at each turn as the process of an 
individual capital. In so far as the reproduction of capital came into consideration, it was sufficient 
to assume that the opportunity arose within the circulation sphere for the part of the product that 
represented capital value to be transformed back into its elements of production, and therefore into 
its shape as productive capital, just as we could assume that worker and capitalist found on the 
market the commodities on which they spent their wages and surplus-value. But this purely formal 
manner of presentation is no longer sufficient once we consider the total social capital and the 
value of its product.’ Marx, Capital vol. 2, p. 470 (my emphasis), c.f. also p. 508. 
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dynamic is constituted within a social process marked by tension and conflict. At 
this level the actualisation of the dynamic reveals itself to be dependent upon a 
specific configuration of economic and political relations, forcing the question of 
political form and crucially of the unity of economic power(s) and state power(s) 
which act as the basis for the constitution and reproduction of capitalist 
domination. This is implicit in the realisation of the dynamic on a social scale and 
points to ‘the need to elaborate the links between changes in the capitalist labour 
process and changes in class composition, in political structures, in the role of the 
capitalist state (in education as much as the economy) and in interstate 
relations.’173 Crucially the state here emerges as the arbiter of class struggle and 
ultimately as the unifying agent that guarantees the correspondence of the 
reproductive cycles of capital and of living labour, stabilising and synchronising 
their contradictory unity as well as regulating their internal dynamics.174 But 
conceived non-instrumentally the state and its geopolitical foundations constitute 
a further site of reproduction-development that is equally subject to historical 
transformation and reinvention. This site is drawn back into the dynamic of 
capitalist subsumption, just as it regulates and enables it, because whereas 
previous historical forms of political power determined production, in capitalist 
society production and competition uniquely shape the material and economic 
basis of political forms and relations. This is particularly evident in light of the 
increasing spatial disjunction between the reproduction of capital, labour and 
political form in the shape of the state. If political form structures the spatial and 
juridical basis for reproduction, the technical, logistical and communicative 
transnationality of capital is increasingly undermining the capacity of the state to 
exert itself as the dominant agent of that form, suggesting a fluidity and 
ambivalence within the reproductive configuration at the level of its spatial unity 
and coherence. This points to the need for a less static and far more multiplicitous 
conception of powers traversing and regulating the movement of the subsumptive 
                                                          
173 Brighton Labour Process Group, ‘The Labour Process’, p. 23. 
174  ‘The state’s intervention in conflicts is an instrument that aims to monopolise violence and 
neutralise conflicts, not simply to look after the affairs of one class. Given the fact that, in some 
historical periods, there may be conflicts between different segments of the ruling classes, and 
between these and other non-proletarian and not fully synchronised sectors, like smallholders and 
declassed middleclass strata, what emerges is a conflict between political temporalities that may 
have different outcomes. The state-mechanism attempts to synchronise these temporalities, even 
by using asynchronous temporalities against each other.’ Tomba, Marx’s temporalities, pp. 167-8. 
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processes that form the ‘vertebral column of modernity’, recalling Foucault’s 
assertion that ‘society is in reality the juxtaposition, the link, the coordination and 
also the hierarchy of different powers that nevertheless remain in their 
specificity’.175 The theory of a dynamic of subsumption offers a perspective from 
which to think the presence of capitalist domination within this dense 
constellation of powers, as the central ‘moving contradiction’ around which all 
other oppositions and conflicts within the social process turn. This should not be 
considered as a unilateral hierarchy of influences, but rather as a synthetically 
underdetermined framework through which to think the combination of multiple 
forms of exploitation and resistance within a practical reproductive totality. 
Breaking with the linear exposition of subsumption forms at the analytic level of 
reproduction, and deploying a dynamic conception of capitalist development in its 
place is, in this way, as essential to a coherent understanding of the emergence of 
capitalist production as it is to grasping its current composition and the 
possibilities of action immanent to it. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                          
175 Jorge Veraza, Subsunción Real del Consumo Bajo el Capital, Mexico City: Itaca, 2008, p. 10; 
Michel Foucault, ‘The Mesh of Power’ [1976], translated by Christopher Chitty, Viewpoint, 
September 12, 2012: https://viewpointmag.com/2012/09/12/the-mesh-of-power/ ‘First, what we 
may find in the second volume of Capital is that one power does not exist, but many powers. 
Powers, this means forms of domination, forms of subjugation that function locally, for example 
in the workshop, in the army, on a slave plantation or where there are subservient relations. These 
are all local and regional forms of power, which have their own mode of functioning, their own 
procedure and technique. All these forms of power are heterogeneous. We may not, therefore, 
speak of power if we wish to construct an analysis of power, but we must speak of powers and 
attempt to localize them in their historic and geographic specificity.’ 
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Conclusion 
 
The three engagements with the problem of subsumption from which this thesis 
departs all share the same critical impulse: to register the actively mediated 
structure of an apparently immediate presence or objective reality and to explore 
the relations and processes by which that mediation occurs as a subsumption of 
diverse elements under a universal order or set of principles. In every case this 
involves rejecting the ‘classical’ view that subsumption has a merely logical 
content and validity, that it is an empty or formal category. Instead, a ‘critical’ 
approach to subsumption uncovers the synthetic content of the logical identity it 
lays claim to in the tautological relation between universal and particular. What is 
revealed in each case is that productive relations and processes play a decisive 
form-determining role whose significance is not locally limited to the individual 
elements that are subsumed, but also underpins the global consistency and unity 
of the systematic totality within which they occur, thus mediating the constitutive 
relation between discrete forms, the mechanisms of formation and the 
‘compositional totality’ within which they are all inscribed. Wherever 
‘heterogeneous’ elements and orders are brought into relation, these underlying 
processes of schematisation, synthesis and ordering are always required to 
produce their logical identity and systemic coherence. Methodologically, we can 
thus trace the parallel strategies that lead Kant to uncover an ‘art concealed in the 
depths of the soul’, Hegel to trace the ‘labour of the negative’ and Marx to 
descend into the ‘hidden abode of production’, all in search of the dynamic, active 
processes and relations that subsumptively produce the coherence and objectivity 
of the apparent by subjecting diverse elements to universal principles of 
adaptation, correlation and transformation. In every case, however, simply 
identifying the discrete processes of unification and form-determination – as the 
action of some universal upon a set of particulars – proves to be insufficient, 
because the very possibility of this formative relation lies in a structurally 
overdetermining context in which the subsumed and subsuming elements or 
orders are both inscribed. Despite their heterogeneity, the multiple orders of being 
must co-exist in a shared medium whose structural unity governs the specific 
relations of ‘production’ pertaining to those subsumption acts through which 
individual elements are formed according to a ‘global order’. At the same time, 
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the significance of the subsumptive processes themselves are shown to constitute 
the actuality of that global medium, the totality of composition. There is thus a 
reciprocal determination between the processes of subsumption and the systemic 
structure in which they takes place – each grounds the possibility of the other. At 
the core of the ‘critical’ concept of subsumption, then, lie two interlocking 
processes: 
(1) The specific acts of form-determination that give conceptual unity and 
determinacy to a range of diverse particulars, according to a ‘universal’ 
order or system of principles. 
(2) The ordination and unification of those subsumptive processes and 
their results within a structured compositional totality that is the ground of 
their possibility but at the same time constituted only in and through them. 
If this is the shared framework through which Kant, Hegel and Marx all 
employ subsumption as a ‘critical’ concept, they nonetheless differ in how the 
structure and effects of the relation between these two levels or processes are to 
be conceived. For Kant subsumption is grounded in a structure of reflexive 
closure (transcendental subjectivity) which acts as a fixed and undeveloping 
structure of unity within which both concepts and intuitions are ‘composed’, and 
it is precisely by virtue of this that they can be related subsumptively. For Hegel 
subsumption is posited as both a moment and immanent function of a totality of 
dialectical development, where the reflexive closure of Kantian apperception has 
been transformed into a processual, stadial concept of subject, whose relational 
structure is transformed as it overcomes its own contradictions. Here the 
compositional totality is no longer indifferent to the determinate ‘empirical’ 
content produced within it, but rather only exists in and as the unity of this 
content with its conceptual form, in their various structural configurations of 
reciprocity. This also indicates a transition from a parallel series of universals – a 
synchronically fixed set of ‘pure’ concepts – to a serial sequence of subjective 
structures that are immanently connected in their diachronic development. It is in 
the course of this development that Hegel decouples the compositional totality 
grounding form and its systemic function from the finite standpoint of an isolated 
consciousness and generates an intersubjective and ultimately social-relational 
theory of composition and subsumption. This, on the one hand, opens the 
possibility of thinking the fluid, changing relation between form and totality, but 
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at the same time, on the other hand, encloses it within a speculatively totalised 
developmental series from whose standpoint subsumptive relations are registered 
as partial and inadequately developed, mired in the stasis of a posited unity of 
elements whose opposition has not been sublated. 
Marx is the first thinker to break – if inconsistently – with the idealist 
closure of subsumption and composition, which are in his writings no longer 
modelled on a reproductive structure of self-same reciprocity (as with Kantian 
apperception) nor on the developmental structure of a self-perfecting ideal subject 
(as with Hegel’s Concept). By dialectically mediating systemic reproduction and 
development through one another with his materialism of the social reproduction 
process, Marx rejects any self-identical unity to the compositional process as a 
whole that would impose synchronic or diachronic closure upon it. Instead, it is 
characterized by a radical openness at the level of history and disjunction at the 
level of structure that was lacking in either Kant or Hegel’s ideally circumscribed 
totalities. There is still an essential reciprocity between acts of subsumptive form-
determination and the systemic structure that grounds them – namely human 
social being, in actu and as the ensemble of relations that determine it – but this is 
a dynamic, changing and unstable reciprocity that cannot be established at the 
level of a universal or ahistorical theoretical discourse, only delimited by 
acknowledging that social reality necessarily occurs as a practical process of 
production and consumption. The concept of subsumption is in this way 
connected to a logic and immanent dynamic of social forms and the metabolic 
synthesis underlying their actuality (that is, to ‘natural-history’) without reducing 
them to an ideal schema of totality or development. Marx’s key modification to 
the critical concept of subsumption therefore comes with his dislocation of the 
subject of composition (that which produces or determines form) and the 
composed/compositional totality (the sphere in which form has its reality and 
basis, and in which its ‘formation’ proceeds). This dislocation means that whilst 
each is always conditioned by and constituted through the other, their correlation 
can nonetheless only be grasped historically and in a multitude of diverse modes, 
rather than essentially, according to a fixed order of being from which both the 
particular and the universal would derive their specific characteristics and 
systemic function. 
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Marx’s theory of the ‘subsumption of labour under capital’ is the result of 
concretising this historically open theory of social form-determination and 
structural reciprocity (as ‘subsumption under relations of production’) with 
reference to their specifically capitalist articulation. Despite the partial repression 
of the theory resulting from the ‘provisional’ closure of Capital, it is of central 
significance to a critical social theory in that it allows us to think through the 
problem of capitalist power exactly at the points of ‘integration’ (as well as 
resistance to it) at which the being, activity and reproduction of living labour is 
determined as an aspect of capital’s life-process. By reflecting critically on these 
moments and processes of ‘integration/transcendence’ as well as their specific 
forms and contradictions, this perspective avoids the theoretical functionalism 
that would either reduce labour’s concrete agency to an already-internal or 
secondary aspect of capital’s ‘dialectical totality’ or assert labour’s absolute 
ontological independence as a vital reserve simply ‘captured’ by an increasingly 
obsolete capitalist command. Instead, subsumption is the key category of 
mediation through which the volatile and contested nature of the social process 
and the struggles to determine its specific and general forms of existence can be 
grasped. This is something Bolívar Echeverría noted in the mid-1980s: 
The concept of subsumption has a special importance with respect to the 
core of Marx’s critical discourse – that is to say, the theory of the 
contradiction between the socio-natural process of 
production/consumption and the socio-capitalist process of the 
valorization of value. It is the most advanced attempt made by Marx to 
show in general theoretical terms the way in which those two 
contradictory processes are articulated.1 
Taking the reproduction process as the ‘compositional totality’ through 
which this contestation is played out as well as a site in which its effects are felt, 
we find that subsumptive articulation operative at three core levels, in which the 
opposition between value and use-value adopts ‘distinct moments of presence’ or 
‘different figures’.2 In each moment the opposition is suspended or repressed 
subsumptively, marking a threshold of integration/transcendence, a development 
                                                          
1 Echeverría, ‘En este número’, Cuadernos Politicos 37, p. 3 (my emphasis). 
2 Echeverría, La Contradicción Entre el Valor y el Valor de Uso en El Capital de Karl Marx, pp. 
26-7. 
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of the contradiction into a ‘deeper’ form (which is to say, a form that affects more 
fundamentally the social reproduction process as a whole). 
(1) Firstly, there is a subsumption of wealth in its ‘natural form’ to 
generalized commodity exchange and money relations that allows it to enter into 
economic relation with capital, and actualizes the value-form of that wealth as a 
specifically capitalist dimension of social objectivity. Here the contradiction is 
manifested in the opposition between use-value and exchange-value internal to 
the commodity, and the subsumption of the former under the latter that occurs 
within the sphere of circulation. Through commodification capital and labour are 
posited as relatable and commensurable, even as mutually presupposing, within 
the compositional totality of bourgeois commercial society. Central to this process 
is the formal determination of living labour within the value-form as the labour-
power commodity, which presupposes historical and ongoing forms of ‘so-called 
primitive accumulation’ as well as the generalisation of a legal apparatus of 
property relations that together constitute a field of economic signification within 
which the ‘spectral objectivity’ of value is constituted as actual. It is this extra-
economic production and maintenance of economic relations that generates the 
conditions for labour’s subsumption in production: the separation of productive 
subjects from both one another other and the ‘practical object’ of their labour 
(means of production) and their subsequent re-articulation as a result of 
commodity exchange.  
(2) Secondly, there is a subsumption of labour (qua activity) under capital 
(qua self-valorising value) which occurs via its direction and exploitation in the 
sphere of production. Here, once the sale and purchase of labour-power has taken 
place, the contradictions of exchange are suspended and a new set of 
contradictions emerge in the opposition between the labour process and the 
valorisation process. The conflict over labour’s integration and transcendence in 
production are primarily expressed in the application of capitalist command 
designed to ensure that labour, in addition to generating use-values also pumps 
out surplus-value that capital can appropriate. This occurs a) in the form of direct 
interpersonal supervision (what Marx termed ‘formal subsumption’) and b) 
through the technical recomposition of the labour process such that it valorizes 
capital with an ever greater efficacy and certainty (what Marx termed ‘real 
subsumption’) as well as c) the use of ‘hybrid forms’ in which direct capitalist 
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command is absent but labour nonetheless produces surplus-value for capital via 
alternative forms of economic exploitation. 
(3) Thirdly, there is a subsumption of the ‘great total process’ of social 
reproduction under the movement of expanded reproduction proper to total social 
capital. This occurs as a mediated effect emanating from the distinctive capitalist 
synthesis of (1) and (2), through which society itself, grasped as a practical 
(compositional) totality, comes to be objectively and subjectively form-
determined by capital as the aggregate result of the activity of a multitude of 
competing private producers. But whilst capitalist subsumption is here operative 
on a social scale, it is neither final nor complete, nor does it simply represent a 
quantitative extension of the same basic processes found in (1) and (2). Rather, 
new contradictions and forms of mediation emerge at this totalised level (e.g., 
consumption, political institutions, etc.) thus generating a dynamic of 
subsumption, connecting and co-ordinating the specific instances of form-
determination in circulation and production. The subsumption of reproduction 
under accumulation is not direct but rather mediated through this dynamic, which 
expresses the openness and conflict-ridden opposition between the life-process of 
social individuals and the life-process of capital.  
The key to understanding the full subsumption of labour under capital, 
then, lies in grasping the ways in which it is (1) commodified, rendering it a 
formally exchangeable good subject to economic circulation and purchase by 
capital; then (2) how it is that capital commands and transforms the labour 
process in order to make it also function materially as a valorization process, 
rendering it productive – ‘forming’ (Bildung) Marx says – of surplus-value. The 
conjunction of these two different acts, finally, effects (3) a subsumption of 
labour’s life-process as such (as a socially reproductive totality) under capital (as 
a self-expanding ‘automatic subject’). These three moments of subsumption 
outline the process of value’s autonomisation – from a form of economic 
mediation & social objectivity, to a medium of exploitation and domination, to 
the ‘automatic subject’ of the social process that progressively negates human 
autonomy and the ‘basic politicity’ proper to the reproduction process. The reality 
of capital’s ‘real abstractions’ is not thus reducible to a discrete moment or act 
(e.g., exchange, as for Adorno and Sohn-Rethel) but traverses and develops across 
the entirety of the reproduction process in a series of different forms and through 
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a number of distinct but interconnected processes. Each level of subsumption 
involves the functional form-determination of an aspect of labour by capital: 
functional determination within the circulation process, functional determination 
within the production process, functional determination within the reproduction 
process. Of these levels, it is (2) that really constitutes the heart of capitalist 
domination, as the moment in which social individuals are directly subordinated 
and the constituting, transformative powers of human practice are commanded to 
serve the end of capital, functionally determined as productive of surplus-value. 
All three are by necessity co-implicated in the capitalist social relation, but (1) 
and (3) are simultaneously both conditions and effects of the essential process of 
exploitation that occurs in (2), around which all other moments of the social 
process are structured.  
Grasped as a dynamic, this active reciprocity between the conditions, 
effects and compositional totality can all be thought together such that, for 
example, direct forms of subordination in production are immanently connected 
to forms of subjectivation occurring through consumption, culture, political 
interventions, etc. If this extension of the theory complicates our understanding of 
capitalist subsumption by following the network of relations by which its 
realisation interpenetrates with the action of states, the working class (in its 
reproduction as well as its ‘obstinate but elastic’ presence within the production 
process) and other non-economic forces (surplus populations, ‘nature’) it 
nonetheless does so in a way that brings the theory closer to the overarching 
problem that circumscribes every Marxist theoretical engagement – that of the 
revolutionary transformation of social conditions. The dynamism of this theory 
allows a recognition of the central role played by mechanisms of subsumption 
within the ‘logic of the body politic’ in capitalist society, without reducing its 
presence to an ideal or unilateral schema that would foreclose (or guarantee) the 
possibility of historical rupture. However, that openness is dependent upon 
adopting a critical stance that is not purely ‘systemic’ or capital-centric, but rather 
works deconstructively in and against the apparent unity and coherence of the 
bourgeois system in order to unconceal and interrogate the conflictual processes 
underlying labour’s subsumption. If we refuse theoretical closure, then this 
deconstruction cannot simply aim to grasp an objective totality of relations 
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determining the truth of social experience (in either the mode of a Kantian 
apperception or Hegelian ‘Erinnerung’). As Max Tomba argues: 
‘It is not a case of giving merely an objective representation of the 
processes currently underway. We have to understand the subjective 
insurgencies that disarticulate the process, because the political task is to 
re-articulate them on new foundations.’3  
But this does not mean adopting the ‘standpoint’ of labour or working class as 
historical subject (as Postone has criticized it). Nor does it mean adopting the 
unmediated standpoint of a politicized field of singularities (as Adorno, Negri and 
Deleuze do in different ways, all advocating new but ultimately hollow theoretical 
categories of relation – affinity, rhizome, etc. – as if emancipation depended on 
‘balancing concepts’). It rather means taking the standpoint of the contradiction, 
syntheses and antagonism subsisting within the logical identity of universal and 
particular, of departing from the real conflicts that delimit the actuality and 
possibilities of form in order to both comprehend and overcome them. 
The point of this critical endeavour, then, is not simply to ‘complete’ or 
‘refine’ Marx’s ‘system’ with a ‘missing’ theory of subsumption. Marx’s thought 
is partial in many respects and whichever stance one takes on ‘planned work’ in 
full, the point would not be for us to fill in the blanks but rather to extend, apply 
and rework his insights in relation to the situation within which we find ourselves 
and therefore to sustain the status of Marxism as revolutionary discourse. Because 
the critical concept of subsumption points beyond the completeness and 
coherency of a closed totality, instead identifying the point of tension and 
antagonism between heterogeneous levels or orders of actuality, it opens up any 
systemic discourse to real conditions and their contradictory character. This 
insight allows us to reconnect the critical-deconstructive moment of Marx’s 
discourse (the ‘detour of theory’ that pierces through surface appearances of 
social phenomena and their cohesion) with the materialist impulse to situate 
knowledge in the ‘force field’ of real conditions as a practical response to the 
demands, needs and limits of those conditions, the crystallisation of thought in a 
‘moment of danger’.4 The theory of subsumption thus situates itself at the 
                                                          
3 Tomba, ‘Historical Temporalities of Capital’, p. 46. 
4 Negri makes a consonant point in his commentary on the Grundrisse: ‘Notebook M elaborates 
explicitly the method of determinant abstraction, the method of the tendency, the method of 
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multiple points of tension at which the conflict over integration and transcendence 
is played out between capital and labour and thus connects the action of 
theoretical critique to a revolutionary horizon by focusing on how the inner logic 
of capitalist accumulation is articulated with the social life process as a 
permanently unstable and generative process of domination. The combination of 
systemic and anti-systemic impulses contained in this dynamic approach affirms 
Jairus Banaji’s insight that: 
In the dialectical method of development the movement from abstract to 
concrete is not a straight-line process. One returns to the concrete at 
expanded levels of the total curve, reconstructing the surface of society by 
'stages', as a structure of several dimensions […] And this implies, finally, 
that in Marx's Capital we shall find a continuous 'oscillation between 
essence and appearance' […] Yet there is a point at which this movement, 
the very development of the concept of capital, breaks down in Capital as 
we have it today. There is a point at which the 'form of enquiry' is no 
longer reflected back to us in the dialectically perfected shape of a 'method 
of presentation'. To say this is only to say that Marx's Capital remains 
incomplete as a reproduction of the concrete in thought.5 
Most importantly, the theory insists that the ‘presentation’ of a revolutionary 
theory cannot be determined without reference the global composition of social 
practices and subjectivities, and in doing so remains rigorously materialist in 
orientation. Unlike in closed idealist totalities where actuality and concreteness 
can be theoretically determined according to systemic place and function, here the 
concrete has its axial point in the practical context of struggle that synthesizes the 
already constituted amalgam of congealed historical forms with those to-be 
constituted (and therefore necessarily multiple and fragmented) or in-constitution 
(and therefore necessarily ambivalent) within an open process of reproduction-
                                                                                                                                                              
historical materialism; the research embodied in the Grundrisse is the first application which 
grafts the materialist method onto a refined dialectical practice. The synthesis of the two 
dialectical forces is open in every sense. On the one hand, dialectical reason intervenes in the 
relation between determination and tendency, it subjectifies the abstraction, the logical-heuristic 
mediation, and imposes on it a qualification and historical dynamic. On the other hand, the 
materialist method, in so far as it is completely subjectivized, totally open toward the future, and 
creative, cannot be enclosed within any dialectical totality or logical unity. The determination is 
always the basis of all significance, of all tension, of all tendencies. As for the method, it is the 
violent breath that infuses the totality of the research and constantly determines new foundations 
on which it can move forward.’ Marx Beyond Marx, p. 12. 
5 Banaji, ‘From the Commodity to Capital’, p. 40. 
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development. The centre of gravity of the dynamic darstellung emanates from 
this process, measuring the actuality of form by its adequation to the 
revolutionary movement it supports. In this sense the function of critique would 
be to deconstruct the surface forms of capitalist society in order to bring the 
essential constituting practice of agents into conscious interconnection with their 
understanding of, and therefore action within, that society. This is the 
revolutionary horizon of Marx’s critique and the theory of subsumption contained 
within it. But it is not a purely negative or demystifying procedure, because in the 
course of the critique positive conceptual knowledge is generated in its real 
connection with practice. Subsumption is thus, at this further level of concretion, 
situation at the interstitial point of negative and positive critical knowledge: 
negative, in relation to the economic categories in which oppression appears in 
distorted form as market fate, and positive in relation to the real processes of 
practical activity and interconnection through which society reproduces itself.
 Even conceived dynamically, however, at the level of generality it has 
been presented here, a ‘theory’ of subsumption cannot replace the more concrete 
engagements needed to grasp these specific articulations but only lead into them 
by mediating the ‘systematic’ discourse with ‘historical’ one in order to negate 
closure by means of the dynamic and thus orient the knowledge of ‘general laws’ 
toward real conflicts. The theory of subsumption is not simply a pillar within an 
expanded ‘Marxist system’ but a framework for further critical research and 
engagement. Many more questions and problems remain open and in need of 
development on the basis of the dynamic. In what way, for example, can we 
rethink the relationship between individuality and subjectivity in light of 
historical and geographical developments in the configuration of capitalist 
subsumption? The paucity of Marx’s comments on the state too leaves a huge 
field of enquiry that Marxism has yet to adequately engage, one that is key for 
grasping the conditions under which the dynamic is unfolding, both at a national 
level and differentially in the relations between and across polities. If the 
challenge for critical social theory is not to advance toward systematic 
completeness but to reinforce its historical relevance and operability then the 
production of new questions and problems such as these will be a positive rather 
than negative symptom. 
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